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Abstract 
This thesis aims to critically examine the relationship between post-socialism 
and post-Marxism, between a historical context opened by the collapse of `really 
existing' socialist states in Eastern Europe, and a theoretical shift fashioned upon the 
idea of the immanent demise and overcoming of Marxist theory. The thesis is split into 
two parts. In the first part, my aim is to trace, through a detailed assessment of the 
writings of Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser - and also via the examination of the 
relationship between the two thinkers -a specific development of the problem of the 
`superstructures' in Marxist theory, of questions of politics, the State and ideology. If 
Gramsci, in his conceptualisation of the politics of hegemony, and in his attempt to 
reformulate Marxism as a `philosophy of praxis', pushes the issues of the theoretical 
and practical autonomy of revolutionary politics to the very limits of Marxism, then 
Althusser represents a further radicalisation of Gramsci. Arguing against a post-Marxist 
call for a `return from Althusser back to Gramsci', and especially against the attempt, 
such as can be found with Laclau and Mouffe, to reinterpret the Gramscian problematic 
through a revalorisation of the fundamental concepts of the liberal-democratic tradition, 
I argue for a need to reassess the singularity of Althusser's philosophical contributions 
to Marxism, and for their importance for a contemporary reinvigoration of Marxism. In 
this sense, I place particular stress on two moments in the theoretical apparatus of 
Althusser: a) his conception of philosophy as an act, or an intervention - which seems 
as a powerful solution to the question of `practicality of thought', to the injunction to 
`change the world' philosophically, without a reduction of philosophy to a simple 
servant of political practice and its immediate ideological objectives; and b) his 
theorisation of politics, or, more exactly, of the specificity of revolutionary politics, 
which Althusser is at pains to extract and separate from the `autonomy of the political', 
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that is, to render heterogeneous to the general, `autonomous', sphere of the Law, of the 
State and of ideology. With Althusser, the true question of the autonomy of politics can 
only come via a radical negation of the `autonomy of the political', and, at the same 
time, through an affirmation of an irreducible singular dimension of political 
practice. In the second part of the thesis, I focus more concretely on the historical 
context of post-socialism, whilst drawing from the field of theoretical problems opened 
by the previous discussions of Althusser, Gramsci and post-Marxism. In this, I attempt 
to demonstrate that a certain rethinking and revitalisation of Marxism, and namely, of 
Althusser's contributions, seems as a necessary part of a critical confrontation with the 
post-socialist political, ideological and socio-economic realities. In the three analyses of 
the second part, I focus on some of the symptomatic moments of what I call the post- 
socialist political reason: a) the precise historical role of post-Marxist theory in the 
genesis of post-socialist reality, which I read via an examination of the political 
significance of Laclau and Mouffe's notion of hegemony in the context of the Slovenian 
Spring of the late 1980s; b) the relationship between liberal-democracy and nationalism, 
and in this, the specific structural dialectic of violence internal to the liberal State as a 
historical form, which I read against the paradoxes of `democratisation' in the context 
of the break-up of Yugoslavia; and c) the effects of the fetishism of legal categories and 
of the general tendency to reduce politics to Law in the post-socialist ideological 
`spectrum, which I contrast to the singularity of the revolutionary politics of Yugoslavia. 
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Criticism itself does not require any further understanding of this 
object, for it is already clear about it. Criticism is no longer an end- 
in-itself, but simply a means. The essential force that moves it is 
indignation and its essential task is denunciation. 
Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction 
(1844) 
In the countries of the East, as those of the West, the history of 
politics commences. It barely commences. The ruin of all statist 
presentation of truth opens this commencement. Everything 
remains to be invented. 
Alain Badiou, Of an Obscure Disaster: On the End of the Truth of 
the State (1998) 
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Introduction: After 1989 
The year 1989 opens an odd chapter in history. A chapter of historical oddities. 
For that which we commonly refer to as post-socialism is a particularly odd historical 
state. What is it exactly that begins with 1989? If we look at the question a bit more 
carefully, we cannot avoid noticing the paradoxical play on time that history presents us 
with here. Every beginning is difficult, as one philosopher famously remarked, but 
beginning for the post-socialist situation seems to be particularly neuralgic. This is a 
very peculiar beginning. A beginning which seems already one step behind itself, 
already one step in the past. How does post-socialism begin? The troubles of the post- 
socialist beginning begin already at the level of nomination. As its proper name shows, 
the post-socialist situation bears an immense mark of the past. The mark of an end. The 
beginning of post-socialism, its historical inception, immediately presents itself as an 
end, a beginning in and through an end: the end of socialism, the end of communism. 
But is this end, this negativity towards the past, all there is here? Is post-socialism 
simply an announcement of something that ended, something that passed? Because, one 
might also ask: what is it that begins properly speaking, after the end? Is there 
something that post-socialism can claim as its own outside of the simple fact of the 
negation of its anteriority? But, then again, is there a beginning here in the first place? If 
we look even closer, we can see that it is not simply the past that haunts the beginning 
of post-socialism. It is also the future. For there seems to be no end to the beginning of 
post-socialism. If it is already displaced in the past, behind itself, post-socialism seems 
to be also immediately ahead of itself: in a state of anticipation, a state of suspension. 
Before we can see it being properly formed, before we can see it taking a shape of its 
own, the historical essence of post-socialism seems to already run ahead of the eye's 
gaze. Its entire consistency is projected into a certain future tense, into a promise of the 
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future. The social scientists have aptly demonstrated this fact - not without a certain 
dose of embarrassment - when they meticulously measured the vectors of the post- 
socialist `transition', thus providing the scientific bases for the ideological constructions 
of neo-liberal capitalism. ' 
Not anymore, not yet: post-socialism presents itself as a temporal caricature. It 
presents itself as a floating historical state, stranded between negation and anticipation, 
between the past and the future. We are all familiar with the catchwords here. The 
`escape from communism', the end of `really existing socialism', the collapse of 
authoritarian apparatuses, the end of stagnating economies, on the one hand. On the 
other, that irresistible desire for `liberalisation', for `privatisation', for `democracy', the 
teleology of economic growth and social stability under the auspices of the laissez faire 
market model, but also, the promises of `Europe' and of the inclusion into the global 
circuits of the capitalist economy. 
But what can we say about the post-socialist present? How can we talk about the 
actuality of this historical situation? The problem here is that post-socialism, from 
within itself, in terms of its own `self-consciousness', seems unable to offer any positive 
responses to this question. As soon as it is interrogated about its present, about its 
actuality, the post-socialist consciousness starts playing an endless game of 
displacements, constantly shifting the question back and forward, constantly pointing 
s 
either to what it is not any longer, to its supposed break with the past, or to what it is not 
just yet, to what it ought to be. This bizarre misplacement in time reveals a striking 
feature of the historical situation that we are facing: its unconsciousness. Between the 
' Being initially formulated in terms of accounts of the political and socio-economic transformations in 
Latin America in the 1970s, `transitology' has established itself as a specific scientific domain after 1989. 
'Transitology' places the social sciences in direct service to the aims of neoliberal capitalism - 
measuring, in an uncritical way, the adequacy of the transformations to market economy, and of the 
introduction of multi-party parliamentary forms of democracy. For a meticulous study of the conjunction 
of the scientific and the ideological in the expansion of 'democratisation theory' after 1989, see Guilhot, 
Nicolas (2005) The Democracy Makers: Human Rights and the Politics of the Global Order, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
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ideological promises of its future and the traumatic encounters with its past, no less 
ideological in their form, post-socialism is a state marked by a stark ignorance of its 
own present. 
And yet it is exactly this present which addresses us, and does so in a disturbing 
manner. This is a present of momentous social transformations, of immense societal 
change, taking place on the backbone of the exacerbation of social and political 
contradictions. Whatever value we may attach to the tendencies which manifest 
themselves currently in post-socialism, one thing is certain: the content of the most 
general features of this historical situation is a rapid decline of all the important aspects 
of social and economic well-being, a rapid decline of the social manifestations of 
equality. As one commentator recently pointed out, the empirical data collected across 
the post-socialist socio-economic realm exhibits only two stable parameters: the 
increase of poverty and the rise of inequality. ' These are the immediate `costs' of the 
introduction of the free market model and its `shock therapy' into countries which were 
defined, for more than half a century, by the politics of social redistribution, 
development, equality and welfare. But, at the same time, the situation is dominated by 
a de-politicisation of all issues related to these socio-economic transformations, and to 
the economy in general. ' The dominant post-socialist political rationality thus seems to 
z Rastko Moýnik draws upon an authoritative source, the extensive empirical research underlying the 
Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe and the CIS 1999, conducted under the 
auspices of the United Nations Development Programme. He observes: "In all post-socialist countries, 
gross domestic product per capita (GDP) has sharply declined after 1991; in Central and Eastern Europe, 
GDP was falling until 1994 to reach the index 65 (1991 being 100); afterwards, the trend stabilised and 
reached the index slightly over 75 in 1997; in the Baltic region, the fall was sharper (index 43 in 1994), 
and the stabilisation after 1994 was on a much lower level (slightly above 50 in 1997); in the former 
Soviet Union (the Commonwealth of Independent States), the decline was still continuing in 1997 when 
the index was around 50". From this, Mo6nik concludes: "The increase in inequality is a uniform feature 
in all post-socialist countries". See "Tranzicija in dru . 
bene spremembe na Balkanu" ("Transition and 
social change in the Balkans") in: Mo6nik, Rastko (2003), Teorija za politiko (Theory for Politics), 
Ljubljana: Zaloiba *cf. pg. 70-73. See also "The World Economy at the Beginning of 1998", taken from: 
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report for Central and Eastern Europe 
and the C/S 1999, United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 
IN. B.: All non-English translations in this thesis are my own, unless noted otherwise. 
3 MoMk himself offers a particularly bleak picture of the political rationality predominant in the post- 
socialist realm: "The same thing which is in western Europe being considered as a 'civilisational' threat, 
is being exalted, in the countries enchanted by the 'transition', as the rise towards civilisation. What is 
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oscillate between, on the one hand, a too uncritical endorsement of different `apolitical' 
figures of politics, such as the rule of consensus, the rule of Law, the rule of human 
rights and juridical liberties, the rule of parliamentary procedures and forms (the same 
ones which we have seen announcing their crisis a moment ago), ' and, on the other 
hand, by a re-politicisation of culture. Witness the strange attraction in post-socialism 
with all sorts of political anachronisms, particularly those imported from the excessive 
episodes of nineteenth century nationalisms. 5 
This actuality of the post-socialist condition poses critical demands in front of 
thought. How can we think this present critically? How can we unravel the 
contradictions which define it? And, most importantly, how can we think beyond it? 
These questions, however, are not simple. They are not simple because they fold 
back upon a specific intricacy that thought encounters here. The object of post-socialism 
presents thought with a veritable difficulty. Not that it would be an object too uncanny 
to grasp. Post-socialism is a difficult object because it engages thought in a difficult 
manner: on the one hand, it provides thinking with a real impetus - due to its internal 
contradictions, its anomalies, its tensions; and yet, on the other hand, it raises an 
arresting blockade upon it. Post-socialism provokes thought, we might even say that it 
calls for it, whilst at the same time forcing it into a retreat. 
The roots of this paradox reside in a peculiar Denkverbot, as one commentator 
0 
called it, 6 that the post-socialist situation imposes. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, what 
we saw taking place almost in a uniform manner in Central and Eastern Europe, in the 
Balkans and in the post-Soviet sphere, was not simply the disappearance of all sorts of 
significant for the Balkans is that here `transition' represents itself in an orientalist manner, with the 
imperative that 'it is necessary to join Europe'. However, whilst in Europe, and elsewhere in the world, 
more and more people seem to reject the false alternative 'liberalism or barbarism', the people in the 
Balkans are being pushed by others into neo-liberal politics, as if this is going to relieve them of their 
`Balkan barbarism"'. See Mo6nik, ibid, pg. 88-89. 
' Jürgen Ilabermas was speaking of a 'crisis of legitimation' already in the early 1970s. See Habermas, 
Jürgen (1975) Legitimation Crisis, Boston: Beacon Books. 
' Boris Buden would here speak of `the society which has replaced politics with culture'. See Boris 
Buden (2002). Kaptolski Kolodvor, Belgrade: CsuB. 
6 See the introduction to Liiek, Slavoj (2001) Repeating Lenin, Zagreb: Bastard Books. 
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subjective and objective political forms which the `really existing socialisms' had 
developed in their historical domain. What we also saw taking place here was a specific 
disappearance of thought. Together with the flight of all those uncanny political figures 
proper to the bureaucratic capacity, or better, the `incapacity' of the party-States - an 
uncanny flight in itself, as these same figures immediately returned in the new robes of 
liberal-managerial technocracy - it was the theoretical figure of Marx that the year 1989 
brushed away from sight. 
This evacuation was made possible on the backbone of a simple ideological 
construction: if Marx is not passe, if he is not stomped over by the movement of history 
itself, then he is fundamentally discredited by the consequences of his own words, by 
the apparent failures of the `realisation' of his philosophy. Is Marx, and Marxist theory 
in general, not to be held directly responsible for all the dramatic disasters of `really 
existing socialisms', from the inefficiencies of the economies of the plan or the dictate, 
to the terror of the Gulag? 7 And do not these failures, at the same time, announce an 
obvious 'end of history', affirming the victory of political economy over its `critique', 
the triumph of capitalism and the market model, together with its political 
representative, liberal democracy? 
But if we are already dealing with obviousnesses, it is not difficult to notice that 
there is something gravely problematic with this construction. Frederic Jameson points 
this out with force: "Marxism is the science of capitalism, or better still, in order to give 
depth at once to both terms, it is the science of the inherent contradictions of capitalism. 
This means (... I that it is incoherent to celebrate the `death of Marxism' in the same 
breath with which one announces the definitive triumph of capitalism and the market. 
Andre Glucksmann famously retorted "Marxism generates not only scientific paradoxes, but also 
concentration camps". See his, (1975) La cuisiniere et le mangeur d'hon: mes: Essai sur ! 'Etat, le 
marrisme, les camps de concentration. Paris: Seuil. For a more subtle version of such a thesis, see the 
arguments put forward by Francois Furet in his (1999) The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of 
Communism in the Twentieth Century, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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The latter would rather seem to augur a secure future for the former, leaving aside the 
matter of how `definitive' its triumph could possibly be". 8 
The actuality of post-socialism seems to strikingly attest to this fact. Marxism, 
instead of being disputed and falsified, seems to be confirmed, even in its most `vulgar' 
forms, those of crude `economism', already at the most visible level of the 
sociohistorical processes which take place in the post-socialist domain. One of the 
central theses of the Communist Manifesto - that the State is but the bearer of the 
political power of capital - acquires a remarkable breath of new life in a situation where 
the processes of `transition' patently reveal the State as the primary instrument of the 
`primitive accumulation' of capital, with the new post-socialist governments trying to 
auction off, under the rubrics of `denationalisation' or `privatisation', the entire 
productive capacity of their societies, as if the race for profit on the marketplace is the 
sole ingredient of the social bond. 9 As Alain Badiou pointed out, what we have here, for 
the first time in the history of political struggles against capital, is an open `admission' 
of the necessary relation between the liberal-democratic sphere of politics and the 
inequalities inherent to the market economy: "The organic relationship between the 
private ownership of the means of production, between structural and radical inequality 
on the one hand, and `democracy' on the other, this is what is not anymore a matter of a 
polemic with socialist tendencies, but a rule of consensus". 'o 
4 
Judging from the level of the `obvious', from the surface, rudimentary level of 
what an analytic gaze can reveal in terms of the social and political contents of the post- 
socialist situation, Marxist theory, rather than being `exhausted', seems to be 
announcing its necessity in a quite forceful way. If we cannot go as far and assert, with 
Hegel, that what Marxism represents for post-socialism is its own `truth', the veritable 
"Jameson, Fredric (1996) "Five theses on actually existing Marxism", in: Monthly Review, April 1996,47 
(11): pg. 1 
9 See M&nik (2003) op. cit. 
1013adiou, Alain (1998) D'un dEsastre obscur: Sur la fin de la verite d'Etat, Paris: Editions de ]'Aube, pg. 
30. 
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content of the post-socialist `unconscious', then we cannot have doubts about the fact 
that Marxist theory stands for one of the fundamental elements of a critical analysis of 
post-socialism. A critical confrontation with the post-socialist present seems 
unachievable without the theoretical and political figure of Marx, without the analytical 
and political inventory of Marxist theory, in its ability not only to critically examine the 
socio-economic, political and ideological realities of capitalism, but also to formulate 
political alternatives to it. 
But if the relationship that Marxist theory displays towards the post-socialist 
situation is one of necessity, this relationship is also a relationship of impossibility. 
Because it is at this same level of `obviousness' that post-socialism discredits Marxist 
theory. It is from this same self-evident gaze, that the post-socialist consciousness, 
imbued with the Cold War ideological arsenal of anti-Marxism and anti-communism, 
seeks to falsify each Marxist statement on history, society and politics. Do not the 
failures of `really existing Marxism' in its role of the ideological cornerstone of the 
socialist States in the East attest to the necessity of this falsification? 
We have to be careful here. For this paradoxical position, and the false dilemma 
associated with it - the dilemma orienting questions such as "wither Marxism? " - is not 
only an ideological construction. It would certainly not be so tenuous were it simply an 
element on the ideological and theoretical battlefront that we inherit from the Cold War. 
The real problem is that this paradox also exists internally to Marxist theory, that it 
strikes Marxist theory from the inside, resonating all the way down to its core. 
What generally exists under the name of `post-Marxism' gives us the primary 
attestation of this fact. Post-Marxism, in general terms, represents that theoretical and 
political trajectory stemming from within Marxist theory which shares with post- 
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socialism the announcement and the acknowledgement of the `death of Marx'. " Post- 
Marxism and the post-socialist ideology alike both draw the consequences from the 
alleged `collapse' and `demise' of Marxism. This complementarity is concentrated on 
two levels. First, in line with the `evidence' of post-socialism, post-Marxism sustains 
the idea that Marxist theory has, in a general sense, lost its grip on history and on 
politics, that the analytical capacity of Marxism has entered a terminal phase of 
bankruptcy, and that we should look for something else to replace it. The paradigmatic 
assertion here seems to be the one of Laclau and Mouffe: "It is no longer possible to 
maintain the conception of subjectivity and classes elaborated by Marxism, nor its 
vision of the historical course of capitalist development, nor, of course, the conception 
of communism as a transparent society from which antagonisms have disappeared". " In 
the second place, post-Marxism also shares with the post-socialist consciousness the 
exhibit of the demise and the untenability of Marxist politics. It shares the claim that the 
inventory of political concepts which has characterised the historical fusion of Marxist 
theory and the workers' movement, especially in its centredness around the notion of 
the revolution, has been exhausted, to say at least, if not historically and politically 
compromised to the utmost. In place of the universality of revolutionary politics which 
Marxism represented, post-Marxism, participating in the post-socialist `revival' of the 
liberal consensus, proposes a diminution of the scope of politics, a diminution of its 
9 
goals, whilst also introducing a significant shift of terrain - from class struggle it moves 
us to the scene of minorities and particularistic movements, from the magnitude of the 
question of the exploitation of labour it shifts us to the intimate sphere of identities, 
" 'Post-Marxism' has in recent years become a very wide and imprecisely defined term, encapsulating a 
broad array of theoretical and political alternatives to Marxist theory, as well as a wide array of 
theoretical and ideological criticisms of Marxism. I will here try to offer a more precise reading of the 
notion, by tracing it to those tendencies which have openly identified themselves as post-Marxist, that is, 
which have, starting from some problems in Marxism, come to a conclusion of Marxism's essential 
untenability, in the light of the idea that Marxism is fundamentally incompatible with political pluralism. 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe, early Lilek, but also certain developments in Gramscian inspired social 
sciences, as we will see later, is crucial in this regard. 
12 Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics, (IISS) London: Verso, pg. 4. 
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from the provocative link which Marxism maintained between the economic sphere and 
politics, it shifts us to the more comfortable abode of the struggles in `civil society', and 
finally, from the universality and the radicality of the question of emancipation, it 
moves us towards the plurality and the finitude of particular liberties, towards the 
discourse of rights and juridical freedoms. 13 
In these general terms in which it participates in the celebration of the `death of 
Marxism', post-Marxism should nevertheless not simply be seen as a theoretical 
correspondent of the post-socialist ideological consciousness. It should be seen, 
properly speaking, as a theoretical symptom of the post-socialist condition. Post- 
Marxism is a theoretical symptom of post-socialism (if not the theoretical symptom of 
post-socialism) inasmuch as it is a theoretical reflection of a historical and political 
status quo, a reflection of a thoroughly blocked historical situation. If Marxism was the 
theoretical orientation which entertained and sustained the questions of emancipation 
and of radical political change, maintaining an organic relationship to the problem of 
the revolution, and if, at the same time, Marx's theoretical endeavour provided the 
exemplar of an uncompromising notion of critique, then the post-Marxist participation 
in the `death of Marx', and its celebration of notions of limitness, finitude, " and what 
one commentator would name an `enthusiasm of resignation', 15 represents a 
symptomatic evacuation of critical thinking: it represents that precise point at which 
thought is forced into a compromise with the `existing state of affairs'. 
" Laclau and Mouffe are again paradigmatic in this regard: "What is now in crisis is a whole conception 
of socialism which rests upon the ontological centrality of the working class, upon the role of Revolution, 
with a capital 'r', as the founding moment in the transition from one type of society to another, and upon 
the illusory prospect of a perfectly unitary and homogeneous collective will that will render pointless the 
moment of politics. The plural and multifarious character of contemporary social struggles has finally 
dissolved the last foundation for that political imaginary". (HSS, pg. 2). 
14 As Laclau would write: "We are today coming to terms with our own finitude and with the political 
possibilities that it opens. This is the point from which the potentially liberatory discourses of our 
postmodern age have to start. We can perhaps say that today we are at the end of emancipation and the 
beginning of freedom". Quoted from: Laclau, Ernesto (1996) Emancipation(s), London: Verso, pg. 18. 
"'See 2iiek, Slavoj "Beyond discourse-analysis", in Laclau, Ernesto (1990) New Reflections on the 
Revolution of Our Times, London: Verso. 
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But, at the same time, and even before being symptomatic of post-socialism, 
post-Marxism represents a symptom of Marxism itself. If something makes post- 
Marxism, or post-Marxisms possible, then this is not the victory of anti-Marxism on the 
ideological battlefront of the Cold War, nor the plain `evidence' of historical or socio- 
political facts. It is something internal to Marxism as a body of thought. Post-Marxism - 
if one could not envisage it without the specific pathos of the post-socialist 
`obviousness' - nevertheless draws its primary conditions of possibility, the seeds of its 
existence, from a space within Marxist theory. In fact, it draws its preconditions from 
the very core of the Marxist theoretical apparatus: from the idea of the primacy of 
practice over theory. Post-Marxism is, properly speaking, a symptom of the peculiar 
centeredness of Marxism upon practice and upon history, of the peculiar credit that 
Marxism sought to find in real history and in actual political practice. It is a symptom of 
what some have called the self-referentiality of Marxist theory. 16 For is not Marxism the 
theoretical orientation par excellence which sought its entire substance and its validity 
in practice, in the self-evidence of the forms of its own `historical realisation'? We only 
need to think of Lenin who enthusiastically proclaims, in 1913, in a pamphlet entitled 
The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx, that "the dialectic of history was 
such that the theoretical victory of Marxism compelled its enemies to disguise 
themselves as Marxists". " From this perspective, the scene of the collapse of 1989, the 
IF scene of the destruction of the socialist States in the East of Europe is indeed an event 
internal to Marxism. An event with profound consequences for Marxist theory. With the 
demise of the historical referent of the `really existing socialisms', what places Marxism 
in doubt, what discredits it, are its own criteria of self-constitution, its own criteria of 
validity. These are the criteria of the practicality of theory, the criteria of the practical 
realisation of philosophy. Marxism is compromised from within itself at that precise 
" See I3adiou's discussion of the `end of referents' in his 1985 book Peut-on penser la politique?, Paris: 
Senil, pg. 25-66. 
17 V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1963, vol. 18, p. 584. 
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point at which its theoretical contents seek a direct reflection in history and in politics, 
at that precise point at which its concepts, categories and theoretical operations attain 
the status of unquestionable practical truths. 
To stop here, however, would be a dangerous oversimplification. It would 
presume lapsing straight into the charge of dogmatism which Marxism has attracted too 
often. It would presume accepting a dogmatic construction of Marxism, a dogmatic 
construction of the identity of theory of practice, the same one which expressed and 
maintained the dogmatism and the political and ideological disasters proper to a specific 
tendency in the politics of the communist parties, present if not dominating throughout, 
from different Stalinist and post-Stalinist trajectories to the pioneers of 
Eurocommunism. More precisely, stopping here would presume endorsing that 
ingenious ideological construction proper to the Stalinist mode of politics, that 
ingenious mirror relationship, on the background of which one could deduce immediate 
practical implications, political directives, plans and programmes, straight from the 
general `laws of the dialectic', whilst at the same time automatically confirming the 
`lawfulness' of this deduction from the self-evidence of practice itself. In the last 
instance, stopping here would amount to a direct identification of Marxism, of Marxist 
theory and politics, with the State, inscribing Marxist theoretical concepts and 
categories at the heart of the raison d'Etat. 
The identification of Marxism with the State seems to be a thoroughly fallacious 
move. It seems to immediately deprive us of the very core of Marx's theoretical 
invention, of that singular trait of his theory, which professed itself to be, at the same 
time, both `critical and revolutionary'. Most importantly, the reduction of Marx to a 
personage proper to the raison d'Etat deprives us of the fact that it was precisely the 
theoretical work of Marx which represented the critical political endeavour par 
excellence in the last century and a half -a real, effective `ruthless critique of 
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everything that exists' - not simply in the forcefulness of its critical analysis of 
capitalist exploitation and of the domination internal to bourgeois forms of politics, but 
also, in its capacity to produce revolutionary effects in the field of historical and 
political struggles, in its ability to translate itself into an effective practical `overcoming 
of the existing state of affairs'. 
It is not enough to repeat the old dictum here, attributable to Marx (and also to 
Lenin), who openly refused being identified as Marxist. It is not enough to separate a 
pure theory, or a pure theoretical position, from the stains of ideology, politics and 
history, divorcing ideas from their insertion into practice and into `consciousness'. The 
proper way to proceed - which seems to be, at the same time, the only correct Marxian 
or Marxist way - is to submit the history of Marxism itself to the criterion of historical 
and political division, to apply the Two that Marxist critique has never ceased 
producing to Marxism itself. This implies recognising the historicity of Marxism as a 
profoundly contradictory reality, always already submersible to the `laws' of class 
struggle, standing under the decisive but permanently uncertain determination of real 
historical and political clashes. Beyond the mourning or celebration of `death', we need 
to acknowledge that the `crisis of Marxism'- the principle motif of discussions on the 
Left from at least the sixties onwards - is in fact Marxism's permanent state of being, 
and, moreover, that this crisis is something upon which Marxism constantly feeds, 
'something which secures its own vitality. "' 
This, in turn, involves a radical rearticulation of the formula which stands at the 
heart of Marxist theory. The idea of the primacy of practice over theory, in fact, seems 
to have a more profound, more radical meaning than the doxical interpretation of 
Marxism seems to imply. Far from paving the way for the translation of theoretical 
IS Already in 1977, Louis Althusser celebrated the `crisis of Marxism' as the primary source of 
possibilities for theoretical reinvigoration: "At last the crisis of Marxism has exploded! At last it is in full 
view! At last something vital and alive can be liberated by this crisis and in this crisis". See Althusser, 
Louis (1979) "The crisis of Marxism", in: Power and Opposition in Post-revolutionary Societies, 
London: Ink Links, pg. 229. 
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concepts into ideological dogmas, far from legitimising the transformation of a critical 
theoretical instrumentarium into a political vulgate, the primacy of practice over theory 
is that formula which allows us to inscribe a permanent void into any notion of `unity- 
of-theory-and-practice'. It is that formula which, whilst indubitably exposing the 
practical and political nature of the theoretical, whilst exposing the essential dependence 
and determination of theoretical investigations by practical struggles, forces us to 
acknowledge that there does exist an unsurpassable gap between concepts and slogans - 
not simply because of the specificity of the two moments, and because of the 
ineradicable surplus that becoming `practical' or `material' of theoretical ideas 
necessarily entails, but, more profoundly, because real historical and political practice 
stands ever ahead of its theoretical `realisation', because the aleatory becoming of 
history and politics always already escapes theoretical apprehension, whilst at the same 
time exerting constant transformative pressure on it. 
Where does this leave us then in terms of the problems which we pose here, in 
terms of the question of how to orient oneself critically in the post-socialist situation? 
If a critique of post-socialism seems incomplete without Marxist theory, than 
this critique is also untenable without an immanent criticism, without the `self-criticism' 
of those tendencies within Marxism which led Marxist theory and politics to assume the 
form of sacrosanct principles of authority, to appear as theoretical and political doxa. A 
critique of post-socialism, a critical confrontation with the uncertainties and the 
impossibilities of our present, in other words, necessitates a critical historicisation of 
Marxism itself, and in that, an acknowledgement of `class struggle in Marxist theory', 
to paraphrase a famous dictum, with the view of extracting those tendencies, those 
living elements of Marxist thought which resisted the identification of theory with 
orthodoxy, which resisted the annulation of the critical discoveries of theory and 
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science, those tendencies which, in the last instance, opposed the `etatisation' of 
politics, thus providing a permanent opening for the project of emancipation. 
This critical historicisation is the background for the first part of this thesis. My 
aim here is to return to what Andre Tosel named `the last great theoretical debate of 
Marxism', j9 the debate between Gramsci and Althusser. This debate - which remains 
unresolved, and largely obscured today - is important for several reasons. It is 
important, in the first place, because it pushes the critical thrust of Marxist theory to the 
utmost, especially in what concerns the theorisation of the `superstructures': of the 
critical analysis of the State, of ideology and of historical forms of politics in capitalism, 
on the one hand, and, on the other, of the reflection upon the singularity of 
revolutionary politics, and its irreducibility to the State form. Secondly, it is important 
because it directly links, albeit through a set of peculiar transfigurations, to the 
contemporary formulations of post-Marxism, and primarily to the work of Laclau and 
Mouffe, which seeks its main source of theoretical legitimacy here. Revisiting the 
debate between Gramsci and Althusser, and primarily, reassessing Althusser's criticism 
of Gramsci, seems as necessary step for a critique of post-Marxism and its theoretical 
and political impasses. At the same time, it seems as one of the most productive paths 
for a contemporary reinvigoration of Marxist philosophy. Returning to Gramsci, and 
especially to Althusser, means reaffirming the critical force of Marxism's take on 
'politics and political phenomena, and in this, reappropriating the theorisation of the link 
between capitalism and the liberal State, together with the forceful subtraction of the 
question of (revolutionary) politics from the general domain of the `political', that is, 
from the domain of the State, of the Law and of `public action'. 
19 Tosel, Andre (1995) In Francia', in: Gramsci in Europa e in America, E. J. Hobsbawm (ed. ), Roma- 
Bari: Laterza, pg. 9. 
30 
But this discussion acquires its full scope inasmuch as it brings forward critical 
concepts with which we can confront the current post-socialist political consensus, the 
consensus which is primarily structured around an evacuation of the very questions of 
emancipation and of revolutionary change. This is why I intend to measure, in the 
second part of my thesis, some of these critical effects in a direct confrontation with the 
post-socialist political rationality. 
The first part of the thesis starts with a discussion of Gramsci and his central 
concept: the concept of hegemony. The aim of the first chapter is to expose and 
disentangle Gramsci's difficult and multilayered construction of the logic of hegemony, 
whilst assessing both the progressive and the regressive implications of the notion. 
Against the deterministic readings of Marx's topography of base and superstructure, 
prevalent in the theorists of the Second International, Gramsci theorises the particular 
effectivity of politics and ideology, whilst defining the latter as practices sui generis, 
irreducible to the simple economic determination. Gramsci does so by localising this 
effectivity within a particular space, which he constructs by recasting the `classical' 
dualism of State/civil society, and by reshaping of the problem of ideology - divorcing 
it from its critical, `negative' status in Marx, and linking it to `positive' issues of 
political consciousness and political will. Gramsci thus situates politics, its possibilities 
and impossibilities, in the sphere of `civil society', defined as a general sphere of 
hegemony and consent, a sphere of consciousness and of intellectual and political 
organisation. This specific theoretical topography is what arguably makes Gramsci the 
principle Marxist thinker of political autonomy, or, more exactly, of the autonomy of the 
political. But this is also what opens the path for numerous difficulties relating to his 
work. Difficulties which have to do, in the first place, with the fact that Gramsci places 
in brackets some fundamental elements of Marx's materialistic approach of history, 
namely, the very critical link that Marx establishes between the exploitation of labour in 
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the sphere of capitalist production and the `freedom' existing in the bourgeois State 
apparatuses. But also, difficulties which traverse Gramsci's entire attempt to redefine 
Marxism as a philosophy of praxis: where Marxist philosophical and scientific 
statements come to be directly subordinated to the normativity of political action. 
The second chapter explores these difficulties further, by tracing them to the 
post-Marxist and post-modern recasting of the notion of hegemony in the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe. Laclau and Mouffe, as I attempt to demonstrate, transform 
Gramsci's notion of hegemony into an idealistic construction in which politics is 
autonomised to the point where it becomes a transcendental space, standing above and 
outside all material determinations. Being read through the post-structuralist 
combinatorial model of language, hegemony becomes a general ontology of socio- 
political relations, where politics comes to be coextensive with the notion of discourse, 
and more generally, with linguistic and rhetorical tropes, such as metaphor and 
metonymy. Instead of resolving Gramsci's difficulties, Laclau and Mouffe explode the 
idealistic elements in his thought, whilst leaving us with a specific `reductionism in 
reverse', where ideology takes absolute precedence over material determinations of the 
economic sphere, where being is fully submerged into consciousness, and where a 
certain voluntarism associated with the linguistic conception reigns supreme. The 
political correlate of this is an apologetic endorsement of the sphere of liberal rights, 
and of the liberal democratic State, which the Laclau and Mouffe posit as the ultimate 
ground and guarantee of any emancipatory political action. 
The third chapter cuts a transversal in these discussions by exploring the work of 
Althusser, particularly in the light of his criticism of Gramsci. Suggesting a novel 
interpretation, I read the Althusserian concepts as correctives, as attempts to go beyond 
a certain `deficit of materiality' in Gramscian approaches, especially vis-a-vis their 
treatment of the problems of ideology and the State in capitalism. Althusser's analyses 
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of the relationship between the State and class struggles eclipse Gramsci's problematic 
at a number of critical points: in the first place, by outlining the complexity of the 
material dimensions of the State apparatus and its ideological supplements. Althusser 
reshapes the critical thrust of the concept of ideology, by linking ideological phenomena 
to the question of individual consciousness, and in this, by inviting us to rethink the 
bond between the legal-political institutions of liberalism and the exploitative relations 
of capitalist production. At the same time, and through his conception of philosophy as 
a divisive practice, Althusser offers a powerful solution to Gramsci's historicism, and a 
forceful reconfiguration of the Marxian idea of the practicality of philosophy, without 
collapsing thought into ideology. 
However, a reinterpretation of Althusser, as I also suggest, has to start with an 
acknowledgment of the originality of his reformulation of the problem of revolutionary 
politics. Althusser points to a way of resolving the question that Gramsci sets out - how 
to define the coordinates for an autonomous political practice - without introducing 
topographical considerations. Revolutionary politics, for him, cannot be located in the 
sphere of the `autonomy of the political', that is, in the general sphere of the State, of 
Law, and ideology, as it also cannot be located in a pre-determined space of `civil 
society'. Political autonomy can be grasped only outside aprioristic theoretical 
localisations - outside of any attempt to subsume politics under the generality of laws - 
in the register of singularity, that is, in the evental and aleatory dimensions of history. 
These theoretical and critical gestures of Althusser, as I argue, offer exceptional 
grounds for recasting and reinvigorating the critical potential of the Marxist tradition, 
and, more generally, for systematically rethinking and reshaping the contours of the 
politics of emancipation. 
This is why I also attempt to translate this perspective, as well as the discussions 
which surround it, into critical analyses of the post-socialist situation, which form the 
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second part of the thesis. Here I present three `concrete analyses' of post-socialism, the 
focus of which is on the collapse and destruction of the Yugoslav socialist federation. 
By drawing on the Marxian critical apparatus, and particularly on Althusser's 
conceptualisation of problems of ideology and the State, I aim to critically confront the 
post-socialist political rationality in what I consider to be its three main dimensions: 1) 
the dialectic between `civil society' and the `State' as the ground of political liberty and 
emancipation, 2) the idea that liberal-democracy represents a non-contradictory 
universalistic framework of recognition and reconciliation and 3) the normative 
identification of politics with the Law. In the process, I also attempt to portray not only 
the symptomatic ideological complementarity of the post-Marxist perspective with the 
politics of post-socialism, but its actual, practical role in the making of the post-socialist 
situation. 
The fourth chapter takes issue precisely with this, by analysing the historical 
context of the `Slovenian Spring' in the late 1980s, with the aim of exposing the 
embeddedness of the post-Marxist theoretical discourses in post-socialist politics. Here, 
I focus on the so-called Alternative, a wave of socio-political and cultural movements 
which dominated Slovenian politics in the 1980s. I trace the development of the 
Slovenian Alternative from the paradigm of the `new social movements', to its twin 
formulation of the notions of `civil society' and `radical and plural democracy', which 
took direct inspiration from Laclatt and Mouffe. The most interesting thing here, 
however, are the lessons that can be drawn from the Alternative's historical fate: from 
its recuperation by nationalism. I argue that this is the moment where we can easily 
become aware of some vexing problems in the political theory of Laclau and Mouffe: 
namely, the fact that the purely formal combinatorial framework of hegemony, the 
emphasis of which is on the discursive construction of political universality out of a 
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conjunction of particulars, remains structurally short-sighted vis-ä-vis the phenomenon 
of nationalism, but also vis-ä-vis the structural dimensions of the State apparatus. 
In the fifth chapter, I explore further the contradictions of post-socialist politics 
by looking at the so-called processes of `democratisation' in the context of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. If one of the primary ideological motifs of the post-socialist 
political rationality is the idea that liberal-democracy represents a universal model of 
political reconciliation, I propose to turn this perspective around, by inquiring about the 
inseparability of liberal-democracy from the political conflicts and nationalist upheavals 
which surrounded the destruction of the Yugoslav federation. In this sense, I analyse the 
processes in Croatia, and in particular the conflict between Tudman's regime and the 
Croatian Serbs, where violent nationalist politics can be seen inscribed in the very 
process of the implementation of liberal-democratic institutions. In order to interpret 
this articulation, I take cue from Balibar's analysis of nationalism and the liberal State, 
and his reformulation of Althusser's conception of the State and its ideological 
apparatuses. The basic idea here is that violent nationalist politics, instead of being 
opposed to the liberal political community, represents its immanent necessity, 
proceeding from the structural incapacity of the liberal-democratic State to reproduce its 
own subjective substance: to reproduce the `people' as a lasting homogeneous 
representation of the social bond, over a heterogeneous population, against constantly 
changing historical circumstances, and against the permanent threat of class conflicts. 
Confronting one of the influential political analyses of Yugoslavia, Zoran 
Dindic's book Yugoslavia as an Unfinished State, the aim of the last chapter is to 
formulate a critique of the normative identification of politics with the Law 
characteristic of the post-socialist political rationality. Whilst seeking to produce a 
`heretic' reading, I return to the year 1943, the revolutionary event of Yugoslavia, in 
order to examine the questions of political novelty introduced by the Yugoslav 
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Partisans. I argue that the classical arsenal of liberal political concepts, concepts such as 
`sovereignty of the people', `constitutive power', and `national self-determination', fall 
dramatically short of accounting for the historical specificity and the singularity of 
politics of Yugoslavia. In its political essence, Yugoslavia cannot be understood as a 
statist project, a project of the development and the perfection of the institutions and the 
apparatuses of the State, but as a project of revolutionary transformation of and 
emancipation, fundamentally rooted in the Marxian idea of the withering away of the 
State. Against Dindic, I read Yugoslavia as an unfinishable State: a dialectical political 
reality, predicated upon historical and political invention, and upon the peculiar practice 
of self-revolutionisation, which inscribes the Two of political novelty into different 
forms of being-together. This seems to me as a forceful exemplification of Althusser's 
theoretical placement of politics in the register of singularity. 
V ,ý 
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PART ONE: 
THE PROBLEM OF POLITICS IN MARXISM AND AT THE 
LIMITS OF MARXISM: FROM AUTONOMY TO SINGULARITY 
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CHAPTER I: 
GRAMSCI AND THE LIMITS OF MARXIST POLITICS: 
AUTONOMY, HEGEMONY AND THE `PHILOSOPHY OF 
PRAXIS' 
1.1. Introduction: the ambivalence of Gramsci 
The work of Antonio Gramsci assumes a peculiar position within the history of 
Marxism. Peculiar, in the first place, because of its originality and its inventiveness - 
which has undoubtedly been and continues to be an inspiring source for many political 
and theoretical projects. But peculiar also because of the intense ambivalence which 
traverses it. Probably no other Marxist thinker - if we count out Marx himself - gave 
rise to such drastic oppositions and contradictions in the field of reading, probably no 
other Marxist thinker has been claimed as the origin of so many divergent and mutually 
exclusive paths in politics and in theory than Gramsci. Whilst recounting the balance 
sheet of what came to be known as `Gramscianism', Christine Buci-Glucksmann notes 
the perverse effects of these divergences and oppositions: "the work of Gramsci has 
always been suspect of a certain sort of heresy: neo-Crocean, historicist, reformist, or 
also, Leninist". ' Ambivalence profoundly surrounds the reception of Gramsci's work: it 
is deeply inscribed in the hermeneutic, and therefore also, the political effects that his 
work engenders. But, at the same time, ambivalence penetrates Gramsci's thought from 
the inside. It traverses Gramsci's analyses and his theoretical operations, his methods 
and modes of presentation, his concepts and conceptions, all the way down to the 
peculiarity of the discourse that he adopts, the discourse that he is forced to adopt whilst 
composing the scattered manuscript of Quaderni di carcere (Prison Notebooks) under 
' Christine Buci-Glucksmann, "Gramscisme", in: Labica, Georges and Bensussan, Gerard (eds. ) (1985) 
Dictionnaire critique du marxisme, Paris: PUF, pg. 509. 
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the vigilant eye of the fascist censor in the Turi prison. One cannot but be amazed by 
the duality of figures which constantly appear one against another in Gramsci's 
writings, creating a profound tension as to the status of his `object', as well as to the 
`subject' standing behind them: at times Gramsci presents us with a systematic, or 
`detached' thinker, at times with a strategist and a political militant, one that zealously 
surrenders his observations to the urgency of the moment; at times his writing present a 
philosopher or a political theorist, struggling passionately with generalisations and 
abstractions, at times a brilliant historical analyst, endowed with an immense capacity 
for detail; at times we can find Gramsci continuing in a direct and scrutinised manner 
the tradition of theoretical and political concepts elaborated by Marx, Engels and Lenin, 
at other times, we can find him taking excursions into other conceptual fields, such as 
those of the tradition of Italian political sociology of Pareto and Mosca, or the 
hegelianism of Croce. 
The concept of hegemony resides at the centre of the proliferation of these 
ambivalent personages and these opposed effects of reading. 2 And without doubt this is 
3 so because hegemony, at least in Gramsci's rendering of the term, is itself a peculiar 
concept, a concept with a unique status: being invested by its author with an enormous 
and difficult role of effectuating nothing less than an essential restructuration or reform 
of Marxist theory. Gramsci develops the notion of hegemony, and the theoretico- 
philosophical apparatus which supports this notion, with an aim to expose and rectify 
the limitations and dead-ends of Marxism - both as a theoretical discourse `interpreting' 
the condition of capitalism, and as an organisational and directive force operative in the 
struggles the workers' movement. He does so, moreover, not only in order to confront 
'- Perry Anderson famously referred in this sense to `Gramsci's antinomies'. See Anderson, Perry (1977) 
"The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci", New Left Review, No. 100 March, London: NLR Press. 
3 Gramsci was not the first Marxist thinker to employ and develop the notion of 'hegemony'. The notion 
is first sketched out by the writers of Russian Social-Democracy, such as Axelrod and Plekhanov, and 
later Lenin and Trotsky, in an attempt to account for problems of political leadership and strategic 
alliances. For an outline of the genealogy of the term amongst Marxist political thinkers, see Anderson, 
ibid, pg. 15 et passim. 
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Marxism with the porosity of its own limits, but also in attempting to step beyond these 
limits, in striving to embrace and appropriate the `outside' of these limits for Marxist 
theory and Marxist politics. This is the essential stake of Gramsci's thought, the stake 
orienting his originality and his difficulty. But, at the same time, this is also the locus of 
its most acute ambivalence, its paradoxical site. For Gramsci does not only authorise a 
peculiar appropriation of the limits of Marxism, but also paves the way for an obscure 
regression and collapse of Marxist theory in front of these limits. Numerous genealogies 
which lead from Gramsci's thought to the reformist and revisionist turns that the politics 
of the workers' movement had taken in the latter half of the 20th century - turns 
towards Eurocommunism and `socialist democracy', but also, more recently, turns 
towards post-Marxism, are a precise attestation of this fact. 
But all this makes Gramsci's notion of hegemony even more interesting: 
because it is a notion of the limit, a notion exposing with force the limits of Marxist 
theory. This encounter of the limit, or of limits, will be the fundamental object of this 
chapter. I will start by presenting the problems entailed in Gramsci's concept of 
hegemony, by presenting the content of his concept, whilst examining the coherence of 
the theoretical apparatus which Gramsci builds up in order to support it. This 
examination will not only take us through Gramsci's political theory - and its 
fundamental problem: the autonomy of revolutionary politics - but also through 
Gramsci's philosophical constructions, through that area where Gramsci indeed 
proposes a peculiar philosophical path, that of the `philosophy of praxis'. 
1.2. An essential limit: the autonomy of politics 
But first of all, it is important to note that the limits that haunt Gramsci are 
determinate and real limits. They are the limits imposed and exposed by a crisis, by a 
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historical situation of crisis. "In order to understand the significance of Gramsci's 
contribution to the development of marxism", Nicola Badaloni writes, "one should use 
as a starting-point [... I the crisis in socialism and, in a more general way, the crisis in 
theoretical marxism". 4 The crisis that instructs Gramsci's thinking, the crisis invested in 
the concept of hegemony is, as Badaloni rightly points out, double: a political crisis, on 
the one hand, and a theoretical crisis on the other. 
A political crisis: Gramsci clearly recognises the political impasse that the 
socialist and communist movement had experienced in the 1920s and the 1930s. After 
several decades of schisms and retreats, decades which have divided the `orthodoxy' 
from `revisionism', the Second from the Third International, and, most acutely, the 
`West' from the `East' - with both the tragic experience of defeat of the attempted 
revolutions in the West, and the growing awareness of the contradictions and failures 
inherent to the Stalinist model of `socialism in one country' - the communist project 
was displaying a serious weakness and immobility, especially in the face of a new 
historical situation opened by the movements of stabilisation and expansion of 
capitalism, themselves followed by the rise of fascism, a mass ideology effectively 
gripping and neutralising workers' class struggles. 
How to respond to this new situation politically? How to revive the prospects of 
the emancipation of labour and of the proletarian revolution in a situation of crisis and 
retreat? 
A theoretical crisis: for these same political problems and uncertainties 
resonated within the domain of theory, within the very form of `unity of theory and 
practice' which has characterised the `fusion' of Marxism with the workers' movement. 
What Gramsci registers here, and what he attempts to respond to, is a critical 
disjunction between the theoretical and the practical levels, a disjunction to be measured 
° Nicola Badaloni "Gramsci and the problem of the revolution", in: Chantal Mouffe (ed. ) (1979) Gramsci 
and Marxist Theory, London: Routledge, pg. 80. 
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not only in terms of Marxism's explanatory grip on the historical and political process, 
its capacity for interpretation and critique of the real tendencies which display 
themselves in the current capitalist configurations, but also, in terms of its ability to 
participate, in person so to speak, in the historical process, by becoming an active 
organising and inciting element of the proletarian struggle against capital. 
How to proceed from the `critique of political economy', from the elaboration 
and explanation of the laws of capital and its mechanisms of exploitation, to politics and 
to its active matter, to the expansion of revolutionary consciousness amongst the 
exploited masses? How can the critique of capitalism become an active element of the 
revolutionary political subjectivity in a conjuncture of retreat? 
Gramsci located the principle sources of this political and theoretical impasse in 
the general `forgetting' of politics, in the underestimation of the critical role of political 
struggle and political consciousness within the strategic domain of Marxism. Against 
the deterministic and evolutionist conceptions of authors like Kautsky and Bernstein, 
but also against the Stalinist formulation of the linear and objective succession of modes 
of production, Gramsci called for a reaffirmation of the politics and the political 
moment proper, for a reinstatement the principles of will and of subjectivity, of 
consciousness and organisation, at the forefront of Marxist theory. He would thus speak, 
paradoxically, of a "revolution against Capital", 5 of a break with the lethargic 
`orthodoxy' of the Second International, which had used the authority of Das Kapital in 
order to assert the mechanical necessity of economic development - fashioning the idea 
of the historical inevitability of the break-down of capitalism. ' Against this political 
S See Gramsci, Antonio (1977) "Revolution against Capital", in: Selections From Political Writings: 
1910-1920, London: Lawrence and Wishart. 
6 See for instance Kautsky: "We believe that the collapse of the existing society is inevitable because we 
know that economic development naturally and necessarily produces contradictions which oblige the 
exploited to combat private property. We know that it increases the numbers and strength of the exploiters 
whose interests lie in the maintenance of the existing order, and that it finally brings about unbearable 
contradictions for the mass of the population which is left only with the choice between brutalisation and 
inertia or the overturning of the existing system of ownership". Kautsky, Das Erfuter Programm, 
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passivism, we could see Gramsci exclaiming: "It is necessary to be more political, to 
know how to use the political element, and have less fear of doing so". ' 
`Being more political', entailed in the first place, rejecting the economicist and 
mechanicist conceptions of the Second International, conceptions which have relegated 
politics to little more than a secondary moment within the laws of economic 
development, an epiphenomenon of the structure of capital. "The claim [... ] that every 
fluctuation of politics and ideology can be presented and expounded as an immediate 
expression of the structure, must be contested in theory as primitive infantilism". ' 
Politics needs to be `emancipated' from economic determination and its inertia, it needs 
to be recognised as a crucial dimension of the historical process on its own terms - 
possessing a unique effectivity and locality, outside of the mechanical confines of the 
development of the laws of production. The prospects for a revolutionary strategy of the 
workers' movement, as Gramsci insists with force, a strategy that would be adequate to 
the difficult historical situation opened by the crisis of Marxist politics, by new forms of 
expansion and consolidation of capitalism, and by the rise of fascism, are essentially 
connected with the acknowledgement of this particular effectivity and autonomy of the 
political moment. No detours or withdrawals can be made in front of the need to 
recognise problems of politics and of political strategy - at the distance from the 
analyses of the laws of motion of capital - as the quintessential theoretical and practical 
Iproblems, which critically instruct the possibilities of the emergence and the victory of 
the proletarian revolution. 
But `being more political' also meant recognising the centrality of strategic and 
tactical issues for Marxist theory and practice. And here we see the Italian communist 
theorist putting tremendous emphasis on the idea that consciousness, organisation and 
Stuttgart, Velrag von J. H. W. Diek, 1892, p, 106. (Quoted from Chantal Mouffe "Hegemony and Ideology 
in Gramsci", in: Mouffe (ed. ) Gramsci and Marxist Theory, pg. 173). 
Quoted from Buci-Glucksmann (1980) Gramsci and the State, London: Lawrence and Wishart, pg. 237. 
" Antonio Gramsci (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks (from hereafter, SPN), London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, pg. 407. 
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mobilisation are the central elements in the revolutionary strategy of the proletariat, and 
that, consequently, revolutionary politics cannot but be a matter of difficult and patent 
work of preparation: "The decisive element in every situation is the permanently 
organized and long-prepared force I... ) Therefore the essential task is that of 
systematically and patiently ensuring that this force is formed, developed, and rendered 
ever more homogenous, compact, and self-aware" .9 The subject of the revolution does 
not arise spontaneously, nor is it simply a consequence of crises in the socio-economic 
system; rather, it is a process, fundamentally related to ideological struggles and the 
capacity for mass mobilisation, organisation and leadership. Revolutionary politics is 
therefore, for Gramsci, first of all, a matter of a gigantic endeavour of the `background', 
it is a matter of arduous battles in the `trenches and fortresses' of popular consciousness 
and ideology, battles whose aim is first of all to secure the critical unity and the 
broadness of the bond of the revolutionary political subject. 
Behind these two appeals, Gramsci is formulating a very precise problem: the 
problem of the autonomy of politics. How to approach theoretically the problem of 
politics as an autonomous and active historical force in capitalism? Or, what amounts to 
the same: how to theorise the autonomy of the revolutionary politics of the proletariat? 
It is in these questions that Gramsci recognises the essential limit of Marxism, and it is 
here that he inscribes his difficult effort of reconstruction and `reform' via the 
conceptual logic of hegemony. 
1.3. Hegemony, civil society and the State: from Marx to Gramsci 
Right from the start, however, Gramsci approaches the problem of autonomy as 
a problem of space: the entire question of hegemony, and of politics as such, begins as a 
9 SPN, pg. 185. 
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spatial question, as a question of the topography of the social and historical world. 
Where is revolutionary politics to be located as an autonomous activity? Where do the 
potentialities of revolutionary action reside? 
And the initial move that Gramsci makes here is indeed peculiar: the re- 
appropriation and reformulation of the traditional opposition between civil society and 
the State. 
The opposition between civil society and the State, inescapable and canonical as 
it may have been for any theorisation of politics, society and the economy in the 
eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, especially amongst those philosophers which 
we now regard as foundational for liberal political philosophy, 10 was not a foreign 
territory for Marxism. It was Marx himself, who, in his youthful works, frequently 
elaborated on the two terms of the opposition (and on their interrelationship) whilst 
inscribing these elaborations into a critique of Hegel. 
However, Gramsci proposes a very peculiar reading of the two dichotomous 
figures. As he writes: "What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major 
superstructural `levels': the one that can be called `civil society', that is the ensemble of 
the organisms commonly called `private', and that of `political society' or `the State'. 
These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of `hegemony' which the 
dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of `direct 
'domination' or command exercised trough the State and `juridical government". " 
We should immediately note the distance that separates Gramsci from Marx. 
Gramsci locates both of the terms of the opposition civil society and State on the terrain 
of the superstructures, on the terrain standing at a remote from the material, economic 
base of society. This is in direct contrast to Marx, for whom `civil society' was 
primarily a determinate economic reality. When Marx employs the term `civil society' 
"' In the first place, we can think of the tradition of the natural law, and thinkers such as Locke and 
Rousseau, but also, later, Kant, Fichte and Hegel. 
" SPN, pg. 12. 
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(Marx actually speaks of die bürgerliche Gesellschaft, which in itself is already a 
provocation, as it literally translates as `bourgeois society') in works such as The 
Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State, On the Jewish Question and even The German 
Ideology, he uses it in order to depict a peculiar economic realm, a peculiar economic 
world: a world peculiar, in the first place, because of its negative and self-destructive 
character. Marx's `civil society' depicts a sphere of atomised individuals caught in a 
lethal and irresolvable struggle, into a deadly competition between their selfish 
particular interests, like in the Hobbessian scenario of a `war of each against each'. As 
Marx would write: "The only bond which holds [the individuals] together [in civil 
society] is natural necessity, need and private interest, the conservation of their property 
and their egoistic persons". " 
But unlike the Hobbesian myth of nature, Marx's `civil society' is a determinate 
historical reality. What reigns supreme in `civil society', what lies at the very root of its 
destructive and `alienating' nature, are modern property relations, the relations instituted 
by the development of modern capitalism and the market. If the realm of modern 
production and exchange destroyed all the `natural' dependencies and inequalities of the 
feudal order, it also started destroying all the markers of commonality and solidarity, the 
very possibilities of the social bond. This is why, for young Marx, `civil society' would 
become "the expression of the separation of man from his community, from himself and 
from other men". 13 
Like for Hegel, Marx's emphasis on the contradictory, self-destructive nature of 
the sphere of economic individual exchanges is geared towards a critique of the social 
and political philosophies of liberal theorists such as Adam Smith and John Locke, 
where the individualistic `civil society' represented the very positive ground of the 
political or social world based on contract and natural right. But if Hegel sought to 
'2 Karl Marx (1975) Early Writings, London: Penguin, pg. 230. 
13 ibid, pg. 221. 
47 
derive the necessity of the State from this `unreality' of civil society (whose 
contradictions, the State, as the embodiment of reason and universality, is supposed to 
overcome), " Marx's claim is exactly the opposite: the `crass materialism', the `vulgar' 
reality of civil society also explains the `unreality' of the State. The modern, liberal- 
democratic State is itself a product and a result of the reign of particularisms of the 
`civil society', it is a result of the development and domination of private property and 
capitalist production over social relations: "[TJhe political constitution as such is only 
developed when the private spheres have achieved an independent existence [... ) The 
abstraction of the state as such was not born until the modern world". 'S In the abstract, 
formal equality of citizenship that it proposes, the modern State seeks to resolve the 
conflictual nature of society, by positing itself above the particularisms and inequalities 
proper to the economic realm of property and production. But this solution is false, 
according to Marx, as the abstract and formal State remains impotent over the 
particularisms and contradictions of `civil society'. What is more, in its formalism and 
its abstractness, the modern political sphere cannot but reproduce these particularisms 
and these inequalities: "The State stands in the same opposition to civil society and 
overcomes it in the same way as religion overcomes the restrictions of the profane 
world, i. e. it has to acknowledge it again, re-instate it and allow itself to be dominated 
by it". 16 Or, again: "the perfection of the idealism of the state was at the same time the 
"`perfection of the materialism of civil society. The shaking-off of the political yoke was 
at the same time the shaking-off of the bonds which held in check the egoistic spirit of 
civil society". " 
Marx's lesson is uncompromising: the absolute limit of political emancipation in 
the sphere of universal citizenship, the absolute limit of the modern liberal State, is the 
14 See G. W. Hegel (1943) Philosophy of Right (Translated by T. M. Knox), Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
's Marx, Early Writings, pg. 90. 
16 ibid, pg. 220. 
17 ibid, pg. 223. 
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reign of private property, and the inequality proper to this reign. "The political 
constitution at its highest point is thus the constitution of private property. The loftiest 
political principles are the principles of private property". " 
Even if Marx does not speak here yet about social classes, and about the 
particular antagonism in the sphere of production, the critical dimensions of the notion 
of `civil society' already exhibit the fundamental contours of what Balibar would call 
Marx' theoretical short circuit, and what arguably represents one of the most decisive 
moments of Marx's entire venture of criticism - from his early critique of philosophy 
and politics to the `critique of political economy'. '9 The key is precisely the abrupt link, 
the short circuit that is established between politics and the economy, between the 
sphere of production and that of political representation in the State. The modern, 
bourgeois institutions of law and the representative State make sense only from the 
point of view of the conflicts and contradictions in the sphere of economic production 
and circulation, they make sense only as expressions (and instruments) of class struggle. 
The political `superstructures' are always already the expressions of the contradictions 
in the economic 'base'. ° 
Now, does it not seem that Gramsci is overturning this conception? If we return 
to the quoted passage from the Prison Notebooks, we see Gramsci relating the 
ibid, pg. 166. 
In Masses, Classes, Ideas: Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx, Balibar attempts to assess 
the profundity of the break that Marx effectuated with regard to our apprehension of politics: "He was to 
build the most powerful and comprehensive `heteronomic' theory of politics in the history of philosophy, 
which relies on a provocative `materialist' identification of politics with its 'other': what I call a short 
circuit of 'politics' and 'economy', arising from the simultaneous economic critique of 'politicism' and 
political critique of 'economicism'. See Balibar, Etienne (1994), Masses, Classes, Ideas: Politics and 
Philosophy Before and After Marx London: Routledge, pg. xi. 
20 The idea of the short circuit can indeed be taken as a powerful solution of the conundrums of the base 
and superstructure. What is at stake here is not a reductive, but a critical conception. It certainly does not 
amount to a negation of politics, unless we want to admit that politics can happen only within the limits of 
the sphere of the State. What is reductive, according to Marx, is the very separation of the `political' from 
the 'economic' effectuated with the constitution of the modern State, and reproduced in countless political 
theories and philosophies. It is reductive because it effectively excludes the set of struggles in the sphere 
production from the official political sphere, because it dissociates politics, and political representation as 
such, from the decisive nucleus of economic contradictions. 
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opposition civil society/state with the opposition of base/superstructure, not by drawing 
an analogy between the respective terms, but by inscribing the first dichotomy within 
one of the terms of the second. It is the `superstructure' which is, according to Gramsci, 
divided by the opposition civil society/State. Or, again, there are "two major 
superstructural `levels': the one that can be called `civil society', that is the ensemble of 
the organisms commonly called `private', and that of `political society' or `the State' . 
21 
What is Gramsci doing here? In the first place, he is transforming the very 
structure of the architectonic conception. The dualistic schema of base and 
superstructure is supplemented by an intermediary instance, located at the same time 
within one of its constitutive terms, or `levels'. Civil society, which belongs to the 
terrain of the `superstructures', assumes the role of mediation between the two 
fundamental instances of the Marxian historical architecture. As Gramsci writes: 
"Between the economic structure and the State with its legislation and its coercion 
stands civil society". 22 
The reason for this transformation is no doubt critical and political. Clearly, like 
young Marx, Gramsci wants to stress the determinate role of `civil society' in the 
historical and political process, he wants to stress the fact that the `truth' of politics, the 
very possibilities of the proletarian revolution and the overthrow of capitalist relations 
of exploitation, is to be found outside of the sphere of the State, outside of that Hegelian 
'crown' of history. Unlike Marx, however, Gramsci insists upon the fact that civil 
society represents a positive and not a negative ground for politics. A ground, moreover, 
that is essentially political and not economic in nature. 
As we already pointed out, Gramsci's fundamental stake here is precisely the 
determination of a particular ground or a space for politics and for political activity. His 
aim is to isolate a space proper to politics, a space which would not be reducible to the 
2' SPN, pg. 12. 
22 Gramsci, Antonio (1995) Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (FSPN), London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, pg. 167. 
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crude fact of economic determination, and which would neither be coextensive with the 
State in the narrow sense - the State as an instrument of coercion and violence. Buci- 
Glucksmann is right to note in this regard that "Gramsci reshapes the distinction proper 
to Marx between civil society and the State as productive of a new dimension of 
politics: politics at large, whose frontiers do not stop at the State". '' Between the sphere 
of economy, conceived as the space of mechanical laws of capitalist production and 
expansion, and the State understood as the machinery and Instrumentarium of violence, 
Gramsci discovers `civil society' as a depository of political potentiality, as the proper 
and autonomous space of politics and of revolutionary political engagement. 
The space of potentiality of `civil society' is the space of hegemony. As Buci- 
Glucksmann writes: "civil society, for a long time considered as pre-political, becomes, 
as an ensemble of institutions, private and public organisations where a group, or a 
class, exercises its leadership over the others, the place of inscription of what Gramsci 
calls the `hegemonic system' or the `apparatus of hegemony"'. ' 
But what does hegemony denote here? 
The political usage of term `hegemony', even in the particularity of its strategic 
meaning which is central here - the meaning of political leadership, the leadership in a 
political sequence, and not stricto sensu domination, as its conventional signification 
might suggest - is not in any case Gramsci's originality. As many interpreters have 
demonstrated, Gramsci takes the problem of hegemony from the context of the political 
and ideological debates within Russian `social democracy', from the theorists of the 
Second and the Third internationals, such as Plekhanov and Axelrod, and even more, 
from Lenin and Trotsky. 25 Within this context, hegemony is, first and foremost, a notion 
related to the proletarian political strategy, a notion which brings to the fore the 
problems of political alliances and of political leadership as part of the revolutionary 
See Buci-Glucksmann, "Hegemonie", in: Dictionnaire critique du Marxism, pg. 535. 
24, ibid. 
25 See Anderson (1977), but also, Buci-Glucksmann (1980). 
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process. For Lenin, to take one example, the political dimension of hegemony arises out 
of the historical and political necessity of the alliance of popular classes against the 
capitalist apparatuses of oppression and exploitation. It arises in a context in which the 
proletariat, as the central revolutionary element of capitalist society, must unite itself 
with other oppressed classes - in the first place with the peasantry, but also with 
elements of the petty-bourgeoisie and other groups - in order to build a critical mass for 
the effectuation of a political and social revolution. In the words of Lenin, written in the 
aftermath of 1905: "The tasks of the proletariat that arise from this situation are fully 
and unmistakably definite. As the only consistently revolutionary class of contemporary 
society, it must be the leader in the struggle of the whole people for a fully democratic 
revolution, in the struggle of all the working and exploited people against the 
oppressors and exploiters. The proletariat is revolutionary only in so far as it is 
conscious of and gives effect to this idea of the hegemony of the proletariat". 26 
This strategic understanding of the hegemony, with its emphasis on political 
alliances political leadership, decisively orients Gramsci's writings, who himself openly 
voices his indebtedness to `Ilich' on this account. 27 Gramsci's main intuition is indeed 
profoundly Leninist: how to secure the conditions for the victory of the proletarian 
revolution, conditions which, as Gramsci himself would state, are to be sought on the 
terrain of political alliances and composite formations in class struggles, whereby the 
proletariat cannot spare the moment of direction and unification with other exploited 
groups. 28 
26 V. I. Lenin Collected Works, Vol. 17, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pg. 231-232. 
27 See SPN, pg. 365 et passim. 
" See Gramsci's "Notes on the Southern Question": "The proletariat can become the leading and the 
dominant class to the extent that it succeeds in creating a system of alliances which allows it to mobilise 
the majority of the working population against capitalism and the bourgeois State. In Italy, in the real 
class relations which exist there, this means to the extent that it succeeds in gaining the consent of the 
broad peasant masses". Gramsci (1978) Selections from Political Writings: 1921-1926, London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, pg. 443. 
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And yet Gramsci inserts something more into the concept. If he theorises the 
strategic question of political alliances and leadership, Gramsci also transforms this 
question. In the first place, he does so by extending its reach, by expanding the range of 
the subjects, the socio-historical groups to which the practice of hegemony would 
correspond. Hegemony thus appears in Gramsci not only as something which would be 
exclusive to the proletariat -a political strategy adequate to the tasks of its own 
revolution - but also pertains to other social classes, especially to the bourgeoisie. In his 
analyses of the Italian risorgimmento, for example, Gramsci would openly speak of a 
`bourgeois hegemony', or a `hegemony of the bourgeoisie'. 29 But at the same time, 
Gramsci transforms the Leninist problematic in its substance. If the question of 
`hegemony', as a question of alliances, was, in its very essence a question of the socio- 
political bond, Gramsci attempts to think this bond beyond the simple fact of political 
leadership and unity. He attempts to conceive of a bond in a much stronger sense: the 
sense which he would call `intellectual and moral leadership' or `intellectual and moral 
unity'. Hegemony becomes something beyond the simple matter of negotiation and 
accordance of different political or socioeconomic interests. It becomes a matter of the 
creation of `collective consciousness', of an ideological bond which unites different 
classes or social groups into a specific `collective will' or a collective subject. Behind 
hegemony, Gramsci would not find anymore a simple alliance of classes or class 
fractions, but a veritable `collective man', shaped as a "`cultural-social' unity through 
which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together 
with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world" 30 
From a thoroughly `engaged' and practical notion, a notion founded upon the 
concrete problems of the unfolding of the proletarian revolution, hegemony now 
acquires a more abstract dimension. The strategic and tactical problems are still here, 
'"See Chapter 3 of the Selections from Prison Notebooks. 
30 SPN, pg. 349. 
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and yet Gramsci seeks to invest these problems in the delineation of an abstract 
dimension of politics and of history, and, moreover, into an abstract dimension of 
power. This dimension is the dimension of the politics of the masses, of what Gramsci 
would call the `consent' of the masses. The vital question of the politics of hegemony 
becomes the question of the capacity for mass political organisation and unification, the 
capacity for the production of `ideological cement' and consent at large. This is why we 
can see Gramsci attributing a central role to the intelligentsia, in regarding the 
intellectuals as the `functionaries of hegemony'! ' 
But this is also why Gramsci localises hegemony within the space of civil 
society: civil society is the space of hegemony because it is the space par excellence of 
`consciousness' and of ideology. Unlike the Marxian scenario of a war between egoistic 
interests, what Gramsci seeks to place under this concept is the entire array of 
institutions and organisations, associations and groups that produce and reproduce the 
`subjective' life of a society: all those different forms of political or cultural 
organisation at a remote from the `official' sphere of the State, such as political parties, 
trade unions and councils, together with bodies of `public debate' and `propaganda' 
such as the press and publishing, but even more generally, the organs responsible for the 
moral and cultural life of society - from the family to the church, from the school to the 
education system at large, including the arts and literature, as well as sciences and 
`! philosophy. 
Civil society, of course, stands in opposition and in contrast to the State. But the 
very dimension of hegemony allows Gramsci to transform the very content of the 
concept of the State vis-ä-vis the Marxist tradition. Drawing on Machiavelli, Gramsci 
argues for the necessity of a `dual perspective', that is, he argues that the State has to be 
conceived in terms of the "dual nature of Machiavelli's Centaur - half-animal, half- 
" See the first chapter of SPN. 
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human". 32 The Centaur is both beast and human, he is both the embodiment of violence 
and an educator. The State, according to Gramsci, cannot simply be reduced to the 
moment of coercion or violence - to the fact of the `monopoly of violence'. It has to be 
also understood in terms of its sway over the consciousness of the dominated classes. 
The state includes both `force and consent', both the force of coercion and the force of 
consent. The enlarged Gramscian State is a State which spreads beyond its official face 
and form - that is, beyond the governmental office, the parliaments and the courts, 
beyond the police and the army, towards the entire web of `hegemonic apparatuses' 
which make up the scattered terrain of `civil society', towards the entire set of `private 
organisms' like the churches, the family, the media and culture, in which the ideological 
submission, the `consent' of the dominated classes and masses is produced and secured 
on a daily basis. Gramsci would insist that the State is made up of "the entire complex 
of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and 
maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it 
rules". 
" 
This expansion of the concept of the State is quite important in theoretical terms, 
as it allows for an establishment of a decisive relation between the problematic of the 
State and the problematic of ideology. The power of the bourgeois State, as Gramsci 
would claim, does not only consist in repression - the State cannot be reduced to its 
coercive aspect only, to the existence and the functioning of the legal-political 
apparatuses of control and violence. The dimension of ideology and of ideological 
power is also crucial. For it is in the domain of ideology where a silent but crucial battle 
is being fought: it is here the ruling classes have to test their capacity to unify society by 
imposing their hegemony over the social forces, by producing and reproducing the 
consent of the dominated classes and the popular masses. 
32 SPN, p0,. 169-170. 
33 SPN, pg. 244. 
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There is also an immediate political importance of this reshaped notion of the 
State. Gramsci's stake is to construct a theory that would be able to bring forth a new 
political line for the workers' movement, one that would be aware of the grave 
difficulties of the repetition of the event of the October 1917 in the West. The 
transformed structure of bourgeois States in the western societies, as Gramsci is at pains 
to demonstrate, is such that the advance of revolutionary consciousness is already stifled 
by a dense network of institutions and organisations that condition and direct the 
`thought' of the masses, forcing them to accept the ideological consensus imposed by 
the ruling classes, and thus effectively neutralising and pacifying their rebellious 
potential: "The massive structures of modern democracies, both as State organisations, 
and as complexes of associations in the civil society, constitute for the art of politics as 
it were the `trenches' and the permanent fortifications of the front in the war of 
position" 34 In contrast to the imagery of swiftness which so vividly characterised the 
Bolshevik seizure of power in the October Revolution, Gramsci's proposal for a 
proletarian revolutionary strategy falls under a specific conception of a prolonged 
struggle -a `war of position' - in which the main task of the revolutionary party of the 
proletariat is to lead a silent and protracted war in the domain of mass consciousness, a 
struggle in the fields of ideology and culture, in order to win the `width' of a mass 
politics - not only by organising and leading the working class and its allies, but also by 
IQ expanding its sway towards the `civil society' as a whole. 
1.4. A topographical gap 
By isolating the dimension of the politics of hegemony (as the politics of the 
production of `consent'), and also by placing particular importance on the terrain of 
34 ibid, pg. 243. 
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`civil society' (the terrain of `consciousness' and association) in the political struggles 
over the power of the State, Gramsci is thus doing two things. In the first place, he is 
constructing a theoretical space for an analysis of the complex structures of power 
proper to `advanced' capitalist societies, a theoretical space within which the problems 
of ideology and of ideological struggles over hegemony receive a central location in 
terms of the analytic of the constitution and the structure of bourgeois States. At the 
same time, Gramsci is also delineating a particular theoretical space of political 
potentiality, a space for revolutionary politics of the proletariat. A space for politics par 
excellence: "In any given society nobody is disorganised and without a party, provided 
that one takes organisation and party in broad and not a formal sense. In this 
multiplicity of private associations (which are of two kinds: natural, and contractual or 
voluntary) one or more predominates relatively or absolutely - constituting the 
hegemonic apparatus of one social group over the rest of the population (or civil 
society): the basis for the State in the narrow sense of the governmental-coercive 
apparatus". " 
In doing so, Gramsci reshapes and re-actualises the terrain of the 
superstructures. He sets a decisive path here for the autonomisation of superstructural 
moment, for the recognition of the particular determination that the latter is capable of 
producing in the historical process, whilst acting `in return' on the economic base. This 
is why Jacques Texier, for example, would dub Gramsci the theoretician of the 
superstructures, 36 or why Terry Eagleton would insist that "the concept of hegemony 
extends and enriches the notion of ideology, land] it also lends this otherwise somewhat 
abstract term a material body and a political cutting edge". 37 
And yet, besides these theoretical advances, Gramsci's construction is not 
without problems. Gramsci also leaves us with is a profound theoretical and political 
's ibid, pg. 264-265. 
36 'See, Jacques Texier "Gramsci, theoretician of the superstructures", in: Mouffe (1979). 
37 Terry Eagleton (1991) Ideology: An Introduction, London: Verso, pg. 115. 
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ambivalence: an ambivalence which concerns the precise status of the autonomised 
terrain of politics qua hegemony. 
Gramsci does speak, as we saw a moment ago, about the fact of mediation, he 
does locate hegemony and `civil society' "between the economic structure and the State 
with its legislation and its coercion". 38 Buci-Glucksmann would also insist in this regard 
that the Gramscian "organised civil society Irepresentsl a veritable bridge between the 
State-domination and the economy". 39 But what is this `veritable bridge'? How does 
Gramsci's `civil society' stand between or mediate between the economic structure of 
capitalism and the legal-political sphere of the State? And does this relation of 
mediation imply the short circuit that Marx forcefully imposes between the economic 
and the political spheres, between the sphere of capitalist production, that is between 
capitalist exploitation, and the sphere of the political representation in the State? Or 
rather, does Gramsci's formula of mediation amount to the negation of this critical link 
between the economic and the political? 
The problem is that Gramsci does not leave us a lot of precise clues. The entire 
conceptual topography behind the logic of hegemony, the topography through which we 
see the space of the State separated from that of `civil society', the dimension of force 
distinguished from the dimension of consent, the fact of dictatorship contrasted to the 
fact of hegemony, remains curiously silent in this regard. 
IV Of course, Gramsci certainly cannot be said to not be aware of the determinate 
reality of the economic sphere, the reality of economic exploitation and of class 
struggles which defines the structure of capitalist production - not only because he 
devotes a significant part of his prison research to a set of very precise analyses of the 
transformations in the domain of capitalist production, but, first of all, because of his 
unquestionable `vocation' as a Marxist and as a revolutionary communist leader. And 
38 FSPN, pg. 167. 
'9 Buci-Glucksman (1985) op. cir, pg. 535. 
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yet, he does not make this link apparent, he does not scrutinise the exact relationship 
between the autonomised sphere of `civil society' and the sphere of `material' 
production. As he also doesn't - apart from a general evocation of Force or Dictatorship 
- theorise in a direct or explicit manner the problem of the materiality of the State 
apparatus, the problem - which Marx and Lenin exposed with all critical rigour - of the 
very form of the State as a machine or an instrument of class struggle. " 
All that we are left with are a set of allusions, and even more, a set of allusive 
and ambivalent concepts - such as the concept of the `historical bloc', which, if we 
scrape beneath the set of astonishingly diverse meanings that Gramsci attaches to it, " 
seems to amount to nothing more than an acknowledgement of the simple fact of `unity' 
of the structure and the superstructures. 
The perplexing result of Gramsci's construction of hegemony, together with his 
entire theorisation of the separate domain of `civil society' - even if the latter purports 
to radically expand the terrain and the problems of politics within Marxist theory - is a 
strange silence about some of the most elementary critical relations which Marx detects 
within the space of capitalism, a silence about the fact of class struggle which takes 
place in the economic sphere, in the sphere of the exploitation of wage labour, a silence 
about the determinate role of the legal-political apparatus of the liberal State in the 
perpetuation and reproduction of this exploitation. 
That this silence and the ambivalence that surrounds it is not only astonishing, 
but very problematic, can be seen from the fact that it is precisely on this account that a 
set of opposed and contradictory readings have surrounded Gramsci, with some of them 
4" Marx uses the metaphors of the machine and the apparatus when he discusses the State in texts such as 
The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and Class Struggles in France. We will discuss the 
importance of this metaphor, especially in terms of the problem of the materiality of the State, in the 
subsequent chapters. 
41 In the dense pages of Gramsci's prison manuscripts, `historical bloc' seems to denote, at the same time, 
a system of sociopolitical alliances, the unity of 'structure and superstructures' (SPN, pg. 137), the unity 
of 'rulers and the ruled' or the 'intellectuals and the people' (SPN, pg. 418), and even the unity of the 
'subjective and the objective dimension in Man' (SPN, pg. 360). 
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taking Gramsci's notions and political propositions far away from the critical theoretical 
dispositive of Marx. Schematising things to certain degree, we can note two essentially 
different, if not drastically opposed readings of Gramsci here. 
The first is the one which tries to maintain an unbroken continuity between 
Gramsci and Marx's prodigious venture of critique, and, even more, between Gramsci's 
theoretical propositions on politics and Lenin's reformulations of the Marxist theory of 
politics and the State. This reading insists that Gramsci's theory stays true to the critical 
short circuit which Marx established, and in the first place, to the very idea of the 
primacy of economic determination and of class struggle. As Jacques Texier would 
insist: "for Gramsci, the infrastructure is indeed `primary' and `conditioning' 
('subordinante') and in this he is a marxist. But this in no way means that the 
superstructures are not active at all times, nor even that men's superstructural activity 
does not become `determinant' (`subordinante') in relation to the infrastructure when a 
period of `social revolution' commences that is, when relations of production have 
become irrational". 42 This interpretation also regards Gramsci's theorisation of politics 
and of hegemony if not a direct extension of Lenin (according to Massimo Salvadori, 
for example, Gramsci's theory of hegemony is the "highest and most complex 
expression of leninism"), 43 then at least asserts a profound complementarity between the 
two thinkers on the questions of the state and the revolution. Gramsci's `silence' is 
therefore only a camouflage for the centrality of the notion of class struggle, a 
camouflage for the idea that State apparatus cannot but be a material instrument of class 
struggle, an instrument perpetuating the domination of the ruling class. 44 Or better, the 
entire theorisation of the autonomised space of `hegemony' is nothing but a profound 
indication of Gramsci's powerful critique of the State-form, an index of his awareness 
42 Jacques Texier (1979) op. cit, pg. 58-59. 
43 Massimo Salvadori "Gramsci and the PCI: two conceptions of hegemony", in Mouffe (1979), pg. 251. 
' According to Perry Anderson, Gramsci "never intended to deny or rescind the classical axioms of that 
tradition [of Marx and Lenin, OPI on the inevitable role of social coercion within any great historical 
transformation, so as long as classes subsisted", Anderson (1977) op. cit, pg. 47. 
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of the necessary external nature of proletarian politics, as a politics of emancipation, to 
the very form of the bourgeois State. 
But, at the same time, there is also another reading, a reading which turns 
Gramsci into a consequential thinker of the `autonomy of the political'. This reading 
erases the line of continuity between Gramsci, Marx and Lenin, and instead links 
Gramsci to the reformist political tendencies of Eurocommunism, as well as to 
contemporary versions of post-Marxism. 45 What is collapsed here is, first of all, the very 
notion short circuit between the bourgeois State and economic exploitation. The State, 
instead of representing a `class state', an instrument of class domination, becomes a 
neutral and autonomous terrain, an empty shell to be filled with different contents 
provided by the contingent struggles over hegemony on the terrain of `civil society'. 
Buci-Glucksmann sustains one such interpretation: "In fact, far from reducing the State 
to a simple instrument or to a mere governmental fact, Gramsci conceived it as the 
synthesis of a hegemonic system ramified in the civil society". ' As does Anne Sassoon: 
"Gramsci goes beyond a view of the State as an instrument of a class. The State is a 
class State in that it creates conditions under which a certain class can develop fully, but 
it acts in the name of universal interests within a field of constantly changing equilibria 
between the dominant class and subaltern groups". 47 
But at the same time, this reading would also seek to hypostasise the very notion 
of `hegemony'. At certain extremes of interpretation, the totality of the historical 
process, all the conflicts and contradictions of social life would become matters internal 
to hegemony: to the production of political consent. Gramsci's `mediation' would 
as At the forefront of the Eurocommunist readings, we can find the canonisation of Gramsci by his own 
party, the PCI. As Martin Jay pointed out: "Led by Gramsci's university friend and later Party comrade, 
Palmiro Togliatti, the PCI I... ] interpreted Gramsci as a forerunner of its own gradualist, coalition- 
building, national political line. I... I Gramsci's central concept of `hegemony' was understood to imply 
the slow progressive education of the population to socialism though an essentially democratic process of 
enlightenment". Jay, Martin (1982) Marxism and Totality, Berkeley: University of California Press, pg. 
150. 
' Buci-Glucksmann (1985) op. cit, pg. 535. 
47 Anne Showstack Sassoon (1987) Gramsci and Marxist Politics, London: Hutchinson, pg. 119. 
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become a veritable moment of synthesis, as hegemony would be presented as the 
solution to the whole array of problems that are defined in the sphere of production, the 
very real material consequences and constraints of the struggle between classes, with all 
the effects of violence produced by capitalist exploitation and domination. And since 
hegemony is a matter of ideology, the movement of history would seem to reside in 
struggles over ideology and culture, a struggle over consciousness and ideas, a struggle 
whose decisive and critical elements reside in the labour of intellectuals, priests, party 
demagogues, artists, in short amongst all those personae of `civil society' who are 
responsible for cultural, moral and spiritual life of a society. ' 
Regardless of which particular avenues these two opposed readings take so in 
order to built their arguments, it should be clear that it is the problematic nature of 
Gramsci's own text - the numerous contradictions, ambivalences and silences which 
mark it - which allows both of them. Gramsci's Prison Notebooks - due to their 
complex, dense and heterogeneous nature - open the road to both interpretations. And 
yet, inasmuch as this ambivalence remains irresolvable within the domain of the 
passages that Gramsci devotes to directly theorising the politics of hegemony, it seems 
that Gramsci himself offers us a solution to riddle of hegemony, although at some other 
places, at those places in which he inscribes the political logic of hegemony in as 
specific philosophical project, into a specific philosophy, the philosophy of praxis. 
M. 
4 
1.5. philosophy as history: Gramsci's `absolute historicism' 
Philosophy of praxis is not only a euphemism for Marxism, a term through 
which Gramsci sought to deceive the prison censor who meticulously controlled his 
' The de-politicised Gramsci of `culture' and `ideology' emerged primarily as a collateral effect of the 
theoretical and political project of 'cultural studies' in the Anglophone context. In the next chapter we 
will examine the precise contours of the translation of this perspective into the post-Marxism of Laclau 
and Mouffe. 
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notebooks. It is also the name for a peculiar philosophical ground that Gramsci sought 
to accord to Marx and to Marxist theory. 49 
The centre of Gramsci's problematic of `philosophy of praxis' is the notion of 
praxis, human creative and self-creative activity. According to the classical definition - 
that of Aristotle - praxis denotes the sphere of thinking and acting in ethical and 
political life, opposed to theoria, in the strict sense of speculation and logical deduction. 
But Gramsci's notion is not Aristotelian; rather, it proceeds from Marx. Or better, it 
proceeds from that prodigious gesture of youthful critique, where young Marx, the 
German journalist in exile, attempted to read both Feuerbach into Hegel, and Hegel into 
Feuerbach, whilst achieving a "genial synthesis of Feuerbach and Hegel" as Althusser 
noted. 50 For young Marx, the centrality of praxis, or of practice, implied a critical 
rejection of speculative philosophy, a critique of philosophical idealism, and the 
concomitant reorientation of philosophy towards the realm of the practical, towards the 
practical and concrete `nature of man'. Marx claimed that philosophy needs to posit 
Man in his creative and self-creative activity, Man as creator of the world around him 
and of himself - and not as a detached, contemplative theoretical animal. In this way, 
Marx wanted to affirm the diesseits, the `this-sidedness', or the `immanence' of the 
human world, against the `other-worldliness', the jenseits or the transcendence of 
metaphysical philosophical constructions. The `essence of man', as young Marx 
insisted, is essentially practical, which means non-speculative and non-transcendent; 
but, at the same time, it is determined by the here and now, by concrete history, by the 
set of real, determinate social and historical relations and conditions. There is nothing 
otherworldly, metaphysical or suprahistorical in the human. `Man' is but the `ensemble 
49 It seems necessary to insist, against someone like Stuart Hall, who would claim that "those who seek a 
`philosophy' in Gramsci will be disappointed", (Hall, pg. 45) that Gramsci does not only indeed provide 
us with a specific philosophical orientation, but, moreover, that it is in this philosophical orientation that 
the key to his entire sociological construction, to his construction of the theory and a science of politics 
and of society resides. 
50 Louis Althusser (1969) For Marx (FM), Harmondsworth: Penguin Press, pg. 36. 
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of social relations' - according to the definition from the Theses on Feuerbach - he is 
his own historical and social praxis, his own `concrete practical activity', and not a 
"dumb generality which naturally unites the many individuals". 51 
In his own attempt at formulating a `philosophy of praxis', Gramsci continues 
this eminently humanist and historicist thematic of young Marx. He continues it in a 
rigorous way, whilst expanding or radicalising some of its presuppositions: "That 
`human nature' is the `complex of social relations' is the most satisfactory answer, 
because it includes the idea of becoming (man `becomes', he changes continuously with 
the changing of social relations) and because it denies `man in general"' (... ] One could 
also say that man is 'history"'. " Or, again: "The philosophy of praxis continues the 
philosophy of immanence but purifies it of all its metaphysical apparatus and brings it 
onto the concrete terrain of history". 53 Historicity of being, historicity of the human, 
and, at the same time, the humanity of history, the primacy of praxis over speculation, 
the primacy of the human over the transcendent: these are the themes that Gramsci takes 
from young Marx. 
But Gramsci also takes this Marxian humanism and historicism to a certain 
extreme. `Philosophy of praxis', for him, is not only a humanist and historicist 
approbation of `man' against the idealist or metaphysical constructions. It is not only, or 
not merely, philosophically speaking, a historicism and a humanism. It is an absolute 
I historicism and humanism: ;. 
"The philosophy of praxis is absolute `historicism', the absolute secularisation 
and earthliness of thought, an absolute humanism of history". TM 
The notion of `absolute historicism' is a curious one, not least because Gramsci 
employs it only three times in his Prison Notebooks, " and does so mostly in a polemical 
s" Marx, "Theses on Feuerbach", in: Marx and Engels (1968) Selected Works, Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, pg. 29. 
52 SPN, Pg. 355. 
'3 ibid, pg. 450. 
' ibid, pg. 465. 
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manner, but also because we are speaking of a term borrowed from Benedetto Croce, 
against whom Gramsci decisively directs his `weapons of criticism'. 56 And yet, it seems 
that the term does express the essence of Gramsci's philosophical position. One might 
say that historicism, the entire problematic of human historical praxis that young Marx 
sets out, truly becomes `absolute' with Gramsci, because it is radically and 
consequently applied. Applied, in the first place, in the direction of that veritably 
creative and critical sphere of human praxis, the practice of intellectual labour. For what 
is at stake in Gramsci's `absolutisation' of historicism is an attempt to subsume the 
entirety of the realm of human thought and human knowledge under the sway of 
historical praxis. It is not only the `idea of man' which is to be historicised and rendered 
`concrete', that is, grasped in terms of the historical and social `world of man', but also, 
and most importantly, it is the very ideational practice of human beings, their 
apprehension and cognition of the world, which is to be submitted to the criteria of 
history. Problems of knowledge, cognition and consciousness, problems of philosophy 
and science, are to be examined only from the point of view of praxis, and in relation to 
historical praxis, in relation to the historical becoming of humanity. As Gramsci would 
maintain: "We know reality only in relation to man, and since man is historical 
becoming, knowledge and reality are also a becoming and so is objectivity, etc". 57 Or, 
again: "Objective always means `humanly objective' which can be held to correspond 
exactly to `historically subjective"'. 58 
At the core of Gramsci's `philosophy of praxis' we find an intimate relationship 
between thought and history, between ideas and historical reality. Gramsci wants to 
55 Peter Thomas points this out in his article "Historicism, Absolute", published in Historical Materialism, 
15, Brill Publishers, pg. 249-256. 
" For an exhaustive survey of the relationship between Gramsci and Croce, as well as an exposition of the 
reception of Marx in the early 201h century Italian philosophy, especially around thinkers such as Labriola 
and Gentile, see Tosel, Andre (1991) Marx en italiques: Aux origins de la philosophie italienne 
contemporaine, Mauvezin: Trans-Europ-Repress. 
57 SPN, pg. 446. 
58 ibid, pg. 445. 
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bring human thinking and human knowledge as close as possible to the immediacy of 
the historical process. And he does so by positing history, the very unfolding of the 
historical movement, as an absolute measure of problems of knowledge and cognition. 
We cannot anymore speak of a scientific or philosophical objectivity at the remote from 
the `ensemble of social relations', at the remote from actual socio-historical processes. 
As Leszek Kolakowski would point out: "Knowledge of social processes is not, for 
Gramsci, their `observation' made from the outside: such an observation does not exist 
at all. Knowledge is part of the social development, an `aspect', or an `expression' of 
this development, on equal footing with economic transformations". 59 Our cognition of 
the social and historical world is a part of this world, and cannot be understood apart 
from the origin and function that it has here. Scientific and philosophical truths do not 
make sense outside of the context of their formation, outside of the role that they play in 
the social environment in which they appear or the global historical processes of which 
they form part. "(T Jhe `truth' of philosophy, as well as the `truth' of science, is the 
`truth' in a social, pragmatic sense: what is truthful is what in a determinate historical 
situation expresses the real developmental tendency of this situation. Both philosophy 
and science are not to be judged by criteria other than those which we use in the 
examination of social institutions, religious beliefs, emotions and political 
movements". 60 
If Gramsci's `absolute historicism' sets the example here for different attempts 
at a social or historical relativisiation of knowledge - attempts which pass from Karl 
Mannheim's project of the sociology of knowledge, to the Foucauldian archaeology of 
epistemes - it is important to bear in mind that Gramsci's endeavour to bring together 
thought and history, the process of knowledge and the process of transformation of the 
human world, truly explodes this problematic, by developing some of its consequences 
S" Leszek Kolakowski (1985) Glavni tokovi marksizma (Main Currents of Marxism), vol. III, Belgrade: 
BIGZ, pg. 264. 
m' ibid. pg. 258-259. 
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to an acute degree. " Gramsci does not only seek to reduce ideas and concepts to their 
historical and sociological origin. He does not only seek to define thought by history, 
but to identify the two in a radical sense. Human thinking, and, in particular, philosophy 
and science, are not only measured in terms of their historicity - they become, for 
Gramsci, historicity as such, they become the active matter of the historical process: 
"One could say that the historical value of a philosophy can be calculated from the 
`practical' efficacity it has acquired for itself, understanding `practical' in the widest 
sense. If it is true that every philosophy is the expression of society, it should react back 
on that society and produce certain effects, both positive and negative. The extent to 
which precisely it reacts back is the measure of its historical importance, of its not being 
individual `elucubration' but `historical fact' tq . 
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How do ideas translate themselves into practice, how do theoretical reflections 
become a matter of real history? And how does history unfold on the basis of the 
activity of ideational systems, on the basis of the practicality of ideas? Gramsci would 
reach for Croce at this juncture, and by adopting and modifying the latter's conception 
of religion, he would attempt to grasp the entirety of the products of intellectual labour 
- philosophy and science included - in the sense of Weltanschauungen, in the sense of 
`conceptions of the world' or `ideologies' which are active in the practical lives of men: 
"Accepting Croce's definition of religion as a conception of the world which has 
become a norm of life (since the term norm of life is understood here not in a bookish 
sense but as being carried out in practical life) it follows that the majority of mankind 
are philosophers in so far as they engage in practical activity and in their practical 
activity (or in their guiding lines of conduct) there is implicitly contained a conception 
of the world, a philosophy. The history of philosophy as it is generally understood, that 
6 See Karl Mannheim (1954) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. See also Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), 
London: Routledge. 
62 SPN, pg. 346. 
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is as the history of philosophers' philosophy, is the history of attempts made and 
ideological initiatives undertaken by a specific class of people to change, correct or 
perfect the conceptions of the world that exist in any particular age and thus to change 
the norms of conduct that go with them; in other words, to change practical activity as a 
whole". 63 As each particular historical practice carries with, implicitly, a certain 
philosophical orientation, in the sense of its own self-consciousness, so do the most 
elaborate and `lofty' philosophical or scientific elaborations find their direct reflection 
in the practical conduct of men. Philosophy and the sciences, instead of being separated 
from practice, as theoretical reflections formulated at a distance, are now directly 
intermeshed with practice and practical activity, as they pass into the nooks and crannies 
of social and practical life, providing the masses with both an insight into the course of 
history and a norm of practical conduct for making history. "What matters is that a new 
way of conceiving the world and man is born and that this conception is no longer 
reserved to the great intellectuals, to professional philosophers, but tends rather to 
become a popular, mass phenomenon, with a concretely world-wide character, capable 
of modifying (... I popular thought and mummified popular culture". ' 
Gramsci effectively makes history and philosophy one: in their practical 
existence, that is, in their existence in the hearts and minds of men, in the `common 
sense' of the popular masses, scientific ideas and philosophical concepts become the 
active and essential ingredients of the historical process. They provide a `historical 
methodology', as Gramsci would say with Croce, for the actual practice of the 
transformation of the world: "The philosophy of an historical epoch is, therefore, 
nothing other than the `history' of that epoch itself, nothing other than the mass of 
`3 ibid, pg. 344. 
64 ibid, pg. 417. 
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variations that the leading group has succeeded in imposing on preceding reality. 
History and philosophy are in this sense indistinguishable: they form a bloc". ' 
Marxism and Marxist theory is to be read strictly according to these criteria of 
practicality and historicity. Before attempting to `explain reality', that is, before 
producing a critique of the conditions and contradictions of capitalism -a critique from 
which one is then to deduce the rules of successful political practice - Marxism is a 
body of thought which is directly immersed in political action. Before being a critical 
scientific doctrine, Marxist theory is a real ideational force, an active political 
orientation and a mass point of view. 
In opposition to the `bookish' Marxism which has characterised the period of the 
Second International, Gramsci here wants to call for directly `changing the world', he 
wants to call for political action and political consciousness, and for an `activist' 
approach to problems of theory and practice. Against the passivising expectation that 
historical and political problems are going to be resolved by themselves, Gramsci 
decisively points towards the necessities of political practice, as well as towards the 
active role of theoretical elaboration in the formation of this practice. Theory and 
practice should not exist as two discrete domains, separated by a wall of 
`specialisation', but should be united under a forceful common denominator, fused into 
a veritable revolutionary force. ' 
But if this represents an attempt to resolve one of the central problems of 
Marxism - the problem of the unity of theory and practice - there are some serious 
problems with the engaged approach that Gramsci proposes here. At the very core of his 
philosophical `activism', Gramsci seems to be effectively annulling the entire caesura 
ýs ibid, pg. 345. 
As Gramsci writes: "if the problem of the identification of theory and practice is to be raised, it can be 
done in this sense, that one can construct, on a specific practice, a theory which, by coinciding and 
identifying itself with the decisive elements of the practice itself, can accelerate the historical process that 
is'going on, rendering practice more homogeneous, more coherent, more efficient in all its elements, and 
thus, in other words, developing its potential to the maximum". (SPN, pg. 365. ) 
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between science and ideology, constitutive as it was for Marx and Engels, and for the 
entire venture of `historical materialism'. With the criterion of practicality and 
historicity of ideas applied thoroughly and consequently, there is hardly any room to 
draw a distinction between truth and falsehood, between rationality and irrationality, 
between philosophy and religion, or common sense. 
And indeed, at the apex of Gramsci's `absolute historicism' the categories of 
Truth and Reason are to be read as nothing more than expressions of real historical 
struggles. What matters is not the adequacy or inadequacy of scientific or philosophical 
concepts in the face of social or historical objectivity, their capacity to explain the world 
or gain knowledge of reality, or even to confront this reality in a critical manner, but the 
way in which these concepts or ideas can become active and practical, the way in which 
they can pass into real history, by intruding into historical practice and seizing the 
consciousness of the actors involved in it. All thought is sized and validated only 
according to its immediate practicability, all thought becomes a function of `seizing' the 
masses. As Gramsci would assert: "Mass adhesion or non-adhesion to an ideology is the 
real critical test of the rationality and historicity of modes of thinking". 67 
Gramsci's `philosophy of praxis' thus effectively does away with all general 
markers of epistemology, all general problems of knowledge, as it also collapses any 
pretensions to scientificity that Marxist theory can lay claims to. Everything proceeds 
from history, everything is already given at the level of real historical practice, which 
philosophy directly expresses in its conceptual and categorical formulations, simply in 
order to return to it as its self-conscious moment, by elaborating a historically effective 
`conception of the world'. Philosophy is thus effectively transubstantiated: it becomes 
nothing more than an ideology, an ideology whose function is to cement and unify the 
subjectivity of political actors and historical forces. Or, to use a famous phrase, it 
" SPN, pg. 341. 
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becomes `identity thinking', it becomes the very self-consciousness of the historical 
process, with the latter taking place on the backbone of the struggles between classes 
and their competing Weltanschauungen. With Hegel, Gramsci can indeed say that the 
rational is real, and that the real is rational - but on the condition that reason and truth 
are but mere expressions of the dominant consciousness of a given historical moment, 
that is, expressions of the self-consciousness of the dominant class: "But at this point we 
reach the fundamental problem facing any conception of the world, any philosophy 
which has become a cultural movement, a `religion', a `faith', and that has produced a 
form of practical activity or will in which the philosophy is contained as an implicit 
theoretical `premise'. One might say `ideology' here, but on condition that the word is 
used in its highest sense of a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, in 
law, in economic activity and in all manifestations of individual and collective life. This 
problem is that of preserving the ideological unity of the entire social bloc which that 
ideology serves to cement and to unify". ' 
As a corollary to this radical identification of philosophy and real history, 
philosophy also becomes identified with real politics. If concepts are immediately 
practicable, and if philosophical or scientific thought finds its direct correlate in the 
practical conduct of the masses, in their practical, i. e. political struggles, than there is no 
point of making a strict difference anymore between a philosopher and a politician, 
between a philosophical notion and a political slogan. Political action and the 
consciousness of this action are two aspects of the same phenomenon, which means that 
professional philosophers or scientists are, essentially, politicians, and, conversely, that 
politicians as such are also in their essence theorists. As Gramsci would remark: "the 
68 SPN, pg. 328. Note that Gramsci, unlike Marx, or Althusser, has a thoroughly 'positive' conception of 
ideology. Ideology does not denote 'false consciousness', and, in fact, it is not related to falsity or illusion 
at all. There is no function of misrecognition, as there is also no conception of critique, whether scientific, 
philosophical or political, which is to be opposed to ideological phenomena. The term `ideology' plays a 
thoroughly positive and practical role for Gramsci - being the `cement' which unifies socio-political 
actors, giving them a definite degree of cohesion and unity, necessary for political action. 
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real philosopher is, and cannot be other than, the politician, the active man who 
modifies the environment". 69 What philosophers and scientist do, what they cannot but 
keep doing, is to elaborate concepts and categories in the service of politics and political 
action: "Everything is political, even philosophy or philosophies [... ) and the only 
`philosophy' is history in action, that is, life itself". 70 
This tendency of historical relativisation that we find in Gramsci has, 
undoubtedly, been subject to a heavy line of critical fire. Many interpreters have 
criticised the Italian communist thinker precisely for fact that he rejects any 
recognisable criteria of truth and knowledge. As Althusser would point out, for 
instance: "IGramscil so easily identifies religion, ideology, philosophy and Marxist 
theory, without calling attention to the fact that what distinguishes Marxism from these 
ideological 'conceptions of the world' is less the (important) formal difference that 
Marxism puts an end to any supra-terrestrial 'beyond', than the distinctive form of this 
absolute immanence (its 'earthliness'): the form of scientificity ". " 
But does this obscure plight into ideology also not carry potentially disastrous 
political consequences? If the truth of politics and of history is always relative to the 
development of a specific class consciousness at a given historical moment, how are we 
to privilege a certain type of consciousness from another, how can we say that one is 
politically more sound than another? Even if we adopt the criterion of `effectivity' that 
Gramsci puts forward, is there any way to differentiate between truth and demagogy, 
between truth and `beautiful lies'? As Terry Eagleton remarked: "If those ideas are true 
which serve to realize certain social interests, does this not open the door to a cynical 
pragmatism which, as with Stalinism, defines objectivity as whatever happens 
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politically to suit you? ". 72 In the last instance, Gramsci indeed seems to be 
spontaneously discovering the theoretical principle for any type of dogmatic and 
instrumental manipulation in politics. 
1.6. Hegemony and class consciousness 
Let us also note the immanent theoretical effects of Gramsci's `absolute 
historicism': Marxism, as a theory of history, or as a theory of the historical 
contradictions of capitalism, will now become primarily, if not exclusively, a theory of 
consciousness. That is, it will become a theory whose principle theoretical and practical 
concern is the formation of the class consciousness of the proletariat, its shaping into a 
subject of history and of politics. How does the proletariat gain knowledge of its 
position and its role in history, its objective place in the structure of capitalism and its 
mechanisms of domination? How can the exploited classes avoid being stranded in a 
`common sense' which renders them subaltern, which subordinates their mode of life to 
the dominant forces? And, in the end, how can the workers' struggle attain that 
necessary degree of political unity and political consciousness which is a precondition 
for any revolutionary action? 
At the centre of the problematic that Gramsci sets out, we thus find the Hegelian 
topoi of the an sich and für sich through which Marx attempted to describe the historical 
and political formation of social classes and their `consciousness', we find the problem 
of the relationship between a class `in itself' and a class `for itself'. 73 This is the 
72 Eagleton (1991) op. cit, pg. 121. 
'' The famous passage from The Poverty of Philosophy reads: "Economic conditions had first transformed 
the mass of the people into workers. The domination of capital has created for this mass a common 
situation, common interests. This mass is thus already a class as against capital, but not yet for itself. In 
the struggle, of which we have noted only a few phases, this mass becomes united and constitutes itself as 
a class for itself. The interests it defends become class interests. " Karl Marx (1936) The Poverty of 
Philosophy, London: Lawrence and Wishart, pg. 145. 
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political substrate of Gramsci's `philosophy of praxis', this is the principle stake of the 
historicist construction elaborated in the Prison Notebooks. 
But what Gramsci makes here from a somewhat lateral conceptual couple in 
Marx is not only the central point for Marxist theory, but a point at which Marxism 
exhausts itself. Marxism exhausts itself in the problem of consciousness because it can 
only respond to this problem directly: by theorising the direct intrusion of scientific and 
philosophical ideas into history and politics, by theorising its own passage into 
proletarian consciousness. Before rationality, we find an active desire or will, before 
knowledge we find consciousness and self-consciousness of socio-historical groups. 
Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will, as Gramsci would say. 
There are, of course, direct parallels which we can draw here with other thinkers 
which have characterised the field of `Western Marxism'. In the first place, we can 
think of Lukäcs, whose History and Class Consciousness also sought to translating 
Marxism straight into political consciousness, whilst proposing the phenomenon of 
`class consciousness' as the solution to the dire economic contradictions of capitalism. "' 
But Gramsci is very precise here: as he goes to 'operational ise' his theory of 
consciousness by providing it, through the concept of the intellectuals, with a concrete 
sociological form. 75 If important social and political processes are realised according to 
the development of class consciousness, this development cannot take place without 
örganisation and without the intellectuals. Social classes do not gain knowledge and 
awareness of themselves spontaneously, but only with the help of specialised and 
autonomised intellectual labour: "Critical self-consciousness means, historically and 
politically, the creation of an elite of intellectuals. A human mass does not distinguish 
itself, does not become independent in its own right without intellectuals, without 
74 As Lukacs would argue in his seminal work, History and Class Consciousness: "Only the 
consciousness of the proletariat can point to the way that leads out of the impasse of capitalism". See 
Gyorgy Lukacs (1972) History and Class Consciousness, MIT Press, pg. 76. 
"For Lukacs's more `modest' attempt of an 'operationalisation' see his 1919 essay `Tactics and Ethics' 
in: Lukdes, Georg (1972) Etika i politika, Zagreb: Naprijed. 
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organisers and leaders, in other words, without the theoretical aspect of the theory- 
practice nexus being distinguished concretely by the existence of a group of people 
`specialised' in conceptual and philosophical elaboration of ideas". 76 The intellectuals - 
and especially those whom Gramsci calls `organic intellectuals', those who stand in an 
immediate relationship to social classes, as opposed to the `traditional intellectuals' who 
attempt to maintain an aura of `detachment' and intellectual `autonomy' - are the true 
mediators between philosophy and history, between theory and practice, between self- 
consciousness and revolutionary activity. It is the intellectuals who are responsible, in 
the last instance, for the very existence of social classes as political and historical actors, 
as they provide a guarantee for their social cohesion, by the elaboration and 
reproduction of their Weltanschauungen, by the preservation of their `intellectual and 
moral unity', by the active, organisational formation of their `wills'. As Gramsci would 
write: "The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, 
which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active 
participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, `permanent persuader' and not 
just a simple orator". " 
At this point we can clearly see Gramsci's philosophical ruminations coming 
full circle with his conception of politics. We can see how the entire attempt of the 
autonomisation of the terrain of civil society finds its direct correlate in the 
autonomisation of consciousness, and in the embodiment of consciousness in the labour 
of intellectuals in the media of civil society. 
But this is also the point the paradoxes of Gramsci's theoretical constructions of 
politics can be properly exposed. If we already saw how Gramsci's autonomisation of 
hegemony leaves open a perilous ambiguity, the same problem can be noted with regard 
to Gramsci's attempt to elaborate and autonomise a theory of consciousness in history. 
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Gramsci's `consciousness' also falls under the impression of `hanging in the air'. It also 
seems as being secluded from the material realities of class struggle, as if Gramsci had 
placed in brackets the structural constraints of history and politics in capitalism, only to 
equate the historical movement with the unfolding of will and ideas - even if the latter 
are embodied in `sociological objects', such as the intellectuals, and not in pure thought 
or contemplation. 
The crux of the matter, again, hinges upon the way in which Gramsci binds 
together economic realities with politics and ideology in the domain of consciousness. 
The key in this regard is what he would term catharsis. Another beautifully ambivalent 
word, fully predisposed to deceive the prison censor, and, at the same time, another 
borrowing from Croce's language. But Gramsci accords a resolutely political meaning 
to the term: catharsis is the concept denoting the very process of the transformation of 
the proletariat into a revolutionary class, the concept depicting the process of the 
`acquisition of consciousness'. As Gramsci writes: "The term `catharsis' can be 
employed to indicate the passage from the purely economic (or egoistic-passional) to 
the ethico-political moment, that is the superior elaboration of the structure into 
superstructure in the minds of men". 78 
At first glance, Gramsci seems to be effectively employing here the Marxian an 
sich and für sich, as an opposition between unconsciousness and consciousness relating 
to the formation social classes. Catharsis seems to be a matter of making explicit and 
active in consciousness, in the domain of politics and ideology, that which remains 
latent and potential in the infrastructure. What is being `purified' and `set free' are 
economic tensions, contradictions that exist in the sphere of capitalist production, 
largely in an unconscious manner, and which are now being `cathartically' transformed 
into a particular type of consciousness, into the consciousness of social classes. The 
'ý SPN, pg. 366. 
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development of the political and ideological class struggle is therefore a reflection, a 
conscious reflection of the existent economic contradictions of capitalism. From a 
purely passive sociological entity, the proletarian class passes into an active historical 
and political subject, becoming conscious of the contradictions out of which it was born, 
and seeking to overcome them. 
But this is not all that Gramsci presents us with here. He also adds a corrective 
to the Hegelo-Marxian schema. A corrective in the form a qualification: the effect of 
catharsis, the advent of the `ethico-political' moment, represents a `superior 
elaboration', a higher or a more progressive mode of consciousness. The relationship 
between the in itself and the for itself is thus not a simple relationship of reflection. 
There seems to be a definite dimension of progression in the passage from `social 
being' to consciousness, a dimension where the political moment is constituted by 
developing away from the economy. And indeed, if we look elsewhere in the 
Notebooks, we can see that Gramsci even formulates a specific gradation of this 
development, according the ascent of consciousness with a scale and a set of degrees. In 
fact, with three particular degrees which mark the movement from `corporatism' to 
`hegemony': 
"The first and most elementary of these is the economic-corporate level: I... ] the 
members of the professional group are conscious of its unity and homogeneity, and of 
the need to organise it, but in the case of the wider social group this is not yet so. A 
second moment is that in which consciousness is reached of the solidarity of interests 
among all the members of a social class - but still in the purely economic field I.... 1 A 
third moment is that in which one becomes aware that one's own corporate interests, in 
the present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely 
economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too. 
This is the most purely political phase, and marks the decisive passage from the 
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structure to the sphere of complex superstructures. It is the phase in which previously 
germinated ideologies become `party', come into confrontation and conflict, until only 
one of them, or at least a single combination of the, tends to prevail, to gain the upper 
hand, to propagate itself throughout society - bringing about not only a unison of 
economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the 
questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a `universal' plane, 
and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of 
subordinate groups". 79 
Gramsci seems to be a good Hegelian here: the immediate self-consciousness, 
the immediate experience of oneself, is only partial and thus false. The direct sentiments 
of economic classes, the awareness of their own conditions and struggles, do not 
provide the key to the political or the revolutionary moment proper. This is not enough 
to move history. Consciousness can become true and historically effective only after it 
is able to grasp the totality and act upon the totality, only after it abandons the 
limitations of the self, the limitations of its own particular origin. 
Again a parallel between Gramsci and Lukäcs comes to mind, between the 
Prison Notebooks and History and Class Consciousness, a parallel in terms of the 
centrality of the notions of self-consciousness and totality. But we should be careful: the 
whole that Gramsci is interested in is not the whole of cognition, it is not the critical 
'knowledge of the whole - the knowledge of the socio-historical totality, of the capitalist 
relations of production and their effects of exploitation and domination - which Lukäcs 
places at the centre of the development of the class consciousness of the proletariat, and 
which, moreover, can only arise from the `point of view of the proletariat'. 80 Gramsci's 
totality of consciousness is a practical totality, whose realisation takes direct leave from 
Lukäcs's emphasis on the conscious deepening of the rift in capitalism. Instead of 
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gripping upon the critical function of the Two, of the antagonistic class struggle at the 
heart of capitalism, Gramsci seems to be taking us away from the Two, as he envisages 
a political and historical movement of `totalisation' the essence of which is a process of 
political, ideological and cultural unification beyond and outside of the fundamental 
class division of capitalism. 81 Once constituted as political subjects, as active agents in 
history, social classes must transcend their own `classist' limitations, they must 
transform their own particularities and particular interests - which proceed from the 
economic sphere - whilst seeking to create an alliance or a fusion with other groups, 
their interests and demands, so that their strivings can become effectively universalised 
and so that they can become proper agents of history. 
Again, Gramsci autonomises politics, or the political moment proper, from the 
economic sphere. History does not find its political substance, its motor, in the 
determinate role of the economic contradictions of capitalism, in the critical awareness 
of the socio-economic conditions of exploitation of labour; rather, there seems to be a 
move away from these contradictions and their determination. It is not class struggle as 
such which makes history, but the progression of political consciousness away from the 
fundamental antagonism defined in the sphere of production. History progresses 
through a progression and expansion of political consciousness towards the plural and 
complex totality of the social realm. 
At a certain register, we can understand how Gramsci here opens the door to the 
entire domain of political pluralism, and to many different variants of post-Marxism 
which have exploited this domain. But this opening is made possible at the price of a 
grave theoretical sacrifice. The Gramscian schema of the `acquisition of consciousness' 
not only dismantles the rigidity of the figure of the Two of class struggle for each 
" In his Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre would also speak of `totalisation' in order to denote an act, 
or the process by which a social movement, composed of an essential heterogeneity and multiplicity, 
constitutes itself as a subject of its own activity. See Sartre, Jean-Paul (2004) Critique of Dialectical 
Reason, London: Verso. 
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strategic and tactical consideration, it also seems to be dismantling the short circuit 
between the economic sphere and politics. The political moment proper, for Gramsci, is 
not constituted anymore, as it is for Marx, by a critical conjunction of the economic and 
the political: by the short circuit which upsets the normal order of representation of 
politics by linking political realities directly with the economic sphere, by pointing out 
that the official sphere of `the political' rests directly upon economic exploitation and 
domination, upon class struggle, which it obscures and reproduces. The Gramscian 
political moment - what he calls, again, with Croce, `the ethico-political' moment - is 
constituted by a move away from the economic sphere, by an autonomisation of politics 
and political consciousness from the determination of economic realities. If Gramsci 
sees in corporatism the moment where "politics [is] grafted directly on to the 
economy", " then the moment of hegemony, which is politically superior, and indeed, 
which represents, "the most purely political phase", is the moment where politics is 
separated and disjointed from the economy. 
Of course, Gramsci is very careful whilst moving on this delicate terrain, and he 
does insist that "though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must 
necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the 
decisive nucleus of economic activity". 83 But even here, it seems hard to avoid the 
impression that the "decisive nucleus of economic activity" never passes directly into 
politics and political activity. It seems hard to avoid the feeling that Gramsci tends to 
keep politics permanently at a distance from the economic structure of capitalism. At 
best, he leaves completely open the question of how and in which form the economic 
contradictions penetrate into the `ethico-political moment', he leaves completely open 
the question of whether the political moment proper, the synthetic movement of 
hegemony, is, in the last instance, a politicisation of the economic structure of 
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capitalism. If the struggle of class against class, as Marx said, is a political struggle, is 
this struggle still, with Gramsci, class struggle? 
In the end, and this is perhaps the vexing point of Gramsci's entire schema, this 
ambiguity is effectively supported by a stupefying conceptual confusion: for if the 
Gramscian `catharsis' does rest upon a crucial reference to the economy, we should note 
that what we are speaking of here is not the determinate materiality of the economic 
sphere. The `economic' moment in the passage from corporatism to hegemony does not 
denote the structure of economic production and reproduction, but the subjectivity that 
is produced in an immediate contact to it. The `economic' is the most `vulgar' moment 
of consciousness: the immediate particularity of the class interest or a class point of 
view, which is to be both included and surpassed in the universalising movement of 
hegemony. It is a specific element of consciousness, and thus of the superstructures. 
As we can see, the entire problematic of the historical becoming of classes, of 
the acquisition of their `self', of their preparation for a decisive historical scenario 
which culminates in the revolutionary act, this entire theoretical space as defined by 
Gramsci rests upon a silence about what actually goes on in the infrastructure, about the 
processes and struggles that take place in the sphere of production. Gramsci's theory of 
class consciousness leaves a looming shadow over those precise problems that Marx 
sought to define vis-ä-vis the structure of capital: problems of the exploitation of labour 
through the extraction of surplus value, problems of class struggle and class domination 
which are fundamentally related to these contradictions, and problems of the role of the 
juridical, political and ideological apparatuses in the reproduction of the conditions of 
capitalist exploitation and domination. Even if Gramsci does mention, at some points, 
that each historical situation is always in the last instance "closely linked to the 
structure, objective, independent of human will, and which can be measured with the 
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systems of the exact of physical sciences", TM at the same time, he seems to acknowledge 
too readily that these conditions and realities are transitive limitations which are to be 
easily overcome with the development of hegemonic consciousness. For example, in the 
following passage: "Structure ceases to be an external force which crushes man, 
assimilates him to itself and makes him passive; and is transformed into a means of 
freedom, an instrument to create a new ethico-political form and a source of new 
initiatives". "' This is certainly why the Notebooks have themselves directly allowed for 
many idealist and voluntaristic readings, paving the road for a reinterpretation of 
Marxism as and idealistic philosophy of Consciousness and Freedom. See, for example, 
Norberto Bobbio: "The superstructure is the moment of catharsis, that is the moment in 
which necessity is resolved into liberty, understood, in a Hegelian way as the awareness 
of necessity j... the very moment in which the material conditions are recognised, they 
become degraded to an instrument for whatever end is desired"" 
1.7. Conclusion 
The unquestionable merit of Gramsci is to have reinscribed the political moment 
proper at the heart of the theoretical problematic of Marxism. Gramsci decisively 
expands the horizon of Marxist theory in the direction of the superstructures, whilst at 
11 the same time detaching politics and political practice from the mechanic movement of 
economic laws, from the pessimism and the evolutionism which has characterised the 
period of the Second International. He also brings out the importance of strategic issues 
of organisation, mobilisation and consciousness in the struggle over political autonomy. 
But Gramsci effectuates this inscription of the `political' at a price of a profound 
paradox. In his obstinate attempt to localise the moment of the autonomy of politics - in 
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the space of civil society, and in the historical movement of consciousness - Gramsci 
ends up obscuring if not dissolving some of the most critical elements of Marxist theory 
and Marxist politics. The result of `absolute historicism' seems to be the suspension of 
the very core of Marx's critical discovery: the short circuit between the sphere of 
capitalist production and the political and ideological apparatus of the State. Bearing 
this paradox in mind, we will explore its dramatic effects in a specific attempt of the 
transposition of the Gramscian problematic beyond Marxism: in the post-Marxist 
perspective of Laclau and Mouffe. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
THE POST-MARXIST IMPASSE: 
LACLAU AND MOUFFE, HEGEMONY AND RADICAL 
DEMOCRACY 
A so-called `going beyond' Marxism will be at 
worst only a return to pre-Marxism; at best, only the 
rediscovery of a thought already contained in the philosophy 
which one believes he has gone beyond. 
(J. P. Sartre, Search for a Method) 
2.1. Introduction: Post-Marxism today 
"Postmarxisms", as Fredric Jameson tells us, whilst putting the term in inverted 
commas, "regularly emerge at those moments in which capitalism itself undergoes a 
structural metamorphosis". ' Whenever a significant historical transformation in the 
capitalist `world-system' - its expansion, its modification, its critical and cyclical 
reinvigoration - changes the shape and the configuration of socio-economic realities, 
the contours of the relation between capital and labour, thus redefining the dimensions 
of the process of production, the role of the State vis-ä-vis capital, the form of 
commodities and their reach, but also the terrain of actual struggles, both political and 
ideological, which surround the domain of capitalist exploitation, one can expect an 
opening of the space for theoretical reactions, for modifications and reformulations, re- 
foundations and revisions, and even open crises. Sartre once famously remarked that 
"'revisionism' is either a truism or an absurdity" and that "[there is no need to readapt a 
living philosophy to the course of the world; it adapts itself by means of thousands of 
'Jameson, Fredric (1996) "Five theses on actually existing Marxism", in: Monthly Review, April 1996,47 
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new efforts, thousands of particular pursuits, for the philosophy is one with the 
movement of society". ' A theoretical crisis, from this angle, is simply an index of the 
historicity of concepts, an index not only of their capacity to confront in a critical 
manner the ever changing historical terrain of capitalism, but also of the position of 
these concepts within the fluctuating configurations of philosophy, science and 
ideology, always close as they are to the field of power and the clash of historical forces 
- Louis Althusser, as we will see later, spoke of `philosophical battlefronts' in this 
regard. 
But at which point does the labour of rectification and adaptation become the 
labour of renunciation and dismissal? For crises can also explode and exacerbate, and 
steered by endogenous and exogenous causes, lead to disenchantments and rejections, 
even violent repudiations. Jameson is certainly right to note a structural connection 
between cycles of permutations of the capitalist system and the emergence of immanent 
attempts at abandoning or `overcoming' the Marxian or Marxist critical paradigm. From 
Bernstein's `evolutionary socialism', through the post-war, `Eurocommunist' shifts 
towards social-democracy, until today's intellectual fascination with post-modernism, 
post-Marxism has been a recurrent phenomenon within the heterogeneous history of 
Marxism. ' 
One of the principal theoretical foundations of what we call `post-Marxism' 
today draws its origins from a 1985abook by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, titled 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 4 This book, 
a self-professed manifesto for post-Marxism, is, as one observer noted `beautifully 
2 Jean-Paul Sartre (1963), Search for a Method, New York: Vintage Books, pg. 7. 
3 For a historical overview of the dialectic between the `crises of Marxism' and different `post-Marxist' 
arguments, from Masaryk to Kautsky and German social democracy, to the debates of the 1980s, see 
Bensussan's entry "Crises du Marxisme" in the Dictionnaire critique du marxisme, (1985) pg. 259-270. 
° Laclau and Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 
London: Verso. (Second Edition, 2001) (from hereafter HSS). 
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paradigmatic'. 5 Beautifully paradigmatic because it not only condenses an entire set of 
theoretical and political tendencies which were moving the Left in a rightward direction 
in the 1970s and 1980s, but also because it shows us an immanent unfolding, from 
within Marxism itself, of that political consciousness which provided the theoretical 
`superstructure' for the restructuring of capitalism at the beginning of the 1990s in 
Eastern Europe, but also in Latin America and on the Indian subcontinent. ' 
The centre stage of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy is occupied by an open 
announcement of the `demise' and the `end' of Marxism. Laclau and Mouffe present 
this in the guise of a natural occurrence -a logical forward movement in the life of 
history, almost as a biological process of ageing. Times have changed, both 
theoretically and politically, and we should move on. Marxist theory, according to 
Laclau and Mouffe, has been exhausted both as an explanatory framework - as a theory 
of history and of socioeconomic and political struggles - and as a concrete orientation 
for political action -a political ideology or a political movement. In any case, it is 
wholly inappropriate for our post-modern world, for the condition of `advanced 
industrial societies', where the increase of `social complexity' and of the conflicts 
related to this readily collapses any attempt at subsuming the sphere of social struggles 
under the dualistic Schemas characteristic of Marxist theory. In the opening words of 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: "The `evident truths' of the past, the classical forms 
of analysis and political calculation, the nature of the forces in conflict, the very 
S Ellen Wood (1998) The Retreat From Class: A New True Socialism (revised edition), London: Verso. 
Pg. 47. 
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they were the ones who added a particular ideological tenor to the term, whilst making of 'post-Marxism' 
an explicit ideological project: the point being not simply to `succeed Marx', but rather to renounce 
Marxism as a theoretical and political project. This is what contrasts them to a range of other 
contemporary authors and projects which are commonly - and in my opinion wrongly - associated with 
the notion of 'post-Marxism', such as Antonio Negri, Alain 13adiou, Etienne Balibar or Jacques Ranciere. 
Moreover, this is also what makes of Laclau and Mouffe's 'post-Marxism' a peculiar accomplice to the 
post-socialist political ideology, which in its own way at the beginning of the 1990s rushed to bury Marx 
as a 'dead dog'. For an intellectual history of post-Marxism from within the Laclau and Mouffe 
perspective, see Stuart Sim (2000), Post-Marxism: An Intellectual History, London: Routledge. For an 
alternative perspective, see Wood, op. cit. 
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meaning of the Left's struggles and objectives - have been seriously challenged by an 
avalanche of historical mutations". ' When the plethora of the particularistic struggles 
and issues associated with the phenomenon of the `new social movements' start 
squeezing out and displacing the typical figures of class conflict, the capitalist boss and 
the labourer, Marxism is not only pushed into a theoretical crisis, but is forced straight 
into admitting its own theoretical capitulation. " The entire arsenal of concepts which 
defined Marxism's grip on history and on historical development - concepts of class 
struggle, of commodity fetishism, of the exploitation of labour in the process of 
production, but also types of political analyses which Marxism has produced, essentially 
related to the notion of the revolution and to an understanding of socioeconomic and 
political crises - founders directly in front of the political `complexity' of the present, 
and should thus be rejected in toto: "The plural and multifarious character of 
contemporary struggles has finally dissolved the last foundation for that political 
imaginary". 9 
In place of the figures of class struggle, of the `State and Revolution', Laclau 
and Mouffe propose a new theoretical framework for politics, based upon a radical 
recasting and deconstruction of Marxist concepts: "To reread Marxist theory in the light 
of contemporary problems, necessarily involves deconstructing the central categories of 
7 IISS, pg. 1. 
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essential determinations, the understanding of an actual event can only mean to identify it as a moment in 
temporal succession that is fixed a priori". (HSS, pg. 21) The problem with this critique, as many 
interpreters pointed out, is that it too readily embraces caricatural depictions of Marx and of Marxism in 
order to support its arguments. For forceful criticisms of L&M's criticisms of Marxism see Wood, op. cit. 
Sec also, Geras, Norman (1987) "Post-Marxism? ", New Left Review, 1, no. 163. 
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that theory". " But, at the same time, they present this framework as the only suitable 
heir to Marxism: as the only one which enables us to continue today the emancipatory 
impulse which Marxism had provided in the twentieth century, to continue the radical 
thread of politics which is critically oriented against capitalism. Thus: "post-Marxism 
restores to Marxism the only thing that can keep it alive: its relation with the present 
and its historicity". " 
It is interesting for us to examine the approach of Laclau and Mouffe for-two 
reasons. In the first place, because it directly links to the problems of Marxist theory 
which we are attempting to trace here: problems of revolutionary politics and its 
autonomy, of the State and of ideology, and the debates surrounding the work of 
Gramsci and Althusser. What Laclau and Mouffe present us in this regard is a 
interesting limit case. Inasmuch as they draw directly from Gramsci's conceptual 
apparatus, they allow us to further seize the depth of the problems surrounding the 
interpretations of Gramsci, whilst pointing to some real perils of Gramsci's historicism. 
As I will attempt to demonstrate below, these perils are condensed precisely around the 
exacerbation of the problem of the `autonomy of politics'. At the same time, Laclau and 
Mouffe are interesting due to the ideological complementarities that their approach 
exhibits with regard to the dominant political discourses of post-socialism. In one of the 
subsequent chapters, I will try to show how the two even stand in direct contact, by 
tracing the embededness of Laclau and Mouffe's theoretical apparatus in post-socialist 
politics. 
10 HSS (second edition), pg. ix. 
Ernesto Laclau (1990) New Reflections on The Revolution of Our Time, London: Verso, pg. 236. 
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2.2. Gramsci for the post-moderns: the theory of hegemony 
The post-Marxist alternative to Marxism is presented in the guise of a `theory of 
hegemony'. A theory which finds its roots in Gramsci, but takes things far beyond the 
limits of the Italian Marxist, by drawing extensively from other theoretical fields, fields 
such as structural linguistics and structural anthropology, and from the post-structuralist 
and deconstructivist approaches, Lacanian psychoanalysis, as well as the philosophical 
investigations of Heidegger and Wittgenstein. 
But why Gramsci in the first place? 
Gramsci is, according to Laclau and Mouffe, not only an enfant terrible within 
Marxism - one who presumably openly points out, although despite himself, the fatal 
gaps in Marxist theorisations of politics and of history - but also one who formulates, 
without being aware of it, a conceptual framework adequate to the historical condition 
of capitalist post-modernity, where the plurality of social struggles and antagonisms, in 
their contingency and their unbridled dispersion, reigns supreme: "The Gramscian 
theory of hegemony I ... I accepts social complexity as the very condition of political 
struggle and I... ] sets the basis for a democratic practice of politics, compatible with a 
plurality of historical subjects". " Hence, as Laclau and Mouffe would claim: "the 
expansion and determination of the social logic implicit in the concept of `hegemony' - 
in a direction that goes far beyond Gramsci - will provide us with an anchorage from 
which contemporary social struggles are thinkable in their specificity, as well as 
permitting us to outline a new politics for the Left based upon the project of a radical 
democracy". " 
'= HSS, pg. 71. 
13 Ibid, pg. 3. 
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What particular shape does this post-modern reading of Gramsci take? And how 
can we concretely trace the peculiar `loan' that the authors of Hegemony want to accord 
to the Italian communist theorist? 
Laclau and Mouffe start with the fundamental issue associated with the notion of 
hegemony, the issue of political association. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
problem of hegemony, for Gramsci, was essentially the problem of the construction of 
political unity, the construction of the political bond - not simply through forms of 
strategic negotiation and bargaining, a give-and-take game between different political 
groups and organisations, but rather through a substantive transformation of the very 
identity and self-perception of these political actors. In the hands of Laclau and Mouffe, 
however, the scenario of the construction of political and historical subjectivities in the 
plural and heterogeneous realm of `civil society' gets expanded beyond the level of a 
conceptualisation of a particular domain of social life. The Gramscian scene of 
hegemony now becomes a skeleton for the formalisation of an abstract theoretical 
framework, a social ontology. Hegemony becomes the general scene of the construction 
of social relations and social identities, and of the constitution of society as such. 
But things have gone quite far. If Gramsci, in conceptualising the `collective 
will', or the collective subject of hegemony in terms of the fusion and the remoulding of 
different social and political elements, gave an example of the transformative power of 
political relations, Laclau and Mouffe take this observation to an extreme. They come to 
conceive the entirety of social identities, the entirety of objects and subjects that make 
up the social terrain in terms of the logic of relations and relationality. Instead of being 
fixed and pre-determined, all the elements of society are seen only from the perspective 
of their mutual interrelations and ties. And, what is most important, it is these relations 
in themselves, and nothing else, which determines the very being of these elements. If, 
for Ferdinand de Saussure, language was of a system of differential relations between 
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signs, without any positive and firm objects, 14 Laclau and Mouffe, in their turn, propose 
a conception of society based fully upon such a logic of differential relations and 
combinations: "The necessity of the social is the necessity proper to purely relational 
identities - as in the linguistic principle of value". 
15 Analogous to the assumption that 
the value of linguistic elements can only be derived from the interrelational nexus in 
which these elements are involved, or better, that signs do not possess a meaning in 
themselves, apart through their differentiation with other elements in the linguistic 
system, Laclau and Mouffe claim that society and its constitutive elements - social 
groups and interests, political ideologies and institutions, social movements, economic 
tendencies - cannot be accounted for as meaningful objects apart from and prior to their 
relations within the totality of a social system of mutual interrelations. Reaching for de 
Saussure, and even more for the post-structuralist radicalisation of the structural model 
of signification, they argue that any discrete element of the structure of society, any 
particular fragment of the social body, can be reconceptualised in terms of the logic of 
signifying system, the logic of the signifier. Each of these social elements, in itself, 
possesses a solely differential and positional nature -just like a signifier in a signifying 
chain, it is what the other signifiers in this chain are not. This means that, ultimately, 
society contains no positive terms, that there are no social objects which would be given 
in advance, but that there exist only sets of relations. The logic of the social is purely 
combinatorial. 
This comparison with structuralist and post-structuralist conceptions of language 
is, however, not merely coincidental. It is substantive. For Laclau and Mouffe do not 
only seek to establish an analogy between linguistic and symbolic systems and socio 
political realities, but to build a deep homology and unity between the two terrains, as 
they venture into redefining the social in its entirety in terms of the symbolic, and 
14 Ferdinand de Saussure (1959) Course in General Linguistics, New York: Philosophical Library. 
15 HSS, pg. 114. 
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ultimately, into asserting an indiscernibility between the social and the discursive: "Our 
analysis rejects the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices. It 
affirms: a) that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object 
is given outside every discursive condition of emergence; and b) that any distinction 
between what are usually called the linguistic and behavioural aspects of a social 
practice, is [... ] an incorrect distinction". " Social relations are thus immediately and 
inseparably fused with discursive relations, that is, they both unfold and intersperse 
themselves at one and the same terrain: "There are not two planes, one of essences and 
the other of appearances, since there is no possibility of fixing an ultimate literal sense 
for which the symbolic would be a second and derived plane of signification". " 
This does not mean, according to the authors of Hegemony, that the social world 
is completely reduced to words, thoughts and ideas, whether beautiful and truthful or 
not, but rather that discourses and practices, words and things, concepts and realities, 
ideologies and institutions, subjects and objects, all form an inseparable whole, and are 
thus open to that peculiar type of theoretical probing which is proper to a linguistic or a 
semiotic structural analysis. Laclau and Mouffe go as far as to claim that as a 
consequence of their approach, linguistic concepts and discursive tropes, such as 
metaphor and metonymy, are not to be taken only as analogical tools which may help 
broaden our understanding of social relations, but can be seen and analysed as real 
logics present in the actual working of society: "Synonymy, metonymy, metaphor are 
not forms of thought that add a second sense to a primary, constitutive literality of 
social relations; instead, they are part of the primary terrain itself in which the social is 
constituted". " Henceforth, it becomes possible to analyse the entire field of social and 
political relations in the same manner in which one would analyse the structuration and 
restructuration of discursive surfaces - in terms of `text' and `context'. And if it is not 
16Ibid, pg. 107. 
" ibid, pg. 98. 
'8 Ibid, pg. 110. 
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simply a matter of de Saussure's or the Levi-Straussian depiction of the combinatorial 
logic of signs and their endless differentiations in a system of signification, then it is 
Derrida with his rejection of the conception of language as a fixed system of 
objectivities, 19 and the concomitant introduction of contingency and indeterminacy into 
the structuralist combinatory that will provide the theoretical key to all the secrets of the 
social world. The Derridian marrying of structuralism and phenomenology, and his 
critique of the `metaphysical' nature of the structuralist model of language, would put 
markers of indeterminacy, contingency, and ambiguity at the forefront of Laclau and 
Mouffe's conception of social relations. With Derrida, the two authors would exclaim: 
"The absence of the transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely". 20 
In the end, we get a very peculiar ontological picture of society and of social 
relations. In the first place, society, for Laclau and Mouffe, is an entirely made up and 
constructed world. All social and political objects, all social identities are "the outcome 
of discursive construction (... J and the social is entirely reconceptualized I... I in terms 
of discursivity". Z' Laclau and Mouffe advance a specific constructivist conception, and 
a radical constructivism in that: "Human beings socially construct their world, and it is 
`9 The key here is the celebrated passage from Writing and Difference: "It became necessary to think both 
the law which somehow governed desire for a centre in the constitution of structure, and the process of 
signification which orders the displacements and substitutions for this law of central presence - but a 
central presence which has never been itself, has always already been exiled from itself into its own 
substitute. The substitute does not substitute itself for anything which has somehow existed before it, 
henceforth, it was necessary to begin thinking that there was no centre, that the centre could not be 
thought in the form of a present-being, that the centre had no natural site, that it was not a fixed locus but 
a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play". Quoted 
from: Jacques Derrida (1978) Writing and Difference, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pg. 280. The 
second important theoretical reference here, of course, is the work of Jacques Lacan, and primarily his 
attempt to reshape Freudian psychoanalytic concepts through De Saussure's combinatorial logic. Slavoj 
2i%ek, in his early works, offers a Lacanian interpretation and extension of Laclau and Mouffe's theory. 
See for example Slavoj Liiek (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso. 
20 Derrida (1978), pg. 280. 
2 Simon Critchley and Oliver Marchart "Introduction", in: Critchley and Marchart (2004) Laclau: A 
critical reader, London: Routledge, pg. 4. 
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through this construction - always precarious and incomplete - that they give to a thing 
its being". 22 
This shifting world of constructions of society is at the same time essentially 
unstable and fluid. It is characterised by a permanent malleability, by constant flux, 
where indeterminacy and plurality of meanings constantly overload and threaten any 
permanent fixation. There are no social structures are which are firm and rigid, which 
may present themselves to us as `essences', and which may possess an objective logic, 
independent of human will and meaningful interactions. The meaning of social 
identities, positions and functions ultimately depends upon contingent and transient 
discursive constructions. A social element, that is, a specific fragment of the social 
structure, a particular social group, a political position or an ideological topos, is always 
subject to constant metaphorical and metonymical interventions, to the precarious play 
of discursive rearticulations and remouldings: "Society and social agents lack any 
essence, and their regularities merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of 
fixation which accompany the establishment of a certain order". 
The purpose of this constructivist, or as Laclau and Mouffe would have it, `anti- 
essentialist' or `anti-foundationalist' ontology is the following: to affirm the plurality 
and heterogeneity of contemporary social relations, and especially, the plurality of 
contemporary political struggles. Laclau and Mouffe are categorical in this regard: "If 
[... J we renounce the hypothesis of a final closure of the social, it is necessary to start 
from a plurality of political and social spaces which do not refer to any ultimate 
unitarian basis. Plurality is not the phenomenon to be explained, but the starting point of 
the analysis". 24 Inasmuch as society is not conceived as an organic or systemic totality, 
but as a plurality of shifting signifiers, each of which does not possess a fixed meaning 
22 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe "Post-Marxism without apologies", in: Ernesto Laclau (1990) New 
Reflections on The Revolution of Our Time, London: Verso, pg. 110. 
' HSS, pg. 98. 
24 Ibid, pg. 140. 
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or a fixed signified, as it is prone to constant sliding, remoulding and transformation, 
then we are basically speaking of an `irreducible complexity of society', the `infinitude 
of the social' or the `growing proliferation of differences'. 
At the same time, this is also the fundamental tool of Laclau and Mouffe's 
critique of Marxist analysis of history and politics. Against what they hold as Marxist 
`essentialism' and `monism' - where, as they see it, a single principle, a substance, or 
an essence, is posited as the truth of all things that appear, always being present in them, 
determining all their properties - the purpose of the pluralistic relational ontology is to 
comprehend the wealth and multiplicity of the empirical realm of politics, the entire 
realm of historical appearances in its concreteness and its givenness. In Marxism, 
according to Laclau and Mouffe, "the concrete is reduced to the abstract. Diverse 
subject positions are reduced to manifestations of a single position; the plurality of 
differences is either reduced or rejected as contingent; I ... I history, society and social 
agents have I ... J an essence which operates as their principle of unification. 
And as this 
essence is not immediately visible, it is necessary to distinguish between a surface or 
appearance of society and an underlying reality to which the ultimate sense of every 
concrete presence must necessarily be referred". 25 
An embrace of the pluralistic, post-structuralist scenario represents an 
emancipation of the political moment proper from the monistic conception: "The terrain 
of politics Iin Marxism can only be a superstructure, insofar as it is a terrain of struggle 
between agents whose identity, conceived under the form of `interests', has set itself up 
at another level. This essential identity was thus fixed, once and for all, as an unalterable 
25 Ibid, pg. 21-22. It is worth noting the similarity here to that what Lord Karl Popper formulated as an 
attack on Marxist `historicism', whilst attempting, in his own way, to raise serious concerns about the 
analytical and explanatory capacity of the social and historical sciences, and even to put in question the 
very possibility of the explanation (as opposed to interpretation) of social and historical phenomena. See 
Karl Popper (1957) The Poverty of Historicism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, and also (1945) The 
Open Society and Its Enemies, London: Routledge. 
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fact relating to the various forms of political and ideological representation into which 
the working class entered". 26 
But where is the political moment located for Laclau and Mouffe? Politics, and 
specifically, the politics of hegemony, resides at the very centre of their relational 
ontology. In fact, politics is nothing but the very practice of discursive construction, the 
practice of `articulation'. If articulation is generally "any practice establishing a relation 
among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory 
practice", " then hegemony is the political dimension of this process. It is a "practice 
instituting nodal points which partially fix the meaning of the social in an organized 
system of differences". 28 Political practice is essentially related to the discursive 
construction of social meaning - or better, it is nothing but the discursive construction 
of social meaning. 
Laclau and Mouffe therefore locate politics not simply at the centre of society 
and social relations, but at each particular and possible place. Politics is not anymore a 
specific region, or a sphere of society, but the condition of possibility of social relations 
as such: a horizon. As Dallmayr would put it: "What society needs to gain contours is 
some kind of political articulation, that is, the formulation and establishment of a 
hegemonic political relationship". 29 In short, everything is political, and politics in the 
broad sense permeates all social spaces and relations - from the economy and 
production to the family and the church, from political meetings to literary gatherings, 
semiotic workshops and acts of naming a ship. Hegemony has, in other words, "become 
a name for the general logic of the political institution of the social. As a consequence 
of this move, the realm of politics was significantly extended to the institution of the 
social as such, where political identities are articulated on a terrain which is primary and 
='HSS, pg. 21-22. 
27 Ibid, pg. 105. 
28Ibid, pg. 135. 
29 Fred Dallmayr "Laclau and Hegemony: some (post) Hegelian caveats", in: Critchley and Marchart 
(2004), pg. 42. 
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not derivable from any underlying `reality', such as the economic `laws of motion' that 
govern the relations of production". " This is why Dallmayr would also say that 
"hegemony involves centrally a revalorization of politics against all forms of 
reductionism (subordinating politics to other domains)". " 
And how can it be otherwise, for there can be no `underlying reality', there can 
be nothing else to reduce politics to. There is only one space, only one `horizon' for 
Laclau and Mouffe, and this is the inseparable interspersing of social and discursive 
relations. If everything is discourse, and if discourse is at the same time nothing other 
than politics, we cannot look for the meaning of political relations in another social 
space. It is incoherent to speak of the distinctions between regions or spaces of social 
practices beyond or outside of political articulation: "the separation between the 
political and the economic I... I is the result of discursive practices, and it is not possible 
to immunize it a priori from every discourse constructing their unity". 32 Politics qua 
hegemony fixes the meaning of the incessant diversity of significations, it arrests the 
endless game of discursive substitutions, as it also determines the distinctions between 
all institutional spheres and regions of social relations. As Mouzelis pointed out: "To 
start the analysis with `pre-constituted' economic and political spheres in order to 
examine their alleged inter-relationships is thus, in their view, to fall again into the 
essentialist trap". " 
But the drive inherent to thetordering operation of hegemony is not chaotic and 
disorderly. It has a definite form and direction. The problem of hegemonic articulation 
is essentially the problem of the construction of a political formation, a chain which 
unifies different and disparate elements, whilst bestowing upon them specific marks of 
commonality. According to David Howarth: "The major aim of hegemonic projects is to 
30 Critchley and Marchart (2004), "Introduction", pg. 3. 
;' Dallmayr, op. cit., pg. 42. 
" HSS, pg. 121. 
3 Nicos Mouzelis (1988) "Marxism or Post-Marxism? ", New Left Review, 1, no. 167. Pg. 119. 
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construct and stabilize systems of meaning or `hegemonic formations' which, on a 
societal level, are organized around the articulation of nodal points. The latter are 
defined as privileged condensations of meaning that partially fix the identities of a 
particular set of signifiers". 34 Like in the semiotic notion of the signifying chain, Laclau 
and Mouffe speak of `chains of equivalence' which are central to the practice of 
hegemonic articulation. Chains of equivalence unite and transform the signifying 
elements by condensing their meaning and by giving them a temporary fixation. Since 
everything is constructed, so is the meaning of each of the elements, of each particular 
political position which enters into a combination. The meaning of such positions is 
only the result of the articulatory practice, where the elements are aligned and 
combined. For example, when it comes to the question of the meaning of political 
struggles, such as the new social movements: "The political meaning of a local 
community movement, of an ecological struggle, of a sexual minority movement, is not 
given from the beginning: it crucially depends upon its hegemonic articulation with 
other struggles and demands". 35 
Politics is thus in its essence a question of unity or a question of the bond. 
Politics exhausts itself in discursive totalisations, whose aim is the formation of a 
political link, a `collective man', as Gramsci would say. 
What is crucial here is the transposition of the Gramscian idea of the `ascent' of 
hegemonic consciousness, its passage from economic `autarchy' to political 
universality. Like the way in which, for Gramsci, economic `class consciousness' 
attains its true meaning and political force only when it abandons the shackles of its 
`corporatism' and enters into a liaison with other interests and groups, thus creating a 
sphere of universality, so particular `floating signifiers' attain their full strength in a 
political field only when their particularity is subverted and they are articulated in a 
'a David Howarth "Hegemony, political subjectivity, and radical democracy", in: Critchley and Marchart 
(2004), pg. 259. 
35 HSS, pg. 87. 
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broad front with other elements: "This relation, by which a certain particularity assumes 
the representation of a universality entirely incommensurable with it, is what we call a 
hegemonic relation. As a result, its universality is a contaminated universality: (1) it 
lives in this unresolvable tension between universality and particularity; (2) its function 
of hegemonic universality is not acquired for good but is, on the contrary, always 
reversible' . 36 If politics starts from particularities, if it starts from the irreducible 
plurality of discourses and political positions, its goal is the construction of a `universal 
bond', a surface of totalisation out of the sphere of particulars. But with the proviso that 
the particularity of the elements is not completely annulled. If hegemonic articulation 
adds a second layer of meaning to the diverse set of political positions or elements it 
does not collapse their particularity and their plurality. A totalistic surface, or the 
surface of hegemony, co-exists with the particularities that it unites. Although it exists 
only for a certain period of time, to be replaced by some other configuration. 
2.3. Absolute historicism at its extremes 
Assessing the peculiarity of this loan from Gramsci, what first strikes the eye is 
that Laclau and Mouffe have taken on board all the problematic points of Gramsci's 
historicism that we discussed in the previous chapter. And not only taken on board, but 
exploded in a veritable way. Gramsci's absolute historicism - or better, to acknowledge 
the essential ambiguity present in the work of the Italian communist theorist, the idealist 
side of Gramsci's philosophical and scientific investigations, gets, in the hands of 
Laclau and Mouffe, a specific theoretical boost and further expansion. Even to the point 
of paroxysm. 
36 HSS (second edition), pg. xii. 
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The perilous consequences of the extended sign of equality which Gramsci 
wanted to place between philosophy, science, religion, ideology, politics and real 
history are felt straight at the heart of Laclau and Mouffe's approach. If Gramsci sought 
to find a direct bond between philosophy and history, between thought and practice, 
whilst opening the path towards an idealist rendering of historical processes, Laclau and 
Mouffe continue this path in a direct way. But they do so beyond Gramsci, by 
collapsing the very distinction between thought and language on the one hand, and 
social practices or social reality on the other. "The category of discourse" as Terry 
Eagleton noted "is inflated to the point where it imperializes the whole world, eliding 
the distinction between thought and material reality". 37 
Laclau and Mouffe would try to rebuke against an accusation of idealism here, 
by claiming that this `identification' does not affect the problem of materiality, as we 
have to acknowledge that discursive practices are, in themselves, material practices, that 
language has definite material aspects and effects, precisely inasmuch as it is inscribed 
in the actions of social and historical agents as meaningful actors. 38 But this claim does 
not resolve the problem. In the first place, because it presumes that we render as 
equivalent - and thus cancel the differences between - very distant layers of materiality, 
very different layers of material practices. Even if we recognise the performative, and 
thus material force of speech acts, it is hardly possible to persuasively argue that the 
material effects of the act of naming a ship can be rendered equivalent to the material 
effects of the process of construction of such naval vessel. We rather need to speak of 
two completely different types of materialities, with two completely different types of 
material effects. 
But, at the same time, it is clear that the purpose of the `identification' that 
Laclau and Mouffe propose is not simply to equate different practices, to equate the 
37 Eagleton (1991) op. cit., pg. 219. 
'" See their "Post-Marxism without apologies" quoted earlier. 
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discursive and the social, but to assert the primacy of the linguistic and discursive over 
the social. This is clearly visible from their attack on Marxist `essentialism': when the 
economy is, as they claim, not a matter of an `essence' but of discursive construction, 
then there can be no talk of the primacy of economic determination, even if this 
determination is already displaced in a certain `last instance'. For this last instance is, 
according to Laclau and Mouffe, always already a discursive instance: economic 
relations, as relations between humans as meaningful agents, are mediated in language 
and through signifying constellations. In the end, political economy is not really 
economic at all, but political and discursive through and through. In fact, it is nothing 
else but politics and discourse. This is why the Marxian schema of the in itself and for 
itself which was so crucial for Gramsci would end up being fully overturned: "ITIhe 
Gramscian subject is in a contingent relation to its own material conditions I... ) There is 
no longer any question of an objectivity which necessarily imposes its own diktats, for 
the contingent interventions of the social actors partially determine such a structural 
objectivity". 39 
This is a veritable radicalisation of Gramsci: if Gramsci's `absolute historicism' 
imposed a certain silence on the material social practices, institutional forms, forms of 
property, forms of economic exploitation of labour, and the materiality of the State (its 
essential link to the violence of class struggle and class exploitation), Laclau and 
Mouffe turn this silence into a determinate absence. If Gramsci had placed in brackets, 
in his vigorous opposition to the economic determinism of the Second International, the 
most fundamental markers of the materialist approach to society and history, whilst 
suggesting that consciousness, that is, the general realm of ideology and culture, is the 
place where the societal contradictions can be resolved, Laclau and Mouffe, in their 
turn, completely drown material practices in the realm of consciousness and discourse. 
" Ernesto Laclau "Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the Constitution of Political 
Logics", in: Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Liiek (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, 
London: Verso, pg. 49. 
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The main problem with this construction, as Eagleton rightly pointed out, is that 
it simply gives us vulgar economic determinism standing on its head: "Whether 
`economics' gives rise to `politics', or vice versa as post-Marxism would hold, the 
relationship in both cases is essentially causal. Lurking behind the post-Marxist view is 
the Saussurean notion of the signifier as `producing' the signified". 40 Like in the crudest 
conception of economic determination, which readily collapses any idea of the 
complexity of the articulation between different types of material practices, between 
different instances of the social whole, Laclau and Mouffe's idea of discursive 
hegemony effectuates a violent reduction of different social and material realities to the 
fact of language. The picture is simply turned upside down: things are not under the 
command of the `evolutionary laws of capitalism', which determine and produce 
everything else, namely politics and ideology, but under the command of language or 
discourse alone, under the command of the signifier, which is in its own terms the 
source of material reality. In the language of classical idealism, we get being simply 
reduced to consciousness, we get material practices simply reduced to ideas or to the 
(discursive) representations of these practices 41 
This primacy of consciousness brings us only one step short from a voluntaristic 
representation of the historical process: the idea of the absolute malleability and 
makeability of social and historical relations. To be correct, Laclau and Mouffe are at 
pains to come up with a specific conception of structuration or fixation. The whole point 
of the application of a theory of the signifier to society is to show that there are 
signifying structures which possess a degree of permanence: "The impossibility of an 
ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial fixations I... I If the 
Eagleton (1991), pg. 209. 
41 Althusser once noted that "if there really are two distinct ways of identifying the superstructure with the 
infrastructure, or consciousness with the economy - one which sees in consciousness and politics only the 
economy, while the other imbues the economy with politics and consciousness, there is never more than 
one structure of identification at work - the structure of the problematic which, by reducing one to the 
other, theoretically identifies the levels present". (RC, pg. 138-139) 
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social does not manage to fix itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, 
the social only exists, however, as an effort to construct that impossible object. Any 
discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the 
flow of differences, to construct a centre. "42 But the peculiar thing about these moments 
of structuration - which Laclau and Mouffe, following Lacan, call `nodal points' - is 
that, in the last instance, they represent discursive or linguistic realities: structures 
rooted in the ambivalence of linguistic signs. This means that things are again under the 
command and primacy of language, and moreover, under the primacy of the discursive 
and rhetorical aspects of language. But when the distance between the concept or 
discourse and practice is annulled in such a radical way, we cannot but be left with a 
precarious and fluid world where human ideas and consciousness, and the practices of 
speech and rhetoric, are free to transform history and society, only to be constrained by 
the prevailing linguistic conventions. 
At the limits of Gramsci's historicism we discover the fallacies of the critique of 
`essentialism'. Laclau and Mouffe's `revalorisation of politics', as some interpreters put 
it, is itself a peculiar `essentialist' and reductionist theoretical operation. It implies a 
hypostatisation of consciousness, an encroachment of the discursive over all other social 
spheres, and particularly, over the material realities of production. If Laclau and Mouffe 
seek to `emancipate politics from the economy', they end up autonomising the domain 
of consciousness and ideas from everything else, leaving us with a space of floating 
rhetorical and discursive practices which are nevertheless posited as the source of all 
social relations -a single `essence' present in economic relations and structures, in 
political institutions, in subjective struggles, etc. 
We should note in passing here that entire critique of Marxist `essentialism' 
which Laclau and Mouffe suggest presupposes a peculiar ideological disfiguration of 
42 IISS, pg. 112. 
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the relation that Marx establishes between the spheres of the economy and politics. 
Marx certainly does not want to reduce politics to the economy - and do it in a 
finalistic, necessitarian and mechanicist manner as Laclau and Mouffe suggest43 - but to 
create a short circuit between two realities which are essentially disjointed in the 
dominant representations of society and history in the capitalist epoch. The economy 
does not function in Marx as the `essence' of politics, as the point of deterministic 
necessity, but as its excess, as that point which brings out the limits of the liberal 
representation of the political sphere -a representation which is prepared to 
accommodate everything, in its abstractness and its formality, but the fact of an 
essential connection between liberal juridico-political forms and the exploitative 
mechanisms of capital. In this sense, one could argue that it is precisely the absolute 
separation between politics and the economy - the emancipation and autonomisation of 
the `political' - which is one of the principle traits of `essentialist' thinking today, as it 
blocks the possibility of a critical reflection on the ideological mechanisms which help 
reproduce the capitalist relations of production. 
2.4. A critical and explanatory vacuum 
Laclau and Mouffe also replicate Granmsci's slide into idealism at the 
epistemological level. If the distance between different spheres of material practices, 
between different social instances, is levelled on the terrain of discourse, so does this 
terrain in itself level all the differences internal to it: the `horizon of discourse' equalises 
all different types of speech acts, all different types of discursive practices, whereby the 
practices that produce knowledge and cognition find themselves indiscernible from 
43 Marxism seems to be akin to technological determinism for Laclau and Mouffe: "For Marxism, the 
development of the productive forces plays the key role in the historical evolution towards socialism (... I 
They are at the root of the formation of an ever more numerous and exploited proletariat, whose historical 
mission is to take possession of, and collectively manage, highly socialized and developed productive 
forces". (HSS, pg. 77). 
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`beautiful lies'. Laclau and Mouffe readily efface any viable distinction between science 
and ideology or between knowledge and rhetoric. When everything is a matter of 
discourse and language, then there is no metalanguage as Lacan would say, there is no 
position that one can assume - in science, or philosophy, or politics, for example - from 
which the truth of social relations and political struggles can be conceived or spoken of. 
As Eagleton pointed out: "All discourse is aimed at the production of certain effects in 
its recipients, and is launched from some tendentious `subject position'; and to this 
extent we might conclude with the Greek Sophists that everything we say is really a 
matter of rhetorical performance within which questions of truth or cognition are strictly 
subordinate' . 4' Science and philosophy, and the entire realm of human knowledge, are 
to be judged solely from the point of view of `language games', from the point of view 
of the discursive effects that they produce - which, in the last instance boil down to 
rhetorical and ideological effects. At the apex of discursive historicism, the question of 
reason and of rationality itself would become an element immanent to the hegemonic 
game. 
While it is without doubt that scientific concepts and philosophical categories 
are essentially rooted in language, and thus also prone to a discursive analysis, this does 
not mean that one can wholly reduce the `point of enunciation' of philosophy or science 
to a mere rhetorical power play. If for nothing else, then not to fall into a relativist 
gloom, where all the cows are grey, and where each assertion of knowledge simply 
collapses. If one can recognise a definite need for a historicisation of truth claims, and 
thus also, for the historicisation of knowledge effects, there still need to be certain 
criteria so in order to judge the falsity or the truthfulness of the contents of 
philosophical or scientific statements, regardless of their, or precisely because of their 
contextual appearance. Otherwise we loose the very ground from which we can make 
4° Eagteton (1991) pg. 201. 
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any meaningful explanatory statements about the reality of history and social relations. 
As Adorno once pointed out in his polemic against sociology of knowledge: "A 
sociology of knowledge fails before philosophy: for the truth content of philosophy it 
substitutes its social function and its conditioning by interests, while refraining from a 
critique of that content itself, remaining indifferent toward it ... [It thus denies not only 
the objective structure of society but the idea of objective truth and its cognition". 45 
Adorno is right to immediately add that this reduction of thought and 
truthfulness to rhetoric also involves an emptying of the concept of ideology: "[A 
sociology of knowledge] fails equally before the concept of ideology, which it will stir 
into its broad beggarly broth; for the concept of ideology makes sense only in relation to 
the truth or untruth of what it refers to. There can be no talk of socially necessary 
delusions except in regard to what would not be a delusion". This is particularly true 
with regards to Laclau and Mouffe. When everything is a matter of discursive 
construction, and when social reality itself is but an effect of language games, then there 
is nothing left to hide, to mask or to distort. With ideology rebaptised into discourse, 
there is no distance anymore between social reality and its representation, between 
ideology and the structure of capitalism. The reality of capitalism is exactly what 
discourses construct it to be. There is thus no question of criticising the distortive social 
phenomena, such as commodity fetishism, for their distortiveness, as there is also no 
question of trying to understand the ways in which the ideology of the State's 
universality, and of the putative formal nature of the official political sphere, conceals 
real fissures and societal antagonisms. If the science and ideology couplet provided 
Marx with one of the principle oppositions for a critical examination of the 
`superstructures' of capitalism, Laclau and Mouffe completely deprive us of the 
possibility of such a critical reflection. Through their relativisiation of knowledge and of 
"'Theodor W. Adorno (1973) Negative Dialectics, New York: Continuum, pg. 197-198. 
46 Ibid. 
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criticism, they readily deprive us of a set of critical operations through which Marxism 
has enriched social and historical analysis. 
All that we are left with is a constructivist social ontology. But a social ontology 
which does not tell us much in theoretical and analytical terms, apart from the simple 
fact that social and political identities are constructed, that discourse plays a central role 
in this construction, that the being of social relations is pluralistic, and that all social 
structures are historically precarious. If this constructivist stance helps us deconstruct 
any established identity and denaturalise social structures, does it provide us with real 
analytical tools with which we might be able to analyse political situations in capitalism 
in their complexity? "(MJany of the concepts of classical analysis - `centre', `power', 
`autonomy', etc. - can be reintroduced", so Laclau and Mouffe claim, "if their status is 
redefined: all of them are contingent social logics which, as such, acquire their meaning 
in precise conjunctural and relational contexts, where they will always be limited by 
other - frequently contradictory - logics; but none of them has absolute validity, in the 
sense of defining a space or structural moment which could not in its turn be 
subverted". 47 But this does not amount to much in theoretical and analytical terms. It is 
not sufficient to simply say that the world in which we are living today is one of 
incessant constructability, because this leaves us with no means to wage out the 
significance of one discursive construction of social relations over another. It leaves us 
with no means to explain why certain social structures - like capitalism, for instance - 
endure, and why do so in a violent way. It certainly leaves with no tools to understand 
where certain constructions come from, and why they do so. In this regard, Norman 
Geras is right in asking: "Are some hegemonic practices, for example, more likely than 
others to prevail, or to prevail in certain conditions, and if so, why or in what 
conditions? I ... I Would it have anything to do with material or other resources in 
47 HSS, pg. 143. 
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different subject positions? [... I Would it depend on already existing structures, 
political or other, and if so, what would be the nature and scope of this dependence? Or 
must we just assume that openness and indeterminacy of the social mean, here, such a 
free play of discourses and articulatory practices that any number of outcomes is always 
possible, so that no particular outcome, no specificity, can be understood or 
explained? ". ' 
A case in hand here is the way in which Laclau and Mouffe seek to theorise the 
State and its autonomy, relativising not only the structural location of the State vis-a-vis 
capital, but also the existence of the structure of the State as such: "The autonomy of 
the State as a whole - assuming for the moment that we can speak of it as -a unity - 
depends on the construction of a political space which can only be the result of 
hegemonic articulations". a9 
2.5. from Saussure to reformism: a radical and plural liberal democracy 
The important thing here is the way in which this discursive idealism feeds into 
a political project. It is here that we can truly seize the effects and the impasses of the 
post-Marxist theorisations. 
The crux of Laclau and Mouffe's project of `radical and plural democracy' 
involves a normative appreciation of the phenomena of the new social movements: 
"What interests us about these new social movements I... I is 1... I the novel role they 
play in articulating that rapid diffusion of social conflictuality to more and more 
numerous relations which is characteristic today of advanced industrial societies". -50 But 
not only conflictuality, but also, and primarily so, a diffusion of emancipatory potential, 
4" Geras (1987) op. cit., pg. 74. 
49 (HSS, pg. 140) 
50 IISS, pg. 159-160. 
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as the point is to affirm the new political movements of the 1970s and 1980s into 
veritable subjects of history and of emancipatory politics. 
For the authors of Hegemony, however, this apology is unthinkable without an 
explicit critique of Marxist politics: "the basic obstacle [... J has been classism: that is 
to say, the idea that the working class represents the privileged agent in which the 
fundamental impulse of social change resides". " Marxism, according to this argument, 
has illegitimately privileged the proletariat as the subject of political struggle and the 
locus of social emancipation, representing it as a universal class, a class which 
incarnates in itself the historical emancipation of humanity as a whole. But the question 
of emancipation, for Laclau and Mouffe, cannot be posed in the singular. It has to be 
posed in the plural. There is not simply one single point in society where social 
inequalities and forms of oppression are concentrated, but a plurality of such points: "a 
polyphony of voices, each of which constructs its own irreducible discursive identity". ' 
The entire attempt to bring together a theory of history and a conception of political 
universality has never been anything else than an "essentialist apriorism, the conviction 
that the social is sutured at some point, from which it is possible to fix the meaning of 
any event independently of any articulatory practice". 53 For Laclau and Mouffe, it is 
impossible to construct a totalisation of history or society in an aprioristic or general 
manner - such as through a theory of capitalist exploitation, or the theory of class 
struggle - because the totality ofthe historical process and of political struggles can 
only be a result, an agglomeration of irreducible empirical and particular moments: 
"universality is no longer the privilege of an `unlimited' social actor - like the working 
class in Marxism - it can only be pragmatically constructed through the `equivalential' 
effects of struggles carried out by actors that are always limited". ' 
" Ibid, pg. 177. 
52 Ibid, pg. 191. 
53 Ibid. 
54 New Reflections on The Revolution of Our Time, pg. 229. 
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But it is not only the Marxist theory of history which is under fire here, it is also 
the very concept of the revolution: "[Ifs we look for the ultimate core of this essentialist 
fixity, we shall find it in the fundamental nodal point which has galvanized the political 
imagination of the Left: the classic concept of `revolution', cast in the Jacobin mould". -5 
At the base of the concept of the revolution we are supposed to find a `privileged' 
conjunction of savoir and pouvoir: "the postulation of one foundational moment of 
rupture, and of a unique space in which the political is constituted". -% Against that, 
Laclau and Mouffe claim, it is necessary to affirm that historical change is plural and 
pluralistic by definition, not only in the sense that it comes from a multiplicity of places, 
but also in the sense that it comprises a plurality of subjectivities, a dispersion of 
conceptions and experiences which cannot be reduced to one single point in the political 
struggle: "the autonomisation of the spheres of struggle and the multiplication of 
political spaces (... ) is incompatible with the concentration of power and knowledge 
that classic Jacobinism and its different socialist variants imply". " 
The affirmation of the political phenomena of the new social movements thus 
has two basic theoretical prerequisites: the abandonment of the Marxist theory of 
politics, centred around notions of class struggle and the revolution, and, more 
generally, the abandonment of each totalistic, general concept of political subjectivities 
in history. 
The main problem here is that as soon as the two abstract moments which have 
characterised Marxist theory are evacuated from the theoretical realm, we find out that 
all the particularistic and plural struggles of the new social movements, in their 
55 t! SS, pg. 177. 
56 Ibid, pg. 152. This is where the authors of Hegemony come close to the position of Michel Foucault, 
who also attempted to displace the Marxist conception of history by stressing a shift of focus from the 
notion of revolutionary ruptures to multiple, heterogeneous and unsynchronised developments, as 
exemplified in his studies on sexuality, on prisons and asylums, and on other forms of societal control. 
See, for example, Foucault's remarks on method in 'History, Discourse, and Discontinuity', Salmagundi, 
No. 20 (Summer-Fall, 1972). 
-"I bid, pg. 178. 
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contingency and their irreducible particularity, are nevertheless readily referred back to 
theoretical abstractions. If Marxism was reproached for attempting to provide a too 
general unifying thread to diverse historical and political phenomena, all the multiple 
subjects and political pluralities that Laclau and Mouffe want are readily given a new 
totalistic principle, a new abstract common denominator. Most paradoxically, under 
what was presented as most problematic in the first place: the notion of the revolution. 
All of the diverse post-68 political figures - sexual minorities, cultural and 
religious groups and their claims of identity, the ecological and peace movements, 
feminism, various human and civic rights campaigns, anti-racists and anti-authoritarian 
fronts, claims for of human rights, etc. - find their proper political meaning according to 
Laclau and Mouffe, only by reference to the French Revolution of 1789. 
How is this possible? 
The importance of 1789, according to Laclau and Mouffe, is that this is the 
precise date when the logic of constructivism and historicism makes an abrupt entry into 
history and politics. When the French revolutionaries decapitated the king and had done 
away with the Old Regime, whilst investing the political power in the body of the 
people, they did not simply change the contours of a political regime or transform the 
nature of political power, but implemented a crucial political innovation. This 
innovation is the idea that a social or a political order can find no a priori foundation or 
guarantee. There is no `divine providence', no `human nature' which would legitimate 
the rule of the monarch, the aristocrat or the clergy. Moreover, there is no `natural' 
hierarchy within a society, no basis for the privileges bound to specific statuses and 
orders, such as those which were characteristic of medieval, pre-modern societies. 
Politics is emancipated from what Marx once called the naturwüchsigen social bonds, 
from all different markers of transcendence which have characterised the ancien regime. 
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The social and political order is thus entirely historicised - it is seen as something 
contingent, man-made, historical through and through. 
But the essence of this deconstructive momentum of the French Revolution, 
according to the authors of Hegemony, is not to be found in the actual political ascent of 
the `third estate', in the abrupt entry of the people on the scene of politics. It is to be 
found in the ideology of this political emergence: in one of the fundamental documents 
of the French Revolution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. "[Tjhe 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, would provide the discursive conditions which made 
it possible to propose the different forms of inequality as illegitimate and anti-natural, 
and thus make them equivalent as forms of oppression". ` When the discourse of rights 
and liberties comes to annul all medieval political privileges whilst recreating every 
individual as abstractly equal and free in his or her political capacity, all social relations 
come under the scrutiny of historicity and contingency. The formal figures of juridical 
positivity, the figures of the man and the citizen, provide politics with a universal 
discourse against the backdrop of which one is able to question any established 
authority or hierarchy, to oppose any form of inequality and oppression. They provide 
the permanent condition of possibility for a politicisation of social relations: inasmuch 
as anybody can claim the universal rights to freedom and equality, every social relation, 
every inequality and every established privilege can be put into question and become 
the object of a political struggle or contestation. 
This is then the common denominator for all the particularistic struggles of the 
new social movements. The plethora of the political phenomena of the seventies and the 
eighties find their own conditions of possibility in the formalistic framework of the 
Declaration. The contemporaneity of the French Revolution appears at each moment 
where in order to direct the struggles against inequalities, in order to give voice to 
HSS, pg. 155. 
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emergent forms of resistance to subordination, it is necessary to refer them back to the 
formal principles of equality and liberty. And this necessity is not relative, but absolute: 
according to Laclau and Moufffe, it is only in and through this discursive mediation, it 
is only through a specific consciousness of rights to equality and liberty, that different 
relations of subordination and inequality can be transformed into effective political 
struggles and claims. 
This interpretation of the French Revolution is not only remarkable due to its 
idealist hermeneutics: the privileging of juridical and ideological forms over social and 
historical forces. It is remarkable because of its idealist political operation: the 
submission of politics under juridical concepts and forms. For all their talk of a 
reinvigoration of a radical tradition of emancipation and the continuation of socialist 
politics for the post-modern age, Laclau and Mouffe have ended up submerging 
emancipatory politics under the institutions of liberal-democracy. The idealism of their 
notion of discourse perfectly corresponds with an uncritical endorsement of liberal 
political principles. Eagleton was right to argue that "a particular brand of semiotics or 
discourse theory was the vital relay by which a whole sector of the political left shifted 
its political ground from revolutionism to reformism". 59 Once the possibility of a critical 
historical reflection on the concrete forms of interrelationship between political 
liberalism and capitalist exploitation gets ruled out - being rejected due to its 
abstraction, and essentialism - politics finds its ultimate guarantees on the abstract 
ground of the juridical instances the liberal State. "For all its anti-universalism", as 
Wood pointed out "this post-Marxist concept turned out to be - could only be - far 
ý' Eagleton op. cit., pg. 218. 
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more abstractly universalistic, and far less sensitive to social and historical specificity, 
than the `essentialist' Marxist conception of socialism it was meant to replace". ' 
It should thus be of no surprise that for Laclau and Mouffe, liberal-democracy 
has no essential relationship with concrete class struggles. In a world of sliding 
signifiers and essentially unstable meanings, liberalism is simply one of the signifiers 
that can be reappropriated for the socialist cause. Its meaning is empty: "liberal 
discourse on individual rights is not definitely fixed; and just as this unfixity permits 
their articulation with elements of conservative discourse, it also permits different forms 
of articulation and redefinition which accentuate the democratic moment". 61 
However, this whole-hearted embrace of liberal-democracy should - be truly 
singled out for its regression. For the claim here is not only that the terrain of liberal 
politics should be revalorised and positively embraced for a contemporary politics of 
the Left. The claim is that there can be no emancipatory politics as such, no struggle 
against oppression at all, without the discursive and ideological guarantees which 
liberalism and the liberal State provide. Laclau and Mouffe are very clear about this: 
"The struggle against subordination cannot be the result of the situation of 
subordination itself". 62 Rather: "it is only from the moment when the democratic 
discourse becomes available to articulate the different forms of resistance to 
subordination that the conditions will exist to make possible the struggle against 
different types of inequality". 63 One may be conscious of the fact that he or she is in a 
relation of inequality or subordination - such as a slave or a serf certainly are in their 
respective domains of enslavement and serfdom - but only once this consciousness is 
also the consciousness of rights and freedoms to claim will people come to politicise 
Wood op. cit., pg. xii-xiii. 
61 IISS, pg. 176. A similar attempt at a reappropriation of fundamental liberal principles was recently 
proposed by Balibar, with his concept of `equal liberty'. See his "What is a Politics of the Rights of 
Man", in: Balibar (1994) op. cit.. 
62 HSS, pg. 152. 
63 Ibid, pg. 154. 
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their situations. The situation of inequality, and the consciousness of this inequality, 
does not, by itself, lead to any political action, it does not lead to revolt or dissent. Only 
when one has a clear idea that the position of subordination in which he or she finds 
himself or herself is illegitimate, and is so according to the prevailing discursive norms 
of the situation, can one take action against his or her own oppressive situation. This is 
why the entire history of the struggles for emancipation cannot be other but the 
continuous reclamation of the sphere of rights: "it is because women as women are 
denied a right which the democratic ideology recognizes in principle for all citizens that 
there appears a fissure in the construction of the subordinated feminine subject from 
which an antagonism may arise. It is also the case with the ethnic minorities who 
demand their civil rights". ' And the same applies to the struggles of the working class: 
"Many workers' struggles in the nineteenth century constructed their demands 
discursively on the basis of struggles for political liberty". 65 The entire project of 
socialism ends up as a moment internal to the unfolding of the `democratic revolution': 
"socialism is one of the components of a project for radical democracy, not vice 
versa". `6 
What we are left with here is an astounding reversal of the order of things: if 
Laclau and Mouffe start from an affirmation of change, plurality and contingency, they 
end up reconfiguring politics as a very `conservative' gesture - always bordering upon 
and tacitly endorsing the status qud. This is because the horizon of politics is always a 
pre-existent discursive structure: in fact, it is the given juridico-political framework of 
the liberal-democratic order. Instead of theorising politics on its own terms, as a vehicle 
for a radical transformation, as the singular and immanent source of historical invention 
and emancipation, Laclau and Mouffe subsume it under the unfolding of a `reformist' 
logic of the system. Politics is not a manner of inventions and breaks, but of 
ibid, pg. 159. 
ýs lbid, pg. 155. 
`'ý Ibid, pg. 178. 
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reclamations of rights within the existent order, of discursive and rhetorical forms and 
reforms under the umbrella of liberal-democracy. 
But besides the uncritical positing of the liberal-democratic State as the 
transcendental structure, there is another idealist reversal that Laclau and Mouffe 
effectuate vis-ä-vis the Marxian revolutionary political conception. For the peculiar 
thing about all the concrete and pluralistic struggles that find themselves expressed in 
and through the discourse of rights in Laclau and Mouffe is that all of them are in the 
last instance struggles of identity. They are all forms of identity politics. This is clear 
from the way in which Laclau and Mouffe conceptualise the problem of social 
antagonism. As Howarth pointed out: "Laclau and Mouffe argue that social 
antagonisms occur because social agents are prevented from attaining their identities 
(and attendant interests) by an `enemy' who is deemed responsible for this 'failure"'. " 
A political conflict or a form of political dissent does not arise for material reasons, for 
reasons of oppression and exploitation, for reasons of an unbearable domination, but 
essentially due to identitary contradictions, contradictions of the self. Concrete political 
demands, and moreover, demands for political emancipation, are only ever a response to 
a crisis of identity: "it is because a peasant cannot be a peasant that an antagonism 
exists with the landowner expelling him from his land". 68 Even the struggle for the 
emancipation of labour from capitalist exploitation would become wholly internal to the 
identitary perspective, a form of identity politics: "it is the defence of a certain identity 
which the workers have acquired (their skills or their organizational functions in 
production) which leads them to rebel". 69 Ultimately, the question of political and social 
emancipation can never find its end in a radical transformation of the existing state of 
affairs. In its essence, politics - qua identity politics - can never be a transformative, 
67 Howarth op. cit., pg. 260. 
69 HSS, pg. 125. 
69 Ibid, pg. 158. Laclau would in fact go as far as asserting that "class struggle is just one species of 
identity politics, and one which is becoming less and less important in the world in which we live". 
(Laclau "Structure, History and the Political", in: Laclau, Butler, 2ilek (2000), pg. 203). 
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transgressive operation: it is always a defence of the given state of affairs, a defence of 
the given identity of social and political subjects. "' 
2.6. Conclusion: the paradoxes of autonomisation 
The most important conclusion to be drawn here concerns the paradoxes of 
autonomy. If with Gramsci we saw how the problem of the autonomy of politics against 
economic determinism exposed the ambivalence of the limits of Marxist theory, with 
Laclau and Mouffe we can see the perils of the explosion of these limits, and a 
regression to a pre-Marxist standpoint. Balibar was right to say that "the critique of 
economism is most often undertaken in the name of a claim that the political sphere and 
the state are autonomous, either in relation to the sphere of the market economy or in 
relation to the class struggle itself, which comes down practically to reintroducing 
liberal dualism (state/civil society, politics/economics) which Marx criticized so 
tellingly". " This is a clear consequence of Laclau and Mouffe's attempts of a 
`radicalisation of Gramsci'. Once the link between the politics of hegemony and 
material realities is severed, once the notion of hegemony gets definitely separated from 
any material base, both in the relations of production and in the structure of the State, 
we not only have an evacuation of the Marxian critical short circuit, but we loose the 
very grounds where we can thinkra revolutionary political subjectivity in its radical 
opposition to capitalist exploitation and its juridico-political conditions. The endpoint of 
7° In his most recent work on populism, (On Populist Reason, 2005) Laclau would fully explode the 
identitary perspective. The question of identity now becomes the fundamental principle, a fundamental 
'motor' structuring and putting in motion all political relations. Behind the totalising drive of hegemony 
there is always the lack of political community's identity with itself, a structural gap which incites 
political projects which try to fill this gap. The political subject qua the 'people' is always already a 
variation of an eternal drive for a lost identity and community: "IA It its root, there is the experience of a 
lack, a gap which has emerged in the harmonious continuity of the social. There is a fullness of the 
community which is missing. This is decisive: the construction of the `people' will be the attempt to give 
a name to that absent fullness". (Laclau, 2005: pg. 85-86). 
" Balibar, Etienne and Wallerstein, Immanuel (1991) Race, Nation. Class: Ambiguous Identities, London: 
Verso, pg. 3. 
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the tendency to autonomise revolutionary politics from economic determinism is the 
autonomisation of the liberal State, and the establishment of its determination over 
revolutionary politics. In this, Laclau and Mouffe clearly point to the precise place 
where a revolutionary conception of politics falls into a systemic and reformist one. 
In what follows we will explore another, radically different solution to 
Gramsci's conundrums: Althusser's theory of politics. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, IDEOLOGY: 
ALTHUSSER'S SINGULARITY 
3.1. Introduction: from Althusser to Gramsci, and back 
The trajectory of the thought of Louis Althusser is complex and contradictory. It 
is a trajectory strained by obscurely shifting patterns, intriguing moves and reversals, by 
incompletions and detours. But it is also, and partly because of its complexity and its 
convolution, a trajectory marked by its provocative character. As one of the radical 
figures of the philosophy of the 20`h century, Althusser remains notorious for the 
immense disturbance his writings caused in academic and political circles, whether in 
the form of impassioned theoretical salutations or vehement philippics and 
denunciations. 
The centre of one controversy was an article written in the tumultuous days of 
the aftermath of May 1968 in France, named "Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses", itself only an extract from a larger study on the `superstructures' which 
Althusser never came to finish. ' What is interesting about this text, first published in 
1970, is not simply the degree of provocation which the theses and remarks elaborated 
in it induced, it is rather the fact that it reveals, in conjunction with several short 
philosophical expositions which Althusser has written roughly around the same time, 
and which include Lenin and Philosophy (1969) and Elements of Self-Criticism (1974), 
a specific phase in the thought of the French communist philosopher, a phase dubbed as 
' The manuscript of Althusser's uncompleted project on the superstructures was published in France in 
1995, under the editorship of Jacques Bidet. Cf. Althusser, Louis (1995) Sur la reproduction (On 
Reproduction) (SLR) Paris: PUF. 
121 
`politicist' by some of Althusser's most meticulous commentators. ' Inasmuch as this 
specific moment is marked by a certain coherency and consistency - and this is 
precisely what I would like to examine here - then we can say that here Althusser offers 
us an original, and radical treatment of the problems of philosophy, politics, science and 
history, and of their systematic juxtaposition. The goal of this chapter will thus be to 
look back at this segment of Althusser's thought, not only by critically examining the 
congruity of the arguments, concepts and categories that comprise it, but also by trying 
to assess the singularity of Althusser's place within Marxism, a singularity which seems 
to emerge precisely at that point at which Althusser thinks the problem of political 
singularity. 
The main task in this sense is to show how Althusser addresses the problem of 
political autonomy that Gramsci had opened, how he offers us a way out of the impasse, 
where the question of the autonomy of revolutionary politics ultimately succumbs to an 
idealistic conception which collapses the critical link between political forms of 
capitalist exploitation. 
But before commencing, we cannot avoid facing the controversy with Althusser. 
The reflection upon the heated debates around Althusser's work, and in particular those 
around the ISA essay, will help us set the path straight for this analysis. Not in terms of 
a positive frame of reference, but as a negative starting point. For what is most striking 
about the discussions which surround the ISA essay is the extent of the misapprehension 
involved in them. It seems far from exaggerated to say that for most part the prodigious 
theoretical elaborations of Althusser's `politicism', even when they were appraised, 
were subjected to dubious and fallacious interpretations and in the end distorted and 
obscured. The symptomatic case is to be found in the Anglophone context of the social 
2 Adopting a disapproving tone, Gregory Elliot, in his exhaustive and otherwise eulogistic intellectual 
biography of the French philosopher, christened Althusser's self-critique of his earlier positions, which 
followed from the events of '68, as a move from 'theoreticism' into `politicism'. See: Elliot, Gregory 
(1987) Althusser: The Detour of Theory, London: Verso, especially chapter 4. 
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sciences, and in particular amongst social and political theorists in Britain, where the 
French philosopher left a decisive stamp, in disciplines such as sociology and the 
nascent cultural studies, as well as in various other fields such as film studies, literary 
theory and feminism. Althusser's take on the questions of ideology and politics, his 
elucidations of the notion of `relative autonomy', his complex schemas of causality and 
determination seemed to have provided a philosophical warrant for the opening of new 
avenues of research in fields of social and human sciences which stood in close 
proximity to Marxism, permitting unrestricted access to the study of `ideology', 
`discourse', `culture' and `subjectivity' as socially and politically effective elements of 
the superstructure. ' But the influence of Althusser spread under a peculiar condition. 
For paradoxically, those who considered themselves part of the Althusserian current 
could be seen sharing, at the same time, a certain sentiment with its most ferocious 
opponents. Both could agree that there was something deficient in Althusser's approach, 
that his conceptualisations exhibited contradictory elements and permanent flaws. The 
malady was diagnosed as `determinism' and `functionalism'. 
"Althusserian structuralism", as Stuart Hall wrote, "is open to the charge, which 
has been made against it, of a creeping Marxist functionalism. Ideology seems to 
perform the function required of it [... ] to perform it effectively, and to go on 
performing it, without encountering any counter-tendency [... I But a notion of 
reproduction which is only functionally adjusted to capital and which has no 
countervailing tendencies, encounters no contradictions, is not the site of class struggle, 
and is utterly foreign to Marx's conceptions of reproduction". ' Likewise, according to 
Paul Hirst, "Althusser, himself, far from advocating `autonomism', is the victim of 
certain persistent economistic deviations. In the ISAs essay I... I ideology and the state 
3 What should be singled out in this regard are the works produced by the Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies. 
° Hall, Stuart (1996) "Signification, Representation, Ideology: Althusser and the Post-Structuralist 
Debates", in: Curran, James et at. Cultural Studies and Communications, London: Arnold. pg. 18-19. 
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are simple pre-given functions; mechanisms derived by a transparent causality from 
elsewhere, ie, the economy". 5 
The standard line of criticism, elaborated by Hall, Hirst and other social and 
political theorists in Britain, claimed that Althusser set forth a too deterministic 
conception of politics and history, one which is blind to the specificities of diverse 
social and historical conjunctures, one which too eagerly pays service to trans-historical 
structural laws, and most importantly, one that is incapable of theorising resistance, 
whether in terms of class struggle, or other forms. The political setting of the essay on 
`Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' seemed overtly reductionist, and fatalistic: 
too readily reducing politics to economic realities, and too hastily submitting diverse 
social and political instances under the rubric of domination by the ruling social class. 
There appeared to be a stark contradiction between the `politicism' of Althusser's 
rhetoric and his way of conceptualising politics and political realities. Even Gregory 
Elliot would object that "in the class struggle in ideology the cards are always already 
stacked in favour of the ruling class because its particular interests coincide with the 
universal functional requirements of social reproduction. No space is left for 
oppositional ideology, little efficacy can be assigned to the oppositional ideologies 
Althusser nonetheless posits" 6 
Parallel conclusions were drawn in other theoretical fields. Althusser's historical 
and political determinism seemed to be in perfect coincidence with his treatment of the 
problem of subjectivity. His conceptualisations of subjectivity were dubbed as 
`hopelessly circular', whilst his reflections on the nature and role of philosophy were 
reproached for being `conservative'. Specifically with regard to the question of the 
subject, Althusser was seen as a resolute determinist, relinquishing all space for `free 
subjectivity', for creativity and innovation. Michele Barrett would, for example, agree 
s Hirst, Paul (1979) On Law and Ideology, London: Macmillan, pg. 43. 
6 Elliot (1987) op. cit., pg. 232. 
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with "many critics [whop have found Althusser's account to be one that strips `the 
subject' of power of agency in its unduly mechanistic approach to the process whereby 
individuals are constituted as `subjects' in a social formation". ' This seemed especially 
clear when Althusser's conceptions of subjectivity were compared to Lacan, who was 
understood to be their source. As Eagleton would remark "for Lacan, the imaginary 
dimension of our being is punctured and traversed by insatiable desire, which suggest a 
subject rather more volatile and turbulent than Althusser's serenely centred entities. The 
political implications of this misreading are clear: to expel desire from the subject is to 
mute its potentially rebellious clamour, ignoring the ways in which it may attain its 
allotted place in the social order only ambiguously and precariously". ' 
In order to cure these maladies, those who found inspiration in Althusser's 
conceptual innovations reached for other figures of theoretical authority, standing close 
to the perimeters of his thought. And if Lacan seemed to provide the warrant against the 
`functionalist deviation' at the level of theories of subjectivity, for those more directly 
concerned with politics, Althusser's determinist flaws were corrected with Gramsci. In 
contrast to Althusser, Gramsci seemed much more in touch with the actual realities of 
politics, possessing an unmistakable sensibility for the `concrete', for the complex and 
conjunctural relations of forces, and the diversity of historical situations. Gramsci's 
scenario of hegemony appeared superior to Althusser's schema of ideological state 
apparatuses for precisely its ability to grasp, in a `non-reductionist' or `non-determinist' 
way as it was claimed, the complexity of political settings and historical contexts, to 
elucidate the struggles of the dominated ideologies and forces against the dominant 
ones, and to think the various forms of resistance. As Hall would note: "Gramsci 
powerfully corrects the ahistorical, dangerously abstract, formal and theoricist scheme, 
See Barrett, Michele "Althusser's Marx, Althusser's Lacan" in: Kaplan, E. A. and Sprinker, Michael 
(1993) The Althusserian Legacy, London: Verso. pg. 178. 
8 Eagleton (1991) op. cit., pg. 144. 
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towards which structuralist theories naturally tend in their practices. His thought is 
always historically specific and `conjunctural"'. 9 
At the same time, Gramsci's analyses of hegemony, where the `State' and `civil 
society' are sustained as discrete entities, and where the agencies of `private 
institutions', operating outside the dictates of state structures, retain decisive political 
impact, seemed to be much more politically sound, particularly with regard to 
Althusser's proposal to collapse the very distinction between' the `State' and `civil 
society'. Such a move was treated as theoretically regressive, erasing the complexity of 
the problem of State legitimation. 10 But it was also seen as politically perilous: being 
only one step short from loosing sight of the very notion of class struggle, and thus 
rendering any type of politics of resistance unthinkable. According to Hall: "The 
`Ideological State Apparatuses' essay I... I unproblematically assumes an identity 
between the many `autonomous' parts of civil society and the state. In contrast, this 
articulation is at the centre of Gramsci's problem of hegemony I... ] A critical question 
in developed liberal democracies is precisely how ideology is reproduced in the so- 
called private institutions of civil society - the theatre of consent - apparently outside of 
the direct sphere of play of the state itself ". " 
Reflecting back upon this episode of the Althusserian controversy, at a distance 
from the theoretical and especially the political stakes involved in it, it seems that the 
interpretations noted above did not, only entail a certain dose of misunderstanding, but 
were based upon complete misconceptions. They seem to have completely missed not 
9 Hall "Cultural Studies and the Centre: some problematics and problems", in Hall et al. (1980), Culture, 
Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972-79, London: Hutchinson, pg. 36. 
10 Particularly significant in this regard is the debate between Ralph Milliband and Nicos Poulantzas. 
Millband reproached Poulantzas for adopting the Althusser's framework of politics, and thus completely 
obscuring the specificity of the State in developed capitalist countries: "To suggest that the relevant 
institutions are actually part of the State system does not seem to me to accord with reality, and tends to 
obscure the difference in this respect between these political systems and systems where ideological 
institutions are indeed part of a State monopolistic system of power. In the former systems, ideological 
institutions do retain a very high degree of autonomy; and are therefore the better able to conceal the 
degree to which they do belong to the system of capitalist power". Miliband, Ralph (1970) "The 
Capitalist State: A Reply to Nicos Poulantzas", New Left Review, No. 59, Jan-Feb, pg. 59. 
11 Hall (1996) op. cit., pg. 20. 
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only the direction and the aims of Althusser's arguments, but also the originality of his 
position. 
It is certainly erroneous to speak of a deficit of politics in Althusser's oeuvre. In 
defining the very endeavour of philosophy as, in the last instance, `class struggle in 
theory' Althusser could not have gone further in according a dominant place for politics 
in his theoretical system. The pre-eminence of a critical reflection on politics, at a 
remote from determinist or functionalist explanations, is also clear from the ISA essay 
itself, and Althusser would not refrain from stressing this fact openly: "We can say in 
effect that the specificity of a theory that we can draw from Marx with regard to 
ideology is an affirmation of the primacy of the class struggle over the functions and the 
functioning of the State apparatus, and the ideological State apparatuses. A primacy 
which is incompatible with all functionalism". 12 
But the true degree of misconception, however, can be read from the very 
`correctives' that we saw being applied here. Especially from the backward projection 
of Gramsci into Althusserian categories. 
For when it comes to the relationship between the two thinkers, it is hard to 
overlook the fact that the substance of Althusser's project owes its substance to critical 
confrontation with Gramsci. Instead of being in drastic need for its rectifying touch, 
Althusser's ISA essay is precisely constituted in a critical reaction to Gramsci and to 
`Gramscianism', that is, as a critical reaction to the political ambiguities inherent in 
Gramsci's approach. 
I would like to expose this relationship in what follows: in the first place, by 
examining Althusser's attempts to define the very nature of philosophy against the 
idealist residues in Gramsci's thought; and then by looking at Althusser's careful 
examination of the problems of the politics, ideology and the State against the 
12 "Note sur les AIE", in: SLR, pg. 253. 
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Gramscian analyses of hegemony, and against Gramsci's attempts to define a specific 
space of political autonomy. 
3.2. Philosophy and its conditions 
Starting with the question of philosophy should not be surprising. The very 
question `what is philosophy? ' concerns the substance of Althusser's writings around 
1968. These writings contain a number of revisions of his earlier positions, but also 
radical reversals, with Althusser engaging in a comprehensive practice of self- 
criticism. 13 The move is a move away from `theoreticism', away from Althusser's 
earlier definition of philosophy as a `theory of theoretical practice', 14 and away from the 
general epistemological orientation of his theoretical project. Instead of a broad concern 
with a theory of knowledge - which was expressed through the thematic of coupure 
epistemologique or the epistemological break - Althusser proposes a different path, a 
path standing in direct confrontation with the concrete realities of politics. ` We are 
presented with the following thesis: "Philosophy is, in the last instance, class struggle in 
field of theory". " 
What does this provocative thesis tell us? Does it amount to reducing 
philosophy, in its entirety, to politics and political practice, as many of Althusser's 
critics were to maintain? Does it announce the end of the philosophical venture in a 
blind submission of theory to the political act? 
13 Hence the collection of essays, Elements of Self Criticism, published in France in 1974 (the first English 
translation appeared in 1976), where Althusser attempts to rectify the 'theoreticist deviations' of his 
earlier works, like Reading Capital and For Marx. 
14 See For Marx (1969), especially the chapter "On the Materialist Dialectic". 
'S Balibar attempted to seize the specificity of Althusser's notion of the coupure or break in "L'objet 
d'Althusser", in: Lazarus, Sylvain (1993) Politique et philosophie dans ! 'oeuvre de Louis Althusser, 
Paris: PUF. 
" "Reply to John Lewis", (RJL) in: Althusser, Louis (1976) Elements of Self-Criticism, London: Verso, 
pg. 37. 
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In fact, Althusser is formulating a notoriously complex problem here. A problem 
which is certainly not a matter of identity or of vulgar reduction. If anything, he is at 
pains to assume a distance precisely from those conceptions which involve a stark 
political reductionism of philosophy. Witness the fact that his principal opponent here 
seems to be exactly Gramsci, with his historicism and his `philosophy of praxis': "[For 
Gramsci], a philosopher is, in the last instance, a `politician'; for him, philosophy is the 
direct product (assuming all the `necessary mediations') of the activity and experience 
of the masses, of politico-economic praxis: professional philosophers merely lend their 
voices and the forms of their discourse to this `common-sense' philosophy, which is 
already complete without them and speaks in historical praxis - they cannot change it 
substantially. Gramsci spontaneously rediscovers, as an opposition indispensable to the 
expression of his thought, the very formulations which Feuerbach used in a famous text 
of 1839 which opposed the philosophy produced by real history to the philosophy 
produced by philosophers - the formulations opposing praxis to speculation". " 
Against Gramsci's reduction of philosophy to history and to politics, Althusser 
proposes to rethink the moments of the scientific and the philosophical for themselves. 
Hence even the significance of his early category of `theoretical practice', the purpose 
of which was, as Althusser comes to acknowledge retrospectively, "to justify the thesis 
of the relative autonomy of theory and thus the right-of Marxist theory not to be treated 
as a slave to tactical political decisions, but to be allowed to develop, in alliance with 
political and other practices, without betraying its own needs". '8 But whilst criticising 
Gramsci's reductionist model, and whilst reaffirming the autonomy the theoretical space 
from its historicist renderings, Althusser still attempts to sketch a decisive bond between 
philosophy and politics. `Theoretical practice' is, after all, a practice, which means that 
" RC, pg. 134. The entire chapter 'Marxism is not a historicism' in Althusser's contribution to Reading 
Capital is a criticism of Gramsci's philosophical propositions. 
's Is it Simple to be a Marxist in Philosophy, (ISMP) in: Elements of Self-Criticism, London: Verso, pg. 
169. 
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theory, in opposition to the idealist notion of its purity, bears an unrelenting stamp of 
materiality. And in fact, this is the whole difficulty: to rethink the theory and practice 
relationship in a manner that does not simply collapse their distinction under the 
dominance of one term. If in early Althusser, the problem of theory/practice suffered 
from an excess of epistemological concerns, if it was moving in the direction of a one- 
sided insistence on the pole of theory, in the post-68 writings Althusser reverses the 
course. The result, apart from the provocative convocation of `class struggle in theory', 
is also the formula of the double inscription of theory into practice. '9 Theory is doubly 
inscribed, as Althusser claims, in its mode of existence in reality: on the one hand, it 
exists in the form of theoria, as reflection upon the world and as knowledge of this 
world. In this mode of existence, the essence of theory, and primarily of scientific 
theory, is that it puts forward principles of analysis and intelligibility of its object - 
history, society, nature - whose totality it seeks to grasp. But on the other hand, theory 
also exists as a part of the very object that it submits to conceptual and analytic scrutiny, 
and moreover, it assumes a very particular location in this object. This second mode of 
material existence of theory brings forth Marx's problem of the `materiality of ideas', 2° 
the problem of the active, practical role of thought in history, its capacity to shape the 
course of the historical process and contribute to the practical transformation of the 
world. Here, theoretical concepts do not represent anymore simple principles of 
explanation of the given whole, but change their shape and their nature. They are 
translated into the element of the `superstructures', they become `ideological forms' 
inscribed in the practices of classes engaged in a bitter struggle. 
'v Cf. "Marx in his limits" (MIL) in: Althusser, Louis (2006) Philosophy of the Encounter: Later 
Writings, London: Verso, pg. 48. 
`Q As young Marx wrote: "Clearly the weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons, and 
material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has 
gripped the masses" ("A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. Introduction", in: 
Marx, Karl (1975) Early Writings, London: Penguin, pg. 251. 
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Thus doubling of theory within the real inserts a drastic contradiction within the 
very category of truth, now submitted to the force of practice. "Hence the distance", as 
Althusser would say, "between the `truth' of ideas which cover the whole of their 
object, and the efficacy of these ideas which are situated in a small part of the `space' of 
their `object'. Hence the essential thesis that ideas, even if they are true and have been 
formally and materially proven, can never be historically active in person, as pure 
theoretical ideas, but can become active only in and through the ideological forms - 
mass ideological forms, it must be added, for that is fundamental - caught up in the 
class struggle and its development" 2' Interpreting the world and changing the world are 
thus united but not reduced to each other. 
But what is it that bridges this distance between truth and efficacy? 
In a short essay, entitled Lenin and Philosophy, Althusser proposes a remarkable 
albeit complex solution to this problem. The thesis `philosophy represents class struggle 
in theory' is here specified in the following way: "Philosophy represents politics in the 
domain of theory, or to be more precise: with the sciences - and, vice versa, philosophy 
represents scientificity in politics, with the classes engaged in the class struggle". 22 Or, 
as Althusser would add: "(Pjhilosophy exists somewhere as a third instance between the 
two major instances which constitute it as itself an instance: the class struggle and the 
sciences". ' 
What is the meaning of this condensed formula? 
In the first place, it is important to grasp that Althusser strictly separates three 
different instances - philosophy, science and politics. There is no question of reducing 
one of these instances to the other two. Each of the three instances represents a reality in 
and for itself, each of them produces effects which are sui generis. In this sense we can 
speak of the specific domains of the scientific, of the philosophical and of politics. This 
21 ibid. 
'-` Lenin and Philosophy, (LP) in: (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and other essays, pg. 64-65. 
23 ibid. 
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act of separation already has tremendous theoretical consequences. Firstly, it 
presupposes that we cannot reduce philosophy to science, that philosophy is different 
from the sciences. This is a strong anti-positivist foundation of Althusser's project: 
"Philosophy is not a science (... ] Philosophical categories are distinct from scientific 
concepts". 24 But at the same time, theory, either philosophical or scientific, cannot be 
reduced to politics. The recognition of the specificity of the theoretical moment is a 
warrant against all kinds of dogmatism, a warrant which averts philosophy from its fall 
into ideology. As Althusser would say, this prevents "the living freedom of science 
from being buried under its own results". '-5 At the same time, politics is also recognised 
as an irreducible instance, an instance with its own practical and theoretical meaning, 
not reducible to its scientific or philosophical reflections. 
But if Althusser isolates the three instances - the sciences, philosophy and 
politics - how does he then put them back together? This is the intricacy of the schema 
of Lenin and Philosophy. And this is where Althusser starts giving us an original answer 
to the Marxian materialist cry for the practicality of philosophy - the injunction to 
change the world - by placing philosophy under conditions. The entire schema, in fact, 
resides upon a fundamental asymmetry, an asymmetry where philosophy is placed in a 
determinate relationship of posteriority. Philosophy, according to Althusser, only exists 
as a separate instance inasmuch as it comes after the two other, primary instances - after 
politics and after the sciences": "Marxism affirms the primacy of politics over 
philosophy", we read. 26 But also: "philosophy is (... I always a long day behind the 
science which induces the birth of its first form and the rebirths of its revolutions". "' In 
being posited in posteriority to the two fundamental externalities, to the sciences and 
24 LP, pg. 50. 
25ISMP, pg. 193. 
26 RJL, pg. 58. 
2" LP, pg. 45. 
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politics, philosophy is placed under conditions. 
28 This does not annul philosophy, nor 
does it reduce it to a simple servant of scientific or political aims. Philosophy has a 
definite purpose and role, which is to make possible the interrelationship between the 
two conditions. This is the central point: philosophy, whose existence is possible only 
under the condition of both the sciences and politics, mediates the relationship between 
its two conditions. Or, to put this in another way, it is philosophy that makes possible, in 
theory, the relationship between theory and practice. 
But how does philosophy perform this difficult role? 
Althusser gives us a laconic and remarkable answer to this question as he 
sketches the fundamental contours of a philosophy of the Two: the crucial function of 
philosophy is division. Philosophy does not construct, it divides: "If science unites, and 
if it unites without dividing, philosophy divides, and it can only unite by 
dividing". 29Another strikingly provocative thesis - one which affirms the non- 
universality of philosophy, or, as Althusser would insist, the `partisanship in 
philosophy'. Scientific theory and practice, according to Althusser, do possess a specific 
dimension of universality. The sciences strive to construct their objects as universal - as 
for instance, the object of history, or of the unconscious - whilst submitting these 
objects under the universality of laws and explanatory regulations. But philosophy is not 
universal. This is because in its essence, and unlike the sciences, it is not here to grasp 
the `totality' of the object, to form a systematic elaboration of the whole. Its essence is 
to divide and separate, and in doing so, to assume a position (prise de position): "An 
entire philosophical tradition since Kant has contrasted `dogmatism' with `criticism'. 
Philosophical propositions have always had the effect of producing `critical' 
distinctions: that is, of `sorting out' or separating ideas from each other, and even of 
Z" This is a point at which we can seize the influence that Althusser exerted on the philosophical project of 
Alain Badiou. Whereas Althusser recognises two conditions for philosophy, Badiou sees four: politics, 
the sciences, art and love. See for instance, Badiou, Alain (1999) Manifesto for Philosophy, Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
29 LP, pg. 31. 
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forging the appropriate ideas for making their separation and its necessity visible. 
Theoretically, this effect might be expressed by saying that philosophy `divides' (Plato), 
`traces lines of demarcation' (Lenin) and produces (in the sense of making manifest or 
visible) distinctions and differences. The entire history of philosophy demonstrates that 
philosophers spend their time distinguishing between truth and error, between science 
and opinion, between the sensible and the intelligible, between reason and the 
understanding, between spirit and matter, etc. They always do it, but they do not say (or 
only rarely) that the practice of philosophy consists in this demarcation, in this 
distinction, in this drawing of a line. We say it (and we will say many other things). By 
recognizing this, by saying it and thinking it, we separate ourselves from them. Even as 
we take note of the practice of philosophy, we exercise it, but we do so in order to 
transform it". " 
The entirety of the field of philosophical practice, according to Althusser, is akin 
to what Kant designated as the Kampfplatz, a field of struggle between opposing 
tendencies. For Althusser, these tendencies are in the last instance reducible to two 
fundamental ones: materialism and idealism. Primacy of matter or the primacy of ideas. 
But, as Althusser would immediately add, this opposition is always already taken 
outside itself, as its significance resides in the effects that it bears upon its two 
conditions, upon the sciences and politics. By drawing, like Marx did, a conceptual 
analogy between idealism and ideology, Althusser would claim that the true stakes in 
the struggle between opposing tendencies in philosophy concern the sphere of ideology 
in its practical existence in the sciences and in politics. Drawing a distinction between 
materialism and idealism thus presumes, at the same time, "`drawing a dividing-line' 
3" Althusser, Louis (1990) Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Scientists & Other Essays, 
London: Verso, pg. 75. 
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inside the theoretical domain between ideas declared to be true and ideas declared to be 
false, between the scientific and the ideological". " 
Philosophy is therefore, in its essence, founded upon a critical function, upon a 
critical act - and this cannot but remind us of the forceful elaboration of the idea of a 
`ruthless critique of all that exists' in the early writing of Marx. But Aithusser is specific 
here: the philosophical act of division is here to assist the sciences in their practices 
whilst guarding them from falling into ideology. Philosophy protects the scientificity of 
sciences by nominating those instances where sciences are tainted with ideological 
notions, those instances where the objects of sciences are conditioned by objectives 
external to them, objectives which proceed from directly political and ideological gains 
which are distortive - and Althusser would not hold back from drawing a certain list 
here: economism, voluntarism, empiricism, historicism, humanism, evolutionism, 
dogmatism 32 The stake in the struggle over scientificity is always, in the last instance, 
the openness of science to novelty and invention. In contrast to the ideologies, and to 
ideological theories, which circulate around mummifying notions, which maintain the 
life of a closed system, philosophy makes sure that sciences are "opened to the 
`infinitude' [..: ] of [their] object, that is, designed ceaselessly to pose and confront new 
problems and ceaselessly to produce new pieces of knowledge". 33 But whilst struggling 
over the faith of the scientific, philosophy also maintains a decisive relationship to 
politics, as it assures that politics is provided with the permanent objective reflection 
about its own tendency, with the knowledge of its possibilities and impossibilities in 
3' LP, pg. 61. 
32 This warrant pertains to all sciences, including the Marxist science of history, which has to be strictly 
separated from ideology. Althusser is categorical here: "The scientific theory of Marxism (... ) is not an 
ideology. An ideology is a distorted representation of reality: it is necessarily distorted, because it is not 
an objective but a subjective representation of reality - let us say, for the sake of brevity, a social (class) 
representation of reality. Science, in contrast, exists only on condition that it struggles against all forms of 
subjectivity, class subjectivity included (consider Lenin's struggles against the 'spontaneous' ideology of 
the proletariat); science is objective. Science provides knowledge of reality independent of `subjective' 
class interests". ('The Historical Task of Marxist Philosophy' in: Althusser, Louis (2003) The Humanist 
Controversy and Other Writings, London: Verso, pg. 191. ) 
33 "Elements of Self Criticism" (ESC), in: (1976) Elements of Self-Criticism, London: Verso, pg. 154. 
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history. There is thus always a double relation of reciprocity that philosophy maintains: 
"constantly intervening `politically' in the disputes in which the real destiny of the 
sciences is at stake, between the scientific which they install and the ideology that 
threatens them, and constantly intervening `scientifically' in the struggle in which the 
fate of the classes is at stake, between the scientific that assists them and the ideological 
that threatens them". 34 
But is this critical function of philosophy essentially reducible to a `critique of 
ideology'? We should be careful here. For the distinction between science and ideology 
that Althusser sketches is not a simple distinction between Truth and Error, between 
facticity and its mystification. The question is not one of the `arbitration of Truth', from 
a transcendental position of Reason. Philosophy is not critical in the sense of having 
science and its essence, the production of knowledge, as its essential object of 
(epistemological) reflection. Philosophy should rather, according to Althusser, be seen 
as having no object at all. And this is the key point. For if philosophy can serve to 
incessantly inscribe the distinction between the scientific and the ideological this is 
precisely because it does not have an object, because it is objectless. There are no 
objects properly speaking in philosophy: philosophical concepts and categories are not 
constituted in the guise of objects, that is, in the guise of a theoretical reflection upon 
the world. Instead of objects, philosophy has stakes, stakes which are defined in a 
wholly conjunctural manner, by the current state of the antagonistic tendencies in the 
sciences, and by the actual contradictions inherent in the field of class struggles. 
Philosophical categories such as `being' or `matter' are not `objective', they are not 
reflections, in theory, of actually existing objects - they do not mean anything in terms 
of the cognitive apprehension of the world 35 Their being resides wholly outside of 
sa Lp pg. 66. 
" For Althusser, for example, the philosophical category of `matter' is not substantialist but critical. It 
makes no sense vis-ä-vis a real object, or a reality. It is a philosophical thesis: "ITlhe philosophical 
category of matter I ... I can never 
be confused with the contents of the scientific concepts of matter. The 
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themselves, in the division lines that they produce in and out of philosophy, in the 
practical effects that they produce in the practices of sciences, and in politics. 
Inasmuch as it is essentially predicated upon division, and inasmuch as it is 
without an object, philosophy does not simply exist as theoria, but as a practice. A 
practice which is essentially an act, an intervention of demarcation. But also, a practice 
which is, as such, strictly speaking, equal to `nothing': "For the intervention of each 
philosophy [... ] is precisely the philosophical nothing [... ] since a dividing-line actually 
is nothing, it is not even a line or a drawing, but the simple fact of being divided, i. e. the 
emptiness of a distance taken". 36 
Althusser's insistence on nothingness or emptiness thus gives us something 
which can be called a conjunctural definition of philosophy, of philosophy under 
conditions. Philosophy is not the `Science of sciences', the transcendental place of 
Reason. The problem of the relationship between science and ideology, that is, the 
problem of the distinction between the scientific and the ideological, in which 
philosophy plays a crucial role, is completely severed from the general epistemological 
field, and the teleological guarantees of Reason. It is a matter of singular philosophical 
interventions into a given conjuncture, a conjuncture which is fundamentally predicated 
upon an uncertainty, on the vicissitudes of scientific and political developments. This is 
why singular philosophical interventions have tobe incessantly repeated under new 
conditions: "The terms that designate the scientific and the ideological 1... ý have to be 
re-thought again and again". 37 
The crucial stake in each of these interventions is precisely the moment of the 
void. This is what is central for the separation the scientific from the ideological, and 
scientific concepts of matter define knowledges, relative to the historical state of the sciences, about the 
objects of those sciences. The content of the scientific concept of matter changes with the development, 
i. e. with the deepening of scientific knowledge. The meaning of the philosophical category of matter does 
not change, since it does not apply to any object of science, but affirms the objectivity of all scientific 
knowledge of an object. The category of matter cannot change. It is `absolute"'. (LP, pg. 48-49). 
36 LP, pg. 62. 
37 ibid. 
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also, for the very distinction between idealism and materialism. For it is precisely the 
materialist position, according to Althusser, that is constituted in and through its 
insistence upon emptiness, in and through the evocation of the void. And conversely, it 
is the idealist tendency which denegates this void, as it recognises in itself the direct 
representation of the objects in the world, as it claims to bring about the Truth of the 
world, to discover its Logos, its fundamental principle. 38 Keeping the void open, this 
means acknowledging the relentless transformative and inventive capacity of scientific 
practices (and also of politics), it means guaranteeing that the objects that these 
practices work upon, namely social relations and knowledge, are infinite. According to 
Pierre Macherey: "Rather than being a seizure of the real, philosophy effectuates a 
certain taking up of a distance towards the real: taking up of a distance towards the real 
which, at the same time, places the real at a distance towards itself, and thus opens the 
necessary space for its transformation, or transformations". 39 Or as Macherey would 
add: "Philosophy expresses, not the fullness of the world, but its void, in other words, 
the fact that its order, which the sciences apprehend in the course of their indefinite 
progression, is non-totalisable, and thus impossible to subsume under a certain 
jurisdiction, or under the goals which would be radically foreign to if'. 0 But this void is 
not only a matter of scientific appropriation, experimentation and invention. It is also 
the void of historical contingency and singularity, it is the void of class struggle in its 
incessant practice of the transformation of the social world. Thus we should also add: 
philosophy expresses politics inasmuch it represents its real, inasmuch as it translates, 
from within its own mode of existence, the imagination, creativity and the singularity of 
the revolutionary class struggle. And this doubling of the void, of course, gives us a 
confirmation of the fact that the question of scientificity and scientific invention is 
" It should not be surprising that Althusser would thus criticise as idealistic those positions in philosophy 
which sought to discover in 'matter' a fundamental principle of the world. 
" Cf. "Althusser: L. nine et la philosophie", in: Macherey, Pierre (1999) Histoires de dinosaure, Paris: 
PUF, pg. 275. 
40 ibid. 
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inseparable from the constant revolutionisation of the world through the political 
struggle between classes. 
What we have here, in effect, is a remarkable transfiguration of Marx's eleventh 
thesis on Feuerbach. Far from being a discourse which `interprets' the world, 
philosophy is a practice - Althusser would say `a new practice' - and in that a practice 
sui generis, implicated in the transformation of the world. Its power resides in its 
`emptiness', in its declaration of the void, through which philosophy is capable of 
representing the very real of this transformation with regard to the sciences and with 
regard to politics. The `task' of philosophy is precisely to bring the real of politics, its 
aleatory, inventive capacity, in contact with the sciences, and vice versa, to bring the 
process of the production of knowledges, with its own uncertainties and discoveries face 
to face with politics. 
By guaranteeing this double relation of reciprocity, philosophy, which in itself 
has no history according to Althusser, 41 reconciles itself with history. It becomes its 
`theoretical weapon'. 
Are there any procedures proper to this particular philosophical practice? The 
most important one can probably be found in that place where Althusser discusses 
Machiavelli's `rule of method', the tenacity of the Italian political theorist to `think in 
extremes'. Thinking in extremes means formulating radical theses, theses which, 
through their divisive and polemical nature, are capable of taking up the position of the 
void, assuming the necessity of the transformation in the real. Thinking in extremes: 
41 As Althusser would ask: "What is a history which is no more than the repetition of the clash between 
two fundamental tendencies? The forms and arguments of the fight may vary, but if the whole history of 
philosophy is merely the history of these forms, they only have to be reduced to the immutable tendencies 
that they represent for the transformation of these forms to become a kind of game for nothing. 
Ultimately, philosophy has no history, philosophy is that strange theoretical site where nothing really 
happens, nothing but this repetition of nothing". (LP, pg. 56) 
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"which means within a position from which one states borderline theses, or, to make 
thought possible, one occupies the place of the impossible". 42 
One example of this exceptionally complex operation of thought is to be found 
precisely in the ISA essay. But before examining this prodigious conceptual terrain, we 
should take into account a couple of very specific methodical remarks that Althusser 
puts forward, and which determine the vantage points of his scientific and critical 
approach to history. 
3.3. Class struggle and abstraction 
In the postscript to the ISA essay, Althusser makes an interpretative caveat: the 
reader should be alert about the peril of abstractness which lurks behind the text. The 
entire set of conceptual elaborations on the problems of ideology, the State, politics and 
subjectivity elaborated in the essay may, according to Althusser, remain abstract, remain 
dissociated from the actual historical realities, if they are not apprehended through the 
prism of class struggle, if they are not as understood as class realities. The problem of 
the relationship between the superstructure and the infrastructure, that is, the problem of 
the specific determination of political and ideological realities, of their material and 
historical effectivity - which Althusser attempts to think through the category of 
`reproduction' - cannot be dissociated from the incessant struggle between the social 
classes. In fact, the entirety of the process of reproduction is not an automatic, 
`objective' process, but a fundamental moment in class struggle. As Althusser writes: 
"The total process of the realization of the reproduction of the relations of production is 
therefore still abstract, insofar as it has not adopted the point of view of this class 
struggle. To adopt the point of view of reproduction is therefore, in the last instance, to 
42 ISMP, pg. 170. 
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adopt the point of view of the class struggle". 43 In other words, it is only by the 
introduction of the concept of class struggle that a dimension of concreteness of 
Althusser's analyses is revealed, it is only under the prism of class contradictions and 
class antagonisms that the scientific concepts elaborated in the essay on the ideological 
state apparatuses can be said to correspond to concrete historical realities. 
A surprising thing then is that Althusser would be reproached precisely for 
functionalism and for irremediable abstraction, for a deficit of the concrete dimensions 
of politics and of class struggle. It was probably E. P. Thompson who expressed this 
criticism most forcefully: "Althusser's structuralism is a structuralism of stasis, 
departing from Marx's own historical method ... [Hisj conceptual universe has no 
adequate categories to explain contradiction or change - or class struggle [... ] Althusser 
... [is] unable to 
handle, except in the most abstract and theoretic way, questions of 
value, culture - and political theory". 
44 
The entire problem here perhaps revolves around the fact that Althusser does 
place a specific emphasis on the `abstract', on the moment of abstraction in thought, 
especially in relation to the reality of class struggle. And yet, the moment of the abstract 
has a precise theoretical meaning here - one which has nothing to do with the common 
sense conception which opposes the abstractness of the space of speculation and 
thought to the concreteness of the sensuous, empirical world. If Althusser does accord a 
central role to abstraction, then he does so in order to stress the centrality of scientific 
abstraction in the process of the production of knowledge. Quite the opposite from an 
empiricist gaze which starts from the immediately given, from readily available 
intuitions and representations, the process of knowledge, for Althusser, is grounded in 
conceptual elaboration and scrutinisation, and ultimately in the systematic development 
of concepts through the work of theoretical abstraction. Concepts are abstract entities, 
a3 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation' (ISA), in: Althusser 
(1971) Lenin and Philosophy, pg. 171. 
44 Thompson, E. P. (1978) Poverty of Theory, London: Merlin Press, pg. 6. 
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that is, entities constituted by the process of abstraction, and, as such, not immediately 
deducible from sensuousness or experience. But this does not mean that they can be 
deemed abstract in the sense that they are mere speculative follies, which do not 
correspond to existing empirical reality: "[T]he `concrete', the `real', these are the 
names that the opposition to ideology bears in ideology. You can stay indefinitely at the 
frontier line, ceaselessly repeating concrete! concrete! real! real! [... ] Or, on the 
contrary, you can cross the frontier for good and penetrate into the domain of reality and 
embark `seriously on its study', as Marx puts it in The German Ideology". " Althusser is 
profoundly anti-empiricist: the scientific knowledge of the real, or scientific objectivity, 
is the precise opposite to experience - it is the result of abstraction and conceptual 
construction, and not of direct, unmediated experience, of the `concretely given': "What 
makes abstraction scientific is precisely the fact that it designates a concrete reality 
which certainly exists but which it is impossible to `touch with one's hands' or `see with 
one's eyes'. Every abstract concept therefore provides knowledge of a reality whose 
existence it reveals: an `abstract concept' then means a formula which is apparently 
abstract but really terribly concrete because of the object it designates. This object is 
terribly concrete in that it is infinitely more concrete, more effective that the objects one 
can `touch with one's hands' or `see with one's eyes' - and yet one cannot touch it with 
one's hands or see it with one's eyes". ' 
What we approach here, in fact, is Marx's famous `rule of method', elaborated 
in the 1857 `Introduction' to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. As 
Marx put it minimally and forcefully: the `scientifically correct method' consists in 
"rising from the abstract to the concrete". 47 Displacing the positivist temptation, Marx 
as FM. pg. 244-245. 
ab "Preface to Capital Volume One', in: (1971) Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, pg. 75. 
a' Marx, Karl (1970) Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Moscow: Progress Publishers, pg. 
206. Quoting Marx further: "It would seem to be the proper thing to start with the real and concrete 
elements, with the actual preconditions, e. g., to start in the sphere of economy with population, which 
forms the basis and the subject of the whole social process of production. Closer consideration shows, 
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here shows us that the `concrete' is not what is empirically given - the ensemble of 
sensuous, perceptive data - but a synthetic construct, the product of the labour of the 
scientific concept, of abstraction and conceptual determination. Instead of being given 
in advance, instead of proceeding from reality or from its immediate phenomenic 
observation, the concrete, which itself is internal to the process of knowledge, is a result 
of a conceptual synthesis. Marx would thus speak of the totality of thought or `concrete- 
in-thought' (Gedankenkonkretum). Quoting the famous `Introduction': "The concrete 
concept is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the 
unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore in reasoning as a summing-up, a result, and 
not as the starting point, although it is the real point of origin, and thus also the point of 
origin of perception and imagination". 48 
It is here that we find a forceful rejoinder to some of the post-Marxist critical 
objections that we touched upon in the previous chapter. Against Laclau and Mouffe's 
claim that the Marxian conceptualisation of the relationship between the economy and 
politics is epistemologically invalid and reductive, as it implies a separation between the 
realm of essences and that of appearances, where concrete social objects are never 
recognised in themselves, but are always reduced to another, more abstract or more 
essential reality, Althusser points to the fact that the `reductionism', or the process of 
abstraction inherent in Marxian concepts is a veritable epistemological and explanatory 
advantage. The strength of the Marxist theoretical apparatus lies precisely in its capacity 
for generalisation and abstraction: in the ability to offer a set of conceptual syntheses 
however, that this is wrong. Population is an abstraction if, for instance, one disregards the classes of 
which it is composed. These classes in turn remain empty terms if one does not know the factors on 
which they depend, e. g., wage-labour, capital, and so on. These presuppose exchange, division of labour, 
prices, etc. For example, capital is nothing without wage-labour, without value, money, price, etc. If one 
were to take population as the point of departure, it would be a very vague notion of a complex whole and 
through closer definition one would arrive analytically at increasingly simple concepts; from imaginary 
concrete terms one would move to more and more tenuous abstractions until one reached the most simple 
definitions. From there it would be necessary to make the journey again in the opposite direction until one 
arrived once more at the concept of population, which is this time not a vague notion of a whole, but a 
totality comprising many determinations and relations". (ibid, pg. 206) 
"s Ibid. 
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and complex determinations which, abstracting from the immediately given 
representation of reality, provide us with precise scientific means of production of the 
knowledge of this reality. 
This is the register from which we should approach the concept of class struggle. 
Class struggle, for Althusser, is just one such `terribly concrete reality', which it is 
impossible to fully `see with one's eyes' or `touch with one's hands'. Before being 
treated in terms of a set of empirical phenomena, it should be seized as a structural 
reality, and in that as a fundamental structural reality of capitalism. Althusser evokes the 
central thesis of the Communist Manifesto, `class struggle is the motor of history', in 
order to posit the form of the Two, the form of division, as the essential structural form 
underlying social relations in capitalism. In this he wants to remind us of the importance 
of Marx's theoretical depiction of the wage relation as the relation of exploitation, an 
`abstract' relation as it is, but with dramatic effects in the `real', in the `concrete'. Class 
struggle being the `motor of history' ultimately signifies, for Althusser, that the totality 
of the social relations within a given mode of production resides on an insurmountable 
structural contradiction, a contradiction for which we can discern both objective and 
subjective aspects. Class struggle is at the same time both the objective contradiction of 
the capitalist system - the contradiction between capital and labour, the contradiction 
contained in the process of capitalist exploitation, in the extraction of the surplus-value, 
and in general in the `social division of labour' that the capitalism imposes; but it is also 
the subjective antagonistic form arising from this objective relation. 
What is important to note is that we are very far from a typical sociological 
representation of classes and of their struggle here. The schema that Althusser adopts is 
a dialectical and structural one - it ultimately rests upon the philosophical idea of the 
primacy of contradiction over the terms of the contradiction. Classes are not entities 
which can be defined aprioristically, in a descriptive, statistical or empirical manner. 
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They are not autonomous `substances' which enter, as such, as pre-given, into an 
antagonistic struggle. Rather, they are the result of this very struggle, the consequence 
of the movement of division. "The class struggle is not a product of the existence of 
classes which exist previous (in law and in fact) to the struggle: the class struggle is the 
historical form of the contradiction (internal to a mode of production) which divides the 
classes into classes". 49 Or again: "In order for there to be classes in a `society', the 
society has to be divided into classes: this division does not come later in the story; it is 
the exploitation of one class by another, it is therefore the class struggle, which 
constitutes the division into classes. For exploitation is already class struggle". 50 What 
this means is that the movement of capitalist production carries within itself the terrible 
characteristic in that it does not constitute a social relation, it does not unite people, 
without dividing them into two opposed classes, into the exploiters and the exploited, 
the dominant and the dominated. As Balibar put in his Five Studies in Historical 
Materialism: "It is class struggle in production that drives the material existence of 
classes, their `subsistence': it is the quotidian class struggle pursued in production by 
capital which makes the process of labour a process of the production of surplus-value 
(and thus of profit, which is but a fraction of the latter), the material basis for the 
existence of the capitalist class; it is the quotidian class struggle in production pursued 
by the workers which assures, against the tendency of capital towards maximum profit, 
the material conditions (namely, the level of wages) necessary for the reproduction of 
the force of labour, for the existence of the working class". 5' 
But this structural embeddedness of class struggle, of the movement of the Two 
at the heart of the capitalist mode of production, and the relations which are proper to it, 
points to another `terribly concrete' characteristic of the `abstract' notion of class 
struggle: the fact that the contradiction on which it rests is fundamentally asymmetrical. 
49 RPJL, pg. 50, footnote. 
50 Ibid. 
S' Balibar, Etienne (1974) Cinq etudes du materialisme historique, Paris: Francois Maspero, pg. 48. 
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As Althusser would point out: "contradiction, as you find it in Capital, presents the 
surprising characteristic of being uneven, of bringing contrary terms into operation 
which you cannot obtain just by giving the second a sign obtained by negating that of 
the first. This is because they are caught up in a relation of unevenness which constantly 
reproduces its conditions of existence just on account of this contradiction". " This 
implies that it is erroneous to conceive of the antagonism between social classes as a 
simple dialectical confrontation between two `subjects' - the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat - each of which equally represents the negation of the other. One of the 
terms in this contradiction is always predominant. And moreover, one of the terms 
defines the very terrain on which the class struggle takes places. In capitalist societies it 
is the capital relation, which is the class struggle of the bourgeoisie, that dominates over 
social relations whilst subordinating the class struggle of the proletariat to itself - in the 
sense that it puts fort the contours of the `social division of labour' based on 
exploitation, in the sense that it produces the proletariat as the class exploited in the 
extraction of the surplus-value, a class whose material existence stands in the very 
contradiction to the premises of the capitalist societies, and yet constitutes its necessary 
element. 
3.4. The State machinery: on the materiality of the State form 
The structural notion of the class struggle, together with its essential 
dissymmetry, is crucial for understanding the context of the entire ISA essay. This 
`abstract' positing of the problem of the historical movement becomes particularly 
important for the way in which Althusser treats the problem of the State. In fact, here 
we can speak of a third moment of a `terrible concreteness'. How does Althusser 
52 ISMP, pg. 184-185. 
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conceptualise the State? Ultimately, in a manner which is as `minimal' and `abstract' as 
his propositions on the class struggle, and, moreover, in a way which points to the fact 
that the two problems - of the State and of class struggle - are inseparable. The State, 
according to Althusser, is essentially a class reality, a reality of class struggle, and in 
that, a repressive reality: "The State is a `machine' of repression, which enables the 
ruling classes (in the nineteenth century the bourgeois class and the `class' of big 
landowners) to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former 
to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i. e. to capitalist 
exploitation)". 53 Althusser here keeps a straight line with regard to the Marxian short 
circuit. The State cannot be conceived of as a neutral terrain, a terrain defined in 
universal and formal terms, but only substantially, in relation to the fundamental social 
classes and their struggle. The State is not above classes, hovering above their conflicts 
like an empty and neutral shell whilst mediating and potentially resolving these 
conflicts, but is itself an element of class struggle, an instrument in the hands of the 
dominant classes. Each particular form of the State is in the last instance a class State, a 
social and historical form which assists the class struggle of the ruling classes against 
the dominated ones (which means that it is impossible to simply `overturn' it for a 
socialist cause, to fill it with socialist contents which would negate its capitalist form). 
In the capitalist mode of production, it is the bourgeois State, or in fact, the liberal- 
democratic State, defined in terms of formal rights of freedom and equality, which 
safeguards the interests of capital and assures the conditions for the reproduction of the 
capitalist relations and for the perpetuation of the exploitation of labour by capital. As 
Marx put it forcefully in the Civil War in France: "At the same pace at which the 
progress of modern industry developed, widened, intensified the class antagonism 
between capital and labour, the state power assumed more and more the character of the 
53 /SA, pg. 131. 
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national power of capital over labour, of a public force organized for social 
enslavement, of an engine of class despotism". ' 
But in which sense is the State a `machine', or an `apparatus'? The mechanistic 
metaphor that we can find already in Marx, who speaks of the Staatsmachinerie, for 
example, in the 18`" Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, is particularly important. 55 It is 
important in the sense that it fleshes out not only the relationship between the State and 
the class struggle, but also the material dimension of this relationship, what we can call 
the materiality of the State form. The main point here is precisely the link between the 
State and violence. The image of the `machinery of the State' immediately confronts us 
with an entire array of administrative, governmental, judiciary, policing, penal and 
military organs, and with their practices of control and repression. It confronts us with 
the idea that at its source, according to its principal apparatuses or machines, the State 
resides upon coercion and violence. The State in the sense of a machine -a bureaucratic 
machine, as well as a policing machine, a juridical machine, and as Marx would add, a 
`parasitic machine' - is at its core an instrument of repressive execution, a coercive 
instrument in the hands of the ruling classes. This is why Althusser would claim, in 
terms somewhat close to Max Weber, that the State at its very essence displays the 
"presence of a public, armed physical force which has its place at the heart of the state 
and makes itself felt in all state activities" -a force which may be hidden from sight, 
which may intervene only intermittently, but is nevertheless essential in the last 
instance. ' At a distance from Weber, however, the locus of this presence does not 
reside in the public control of coercion and a `monopoly of violence', but precisely in 
the peculiar dialectic of violence and the Law, a dialectic of juridico-political 
universality and the violent force of class struggle, which predates - and provides the 
very grounds for - the establishment of public and political institutions. The key here is 
Marx, Karl 'The Civil War in France', in: Selected Works, op. cit, pg. 285, 
ss See "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in: Selected Works, pg. 96-179. 
MIL, pg. 104 
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Lenin's idea from The State and Revolution, where the State is depicted as "a power 
standing above the law". 57 As Balibar pointed out in his close reading of the text: "In 
Lenin's definition the essential factor is not repression or repressive violence, as 
exercized by the State apparatus [... I and by its specialised organs - police, army, law 
courts, etc. He does not claim that the State operates only by violence, but that the State 
rests on a relation of forces between classes, and not on public interest and the general 
will. This relation is itself indeed violent in the sense that it is in effect unlimited by any 
law, since it is only on the basis of the relation of social forces, and in the course of its 
evolution, that laws and a system of legislation can come to exist -a form of legality 
which, far from calling this violent relation into question, only legitimates it". ' 
But at the same time, the metaphor of the machine also points to the fact that the 
State is a tremendous material presence in itself. A presence which cannot be simply 
overturned by the capturing of State power, let alone by a change in the political 
contents of a regime, of a government or the parliaments. This is surely, as Althusser 
would not cease pointing out, one of the tragic lessons of the revolution of 1917. The 
idea of the State as a machine or an apparatus shatters the illusions of liberal political 
theory, the illusions proper to the theories of Natural Law or of the Social Contract, as it 
also shatters all the illusions of Eurocommunism and of the `democratic roads to 
socialism'. The State as a machine cannot be conceived as a result of a `social contract' 
between the individuals, as it also cannot be thought of as an expression of the 
`sovereign will of the people', an essential expression of the democratic subject. The 
57 Lenin, V. I. (1970) The State and Revolution, Peking: Foreign Languages Press. 
58 Balibar, Etienne (1977) On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat, London: New Left Books, pg. 71. In one 
of his later essays Althusser would use the metaphor of the 'machine' in order to come up with an original 
understanding of the relationship between force and legality, between class domination and political and 
legal power. The State is here quite literally a machine, a machine of transformation. The essence of the 
State resides in that it translates the violence of class domination, the `excess' of its force over the 
dominated classes, into legal and legitimate power, into laws and universal principles. Quoting Althusser: 
"The state [... I is a machine for producing legal power I... I For class domination does indeed find itself 
sanctioned in and by the state, in that only the Force of the dominant class enters into it and is recognised 
there. What is more, this Force is the only 'motor' of the State, the only energy to be transformed into 
power, into right, laws and norms". (MIL, pg. 107,109-110) 
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State leads an existence -a brute and determinate existence - outside of the actions of 
its citizens, it is exterior to social groups or individuals and their subjective political 
expressions or volitions. Its unity and its fundamental principle cannot be found in the 
morality of its citizens (as Hegel thought), but in the material mechanisms of repressive 
control and regulation that it exerts over the citizens, over individuals and groups. 
Moreover, far from being a result of a subjective expression, the State in the sense of a 
`machine' or an `apparatus' is essentially impersonal, it is a non-subjective reality, 
which nevertheless exerts tremendous power over its `subjects'. This is precisely one of 
the reasons why Marx recognised the historical continuity of the State beyond the 
contents of different historical revolutions: "All revolutions perfected this machine 
instead of smashing it". 59 
The separate existence of the State machine is at the same time the locus of its 
being a class State, an instrument of class struggle. There is no inconsistency here. For 
it is precisely as a separate entity, a machine or an apparatus, leading an existence at the 
distance from the class struggles, that the State expresses its class character most 
strongly, that it becomes a powerful instrument in the hands of the dominant class. By 
placing itself `above' society, above its tensions and its struggles, the State abstracts 
itself from any particular content and assumes the form of universality - it emerges as a 
universal power, a `public service' possessing a `monopoly of violence' over the clash 
of particular social forces, and regulating their affairs through the formalism of the law. 
And yet, it is exactly through its formal shape and its putative universality, through its 
claims on the `national interest' or the `general will', that the State effectively becomes 
an extension of the power of the dominant class, capable of intervening in class 
struggle. The appearance of universality and neutrality masks the force on which the 
State resides, the force of ruling classes. As Balibar put it: "In the functioning of the 
59 "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", pg. 169. 
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State apparatus, the relation between classes is concealed, and it is concealed by the 
same mechanism which realises it". 60 In other words, that the State is separated from 
class struggle solely in order to be able to effectively intervene into it, solely in order to 
be able to further the gains of the ruling classes. The State intervenes in the class 
struggle of the proletariat by blocking the realisation of the popular grievances of the 
exploited masses, by keeping their dissent within the bounds of `order', by ensuring that 
they do not threaten the conditions of the existing relations of production. It also 
intervenes in the class struggle internal to the dominant class, overcoming the divisions 
and fractional cleavages within it, unifying the dominant class and thus securing its 
domination. 
But Althusser also broadens the scope of the idea of the Staatsmachinerie. The 
State machine does not only include the repressive State apparatus (the courts, the 
ministries, the army, the death squads, etc. ), but also the ideological State apparatuses. 
The problem of the repression exerted by the State apparatus is complemented with the 
question of the ideological effects of the State and its apparatuses. Althusser, in other 
words, steps on the path of Gramsci, who, as we saw in Chapter 1, expanded the 
Marxian analysis of the State with the question of non-coercive aspects of capitalist 
domination, with the analyses of ideology and of the production of ideological consent 
via hegemony. But Althusser also goes beyond Gramsci. In fact, he reacts to Gramsci's 
formulations in a direct and profound way, first and foremost, by rejecting the very 
distinction between the State and the civil society. The State is always, for Althusser, a 
State in the `enlarged sense', encroaching upon and encapsulating the whole of the civil 
society. The very distinction between the State and civil society, between a `public 
sphere' on the one hand, opposed to the `private' life of individuals and groups in the 
autonomous region of `civil society' on the other, is falsely construed. There is no 
ý0 Balibar (1974), pg. 93. 
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autonomous terrain of `private', `specialized' institutions or organisations, as all of 
these institutions and organisations have to be essentially defined via their relationship 
to the State. Althusser would in fact follow Marx word for word: "the State enmeshes, 
controls, regulates, superintends and tutors civil society from its most comprehensive 
manifestations of life down to its most insignificant stirrings, from its most general 
modes of being to the private existence of individual S91.61 
The ideological State apparatuses in this sense include a multiplicity of different 
institutions, organisations and practices, which extend to the most minute aspects of 
`private' life - from the School to the Church, from trade unions to political parties, 
from consumer groups to NGO's, from cultural organisations to mass media, with even 
the institution of the family not being excluded. All of these compose the `machinery of 
the State' in the large sense, all of them are to be conceived as ultimately performing a 
certain function of the State. That is, all of them in the end play a role in the 
reinforcement and perpetuation of the relations of class domination and exploitation in 
the service of the ruling classes. "All ideological State apparatuses, whatever they are, 
contribute to the same result: the reproduction of the relations of production, i. e. of 
capitalist relations of exploitation". 62 
This stands in a stark contrast to Gramsci, who saw the elements of the `civil 
society', or the `hegemonic apparatuses' as he called them, representing neutral and 
empty forms, forms which depend in the last instance on the ideological `consensus' 
created by the `organic intellectuals', that is, on the subjective expressions of a class, 
and which can therefore be modified and `won over' in the struggle for hegemony. This 
is why Gramsci sought the potentialities of the proletarian revolution precisely in `civil 
society'. For Althusser, by contrast, the cards are always already stacked in the favour 
of the ruling classes. This is the fundamental asymmetry of class struggle. We cannot 
61 "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", pg. 127. 
62 ISA, pg. 146. 
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think of an autonomous, separate terrain of `the political' in which the potentialities of 
revolutionary politics reside. There is no pre-guaranteed terrain of political `resistance' 
as such. The `private' institutions of civil society, however distant they may appear 
from class struggles, already maintain a necessary, organic relationship to the State, and 
thus to the domination of the ruling classes: "hegemony is exercised under forms which 
are, even if their origin is `spontaneous' and `private', integrated and transformed into 
ideological forms that have an organic relationship to the State: the State can `find' 
these forms already made, forms more or less devoid of form - and this is what always 
happens in history - it can `encounter' them without 
having produced itself: it has never 
ceased integrating and unifying them under forms proper to ensure hegemony". ' 
But this whole scenario is not a deterministic one. Althusser is at pains to show 
that the power implicated in the ideological State apparatuses does not proceed from a 
single source, that it is not expressed in a linear, one-dimensional manner. The 
`enlarged' terrain of the State implies a dense and complex set of interrelations, 
mediations and levels, it is a terrain which is by definition `pluralistic'. And indeed, 
Althusser insists on the fact that the ideological State apparatuses maintain a crucial 
degree of autonomy, that they are essentially defined by their distance vis-a-vis the 
State. They are indeed private and particular, specialised institutions and organisations, 
heterogeneous bodies, each of which is enmeshed'in its own irreducible practice, each 
of which possesses its own idiosyncratic mode of operation. There is thus no question of 
reducing in advance the ensemble of the ideological State apparatuses to the direct 
control of the State and its executive institutions. For all of these apparatuses are 
`6' Te marxisme comme theorie « finie »', (TF) in: Althusser, Louis (1998) Solitude de Afachiavel et 
autre textes, Paris: PUF, pg. 288. Althusser would draw from the following political conclusion from this: 
rather then `winning over' or `democratising' the civil society, the stake of the revolutionary struggle is to 
dismantle the ideological State apparatuses, in the same sense in which the State has to be dismantled and 
abolished. "[The proletariat must seize State power in order to destroy the existing bourgeois State 
apparatus and, in a first phase, replace it with a quite different, proletarian State apparatus, then in the 
latter phases set in motion a radical process, that of the destruction of the State (the end of State power, 
the end of every State apparatus". (ISA, pg. 135). 
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essentially realising their own material practices, whose contents may not have to do 
anything directly with the State, and may be even in contradiction to it. And yet at the 
same time, each of these apparatuses puts forward and reproduces an ideological surface 
which is organically related to the State, to its legitimation and normalisation of the 
relations of capitalist exploitation. As Althusser writes: "Each of them contributes 
towards that single result in the way proper to it. The political apparatus by subjecting 
individuals to the political State ideology, the `indirect' (parliamentary) or `direct' 
(plebiscitary or fascist) `democratic' ideology. The communications apparatus by 
cramming every `citizen' with daily doses of nationalism, chauvinism, liberalism, 
moralism, etc, by means of the press, the radio and television. The same goes for the 
cultural apparatus (the role of chauvinism is of first importance), etc. The religious 
apparatus by recalling in sermons and other great ceremonies of Birth, Marriage and 
Death, that man is only ashes, unless he loves his neighbour to the extent of turning the 
other cheek to whoever strikes first. The family apparatus ... but there is no need to go 
on 64 
This is the crux of Althusser's schema of the reproduction of the capitalist 
relations of production: the problem of securing the perpetuation of capitalist 
exploitation, of the continuous domination of the ruling class, cannot be simply posed at 
the level of crude material force in the economic sphere, as it can neither be sufficiently 
explained by the exercise of repression through the instrument of the State. A crucial 
role is played by `non-coercive', ideological means, which assure the reproduction of 
capitalist production and exploitation on a daily basis, in the most delicate of ways. This 
is the essence of the ideological machinery of the State, of all the myriad elements of 
the `civil society', such as the school, the family, the church, the media, etc. The 
ideological function of these elements is essentially to enforce the `normality' of the 
' ISA, pg. 146. 
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relations between classes in capitalism, to portray the `obviousness' of what is 
understood as `universal social functions' of the State and of capital, to enforce the 
recognition of the existing `social division of labour'. 65 
Althusser thus leaves us with a powerful theoretical scenario depicting the 
disturbing problem of how power and domination are reproduced in most ordinary 
quotidian practices, at a far remote from State repression and class violence. He leaves 
us with the problem of that `subtle everyday domination' extending throughout the 
nooks and crannies of social relations, whilst being ultimately distilled through a 
multiplicity of social institutions, organisations, practices, each of which, in itself, 
already presents a form of class domination. This picture is not functionalist, not the 
least, as Althusser insists that `class struggle never ceases', that it is present in and 
around each of the specific ideological State apparatuses, the installation and the 
65 Althusser would see two particular ideological State apparatuses playing a crucial role: the legal- 
political system, on the one hand, and the education system on the other. In fact, he puts a specific 
emphasis on the ideological role of the schooling system for the reproduction of capitalist relations, where 
"[e]ach mass ejected en route is practically provided with the ideology which suits its role it has to fulfil 
in class society: the role of the exploited (with a `highly-developed' `professional', 'ethical', `civic', 
`national' and a-political consciousness); the role of the agent of exploitation (ability to give the workers 
orders and speak to them: `human relations'), of the agent of repression (ability to give orders and enforce 
obedience `without discussion', or ability to manipulate the demagogy of a political leader's rhetoric), or 
of the professional ideologist (ability to treat consciousnesses with the respect, i. e. with the contempt, 
blackmail, and demagogy they deserve, adapted to the accents of Morality, of Virtue, of 'Transcendence', 
of the Nation". (ISA, pg. 147) 
In this sense we can draw a parallel between Althusser and Foucault, in terms of the latter's remarkable 
studies on the heterogeneous nexus of power relations invested in the cacophony of social practices and 
discourses. See Foucault, Michel (1977) Discipline and Punish, New York: Random House, and also 
Foucault, Michel (1980) Power/Knowledge, New York: Pantheon Books. Althusser's difference from 
Foucault, however, emerges on two fronts. Against Foucault, who, having demystified and deconstructed 
the `monolithic' structure of power into a pluralistic and heterogeneous web of social relations, remains 
ultimately unable to link together all the heterogeneous practices, Althusser forcefully points out the 
unifying capacities of the dominant ideology and of the State apparatus (I owe this remark to Rastko 
Moýnik - see his book, 3 teorije: Ideologija, Nacija, Institucija, CSUB: Belgrade, 2003). At the same 
time, against Foucault, who seems to reintroduce a specific 'metaphysics of power' by turning power into 
a substance - power comes from everywhere and nowhere and is productive at the same time - Althusser 
seeks to further demystify the nature of power relations by decisively rooting them in the fact of class 
exploitation and domination: "Let us note straight away, to avoid all temptation to invoke metaphysical 
Powers here 
... that Force and Violence are relative, not absolute concepts; that Force designates the 
Force of the one who has the greater force, and Violence, the Violence of the one who is the more violent 
... 
Some people would like to see, in the trick theatre that they have themselves rigged up, Force, pure 
and alone, and Violence, pure and alone, produce the effects of fascination that suit their purposes. But 
what we mean is something else entirely: class struggle, where one class is powerful and violent only 
because it is the dominant class, in other words, exercises its force and violence upon another class 
(which is also a force) that it must, in a never-ending struggle, hold in check if it is to maintain the upper 
hand over it". (MIL, 108-109). 
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functioning of which ceaselessly runs against determinate obstacles, obstacles in the 
guise of their internal contradictions, but also the effects of the class struggles of the 
subordinated classes, their resistance to domination. 67 And if it also necessary to point 
out, there is no loss of empirical concreteness here, there is no question of reducing the 
complexity of instances and levels through which the problem of domination is posed, 
as there is equally no question of loosing from sight the specificity of forms of class 
struggle, forms of opposition to the dominant ideology and to capitalist exploitation 
throughout the State and the social realm. Instead, there is a real critical and theoretical 
gain, as all of these particular forms of struggle acquire a precise meaning in relation to 
the structure of the capitalist system as a whole, with regard not only to relations of 
production which make its infrastructure, but also in terms of different superstructural 
forms that are implicated in its reproduction. If the theoretical space of the ideological 
State apparatuses is an extreme one, then it is precisely this extremity which enables 
Althusser to pose some critical problems which take us beyond the obviousness of the 
dominant ideologies and institutions in the capitalist world. Behind a set of ideological 
screens, Althusser forces us to acknowledge that the origins of the modern State - 
which is the State of capital - cannot be depicted through a beautiful picture of the 
reconciliation of the state of nature in the social contract and positive law: the origins of 
the State reside in relations of force, in the perpetuation of the violence of one class over 
another. ' From a different angld, this is the same problem that preoccupied Marx, and 
67 "The ISAs are not the realization of ideology in general, nor even the conflict-free realization of the 
ideology of the ruling class. The ideology of the ruling class does not become the ruling ideology by the 
grace of God, nor even by virtue of the seizure of State power alone. It is by the installation of the ISAs in 
which this ideology is realized and realizes itself that it becomes the ruling ideology. But this installation 
is not achieved all by itself; on the contrary, it is the stake in a very bitter and continuous class struggle: 
first against the former ruling classes and their positions in the old and new ISAs, then against the 
exploited class". (ISA, pg. 172) 
' The point here is not to reduce the State to sheer power and manipulation, and thus to collapse the 
difference between different forms of rule, as for example, the difference between liberal democracy and 
fascism, between democratic and dictatorial regimes. The question is rather to understand how 
universalistic political institutions - liberal-democracy, first and foremost - regardless of, or precisely 
because of their universality, reside upon relations of force, relations of class exploitation. This is why, 
for Althusser, as for Marx, the question of modern democracy would ultimately represent the question of 
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which, as Jacques Bidet rightly noted, one can hardly consider outdated today: "under 
which conditions, in a society that proclaims the ideals of liberty and equality, the 
domination of ones over the others is being reproduced over and over again". 69 
This brings us exactly in front of the problem of ideology and its relationship to 
the Law. 
3.5. Ideology, Law, the Subject 
How to situate Althusser's conception of ideology in relation to the project of 
the critique of ideology, as famously formulated in The German Ideology? In the ISA 
essay, Althusser seems to be taking a noticeable distance from the `foundational text': 
"The German Ideology does offer us, after the 1844 Manuscripts, an explicit theory of 
ideology, but ... [this theory 
is not Marxist". ' How come this paradox? The problem 
with the critical project of Marx seems to be in that it went too far in its critical 
pretensions. Althusser's claim is that The German Ideology ultimately formulates only a 
negative theory, a theory which denies any positive reality to the phenomenon of 
ideology, as it maps it entirely to the distinction between Truth and Error. By stretching 
to a critical point the opposition between the idealistic nature of thought and the 
materialism of the real world of social production and intercourse, Marx could not do 
much but to relegate the sphere of ideas and of ideologies - and philosophy would 
figure most prominently amongst the latter - to the status of secondary `reflections', the 
epiphenomena of the material world of social relations. Marx's critique of all kinds of 
philosophical, scientific and social illusions amounted to treating the phenomenon of 
ideology as a "pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the `day's residues' from the 
"the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie under the forms of the parliamentary or the presidential democratic 
apparatus". (SLR, pg. 135) 
`'' Bidet, Jacques "En guise d'introduction: une invitation a relire Althusser", in: Sur la Reproduction, pg. 
5. 
70 ISA, pg. 149. 
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only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material 
individuals materially producing their existence". " But ideology, according to 
Althusser, cannot be dismissed as a phantasmagoria. Ideology produces tremendous 
effects which are not only the effects of an illusion, but real material effects. Ideology is 
inseparable from a set of complex and dense material practices in which it is inscribed, 
it is inseparable from the practical lives of men. In Althusser's words: "an ideology 
always exists in an apparatus, and its practice, or practices. This existence is material 72 
Judging from this, it should not be surprising that many would seek to 
immediately situate Althusser amongst those thinkers who treated ideology in a manner 
quite at a remote from Marx, as a positive reality, amongst those who saw in ideology a 
phenomenon which is socially and politically necessary, whether as an expression of the 
political consciousness of classes, or as a guarantee for a `social bond' between the 
members of these classes. If read in this vein, the ISA seems truly akin to some like 
Gramsci, who, as we saw in Chapter 1, regarded ideology as a `neutral' phenomenon 
related to class political consciousness, to Gramsci for whom the ideological sphere was 
not a matter of illusions, distortions or mystifications, but a general "terrain on which 
men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc". 73 This is how 
Althusser would become an important figure for many attempts at a `rectification' of the 
Marxian problem of ideology, via the language of Gramsci, or Lacan and the post- 
structuralist and semiotic systems, attempts which sought to derive the crucial 
coordinates for a contemporary `politics of resistance' straight from the reality and 
positivity of ideology. 74 
" ISA, pg. 151. 
'= ISA, pg. 156. 
'' SPN, pg. 377. 
'4 This is the way in which Althusser is most commonly read today, especially in the Anglophone context. 
The most elaborate theoretical examples of this reading can be found in the work of Stuart Hall, Ernesto 
Laclau, Judith Butler, and Slavoj Lilek. See especially Laclau, Ernesto (1977) Politics and Ideology in 
Marxist Theory, London: New Left Books; Butler, Judith (1997) The Psychic Life of Power, Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. Liiek, Slavoj (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso. 
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And yet it seems necessary to insist, against this entire corpus of interpretations, 
that Althusser retains an essentially critical, and negative concept of ideology. This is 
crucial for understanding the theoretical force of the propositions presented in the ISA 
essay. If Althusser does takes a distance from Marx, he does so not in order to abandon 
the critical potential of the concept, but to incorporate the latter within a more complex 
theoretical problematic. Ideology is still, and primarily so distortive for Althusser: but 
this distortion is not a mere matter of consciousness and knowledge, but has specific 
material dimensions. 
Everything here revolves around Althusser's `central thesis' on ideology: 
"ideology interpellates individuals as subjects". 75 This is quite a remarkable theoretical 
scenario. Althusser's aim is to paint the picture of the `everyday' functioning of 
ideology by exposing the relationship that each individual maintains vis-ä-vis ideology, 
or better, the relationship that ideology always maintains with regard to the individuals. 
Put simply, ideology `works' in that it addresses the individuals, by hailing or 
interpellating them, whilst the individuals respond to this address by recognising 
themselves in it, and, through this response and this recognition, subject themselves to 
the ideological sway. The critical moment is precisely the moment of (self)recognition, 
where the problem of ideology encroaches on the question of the subject. Althusser 
would write: "all ideology hails or interpellates concrete individuals as concrete 
subjects, by the functioning of the category of the subject". 76 What this means is that the 
centre of the ideological mechanism resides in the phenomenon of individual self- 
consciousness, in the moment of the self of the Cogito, in that `primary obviousness' as 
Althusser would say, in which we recognise ourselves as being truly ourselves, as the 
authors or originators of our thoughts, our actions, our volitions. As Rastko Mo6nik 
observed: "The individuals which are addressed by the ideology recognise themselves 
's ISA, pg. 160. 
76 ISA, pg. 162. 
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as the addressees, and through this (self)recognition they gain a recognition or 
acknowledgment that they are precisely that what they have become by their response, 
namely `addressed subjects' I... J By responding to the ideological discourse, the 
interpellated individuals constitute themselves as subjects precisely in that they 
`recognise' themselves in the place in which ideology has placed them". " The 
mechanism of ideological interpellation, in other words, is a mechanism of vicious 
circularity: ideological interpellation presumes a free individual self-consciousness to 
begin with, and, at the same time, it is responsible for this self-consciousness, it 
constitutes it by subsuming it under its own field of influence. Ideological subjection 
and the constitution of individuals as self-conscious subjectivities are one and the same. 
This is why Althusser would play on the linguistic ambiguity of the term `subject': 
which is both a free subjectivity, a self-determining agency, and a subjected being, one 
that submits to a higher authority. "ITjhe individual is interpellated as a (free) subject 
in order that he shall submit freely to the commandments of the Subject, i. e. in order 
that he shall (freely) accept his subjection, i. e. in order that he shall make the gestures 
and actions of his subjection `all by himself"'. 78 Or again: "The subjects `work by 
themselves'... They `recognize' the existing state of affairs (das Bestehende), that `it is 
really true that it is so and not otherwise', and that they must be obedient to God, to 
their conscience, to the priest, to de Gaulle, to the boss, to the engineer, that thou shalt 
`love thy neighbour as thyself', 4etc. Their concrete, material behaviour is simply the 
inscription in life of the admirable words of the prayer: `Amen - So be it"'. 79 
The scenario of interpellation involves a significant reconstruction of the critical 
dimensions of the concept of ideology. Ideology is not individual illusion, an act of 
fallacious imagination, but a system of concepts, and a rigorous system in that. And yet, 
this system, which is mediated through a complex web of practices, rituals and 
" Mo6nik (2003) op. cit, pg. 3. 
'8 ISA, pg. 169. 
79 Ibid. 
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ideological (State) apparatuses, can only work if it is ultimately rooted in the individual 
self-consciousness, in the representations that individuals hold towards themselves and 
their selves. This is where the locus of the distortion resides. 
Althusser is effectuating a violent reversal of the order of things: the question of 
individual agency, of individual self-determination, cannot be posited as the starting 
point, but only as a result, an ideological result. This is a decisive critical moment: a 
critique of the centrality of individual subjectivity, a critique of the illusions of 
individual self-consciousness. And this is what connects Althusser to Marx and his 
critique of liberalism. For indeed, it is not simply a `private', internal `voice of 
conscience' which interpellates me, but a `public' voice, that constitutive voice of 
political modernity which declares me a free subject, a legal person, a citizen, and also, 
a bourgeois, a possessor of property. Following upon Marx, Althusser would make 
powerful use of the idea that the reality of the modern juridico-political figures of 
equality and liberty resides completely outside themselves, that the absent content of the 
formal political sphere is in the economy. In the liberal juridico-political ideology there 
exists nothing but individuals, nothing but free subjects and free wills. But what is 
expressed though these `free wills' are, in reality, the dominant relations of production. 
As Marx put it in the first volume of Capital: "This juridical relation, which thus 
expresses itself in a contract, whether such contract be part of a developed legal system 
or not, is a relation between two wills, and is but the reflex of the real economic relation 
between the two. It is this economic relation that determines the subject-matter 
comprised in each such juridical act". 80 The juridico-political sphere, with its abstract 
personae, provides a necessary counterpart to the exploitation of labour as a commodity. 
The wage worker is free, or, in other words, he is interpellated as free. But this freedom 
does not make sense outside the limits of the wage relationship, outside of capitalist 
80 Karl Marx (1956) Capital, Vol. 1, London: Lawrence and Wishart, pg. 88. 
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exploitation. And the same goes for the freedom of the citizen, the freedom of the bearer 
of the public vote; for the moral sphere, for the sphere of circulation, of consumption, 
etc. The entirety of the abstract legal and political sphere, that `Eden of liberty, equality, 
property and Bentham' as Marx would say, is but a mystifying form which enables one 
class, the proprietary, or the capitalist class, to dominate over and to exploit those who 
possess nothing but their force of labour. And again, everything goes on `all by itself', 
everything works without the need for external coercion or repression, as it is 
guaranteed by the `naturalness' of my own individual liberty - in my acting as a `free' 
subject. 
But there is more implied in this theoretical reconfiguration. In the same coup de 
force, Althusser seeks not only to displace the `juridical fiction' which masks social 
exploitation and domination behind the ideal of free individuality, but also to undermine 
the very foundations of the philosophical orientation which placed the figure of the 
subject, the phenomenon of individual self-consciousness, at the centre of problems of 
cognition, ethics, and aesthetics. The concept of ideological interpellation thus also 
emerges as a critique of the entire scope of philosophical modernity predicated upon the 
centrality of the philosophical category of the individual subject (the ego of cogito, the 
transcendental subject, but also, the Feuerbachian Man, etc. ). Althusser here stands on 
the side of someone like Spinoza, for whom the idea of individual self-consciousness as 
a primary datum was thoroughly illusory. As, for example, the Appendix to the first 
book of the Ethics reads: "men believe that they are free, precisely because they are 
conscious of their volitions and desires; yet concerning the causes that have determined 
them to desire and will they do not think, not even dream about, because they are 
ignorant of them". " Althusser maintains a radical thesis in this regard: the entirety of 
the philosophical question of the Cogito is but a moment of the superstructures of the 
Spinoza Ethics, Part I, Appendix, in: Complete Works, Indianapolis: Hackett, pg. 239. 
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capitalist system, an expression of the modern juridico-political sphere which supports 
the capitalist relations of production. He writes: "The dominant classical bourgeois 
philosophy is built on legal ideology, and its `philosophical objects' [... 1 are legal 
categories or entities: the Subject, the Object, Liberty, Free Will, Property (Properties), 
Representation, Person, Thing, etc" 82 While thinking through the notion of the subject 
as `Free Will' and `Origin', while identifying freedom with the rationality of the 
individual, philosophy is thinking from the point of view of bourgeois Law and the 
bourgeois State, from the point of view of the dominant social order and its 
reproduction. Or, as Balibar would note: "the subject as that abstract, philosophical 
name for the man, or the individual, concentrates in itself the common effects of 
different bourgeois `theoretical ideologies': philosophy of history, economy, natural 
law, all induced by the capitalist structure". ' 
We can thus understand the ferocity of Althusser's attack on `humanism' and on 
the various exaltations of the figure of Man as Subject. Quoting one of his later essays: 
"Marx's theoretical anti-humanism, as it operates within historical materialism, thus 
means a refusal to root the explanation of social formations and their history in a 
concept of man with theoretical pretensions, that is, a concept of man as an originating 
subject, one in whom originate his needs (homo oeconomicus), his thoughts (homo 
rationalis), and his acts and struggles (homo moralis, juriducus and politicus). For when 
you begin with man, you cannot avoid the idealist temptation of believing in the 
omnipotence of liberty or of creative labour - that is, you simply submit, in all 
`freedom', to the omnipotence of the ruling bourgeois ideology, whose function is to 
mask and to impose, in the illusory shape of man's power of freedom, another power, 
much more real and much more powerful, that of capitalism". ' 
$'- ESC, pg. 117, footnote. 
83 Balibar 'L'objet d'Althusser', op. cit., pg. 98. 
8'ISMP, pg. 205. 
163 
But this also exposes the erroneousness of any attempt to `complement' 
Althusser with a theory of the subject, and to `expand' the notion of interpellation in the 
direction of the problem of the constitution of a `subject of politics' or a `subject of 
history'. Indeed, it seems necessary to insist upon this especially in the light of all those 
endeavours that sought to bring together the problematics of Althusser and Lacan, and 
to read Lacan's split subject into the Althusserian schema of ideology. 85 Despite some 
of his flirtations with psychoanalysis, Althusser accords a completely different 
theoretical role to his subject of ideology, than the notion of the subject in Lacan. The 
category of the subject in Althusser cannot have an ontological status as it does for 
Lacan, it is a critical concept. There is thus no question of locating the problem of 
revolutionary politics in the figure of interpellation - as there is equally no question of 
deriving a politics of emancipation straight from the reality of ideology. As Badiou 
would point out in his Metapolitics: "It is crucial to note that ideology, whose 
materiality is given by the apparatuses, is a statist notion, and not a political notion. The 
subject, in the sense of Althusser, is a function of the State. There is thus no subject of 
politics, because the revolutionary politics cannot be a function of the State". ' In 
opposition to the entire lineage of Hegelianism in the history of Marxism, in opposition 
to a thinker like Lukäcs who would seek to philosophically elevate the proletariat as the 
subject of history and politics, Althusser would sustain the idea that there is no proper 
`subject of politics' or a `subject of history' philosophically speaking. Revolutionary 
politics and political practice cannot be subsumed in an aprioristic manner under the 
scope of the universal theoretical personae that philosophy constructs within its own 
domain. The concept of the subject is ideological, for Althusser, and ideology is proper 
to the domain of the State. Which means that philosophy pretending to explain politics 
" This was indeed the operation through which Althusser was read philosophically in the 1980s, 
especially in the context of the Ljubljana `school' of psychoanalytic theory. See for example Lilck 
(1989). In the Anglophone context, see Laclau (1977) and Butler (1997). 
Cf. Badiou, Alain (1998) AbregEde metapolitique (Metapolitics), Paris: Editios du scuil, pg. 73. 
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under the figure of the subject, pretending to seize and determine it directly, does 
nothing more than reduce the entire question of politics to the State. 87 
But where can we think revolutionary politics then? How does Althusser 
propose to solve the lacuna of Gramsci's topography? 
3.6. Politics as singularity 
In order to seize the significance of Althusser's thought on politics, we need to 
revisit one more time the schema from Lenin and Philosophy that we discussed above. 
And in the first place we need to revisit one of the theoretical motifs evoked there - the 
primacy of politics over theory, the primacy of politics over science and philosophy. 
Asserting that politics is prior to philosophy (or science) presumes in the first 
place an affirmation of the significance of politics in history, its historical effectivity. In 
Althusser's language, this amounts to acknowledging the reality of class struggle as a 
`motor of history', "' class struggle which has to be posited both in the abstract terms of 
a fundamental dialectical or structural principle of history and at the same time as a 
profoundly conjunctural reality. But at the same time, the affirmation of the primacy of 
politics over theory presupposes something more. It presupposes that politics is always 
in an irreducible excess over the theory which tries`to seize it. Politics stands ever ahead 
of its philosophical or scientific apprehensions: it necessarily escapes them, runs ahead 
of them, as it represents the very capacity of the production of the new in history. "Class 
struggle is permanent, but it takes place through constantly changing forms" - this is a 
forceful acknowledgement of the inventive, aleatory character of political practice. 
s' Althusser would, in fact, go as far as to speak of the `philosophical party of the State' in this regard. See 
the text `La transformation de la philosophie', in: Althusser, Louis (1994) Sur la philosophie, Paris: 
Gallimard. See also the essay 'Philosophie et Marxisme', that is, the correspondence with the Mexican 
philosopher Fernanda Navarro, published in the same volume. 
' Politics and class struggle are consubstantial for Althusser. However, this does not mean that class 
struggle is only 'political' in the narrow sense. Nor that politics is narrowly `classist'. The structural 
concept of class struggle is central in this regard. 
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This motif has profound theoretical consequences. For in order to be able to 
account for politics in the register of the aleatory, one needs a very specific theoretical 
dispositive. Althusser acknowledged this with particular clarity, when, in one his later 
essays, he spoke of Marxism as a finite theory. He states: "Only a `finite' theory can be 
really open to the contradictory tendencies which it detects in the capitalist society, and 
open towards their becoming aleatory, open to all the unpredictable `surprises' that have 
not ceased to mark the history of the labour movement, open thus attentive, capable of 
taking seriously and grasping in time the incorrigible imagination of history". ' 
What is it that makes a theory finite? A finite theory, in Althusser's sense, is a 
theory that abandons its pretensions to include the entirety of social relations under the 
object that it constructs, a theory that does away with the ambition to totalise the whole 
of the process of history, whether under a single principle, or under a set of formal 
elements and their relations. Theory is finite when it is conscious of the fact that it 
cannot exhaustively conform the world to its practice of systematic apprehension, that 
there would always be something which would resist its inclusion in the whole, 
however complex the latter may be. Or, it is finite when it is aware that it cannot 
determine, in a teleological way, all the possible conditions and variations of forms of 
historical becoming. It is thus not surprising that Althusser would sharply state his 
opposition to philosophies of history, to all attempts at a transcendental foundation of 
the historical movement: `To say that Marxist theory is `finite', this means endorsing 
the essential idea that Marxist theory is the precise opposite of a philosophy of history 
which `encloses', whilst thinking it effectively, the whole of becoming of humanity, and 
is thus capable of defining in advance the term: communism, in a positive manner". 90 
What this means is that the problem of politics, which makes one with the 
problem of communism - the `real movement which abolishes the present state of 
ey TF, pg. 286. 
ý" Ibid, pg. 285. 
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things' (and this minimal definition is probably the only one from the Marxian legacy 
that Althusser would fully conform to) - cannot be in the last instance an object of a 
totalistic theory, it cannot ultimately be a matter of prediction, of aprioristic 
construction from within the realm of theoretical construction. Communism is not 
utopian. But it is also not scientific in the strict sense, for politics escapes the positivity 
of a science. Althusser's proposal for a theoretical apprehension of politics is quite at 
odds to the model of formation of a positive knowledge. Marxist theory, according to 
Althusser, should in this regard be at a distance from a pure positive science, at a 
distance from something like a `science of politics' properly speaking, which tries to 
deduce, form a certain set of general laws, from a certain number of formal elements 
and their combinations, the general conditions of possibility of the social and political 
world, and thus also to predict in advance all the possible variations or manifestations 
that might take place within this world. If Marxist theory does apprehend politics, it 
does so under very different conditions to that of the closed space of positive scientific 
objectivity. Or rather, the problem of the relationship of scientific objectivity to politics 
is founded on a problem which stands at a distance from the question of the `nature of 
things in general'. 
There is one thinker who left a profound impression on Althusser here, probably 
even more than Marx: Machiavelli. What Althusser would flesh out in his heretical but 
innovative reading of the Florentine philosopher is a thinker of singularity, a thinker 
who registers politics in the brutality of its historical appearance - and this does not 
mean reducing politics to naked violence alone, but theorising and acknowledging its 
innovative historical force, its violent urge to go beyond the `present state of things'. 
Machiavelli, for Althusser, is not the founder of modern political science, he is not that 
terrible political realist whose separation of politics from morality, its reduction to 
power alone, long ago entered into the proverbial realm. He represents something very 
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different: a thinker of the New, a thinker of political novelty which radically ruptures 
with the coordinates of the present: "IMachiavelli is they theoretician of the political 
preconditions of the conditions of the constitution of a national state, the theoretician of 
the foundation of a new state under a new prince I... I This is a quite original position, 
since he does not think the accomplished fact of absolute monarchies or their 
mechanisms, but rather thinks the fact to be accomplished, what Gramsci called the 
`having to be' of a national state to be founded, and under extraordinary conditions, 
since these are the conditions of the absence of any political form appropriate to the 
production of this result". 91 How to think the new in a total absence of its conditions? 
As Antonio Negri pointed out here: "After recuperating the traditional interpretation of 
Machiavelli, Althusser, in fact, turns it upside down: it is no longer the project that 
counts, but, rather, the radicalism expressed by Machiavelli's thought when it clashes 
against the impossibility of realizing the project: the thought of the new, therefore, in 
the absence of all conditions". 92 In Althusser's reading, the entire theoretical dispositive 
of the Prince is thus not formed around the question of the general laws of politics 
(although Machiavelli does indeed propose them), and neither is it framed around the 
question of the typology of forms of power; rather, its significance resides in the fact 
that it announces and opens up the space for political novelty. Althusser writes: "What 
does Machiavelli do? In order to change something in his country's history, therefore in 
the minds of the readers whom he wants to provoke into thought and so into volition, 
Machiavelli explains, off-stage as it were, that one must rely on one's own strength, that 
is in fact not rely on anything, neither on an existing State nor on an existing Prince, but 
on the non-existent impossibility: a new Prince in a new Principality". 93 A new Prince 
91 Althusser, Louis (1999) Machiavelli and Us, London: Verso, pg. 121. 
92 Negri, Antonio "Notes on the Evolution of the Thought of Late Althusscr", in: Callari, A. and Ruccio, 
D. (eds. ) (1996) Postmodern Materialism and the Future of Marxist Theory, Hanover: Wesleyan UP, pg. 
54. 
' ISMP, pg. 170-171. 
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and a new Principality: this is irreducible dimension of political singularity that 
Althusser discovers in Machiavelli. 
The `detour' through Machiavelli, Althusser would not refrain from 
acknowledging, has powerful consequences for Marxist theory. It allows its 
refoundation (and one can probably say that this is the substance of Althusser's 
`politicism') around the problem of how to grasp theoretically - through which 
concepts, through which operations, through which theoretical dispositions - the 
profound aleatory and singular being of politics; how to grasp the aleatory becoming of 
communism, how to account for the fact that one cannot predict, locate, define in 
advance the question of where and when, in which form and from which site, is 
communism to emerge and develop. 
In Marxism as a `Finite' Theory, Althusser would indicate two modalities in 
which theory can approach this difficult problem: the modality of anticipation, on the 
one hand, and the modality of critique, on the other. He would write: "All that [Marxist 
theory] can say about the future is the extension in outline len pointillel, and in the 
negative of the possibilities of an actual tendency, the tendency towards communism". 94 
Critique and anticipation. This indication, in turn, is simply the reaffirmation of the 
remarkable character of the relationship between politics, science and philosophy that 
Althusser establishes in Lenin and Philosophy, and practices in `analytical' works such 
as the ISA essay. 
The moment of critique: this is where we find once more the importance and the 
irreducibility of science and scientific knowledge, of the `science of history' in terms of 
its adhesion to politics. Althusser would never stop insisting on the necessity of that 
what Lenin called a `concrete analysis of a concrete situation', on the necessity of 
scientific, objective knowledge of the conditions, forms and structures that characterise 
94 TF, pg. 285-286. 
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class struggle, knowledge about the relations of forces existing in the current situation, 
of the real possibilities and impossibilities that determine the development of the actual 
tendencies of politics from within the present conjuncture. `Without revolutionary 
theory there can be no revolutionary movement'. It is this critical knowledge which is to 
play a practical role in actual struggles, not in the sense of the Gramscian-Hegelian 
expressive model of the `elevation of consciousness', but in the sense that this 
knowledge might aid an existent, real politics in the proper development of its 
innovative tendency. And aid it in the negative: by preventing its reduction to existing 
forms, models, solutions, and, most importantly, by pointing to the fundamental 
dissymmetry of the conditions in which it finds itself, the profound inequality whereby 
the entire terrain on which it operates is already occupied by its adversary. Scientific 
theory, in other words, seeks to defend negatively the autonomy of revolutionary 
politics against the encroachment of ideologies and institutional forms which seek to 
neutralise it and annul it. We can thus understand the importance of the critical 
arguments on the State and its apparatuses in the ISA essay, we can understand the 
significance of Althusser's attempts to extend the Marxian critique of law and human 
rights, as well as his entire attempt to pose the question of the revolution by theorising 
the moment of the utmost synchronicity - the reproduction of the relations of 
production. As Althusser himself would note: "In what concerns politics, it is crucial, 
before everything else, not to reduce it to the forms officially consecrated as political by 
the bourgeois ideology: the State, the popular representation, political parties, political 
struggle for the possession of the power of the existing State, etc. If one enters into this 
logic and stays there, one risks falling not only into `parliamentary cretinism' I... I but 
above all into the juridical illusion of politics: because politics is defined by the law, 
and this law consecrates (and consecrates only) forms of politics defined by the 
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bourgeois ideology, which includes the activity of parties". 95 Scientific knowledge, far 
from being repressive, is productive, as by of force of critical insight it aims to set the 
course straight for revolutionary politics. 
The moment of anticipation: inseparable, in fact, from the former moment, it 
designates the obstinacy of thought to open itself towards the new, towards novelty in 
history, both with regard to politics as well as with regard to the sciences. It is here that 
'Machiavelli's rule of method' of thinking in extremes appears in all its force. Thinking 
in extremes means assuming the position of the necessity of a radical innovation, the 
necessity of the profound overcoming of the present - the place of the `impossible'. It 
means drawing the consequences within the realm of theory from the perpetual 
figuration of novelty in history. And especially with regard to politics, thinking in 
extremes means recognising the immanent capacity of politics for surprise, its capacity 
to produce novelty beyond all prediction, to invent new forms out of the impossibilities 
of the present. And again, there is no question of reducing this immanent political 
capacity by an aprioristic inclusion under the strict rule of the object of knowledge. All 
that theory can do, from within its own proper space, is to recognise it and anticipate it, 
"in certain radical formulae, which cause the relation of force between the new ideas 
and the dominant ideas to be felt in the very statement of the theses themselves". 96 
Radical formulae: this is where we can truly grasp the importance of Althusser's 
attempt to define the entire venture of philosophy as one of (class) struggle, and in that, 
as one of division and demarcation. Althusser writes: "this extremism in the formulation 
of theses, belongs quite properly to philosophy". 97 Extremism, but not dogmatism. 
Because, as we already saw, it is the essence of materialism, of the materialist position 
in philosophy, according to Althusser, to remain open towards the real, to recognise its 
aleatory emergence, whilst seeking to constantly reinscribe its consequences in the 
95 TF, pg. 289. 
96 1SMP, pg. 171. 
97 Ibid, pg. 172. 
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realm of philosophical `objects' - concepts, categories and their relations - against the 
idealist temptations of totalisation and systematic closure. 
3.7. Conclusion: a theoretical atopia of politics 
The singular contribution that the work of Althusser which we examined here 
brings to Marxist theory, and to philosophy and social theory in general, can be 
registered at a number of different levels: in the powerful reconceptualisation of the 
problem of ideology, in the expansion and deepening of the analysis of the capitalist 
State, but also in the re-examination of the status of philosophy vis-ä-vis political 
practices and the sciences. Althusser's critical analyses of the State, of its relationship 
with class struggles, and thus also of its role in the reproduction of capitalist relations of 
production and exploitation, surpass Gramsci's problematic at a number of crucial 
points, especially by displaying the complexity of the material dimensions of the State - 
which include, as an important element, the workings of the ideological State 
apparatuses. At the same time, Althusser reshapes the critical thrust of the notion of 
ideology, by linking the phenomena of ideology to the question of subject and the 
problem of individual subjectivation, but also by linking these questions to the 
fundamental legal institutions of capitalist modernity. Althusser also proposes a 
powerful redefinition of philosophy which tries to stay true to Marx's injunction to 
`change the world' without making of philosophy, and thought in general, a simple 
`servant' of politics, without reducing philosophy in its entirety to politics pure and 
simple. 
But in and through these critical moments, Althusser also powerfully reshapes 
the entire problematic of revolutionary politics and its location in Marxist theory. If the 
question of the autonomy of revolutionary politics, and thus of the autonomy of the 
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practice of emancipation, brings about not only theoretical urgencies for Marxism, but 
also, as we saw in Gramsci, and especially in the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe, 
serious theoretical difficulties and impasses, the importance of Althusser resides in the 
fact that he points to a way of resolving this problem without sacrificing the radical 
nature of the modality of the break of revolutionary politics. Politics, according to 
Althusser, can only be rendered autonomous, it can only be seized in its proper 
autonomy, if it is subtracted in a radical way from the so-called `autonomy of the 
political', which means, if it is expatriated from the domain of the juridical and 
constitutional sphere of the State: from the official domain of the `political', and also 
from the space of civil society. And even more radically, the true question of the 
autonomy of the moment of politics can be posed only when we exclude politics from 
any topographical considerations, from any attempt at its aprioristic theoretical 
localisation. 98 There is no general space of revolutionary political potentiality that 
theory can delineate. Moreover, each theoretical topography of politics - such as a 
topography of the subject, or of the Gramscian space hegemony - is a fundamental 
theoretical mistake, as, according to Althusser, we need to acknowledge that the entirety 
of the socio-political space is already stacked in the favour of the adversary. Politics in 
the guise of a radical break, politics as revolutionary practice, can only be seized if 
subtracted from this space, if seized as an irreducible singularity, as an aleatory, evental 
emergence. 
If Gramsci approached the problem of revolutionary politics with a visible 
theoretical and intellectual optimism - in fact: with a `pessimism of Reason, and and 
98 It is here that we can see Althusser be anticipating the contemporary debates which oppose politics to 
`the political'. Althusser in fact prefigures the positions and arguments of thinkers like Badiou, Lazarus 
and Rancie're in their conviction that politics needs to be extracted from the jurisdiction of any type of the 
transcendental gaze - which is always, in the last instance, the gaze of the State. See I3adiou, Alain (1998) 
Abrege de metapolitique (Metapolitics), Paris: Editios du seuil, and, also, Rancitre, Jacques (1995a) La 
mesentente (Disagreement), Paris: Galilee. One might add that, by comparison to some of the 
contemporary authors, Althusser's significance lies in the fact that he does not abandon the categories of 
science and history, in the fact that he accords a necessary place for the objectivity of knowledge and 
scientific theory (and not only for philosophy) in its encounter with real politics and its innovative 
tendencies. 
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optimism of Will' - Althusser's perspective seems pessimistic. But the pessimism of his 
theoretical atopia is nevertheless a source for a renewed critical work. If theory cannot 
delineate the general space of revolutionary and emancipatory politics proper, it can 
anticipate this politics, it can perpetually aid it via the labour of the `negative', "keeping 
alive", as Jameson would say, "that place from which the new can be expected, 
unexpectedly, to emerge". 99 
c 
99 Jameson (1996) op. cit., pg. 8. 
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PART TWO: 
TOWARDS A CRITIQUE OF THE POST-SOCIALIST 
POLITICAL REASON 
175 
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INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND PART: 
Why speak of the post-socialist political reason? What is the specificity of the 
political rationality which emerges after 1989? 
Alain Badiou recently remarked that today we live in an obscure present. ' A 
present where our own subjective grip on history, our own relationship to historical time 
and historical change, seems completely divorced from the immediacy of the present, 
from its creative and disruptive character, and where, as a consequence, the very idea of 
changing the world in a radical sense disappears. An 'obscure present' is a present 
voided of the `presence of the present', of the presence of any substantive idea or a 
conception of radical change in the here and now, a present where a radical 
transformation of our social condition seems not only improbable but also impossible. 
Post-socialism is a privileged historical place vis-ä-vis Badiou's philosophical 
observations: a place where politics which maintained an intimate relationship to the 
present, a revolutionary and emancipatory politics, as it was understood in the 
communist and socialist projects, is replaced, in the first place, with an overwhelming 
affinity for the past. It is hard to overlook the excessive fascination of post-socialist 
politics with nineteenth century nationalisms and with all the identitary and racial 
ideologies which have followed this historical doctrine of politics. ' As if post-socialism, 
evoking the `certainty' and simplicity of nationalist imaginaries, had finally come to 
reverse the curse of Alexis de Tocqueville, who once stated, following the unstoppable 
development of `democracy in America' that "[tihe past has ceased to throw its light 
upon the future, and the mind of man wanders in obscurity". 3 But, at the same time, 
' Badiou, Alain "Presence et Present", lecture in Bruxelles, Palais des Beux-Arts, 28" March 2007. 
2 On the peculiar ideological 'supplements' to the historical idea of the nation, and particularly on the 
relationship between nationalism and racism in the writing of national histories, see Balibar and 
Wallerstein (1991) op. cit. Also, see Balibar, Etienne (1992) Les frontieres de la democratie, Paris: La 
Decouverte, especially the chapter on "Racism, Nationalism and the State". 
3 De Tocqueville, Alexis (1945) Democracy in America, New York: Knopf, vol. 2, bk. 4, pg. 331. 
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post-socialism is also a place where we can see the present being forcefully divorced 
from politics conceived in any radical way, where our sense of being in history is 
separated from emancipatory and revolutionary political gestures, from subjective 
revolts oriented against the status quo, only to be left to the `realistic' managing of the 
effects of the vagaries of the market, to the administrative and parliamentary alleviation 
of the destructive rhythms and cycles of global capitalist production, reproduction and 
exchange. One of Badiou's foremost philosophical interlocutors, Jacques Ranciere, 
named this the logic of consensus: "Consensus means erasing the contestatory, 
conflictual nature of the very givens of common life [... j Consensus knows only: real 
parts of the community, problems around the redistribution of powers and wealth 
among these parts, expert calculations over the possible forms of such redistribution, 
and negotiations between the representatives of these various parts". 4 
Between the two poles - the reduction of politics to the past, to history and its 
`essentialisations', on the one hand, and, on the other, the reduction of politics to the 
`management of the possible', to an adaptation to the consequences of global economic 
necessity - one can clearly map the dominant post-socialist political realities: from 
numerous manifestations of identitary politics, the politics of the nation and 
nationalism, but also of ethnic and religious claims, to a renewed enthusiasm with the 
establishment of the liberal-democratic political institutions, parliamentary debates and 
party contestations, but also juridical principles of Right, legality, legitimacy and 
accountability. But what is most important here is precisely what lies beneath these two 
poles, and what Badiou and Ranciere forcefully emphasise: a profound depoliticisation 
inherent to the political rationality of post-socialism. One of the most dramatic effects 
of the collapse of the `really existing' socialisms is to be measured exactly in terms of 
the evacuation of all revolutionary political thought, the thought of politics which seeks 
4 Ranciere, Jacques (2004) `Introducing Disagreement', in: Angelaki, Vol. 9, No. 3, pg. 7. 
178 
its finality beyond the coordinates of the given: in the egalitarian transformation of 
social relations. The post-socialist political rationality is a rationality which purges from 
the space of thought all radical attempts to counter the alignment with the way of the 
world (which, in the last instance, is always an alignment with capital). Thus its 
fascination with the figures of consensus, with juridical universality, with mechanisms 
of political pacification and `normalisation', but also with history in its conservative 
guise. 
In the following three chapters, I would like to propose the possibilities of 
approaching this political rationality in a critical manners Whilst doing so, I aim to 
show in the first place the pertinence of the Marxist philosophical theory - especially in 
the light of the discussion of Gramsci and Althusser which preceded this part. If the 
discussions in the first part of the thesis circled around an attempt at a theoretical 
scrutinisation of some key analytical and critical moments in the Marxist tradition, 
namely, around the concepts of ideology, the analysis of the State and of the `short 
circuit' between the liberal and bourgeois political forms and capitalist exploitation, 
around questions of the localisation of revolutionary politics in Marxism and at its 
limits, but also around the problem of the relationship between philosophy, social 
S The critical operation that I propose here, if it takes -inspiration 
from Badiou's and Ranciere's 
approaches, does not seek to engage with the two thinkers - with the complexity and the innovations of 
their respective philosophical projects - in a direct way. Nevertheless, I do need to acknowledge two 
things vis-ä-vis these thinkers: 1) the fact that both of their projects essentially stem from an attempt to 
critically confront the 'obscure present', which in sense is precisely the present of post-socialism. Indeed, 
it does not seem exaggerated to claim that what lies at the core of Badiou's philosophical endeavour is an 
attempt to forcefully re-establish, against the obscurity of the present, the link between philosophy and the 
novelty of political emancipation. For a systematic discussion of Badiou under this light, see Hallward, 
Peter (2003) Badiou: A Subject to Truth, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. At the same time, 
Rancie're openly sets his task as rethinking the very notion of democracy as a category of division and 
uncompromising egalitarianism against the logic of consensus. See Ranciere (1995a) op. cit.. 2) The 
second observation to make is that Rancic're's and Badiou's relationship to Marxism, and especially to the 
Marxist approaches that I deal with here - namely, the work of Louis Althusser - is a complex issue, 
which invites a fruitful examination and problematisation that unfortunately goes beyond the confines of 
this text. If both of these thinkers were Althusser's students in the 1960s, Ranciere's work has been 
shaped to a large degree by an attempt at a strict distantiation from his teacher (See for instance, Ranciere, 
Jacques (1974) La lepon d'Althusser, Paris: Gallimard), while Badiou has himself maintained a more 
productive relationship to Althusser, exemplified, for instance, in his recent book Petit pantheon portatif, 
(2008) Paris: La fabrique. 
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theory and revolutionary political practice, the second part offers a concrete historical 
grounding for these discussions, their immediate historical `interlocutor'. And even 
more than that, it provides these discussions with a veritable laboratorial space -a space 
to seize the effectivity of concepts and philosophical categories, a space to assess, 
experiment with and demonstrate the significance of the Marxian critical method in its 
capacity to produce a forceful antithesis to the `obscure present' of post-socialism. 
To this aim, I focus on three particular moments of the post-socialist rationality, 
each of which constitutes the subject matter of one of the three respective chapters: 
1) the ideological and conceptual contiguity between the post-Marxist conception 
of politics qua `radical and plural democracy' which can be found in the work of 
Laclau and Mouffe, and one of the preeminent post-socialist political concepts: 
the concept of civil society of the late 1980s. I examine this contiguity by 
inquiring into the context of the political struggles in Slovenia in the late 1980s. 
2) the contradictions which surround the idealisation of liberal-democracy after 
1989: especially in the light of the paradox between, on the one hand, the idea of 
liberal-democracy as an effective resolution and pacification of social and 
political conflicts, and, on the other, the effective role of liberal-democratic 
political forms in the explosion of nationalism and nationalist violence in the 
1990s. I examine this paradox by looking at the process of `democratisation' in 
Yugoslavia, and more concretely at the political conflicts in Croatia in the early 
1990s. 
3) the `obscurantist' ideological consequences of the positing of the State of Right 
as a universal political form and norm, and, consequently, of the subjection of 
politics to juridical conceptions. I try to assess these consequences by examining 
one of the most influential readings of the socialist Yugoslavia in Yugoslav 
political philosophy: the work of Zoran Dindik. 
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The three moments are not selected arbitrarily -I see them as symptomatic 
moments which reflect some of the key elements of the post-socialist political 
rationality: a) the formalisation of the question of the subject of democracy via the 
collapse of the distinction between `formal' and `real' democracy, and an assertion of 
the superiority of the former over the latter b) the celebration of liberal-democracy as a 
universal historical and political model, a model bringing an effective `end of history', 
whilst reconciling and pacifying all forms of rebellious political subjectivity connected 
to social struggles c) the normative identification of politics with the Law, and its 
historical form: the State of Right (Rechtsstaat). 
One last note about the method: even though the three analyses that I present 
here focus on a set of concrete philosophical and theoretical works: the post-Marxism of 
Laclau and Mouffe, the notion of civil society amongst Western and Eastern 
philosophers and social scientists, the political philosophy of Zoran Dindid - and even 
though they start from very concrete political contexts and situations: namely, the 
different political situations which surround the destruction of Yugoslavia - they are all 
undertaken in the light of more general aim: an attempt at critical confrontation with the 
post-socialist political rationality as a whole. In this sense, it is important to point out 
that what I seek to approach here is not simply a body of particular academic positions, 
nor only a body of concrete historical contexts and situations, but precisely a global 
condition - an ideological spectrum - which unites concrete political situations, 
concrete actors, such as state administrations and political movements, with more 
abstract, more detached scientific and philosophical debates. Therefore the particularity 
of the method that I adopt here -a method bordering between a socio-historical analysis 
and a critical examination (but also an application) of philosophical concepts. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
SPRINGTIME FOR HEGEMONY: 
LACLAU AND MOUFFE AND THE 'SLOVENIAN SPRING' 
4.1. Introduction 
In the autumn of 1987, the Slovenian journal Mladina published a large 
interview with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, under the heading: "Once Was a 
Revolution: Large interview with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe". 6 
At some point in this interview, we can find Mouffe stating: 
"We cannot think of socialism anymore in mere terms of the socialisation of the 
means of production, because all of this is too much related to the struggle against only 
one form of social inequality - that of class - whilst at the same time, all other forms of 
inequality, which have no class basis, but are nevertheless as important, are overlooked. 
The project of radical democracy attempts, on the one hand, to recognise this extension 
of social conflictuality; on the other hand, it aims to pose the question of politics in a 
non-essentialist way. This means that it does not presuppose some sort of a `human 
nature', whose essence would be the struggle against subordination, but rather 
conceives each antagonism as discursively constructed I... ] This is why we placed such 
an emphasis on the significance of the `democratic revolution' in our book. Because it is 
the democratic revolution that offers the language through which more relations of 
subordination can be effectively translated into relations of oppression. Plurality also 
brings about the realisation that the idea of a total, homogeneous collective will is 
something extremely dangerous - it leads to totalitarianism". 7 
6 "Once Was a Revolution: Large Interview with Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe", Mladina, (1987), 
No. 39, Ljubljana: ZSMS. 
ibid, pg. 25. 
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These statements are interesting. Not because they represent a condensed 
recapitulation of the most important theses of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, which 
we already explored in Chapter 2. They are interesting in relation to the context in 
which they appear and thus also in terms of their meaning in this context. Although this 
interview was conducted at the time when the educated public in Slovenia was 
expecting to see the light of the day of the translation of Hegemony into Slovenian 
language, one cannot say that this context was simply a matter of intellectual exchanges. 
The significance of these statements cannot be confined to the level of theory alone. 
In fact, the very appearance of Laclau and Mouffe in Mladina, a Slovenian 8 
weekly standing at the forefront of the political forces which were announcing, from the 
inside, so to speak, the historical transformations of the `real socialist regimes' at the 
end of the eighties, should tell us something important about their theoretical 
propositions, about the concepts of `hegemony' and `radical democracy'. This 
appearance invites us to look for the reach of these concepts beyond the realm of pure 
theory, to explore the actual involvement of these theoretical ideas in political and 
historical struggles. If it is without doubt that Mouffe's statements in Mladina exhibit a 
certain degree of analytical force - capturing, so to speak, the sprit of that moment - 
from today's perspective, we might rather consider them as being programmatical. 
Indeed, we could even go as far as saying that if the theoretical propositions of Laclau 
and Mouffe had ever seen their materialisation in concrete politics, if they ever had a 
concrete grip on history, not simply in terms of conceptual adequation, but in terms of 
real, practical effects, then we have to search for these in the historical episode of the 
`Slovenian Spring'. 
ö Mladina (Youth) was a political weekly which was the chief spokesman for the `alternative' political 
scene in Slovenia throughout the eighties. Published by the Socialist Youth Alliance of Slovenia, Mladina 
provided the key intellectual role in the arena of the social and political movements united under the label 
of the `Alternative'. It also had a very strong impact on the wider Slovenian public. At its peak, the 
magazine had a print run of around 80,000 copies per week, in a republic of 1.7 million inhabitants. 
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The analysis that follows here is an attempt to understand this practical 
involvement of a theory, and to draw some consequences from it. In a sense, this would 
presume that we take the Laclau and Mouffe theory in a consequential way. For as we 
know, one of the fundamental presuppositions of their theorisation - and in this sense, 
their post-Marxism has clear Marxist roots - is the idea of the unity of theory and 
practice, a unity which Laclau and Mouffe attempt to conceptualise in an unmediated 
manner. But this excursion of theory into practice seems to reverse the normal order of 
things. The point of the historical appearance of Laclau and Mouffe in Slovenia is not 
the point at which we can learn from the theoretical enrichment of practice. Quite the 
opposite, it is the point at which practice teaches us important lessons about theoretical 
constructions. The episode of the `Slovenian Spring' gives us a vivid historical example 
of the political problems underlying the Laclau and Mouffe project. And in this, it also 
reveals the precise points at which the post-Marxist construction becomes a peculiar 
theoretical symptom of the post-socialist political reason: the points at which we can 
draw a direct connection between the theoretical apparatus of Laclau and Mouffe and 
the contradictions and paradoxes of the political rationality of 1989. 
4.2. Socialism, democracy and the Alternative 
The themes that Laclau and Mouffe were discussing in this 1987 interview - 
themes such as socialism and democracy, political pluralism, new social movements 
and civic liberties - were veritable signs of the times. These themes were at the 
forefront of the political strivings that characterised the decades of the seventies and the 
eighties in the East of Europe, where the structural pinnacles of the `socialist bloc' were 
experiencing a compelling drive for transformation, both from `above' and from 
`below'. If the entire conceptual construction of `radical and plural democracy' 
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proposed by Laclau and Mouffe cannot be seen as direct theoretical expression of this 
concrete political conjuncture - as this would involve some slight stretching - the 
approach that they sketched definitely shared its broad spirit. 
In general terms, what perhaps best characterises this historical transformation is 
the shift in the topography of the dialectic, occurring at the very heart of Marxism. One 
of the decisive consequences of the seventies and the eighties, in this sense, was that the 
entire theoretical field which included the dichotomous and antagonistic figures of class 
struggle, of capitalism, socialism and communism, of the bourgeoisie and the 
proletariat, of reform and revolution, was to be replaced by a rather more pacifying 
doublet: the dialectics of democracy and socialism. The problem of social or `human' 
emancipation, as young Marx would put it, is `taken a step back' in order to rethink the 
questions of political emancipation. 
In the midst of the theoretical and political crisis that the post-War period had 
uncovered, the discourse of `democracy' re-emerged as a crucial ideological topos. It 
became a beacon of new times for the entire socialist world. From the East to the West, 
from the `official' to `unofficial' spheres, amongst the intellectuals and in the party 
structures, `democracy' surfaced as an indicator of a momentous change, a dramatic 
shift of direction. One can think of all those names inscribed in the history of 
`democratization' of Marxism: from Dub6ek to Berlinguer, from Marchais to Bahro, 
from Bobbio to Hobsbawm, from Kurorn to Carillo, from Kor6ula to Budapest, from 
KOR to Charter 77, from compromeso storico to the New Left. Here the discourse of 
`democracy' provided the point of opposition to the repressive nature of the apparatuses 
of State socialism: it was seen as a necessary `corrective' which could measure the 
excesses of the party-States. But at the same time it was also a ground for new utopian 
hope, as some saw in it the possibilities for a rebirth of the subject of history and 
politics, that one which was reduced to frostbite by the realities of the Cold War. The 
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Hungarian Marxist, Ivan Szeleny, could still write in 1979: "The issue of human rights, 
democratic freedoms, freedom of speech, assembly and association, crosscuts 
ideological divisions amongst the dissidents and it offers a basis for a broad `national 
front' into which all democratic forces of Eastern Europe can be integrated and from 
which socialists just cannot isolate themselves. The idea of `democratic socialism' is the 
most appealing one. This is why Eurocommunism attracts much attention". 9 
The result of this ideological transformation, however, was a pacification of the 
radical political subjectivity which sought inspiration in Marxist theory: as the dissident 
intellectuals and reformist communists in the East started openly embracing the 
formalism of equality and liberty, their counterparts in the West were hastily getting rid 
of the Marxist-Leninist conceptions of politics, 10 whilst at the same time fully adopting 
the terrain of liberal democracy, in both its political and economic aspects. With 
Marxist politics steadily loosing ground, it also seemed that Marxist theory, in its 
official version at least, lost its grip with the movement of history. This is why the 
parole of the students of May 1968, in Paris and in Prague, in Belgrade and in Rome, in 
Budapest and in Ljubljana, would come up with a witty inversion of Lenin's remark: 
`Communism as a geriatric deviation'. A political and theoretical decentering of 
Marxism would get condensed in the idea that the question of emancipation cannot be 
posed anymore in the singular. Instead, a whole range of particular and plural social 
concerns, embodied in the struggles of women, sexual minorities, students, youth and 
alternative cultures, exploded onto the political scene, articulating their own symbols of 
social change. 
9 Cf. Szeleny, Ivan "Socialist Opposition in Eastern Europe: Dilemmas and Prospects", in: TQkds, Rudolf 
L. (1979) Opposition in Eastern Europe, London: McMillan Press, pg. 201. 
1° As Chris Marker remarked in his remarkable 1977 film Le Fond de lair est rouge (A Grin Without a 
Cat) with regard to the French Communist Party: "the party which was slowest to de-Stalinize, was the 
fastest to de-Leninize". 
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It is in this political and historical context that we can locate the episode of the 
`Slovenian Spring'. As elsewhere in the socialist East, the seventies and the eighties in 
Slovenia unfolded primarily under the banners of `democracy' and `pluralism'. But at 
the same time, the Slovenian episode drew its strength from the paradigm of new social 
movements. The roots of the alternative political subjectivity which marked the 1980s 
in Slovenia -a subjectivity which came to stand self-consciously under the name of the 
Alternative (alternativa) - resided in the `new' social and political movements which 
were gaining momentum in this Yugoslav republic from the late 1970s onwards. The 
Alternative grew out of various forms of student activism, from different artistic and 
subcultural expressions (from alternative theatres and various experimental performing 
arts, to the punk movement), from squatters' initiatives to alternative trade unions, but 
also from political movements oriented around the issues of gender and sexual 
inequalities, demilitarisation, conscientious objection and nuclear disarmament. `] As a 
heterogeneous and diversified social and political consciousness, the Alternative in 
Slovenia practiced, in the first place, a specific form of `anti-politics', 'Z as it struggled 
for the creation and protection of niches of difference, for the production of plural and 
autonomous social fields at the distance from the State and its power, and for the 
politicisation of aspects of everyday life. But, at the same time, the Alternative had 
definite political targets: it attacked the ruling Communist Party, it launched severe 
criticisms of the socialist system and its ideological underpinnings, 13 whilst articulating 
an internal critique of socialism and Marxism, framed as a `democratisation of 
socialism'. In all of these aspects, the `alternative sphere' in Slovenia in the eighties was 
" One of the most exhaustive anthologies of the Slovenian Alternative movements can be found in the 
collections of essays: Malerkar, Nela and Mastnak, Tomal eds. (1985), Punk pod Slovenci (Punk under 
Slovenes), Ljubljana: Krt. See also MoZnik, Rastko (2003) "Ljubljana: Cultural Policies and the Balkan 
Nexus" (mimeo. ) 
12 As famously elaborated by the Hungarian `dissident' intellectual György Konrad. See his 1984 work 
Antipolitics, London: Quartet. 
" One of the most famous public interventions was the 'poster scandal' in 1987, where a group of artists 
associated with the Alternative sent a re-designed Nazi poster to a competition which was to 
commemorate the Yugoslav Day of the Youth (and Tito's birthday). The poster won the first prize. 
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a harbinger of a new, post-Marxist political subjectivity, a subjectivity which was 
openly saying `farewell to the proletariat'. 
But what is most interesting about the Alternative for our purposes here is that it 
the came to openly embrace the political project of Laclau and Mouffe. The entire 
theoretical baggage which supported the notion of `radical and plural democracy' was 
readily absorbed by the theoreticians associated with the Alternative, especially by those 
Slovenian philosophers and intellectuals who were attempting to reconstruct a 
productive exchange between Marxism, structuralism and psychoanalysis. 14 These 
theorists were providing the practices of the Alternative with a theoretical and 
ideological `superstructure', with a `self-consciousness' and a political strategy, 
precisely via the terminology of `hegemony' and `discourse', with the language of 
`floating signifiers' and `chains of equivalence', `pluralism', `democracy' and 'post- 
Marxism'. 'S And to such extent that the very motif of the struggle for ideological and 
cultural hegemony and the general urge for blurring the boundaries between politics and 
culture became the principle modus operandi of the practices of the Alternative. 16 As 
Rastko Mo6nik pointed out: "The alternative as a cultural undertaking in the widest and 
most dramatic sense was nothing other but `discursive articulation"'. " 
14 It is hard to overestimate the impact of Laclau and Mouffe theory in the Slovenian theoretical circles. A 
number of the most important theoretical journals in Slovenia, and especially those which were in tight 
connection with the Alternative, such as Problems, Razpol, Vestnik and Gasopis za kritiko znanosti were 
discussing the theoretical propositions of Laclau and Mouffe at length, and at times, producing not only 
original and critical interpretations of them, but also quite forceful proposals for a theoretical 
reconstructions. During this theoretical hype, Laclau and Mouffe also made two very important 
appearances in Slovenia. In 1986, the Institute for Marxist Studies of the Slovenian Academy of the 
Sciences, organised a round table with Laclau and Mouffe. The proceedings of the two lectures, and the 
discussion which ensued were published in several theoretical journals (Problems and Vestnik), whilst the 
audio recording of the entire event was broadcast on Ljubljana's Radio Student. In 1987, about the time 
when the Slovenian translation of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy was in preparation, the Institute for 
Marxist studies organised a large conference entitled New Social Movements as the Political Extension of 
the Metaphor, where Laclau and Mouffe were the keynote speakers. The papers from this event are 
collected in the first issue of Vestnik from 1988. 
15 What is topical here are the interventions of Slavoj Liiek, Tomas Mastnak, Rado Riha and others from 
the mid and late 1980s in the journals such as Problem! and Vestnik. 
'6 One of the cornerstones of the Alternative movement, the experimental music group Laibach could be 
found stating: "Politics is the highest form of popular culture and we, who create the contemporary 
European pop culture, consider ourselves politicians". Quoted in Thompson, Mark (1992) A Paper 
House: the ending of Yugoslavia, London: Hutchinson, pg. 44. 
17 Mo6nik, Rastko (1998) Koliko fafizma? (How much Fascism? ), Zagreb: Bastard, pg. 40. 
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However, the concept of `radical and plural democracy' had to compete here 
with another political notion, a notion which the emergent political forces in Eastern 
Europe resurrected from the historical inventory of liberalism: the notion of civil 
society. Just as in Hungary, Poland or Czechoslovakia, it was exactly this notion which 
proved to be the critical for the political transformations in Slovenia. By the mid-1980s, 
the Alternative came to embrace `civil society' in a strong sense: both as a 
mobilisational slogan and as an open political programme. `Civil society' proved to be a 
particularly effective symbol, as it allowed the Alternative not only to address the 
`public sphere' at large and to expand its political reach, but literally to dominate the 
political processes in Slovenia. '8 This is why Mastnak could claim that "the new social 
movements were those who have not only intrigued, but also by the mid-80s 
hegemonised the social consciousness". 19 
The peculiarity of the Alternative, nevertheless, resided in the fact that it 
managed to achieve an effective combination of the two concepts: the concept of civil 
society and that of hegemony qua radical and plural democracy. In the Slovenian 
Alternative the paradigm of the new social movements came to coexist side by side with 
an immanent critique of Marxism, inspired by the post-structuralist and post-modernist 
ideas, and also with a reaffirmed political liberalism, which expressed itself in terms of 
the opposition between the State and civil society. This can perhaps most vividly be 
seen from the writings of Mästnak, at that time one of the Alternative's principle 
theorists: "If we designated the system in Eastern Europe as inverted post-structuralism, 
with the help of Laclau and Mouffe - post-Marxists will understand: we put it back on 
` See Mastnak, Tomai (1992) Vzhodno od Raja: civilna druiba pod komunizmom i po njem (East of 
Eden: Civil Society Under and After Communism), Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Zaloiba. For an alternative 
view, see Mo6nik "Ljubljana: Cultural Policies and the Balkan Nexus" (mimeo). 
" ibid, pg. 57. 
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its feet. We thus gained civil society, which can be - although partially, included in the 
scenario of radical democracy". " 
4.3. Theoretical excursus: the hegemony of civil society 
It should not be surprising that the notions of `radical democracy' and `civil 
society' appear together in the political and ideological practices of the Slovenian 
Alternative. Genealogically speaking, both notions have a definite place within the 
development of the dialectics of democracy and socialism which marked the shift of 
Marxist politics from the 1970s onwards -a development which ended with a peculiar 
point of synthesis or resolution, where we see the first term engulfing and collapsing the 
second. Put differently, both terms are being formulated at the peculiar meeting point 
between Marxist theory and the liberal tradition, at the precise point where the contours 
of Marxist politics begin to dissipate in front of the ideals of democracy. In the case of 
`radical and plural democracy', as we already saw in Chapter 2, it was a matter of 
revalorising fundamental liberal political concepts, such as formal liberty and equality, 
at the heart of the Marxist political strategy in the West. In the case of `civil society', it 
was a matter of domesticating a classical liberal concept - the dichotomy of state/civil 
society - in the context of the struggles internal to the socialist states in the East. If the 
former appropriation of liberalism appears as a peculiar leftist reaction to the impasses 
of Western Marxism in the face of post-68 diversification and pluralisation of the 
political scene, the latter notion surfaces as an equally leftist `corrective' to the 
contradictions of Marxist politics in its reduction to the State apparatus. 21 
20 Mastnak, Toraal (1988) "Implozija druibenega" (The Implosion of the Social), in: Problemi: Eseji, 26, 
7, pg. 67. 
21 In this sense, `civil society' was also an eminently post-Marxist concept as it allowed for an immanent 
critique of the practices of socialist regimes themselves and for an imagining of alternatives internal to 
these regimes. As Mastnak would note: "Theorising civil society was an alternative to Marxism. It had, 
through `post-Marxism', opened an intellectual exit from the then dominant social and political theory, 
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But it is not only the historical complementarity between the two perspectives 
which is important here. It is first and foremost, their logical and thematic connection. 
When it comes to comparing the Laclau and Mouffe notion of `radical and plural 
democracy' with the revived version of the politics of `civil society', the 
correspondences are indeed remarkable. 
Both of these conceptions are, before anything else, formal or formalist 
conception of politics. Both are fundamentally bound to that what the revolutionary 
tradition named `formal democracy'. Instead of trying to seize politics in a substantive, 
subjective manner, they are both interested first of all in providing politics with formal 
conditions of possibility. Indeed, the crux of the project of the reconstruction of the 
nineteenth century liberal dichotomy between the civil society and the State, which the 
1980s saw being propelled both by the `dissidents' in the East and various liberal- 
democratic theoreticians in the West, 22 was to come up with the formal conditions of 
democracy. The `resurrection' of the eighteenth century distinction between the State 
and civil society was in this sense seen as a recuperation of the ground from which one 
can speak about the real possibilities of democracy and of democratic politics. "The 
distinction between civil society and the State, and in this the existence and the 
functioning of an autonomous social sphere, was conceived as a necessary condition of 
democracy", as Mastnak would claim. 3 The crucial moment here was precisely the 
formal, that is, the institutionalised separation of the two realms - civil society and the 
and thus also from the socialist (and especially 'self-management') ideology". Mastnak (1992) op. cit., pg. 
55. 
22 The most important 'dissident' writings on the subject are the works of Ferenc Feher, György Markus, 
Mihaly Vajda, but also Vaclav Havel and Jacek Kuron in the 1970s and the 1980s. For an extensive 
analysis of these approaches see Mastnak (1992) op. cit. `Civil society', at the same time, seemed a 
theoretical fetish in the academic and intellectual circles West in the 1980s and the early 1990s, especially 
for the revived discipline of political philosophy. The most crucial elaborations of the `reinvented' civil 
society are to be found in theorists such as John Keane, Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen, Larry Diamond, 
Ernest Gellner. See Keane, John (ed. ) (1988a) Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives, 
London: Verso, and also: Keane, John (1988b) Democracy and Civil Society: On the Predicaments of 
European Socialism, the Prospects for Democracy, and the Problem of Controlling Social and Political 
Power, London: Verso. Cohen, J. and Arato, A. (1992) Civil Society and Political Theory, Cambridge: 
MIT Press. Gellner, Ernest (1996) Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, London: Penguin. 
23 Mastnak (1992) op. cit, pg. 26. 
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State. This separation was not only to place `checks and balances' on the functioning of 
the State apparatus and its excess of power, but at the same time to provide the formal 
guarantees for the existence of a space for an unbridled political liberty, a space of free 
association, of social autonomy and of pluralism. 24 In its formal separation from the 
State, the realm of the civil society, conceived "as a sphere of social interaction between 
economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), 
the sphere of association (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and 
forms of public communication", 25 was thus identified as the terrain for autonomous 
social and political expression, and as such, as a necessary and inescapable terrain of 
democracy. 
This formalisation of politics and of democracy is also at the heart of the 
political project of Laclau and Mouffe, as we already saw in Chapter 2. The scenario of 
political life represented in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy bears a striking 
resemblance here. The questions that Laclau and Mouffe place at centre of their political 
conception, just as for the theorists of `civil society', are precisely the questions of the 
conditions of possibility for the autonomous production of social and political life, the 
conditions of possibility for association, organisation and cohesion. 26 As we already 
saw, Laclau and Mouffe would explicitly depict the substance of their political project 
in terms of the opening of the space, or rather, of the spaces for the emergence of 
democratic subjects in society: "the project for a radical and plural democracy, in a 
primary sense, is nothing other than the struggle for a maximum autonomization of 
24 See, for instance: Heller, Agnes 'On Formal Democracy", in Keane, John (ed. ) Civil Society and the 
State: New European Perspectives. 
25 Cohen and Arato (1992) op. cit, pg. ix. 
26 It is interesting that Laclau and Mouffe want to explicitly dissociate themselves from the notion of 
`civil society', rejecting the separation of civil society and the State as being too rigid, and as politically 
inappropriate today (See the interview in Mladina, pg. 24). But it is difficult to imagine their notion of 
hegemony without this dichotomy. This dichotomy, as we saw in chapter 1, was central for Gramsci, who 
essentially bound his concept of hegemony to civil society in its separation from the State apparatus, in 
order to think the conditions for the political unification and development of an autonomous revolutionary 
politics. If Laclau and Mouffe derive their entire political substance form Gramsci's idea of a 'political 
and cultural hegemony', then their notion remains inseparable to the conceptual space of civil society. 
193 
spheres on the basis of the generalization of the equivalential-egalitarian logic". 27 And 
the fundamental theoretical problem of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in this sense is 
precisely to provide formal conditions of possibility for this autonomisation: "Our 
central problem is to identify the discursive conditions for the emergence of a collective 
action, directed towards struggling against inequalities and challenging relations of 
subordination". 28 
The second point of comparison is the fact that this `reinvention' of formal 
politics is framed, in both cases, as an explicit reaction the `substantial ism' and 
`essentialism' of Marxist politics. The proponents of civil society meet with Laclau and 
Mouffe at the point of criticism and rejection of Marxist politics, and especially of the 
notion of class struggle. The concept of class struggle, as the argument goes, and this is 
an old argument indeed, 29 is not only reductively particularistic, but also particularly 
reductionist, which means both indifferent to the plurality of social spaces, demands and 
identities in civil society. At the same time, it is dismissive of the historical significance 
of the formal sphere of democratic rights and liberties. As Ellen Wood pointed out: 
"One of the principal charges levelled against Marxism by the advocates of `civil 
society' is that it endangers democratic freedoms by identifying Western `formal 
democracy' - the legal and political forms which guarantee a free space for `civil 
society' - with capitalism: `civil' = `bourgeois' society. The danger, they claim, is that 
we might be tempted to throw out the baby with the bath water, to reject liberal 
democracy together with capitalism. We should instead, they argue, acknowledge the 
benefits of formal democracy, while expanding its principles of individual freedom and 
equality by dissociating them from capitalism in order to deny that capitalism is the sole 
or best means of advancing these principles". " 
27 HSS, pg. 167. 
2 HSS, pg. 153. 
29 See for example Eduard Bernstein's Evolutionary Socialism, (1961) New York, Schocken Books. 
30 Wood, Ellen M. "The Uses and Abuses of `Civil Society", in: Miliband, Ralph and Panitch, Leo eds. 
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The problem with this criticism is not simply in that it invites for a 
simplification and distortion of Marxism, depicting Marxist theory as overly 
reductionist and deterministic, whilst portraying the realities of socio-economic classes 
as absolute `monistic' substances, absolutely irreconcilable with the existence of a 
complex social world. What is most problematic are its political effects: the open 
rejection of the very possibility of a critical reflection on the link between liberal- 
democracy and capitalist exploitation. In the end, we are simply led towards a 
fetishisation of the liberal democratic model and parliamentarianism as the only 
acceptable political forms, as universals - as the following moment of intellectual 
enthusiasm of Timothy Garton Ash certainly bears witness to: "When it comes to 
politics, all Easterneuropeans claim: there is no socialist democracy, but only 
democracy. And with democracy, they understand multiparty parliamentary democracy, 
as practised in contemporary Western, Northern and Southern Europe. Everybody is 
saying: there is no `socialist legality', just legality. And with this they understand the 
rule of law, which is guaranteed by the constitutionally determined independence of the 
judiciary. Everybody is saying, and this is perhaps the most important viewpoint for the 
Left: there is no `socialist economy', there is just economy. And economy does not 
mean socialist market economy, but social market economy". 31 
A important corollary of the embrace of democratic formalism in both the post- 
Marxist and civil society perspectives is that politics ultimately lapses into being 
conceived and structured around juridical terms. For what the 'formal conditions of 
possibility' of democratic practices boil down to is nothing but the sphere of liberal Law 
in all its different ramifications: the sphere of civic and human rights, the sphere of 
modern citizenship, of the constitutional state, of the separation of powers, of juridico- 
normative procedures. Thus, whilst we see the theorists and activists of `civil society' in 
(1990) The Retreat of the intellectuals, Socialist Register, New York: Monthly Review Press, pg. 67. 
31 Ash, T. G. (1990) We the people, London: Granta, pg. 151. 
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Eastern Europe trying to reinvent the liberal question of legality and legitimacy, to 
resurrect the problem of the Rechtsstaat, whilst we see them uncovering all the classical 
liberal topoi of politics such as constitutional rights, civil liberties, mechanisms of 
political representation and principles of contract, 32 Laclau and Mouffe are engaged in 
rethinking at large the implications of the bourgeois revolutions and of their 
universalistic juridical propositions. In both cases, the centre stage is occupied by the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. This foundational text of the juridico- 
political modernity acquires new life as it resurfaces in the shape of a formal guarantee 
for the autonomisation of social spaces and the politicisation of various issues and 
concerns. The other side of the political pluralism of the new social movements, the 
other side of the heterogeneity of civil initiatives and democratic oppositions in Eastern 
Europe is therefore legal universality. As we already saw, Laclau and Mouffe truly go 
far in this direction, positing the very conditions of possibility of emancipatory politics 
in the abstract personae of man and citizen who are both `free' and `equal': anybody can 
claim to be the subject of freedom and equality, at any time, anywhere, there are no 
social relations or locations which could not be a matter of the discourse of civic 
liberties and human rights, which is here precisely to provide a condition of possibility 
of their politicisation. Politics ultimately finds its beginnings, its perpetuum mobile in 
juridical consciousness. And this is true even, and perhaps above all, for questions of 
social emancipation: "the nature and degree of the resistance against capitalist relations 
of production will crucially depend on the consciousness of their rights that people have 
in a certain historical moment". " Laclau and Mouffe thus not only subordinate politics 
and the problem of emancipation to the theme of the Law, to the theme of legal equality 
32 See Keane (1998b) op. cit., and Gellner (1996) op. cit. 
33 Cf. Laclau, Ernesto (1988) "Political Significance of the Concept of Negativity", in: Vestnik, 1988,1, 
pg. 78. 
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or equality in rights, but at the same time openly start endorsing what Marx long ago 
criticised under the rubric of a `partial emancipation'. 34 
The main issue here, however, is that in this return to the theme of Law, political 
formalism does not only subordinate politics to juridical principles and norms, but ends 
up identifying politics and democracy tout court with the State and its institutional 
matrix. As Wood pointed out: "Now, the purely `formal' principles of liberalism have 
come to be identified with democracy. In other words, these formal principles are 
treated not simply as good in themselves, nor even as necessary conditions for 
democracy in the literal sense of popular rule, but as synonymous with it or as its outer 
limit". 35 Democracy and democratic politics, instead of being subjective political 
principles, principles which edify the emergence of a political subject, become 
questions of the State's own normativity, they become ideological instruments of the 
State. 
Besides political formalism, and the reduction of politics to Law, there is one 
more level at which we can compare and identify the two concepts. The perspectives of 
`civil society' and `radical and plural democracy' also share an identical philosophical 
substance, an identical epistemological vantage point, expressed under the slogan of the 
`return to the concrete'. `Return to the concrete' implies a double rejection: on the one 
hand, the rejection of all `utopian' dimensions of thought, of all `impossible' social and 
political demands; on the other hand, the rejection of all `abstract' philosophical and 
theoretical statements on history, society and politics, of all statements which do not 
proceed from the factual, immediate social reality. This double rejection was indeed the 
34 According to Marx, the modern political emancipation in the liberal State - which recognises equality 
of individuals before the law and equality of citizens in relation to the State, regardless of their social 
status, their privileges, or their religious affiliation - is partial because it leaves untouched (and therefore 
reproduces) the inequalities in the socio-economic sphere. A complete, or 'human emancipation' must 
start from the unconditional demand for equality not only of rights but primarily so of the means of 
material life and production. See the Jewish Question'. See Marx, Karl (1975) Early Writings, London: 
Penguin. 
35 Wood (1990), pg. 72. 
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primary medium through which the political approaches of the seventies and the 
eighties sought to oppose themselves to Marxism as a theory of history. Against the 
centrality of the Marxian Two of the class struggle, against the very notion of the 
dialectic, these perspectives propose very peculiar ideas of the `concrete analysis of the 
concrete situation', quite at odds with Lenin. The question of the apprehension of 
politics becomes here a question of the concrete given - of the immediate `living 
problems', of empirically visible and tangible issues and demands, of particular social 
and historical forces, of strategic and tactical orientations, of pragmatic calculations, of 
innumerable opinions of individuals and groups, all of which need to be recognised in 
what they are, both de facto and de jure. From the distance and critical potentiality that 
the notion of scientific abstraction provided - and which was the cornerstone of 
Marxism's grip on history - these perspectives shift us towards a crude empiricism, 
which recognises nothing but the obviousness of the concretely given - which is always 
the obviousness of the status quo. 36 
The attempt to dispose of the terms `abstract' and the `speculative' with regard 
to politics was a cornerstone for many East European `civil society' and dissident 
intellectuals. A particularly illustrative case here is the one of Mihaly Vajda, who 
probably elaborated the fundamental theoretical principles of post-Marxism avant la 
lettre: "If I give up this reductionism, there is no capitalism and socialism in abstracto 
any more. There are societies determined by concrete, special historical traditions and 
special historical I... I endowments. If I give up this reductionism, the class division of 
society ceases to be the only important and decisive factor in the constitution of social 
" As Fredric Jameson noted: "when one is immersed in the immediate - the year-by-year experience of 
cultural and informational messages, of successive events, of urgent priorities - the abrupt distance 
afforded by an abstract concept, a more global characterization of the secret affinities between those 
apparently autonomous and unrelated domains, and of the rhythms and hidden sequences of things we 
normally remember only in isolation and one by one, is a unique resource, particularly since the history of 
the preceding few years is always what is least accessible to us. Historical reconstruction, then, the 
positing of global characterizations and hypotheses, the abstraction from the `blooming, buzzing 
confusion' of immediacy, was always a radical intervention in the here-and-now and the promise of 
resistance to its blind fatalities". Jameson, Fredric (1998) The Cultural Turn, London: Verso, pg. 35. 
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groups [... ] If there are other factors of group-constitution as well, either subordinated 
to class differences, or equal to them, sometimes even playing a more essential role than 
such differences (if they exist at all), then in order to comprehend a society, I have to 
see first of all the rather heterogeneous factors of social group-constitution, the interest- 
relations, the dependencies of the existing and constantly changing social groups which 
also intersect with each other". 37 
But the post-Marxist theory of hegemony seems to represent the apex of this 
entire endeavour. With their rejection of the Marxist `essentialist apriorism' and 
`reductionism', Laclau and Mouffe do not only want to drown all the global, structural 
dimensions of social and political processes, but to espouse a peculiar pseudo-realism of 
discourses, where the attributes and appearances become the matter of the essence. 8 
Their version of the `return to the concrete' depicts a social and historical space 
composed of a plurality of languages, each of which is irreducible in its givenness and 
immediacy. The ruling principle in this space, which is also the ruling principle of 
politics, is not social structure, nor historical sense, but rhetoric and rhetorical 
construction. As Bennett pointed out: "Abandoning earlier conceptions of politics in 
which political actors as well as the lines of alliance/opposition between them are held 
to follow from structurally determined positions and interests, this logic [... I views 
political relations as essentially rhetorical constructs. Where and how lines of political 
alliance/opposition are drawn and who ends up struggling with whom, and against 
37 Vajda, Mihaly (1981) The State and Socialism: Political essays, London: Allison & Busby, pg. 6 
38 This is the centrepiece of their attack on Marxism, as we saw in chapter 2. Laclau and Mouffe maintain 
that the conception according to which society is essentially divided into two opposed and antagonistic 
classes - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat - seems to 
imply a separation between the realm of essences 
and that of appearances, where concrete social objects are not recognised in themselves, but are always 
read against another, abstract or essential reality: the economic laws of capitalism. Marxism is thus seen 
as always reducing empirical politics to abstract and essentialist laws, as reducing social relations and 
identities to something other than their actual discursive configuration - to the objective laws of economic 
development. The only problem, as we saw with Althusser, is that what Laclau and Mouffe dispose of 
here, in their 'pseudo-empiricism of discourses', is one of the principles of scientific practice: conceptual 
abstraction. 
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whom are questions which are not resolvable independently of the ways in which 
discourse organises political antagonisms". 39 
It is not hard to realise that a corollary of this position is also the collapse of all 
fundamental modern political concepts and forms, the evacuation of not only the 
classical questions of power and sovereignty, of the State and the historical forms of 
politics, but also of the substance all modern political distinctions, such as Left/Right, 
Revolution/Reform, liberalism vs. conservatism vs. socialism, etc. Inasmuch as the 
combinatory potential of discursive elements is infinite, politics, for Laclau and Mouffe, 
is solely the matter of the pragmatics of attribution. This, in turn, means that all political 
concepts, even the most fundamental ones, such as liberty, equality, property and 
security, become what Laclau and Mouffe would call `contested signifiers', that is, they 
become concepts which, in themselves, are completely vacuous and empty, concepts 
whose contents depend solely on the contingency of different political attributions. 
Quoting Hegemony: "The exploding of the uniqueness of meaning of the political [... I 
dissolves every possibility of fixing the signified in terms of a division between left and 
right". ' 
And indeed, what seems to be radical in `radical democracy' is its combination 
of empiricism and relativism: the insistence of Laclau and Mouffe on the recognition of 
the actual pluralism of discourses, of the subjective expressions of political positions, of 
demands and revendications, all of which are, at the same time, absolutely malleable, 
context specific, contingent. Politics, for Laclau and Mouffe, begins at the level of 
discursive immediacy, and quite at a remote from all the `grand narratives' of political 
modernity, such as the State, the Nation, the Party, the Revolution, it finds its end in 
pure rhetorical constructions and discursive articulations. 
3y Bennett, Tony (1990) Outside Literature, London: Routledge, pg. 263. 
HSS, pg. 17. 
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The other side of this discursive relativism, the other side of the `irreducible 
pluralism' of discourses, is, nevertheless, the very idea of legal universality, and thus 
also the materiality of liberal-democratic order. Philosophical questions of relativism 
and pluralism have as their conditions of possibility the formal, that is, juridical 
framework of liberal-democracy. If Laclau and Mouffe would not go as far as offering a 
strict theoretical admission of this fact, it is amongst the theorists of `civil society' that 
we can find its explicit articulation. For example, with John Keane: "[relativism] 
implies the need for democracy, for institutional arrangements and procedures which 
guarantee that protagonists of similar or different forms of language games can openly 
and continuously articulate their respective forms of life". 41 Or, again: "a pluralist and 
self-organizing civil society is an implied condition of relativism". 42 
4.4. Janez Janga, the empty signifier 
But what about the practical realisation of these political propositions? What can 
the Slovenian context tell us about the actual political effects of the `radical and plural 
democracy'? 
We should turn our attention to one moment in this regard, one moment which 
represents not simply the culmination of the political struggles which have marked the 
1980s in Slovenia, but also the beginning of their end: the events of the spring of 1988, 
and the trial of Janez Jan3a. 
On the 3 1S` of May 1988, Janez Janga, then a peace activist and a journalist of 
Mladina, was arrested, together with two other journalists and an officer of the 
Yugoslav National Army. The four were arrested and put on trial on the allegation of 
disclosing confidential State documents to the public. What the journalists of Mladina 
41 Cf. Keane (1988b), pg. 237. 
42 ibid. 
201 
came in possession of were transcripts from a closed meeting of the Federal Presidency 
of Yugoslavia, where there were discussions about possible military involvement in 
Slovenia, in order to curb what was perceived as increasing signs of political instability. 
Amidst the political turmoil of the end of the eighties not only in Slovenia, but also in 
Yugoslavia as a whole, this was, of course, a matter of tremendous controversy. 
Controversial was also the reaction by the Yugoslav military to this journalistic scoop: 
Janga and others were being tried and sentenced by a military and not a civilian court, 
which violated a number of republican legal codes, as it also went against the pleas and 
the demands of the Slovenian political authority. 
The most important thing about the trial of Jana and others - otherwise known 
as the JBTZ process - were, nevertheless, its immediate social and political 
consequences. Already a few days after the first arrests, the Alternative would take the 
leading role in the politicisation of this event. Their urgent response was the creation of 
a body named the Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Janez Jan3a, which was 
soon renamed into the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights. The Committee 
swiftly imposed itself as a crucial political actor in Slovenia. It organised public debates 
and channelled public criticism, it prepared demonstrations and helped to coordinate 
mass intellectual and political mobilisations. But it also detonated the political 
implications of the JBTZ process, transforming the arrests and the trials into symbols of 
opposition not only to the structures of military and political authority, but to the 
socialist system as such, to its political, juridical and ideological underpinnings. 
The political demands of the Committee were minimal - human rights and civic 
freedoms for the defendants - but its politics was explosive. The trial of Janez Jana 
came to personify the trial of the entire span of struggles for democracy, liberty and 
pluralism, the trial of a whole set of demands posed by the new social movements, by 
Alternative political groupings and conceptions. It was a trial of civil society and radical 
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and plural democracy as such. This is why the political force of the Committee was so 
momentous. This is why the events of May of 1988 would indeed mark the beginning of 
drastic political and historical transformations in Slovenia, transformations in which the 
political institutions of Yugoslav socialism were imploding both from `below' and from 
`above'. 
This remarkable political success of the Committee, however, seemed to 
confirm the political force of the conceptual propositions of Laclau and Mouffe. It is 
exactly in the Committee, that is, in both the form and the contents of its politics, that 
the notion of `radical and plural democracy' would attain the moment of its truth. The 
Committee was the moment in which both of these political conceptions could look at 
themselves and say `I am I'. 
We can follow this through a couple of remarks of Slavoj Liiek, then an 
enthusiastic witness: 
"[The Committee for the Defence of the Rights of Janez Janga is] an organ 
which safeguards and opens the very space of possible political and social pluralism, an 
organ which expresses the interest of a widest democratic front". 43 
Or, as'Lizek would add: 
"[The Committee is] a political body, which is not organised corporatively [... J 
but transcorporatively: it consists of a multitude of individuals and `corporations' 
(editorial boards, associations, social groups and organised groups of labour), which are 
extremely diverse not only in terms of their organisational structure and their status, but 
also in terms of their ideational orientations: here we can find theologians, communists, 
[... ] the representatives of `traditional' and `alternative' culture, individuals and socio- 
political organisations. What unites them is neither a common ideological project nor a 
specific political vision (with regards to this, the differences between them are 
41 Liiek, Slavoj (1989) Druga smrt Josipa Broza Tita (The Second Death of Josip Broz Tito), Ljubljana: 
DZS, pg. 61.2iiek's text was originally published in Mladina, just after the arrest of Jansa, 
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enormous), but a fundamental political consensus on the need to defend the public space 
of democracy". ' 
Liiek was certainly right to locate this essential political heterogeneity at the 
heart of the politics of the Committee. Because the Committee in itself, in terms of its 
own political and organisational constitution, was marked by diversity, plurality, even 
contradictority. In this sense, it truly represented the practical achievement of the 
political proposition of `radical democracy'. What was formed on the backbone of the 
Committee was a massive and heterogeneous democratic subject which was extending 
throughout Slovenian society, a subject capable of overcoming all the political, 
ideological and social differences, of uniting a plurality of actors without collapsing 
their diversity and heterogeneity. New social movements, the `alternative culture', 
liberal `dissidents', Marxist and post-Marxist theorists, the nationalist intelligentsia, 
socialist and post-socialist political cadres, the Catholic Church, workers' organisations, 
the associations of Slovenian peasants, socialist youth groups and others. This is 
precisely what Laclau and Mouffe would call `chains of equivalence', unity in 
heterogeneity. And this is why Janez Janga himself would represent an `empty signifier' 
in the latter's sense, ' a signifier capable of overdetermining an entire ensemble of 
social differences and diversities. 
But inasmuch as the signifier Janga was empty in a horizontal sense, in the sense 
of its political and social extension, it was also empty in its intention. The Committee 
did not profess any specific political or ideological position. Its sole political content 
was a demand for political and legal forms, for human and civic rights. 
As Liiek would also remark: 
' ibid, pg. 60. 
45 Cf. 'Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to Politics', in: Laclau, Ernesto (1996) Emancipation(s), London: 
Verso. 
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"The Committee is not a political body, it does not represent any determinate 
political orientation [... I rather, it consciously limits itself to a `common denominator' 
of the democratic public: the defence of human rights". ' 
The entire political thrust of the Committee resided in this emptiness and this 
formalism. Behind this scarcity in the formulation of demands lay the entire strength of 
the formal opposition between the `State' and `civil society'. The demand for human 
and civic rights of the detainees was nothing but a for the institutionalisation of political 
pluralism, for a concrete embodiment of `radical and plural democracy'. 
And, as Zizek would rightly note, this demand was particularly neuralgic with 
regard to the apparatuses of the socialist State: "Exactly as such, as `apolitical', the 
Committee places the Slovenian state institutions in front of an inexorable ordeal: faced 
with the demands of the Committee the latter need to prove not whose are they in the 
struggle for power, but more simply and more radically, are they still legitimate 
institutions". 47 
In fact, it was not only neuralgic, but immensely effective. The trial of Janga 
truly represented a turning point in the political dramas at the end of the eighties in 
Slovenia, as well as in Yugoslavia as a whole. It marked the formal beginning of a 
proper post-socialist political sequence. The actual event of arrest, trial and detention 
was rather short-lived: although sentenced for much longer, Jana and the two other 
journalists were released from imprisonment already by August 1989 (the officer of the 
Yugoslav People's Army stayed incacerated for slightly longer). But a decisive point of 
no return had already been reached. Because the demands for human and civic rights, 
demands for `formal democracy' and the rule of law were rapidly finding their way 
from civil society to the official politics of the socialist State, encroaching upon and 
subverting the very foundations of the latter. The political success of the Committee 
46 
, ibid, pg. 75. 47 ibid, pg. 76. 
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brought with itself a dramatic resolution of the dialectic of democracy and socialism. 
On 28`h February 1989, a mass protest in support of the miners' strike in Stari Trg, 
Kosovo, united the Slovenian Communist Party leadership with the organisations of 
civil society. Milan Kui`an, the president of the Slovenian League of Communists, 
would speak openly there about the need to defend human rights, pluralism and the rule 
of law. And it would take only a couple of months before the Slovenian Assembly 
would propose and then adopt, in September 1989, the constitutional amendments in 
order to institutionalise the "rights and freedoms of man and citizen", "democracy and 
the principles of the Rechtsstaat" in the republic. 
However, it is precisely at this point, that the tragedy of the entire episode of 
Slovenian Spring is revealed in all its ironical dimensions. The peak of the political 
success of the Committee, the very realisation of its demand for `formal democracy', 
represented, from the point of view of its origin, a proper historical catastrophe. What is 
effectively taking shape on the backbone of the political subjectivities and spaces carved 
out on the terrain of civil society from this moment is a nationalist politics of state- 
building. 
The trial of Jansa, in fact, brought out one more issue, an issue which was 
already the principle site and the stake in the struggles over the legacy of the Yugoslav 
federation: the issue of national sovereignty. Since the mid-eighties at least, politics in 
Slovenia had been completely absorbed in questions of sovereignty, as its political elite, 
the `reformist' leadership of the Communist Party of Slovenia, was increasingly 
clamouring and quarrelling about the socio-economic, the fiscal, the redistributionist, 
the constitutional and the political constructions of federal life. 8 The trial further 
exploded the problem of sovereignty: was it the freedom of individual citizens which 
was put on trial, or was the entire process staged by the army a trial of sovereignty of 
48 For a critical overview of the political and socio-economic conflicts in Yugoslavia in the early 1980s, 
see Woodward, Susan (1995) Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War, Washington: 
Brookings (especially chapters 3 and 4). 
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the Slovenian state? The political elite acted swiftly upon this montage: the 
constitutional amendments which the Slovenian parliament adopted in September 1989, 
were not only epitomes of liberty and democracy, they were also the first formal 
inscriptions of the theme of Slovenian national sovereignty, and as such the first formal 
announcements of dissociation from Yugoslavia. 
But it could not have done so without the pathos of the civil society struggles 
which were being simultaneously hegemonised into a nationalist genre. Internally to the 
`alternative' movements, the problem of sovereignty was most successfully exploited by 
the cultural intelligentsia gathered around the journal Nova Revija (New Review'). These 
nationalist philosophers, writers and intellectuals, who had already formulated a 
manifesto for Slovenian nationalism and independence two years earlier - dubbed the 
Contributions to the Slovenian National Programme49 - detonated the `cultural' 
question associated with the trial of Janga: the issue of language. The entire proceedings 
of the military trial of Janga were held in Serbo-Croatian language, and not in 
Slovenian, which was a violation of the republican and federal laws, namely the right of 
the defendants to be tried in their mother tongue. But the nationalist intelligentsia 
succeeded in representing this as a problem of the cultural and political sovereignty of 
the Slovenian nation within Yugoslavia. Ideas of freedom and human rights were 
swiftly repainted in national terms - they became questions of the self-determination of 
the Slovenian nation, and ultimately claims for the sovereignty of the Slovenian State. 
As Tine Hribar, for example, put it: "Everything points to the fact that the organs of 
Slovenian rule - and this means its internal organs - used these events as instruments 
for an external intervention, as executive instruments for an extra-Slovenian 
intervention into Slovenian sovereignty. But is the government in Slovenia then still a 
Slovenian government? What is Slovenian sovereignty, if the forces of dictatorship in 
49 See Prispevki za slovenski nacionalni program, Nova Revya, No. 57,1987. 
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Yugoslavia openly proclaim that Slovenia should be pacified violently, if this cannot be 
done peacefully? How come that SR Slovenia, if it is truly a State, cannot determine its 
own internal politics? ". 50 A nationalist hegemonisation of the massive political 
subjectivity of the Committee followed suit, culminating in the mass rallies held in 
Ljubljana in May 1989 around the reading of the May Declaration, a political tract 
openly seeking Slovenian independence from Yugoslavia. 51 
The end display of this process was truly ironical: the entire drama of the birth 
of the heterogeneous political subjectivity in `civil society' being resolved in terms of a 
homogenous nationalist consciousness; the very fulfilment of the `apolitical' demand 
for formal democracy, of the demand for the abstract framework liberty and equality, 
taking the form of a substantial politics of national sovereignty; and the democratic and 
pluralistic essence of the social movements in Slovenia coming to symbolise, in the 
light of the conflicts over the legacy of Yugoslav socialism, the very necessity for a 
sovereign Slovenian State. s2 
50 See Hribar, Tine "Slovensko poletje" ("Slovenian Spring") (1988) Nova Revija (No. 77, July), pg. 
1343-1344. Hribar would also add: "According to its constitution, the Socialist Republic of Slovenia is a 
State. But this `State' does not have even the most fundamental attributes of statehood. The authority of 
the Slovenian 'State' is neither full, nor exhaustive, in both cases it is bound to a higher instance. We do 
not have our own foreign policy (we do not have a foreign minister), nor our own defence (we do not 
have a minister of defence), and our internal politics is subordinated, as the arrest of Jana has shown, to 
the organs of federal state security. In relation to the terrain, which is being occupied by the Yugoslav 
Army, the entire territorial sovereignty of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia seems to be under question. " 
(ibid, pg. 1347-1348). 
31 See Repe, Bolo (2002) Viri o demokratizac#i i osamosvojitvi Slovene (Sources on the 
Democratisation and Independence of Slovenia), Ljubljana: Arhivski Zavod. 
52 Toraal Mastnak, for example, would end up theorising and appraising the necessary link between civil 
society and Slovenian independence. In an essay "Nacionalna driava in nacionalizacija civilne druibe" 
(National State and the Nationalisation of Civil Society), published in the special issue of Nova Revija 
dedicated to "Independent Slovenia" (No. 95,9,1990), Mastnak would first state that "there are no more 
positive reasons for the existence of Yugoslavia", and then go on arguing that "democracy in Slovenia 
cannot exist without a sovereign Slovenian state. The national state as such, nevertheless, assures neither 
complete sovereignty nor democracy. The Slovenian State can only be sovereign, that is, the demand for 
the sovereign national State can only be successful, on the condition that its citizens are sovereign. Not 
simply when the internally homogeneous Slovenian State would limit the sovereignty (that is, the 
aggressiveness and the terrorism) of the Yugoslav State, but only when the pluralistic civil society would 
limit its own State as a sovereign" (pg. 456). 
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How come this paradoxical resolution? Why did civil society, in its very 
realisation, end up representing, as Tonbi Kuzmanie put it, 53 the `eve of the nationalist- 
democratic revolutions'? 
There is no space here to account for all the particularly bizarre details of the 
transformations of the Slovenian alternative political scene at the end of the eighties, 
transformations through which the massive and pluralistic subject of democracy and 
liberty constituted around the trial of Janez Janga provided not only the space and the 
momentum, but also the political contents for the emergence of the so-called DEMOS, a 
similarly heterogeneous coalition, this time of political parties, ' which would form the 
first post-communist government in Slovenia, and do so in strikingly conservative, 
nationalist and exclusionist terms; transformations in which the Socialist Youth 
Alliance, the publisher of Mladina, and the intellectual and political backbone in many 
regards of the anti-systemic struggles of the civil society would transform itself into the 
Liberal Party when entering this post-communist struggle for power (where it would 
loose dramatically); and finally, and perhaps most dramatically, transformations where 
the principal dramatis personae of the Alternative, the delegates of its `apolitical' 
politics, would themselves become the pioneers of the new political caste at the moment 
of the formation of the sovereign Slovenian state out of the crumbling body of the 
Yugoslav federation (the two most striking examples: Janez Jansa, a peace activist and a 
symbol of political pluralism, liberty and democracy, and Igor BaWar, the founding 
member and the president of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, would 
become, in 1991, respectively, the minister of defence and the minister of the interior). 
s3 Kuzmanib T. (1994) "Civil Society and Nationalism in Slovenia", Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences 
(mimeo. ) 
S4 Analogously (or in fact homologously) to the Committee, DEMOS, or the 'Democratic Opposition of 
Slovenia', was also the embodiment of a plurality of political orientations - nationalist, liberal, social- 
democratic, ecological, etc. The parties which formed it were: SDZ (Slovenian Democratic Association), 
SDSS (Social-Democratic Party of Slovenia), SKD (Slovenian Christian-Democrats), SKZ (Slovenian 
Peasant Association), the Green Party, SOS (Slovenian Craftsmen Party). 
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In fact, the problem that interests us in terms of this analysis is not whether this 
paradoxical transformation of civil society into nationalism was necessary or not, but 
whether it was conceivable or predictable for those who were engaged in this political 
shift. The internal aspects of this historical drama, aspects relating to the self- 
conception, and indeed, the self-consciousness of the `Slovenian Spring', are revealing 
in themselves, even in their limited scope. Because if these twists and ironies of history 
point something out, then they point out, in the first place, that limitedness was at the 
root of the theoretical conceptions which oriented the episode of `Slovenian Spring'. 
What made the Alternative susceptible to the paradoxes of history, what made it prone 
to this recuperation by nationalism, was a definite defect in its theoretical 
consciousness: an incapacity to grasp the extent and the depth of the historical processes 
in which it was involved. And this is the precise point where the theoretical optics of 
Laclau and Mouffe receives a determinate lesson of history. 
4.5. Thinking petite 
How to seize the dimension of the theoretical failure of the Laclau and Mouffe 
project here? 
The problem emerges already at the most fundamental level of theoretical 
apprehension, at that level at which theory seeks to construct its own ways of seeing, its 
own grasp of objects, its own field vision of the phenomena of politics. MoLnik 
forcefully emphasised this moment: "Because it is not possible to think `small' without 
a wider frame, and local thought especially demands a global consciousness, the 
rejection of `grand narratives' is suspiciously close to the rejection of thinking as such. 
Prohibition embraces the alternative stories and in fact prohibits thinking itself: the 
issue is not simply that one is not allowed to think in long terms, in big moves, and 
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perhaps even to lurk beyond the nearby fence. The issue is that the omission of these 
`big' proportions releases those small illusions of various forms of control, critique and 
refutation, illusions on which the biggest possible system lives". " 
These `small illusions' that Mo6nik refers to are precisely the theoretical 
shortcomings of that philosophical orientation which sought a `return to the concrete', 
Thinking small, thinking concrete: the neuralgic point of the political consciousness of 
the `Slovenian Spring' was precisely the rejection of the dimension of the `abstract', the 
rejection of the analysis of global processes and relations. "The Alternative did 
possess", as MoCnik argues, "a `concept' of its responsibility towards the historical 
situation, but the `content' of this concept was deceptive". 56 In both its analyses and its 
practices, the Alternative was unable to see beyond the immediate empirical and 
discursive realm, beyond what was immediately tangible and merely given. It thought 
that it is located in a space without abstractions, it was not particularly interested in 
questions of State power, questions of class struggle and its historical forms, it could not 
envisage historical and political realities or projects of global extent. It only wanted to 
catch sight of the multiplicity of particulars, to recognise the immediate wealth of 
discursive expressions and articulations, to appropriate, politicise and universalise the 
given, the empirically `concrete'. "The Alternative, according to its self-understanding, 
felt so fully responsible to the `existing state' that it did not see any need for a 
supplementary construction of 'utopias"'. ' But exactly in this fascination with 
givenness and concreteness, the Alternative was irremediably abstract. It was incapable 
of conceptualising or even recognising political and historical processes of less 
immediate shape, processes which were nevertheless dominating its own development. 
This entire allure of the `concrete' left the Alternative structurally blind: and this is what 
also made it particularly predisposed to the paradoxes of recuperation, this is what made 
S4 Mo6nik, Rastko (1998) op. cit., pg. 32-33. 
Ibid, pg. 40. 
57 Ibid, pg. 39. 
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its expectations, its aspirations and its demands all the more prone to twists, 
disfigurations and displacements. As MoWk would put it, this is what resulted in that 
the "formulation of [its] `demands' took place under the dictate of the system". ' 
Nothing can be more pertinent here for the approach of Laclau and Mouffe. For 
it is precisely their insistence on the givenness of discursive objects and constructions, 
their rejection of anything other than the terrain of literality of discourses, which 
exhibits a bewildering blindness in what concerns some of the most fundamental 
`abstract' dimensions of politics and political forms. By collapsing everything into 
concrete acts of discursive or rhetorical construction and `articulation', by attempting to 
redefine the entirety of social relations in terms of symbolic exchanges, whose meaning 
we can read off from the `surface', the approach of Laclau and Mouffe remains 
incapable of accounting for the structural dimensions of both the State and society in 
their properly modern guises. When Laclau and Mouffe conceptualise society, or the 
`social', as a totalistic horizon of articulation of diversified particulars, a horizon which 
is wholly immanent to the concrete givens, to actual demands of diversified and 
multiple social and political actors, they dramatically loose out of sight the fact that this 
`discursive horizon' cannot but be already pre-formed, that it already possesses a 
determinate structure in the guise of the State form and its ideological and 
representational surface, its ideological apparatuses, as Althusser would call them. 
Indeed, this is the point where wp can seize the importance of Althusser's conception of 
the `machinistic' essence of the State - its objective, material dimensions, beyond the 
subjective facade - as well as his remarks on the State's `terrible concreteness' which 
one `cannot touch with one's hands'. One of the great paradoxes of the entire range of 
the `formalistic' political conceptions of the 1989 `democratic revolutions' - including 
Laclau and Mouffe - was precisely the inability to grasp properly these `abstract', 
` Ibid. 
212 
objective dimensions of the State - its existence beyond the mere subjective domain of 
actors. But also, an inability to grasp the peculiarity of the `dialectic' between the State 
and civil society, in which the State is the determinant element. The demands for civil 
society and for `radical and plural democracy' in the post-socialist setting were never 
and could not have been simply demands for securing the autonomy of different spheres 
of society at the remote from the State. These demands were, at the same time, and 
primarily so, demands for the State. It was never simply a matter of counterposing the 
pluralism of society to the `monolithic' socialist State, but of demanding from the 
socialist State to transform itself into a State of Right, into a liberal State, which would 
then juridically guarantee the free expression of pluralism. "Civil society had to, so in 
order to constitute itself, also constitute the State", as Mastnak pointed out. 59 
But the same can be said with regard to the `abstract' phenomenon of 
nationalism. What gets obscured in the approaches which, like Laclau and Mouffe, 
sought a `return to the concrete', is the fact that the social space in modernity is always 
already structured as One, not only through the State apparatus, but also, and before all, 
through the symbolic form of the nation. Playing upon the problem of the formal 
construction of the community out of a plurality of diverse elements, the post- 
structuralist theory of hegemony remains totally blind for the fact that the One of the 
modern polity, the form of mass representation of society proper to capitalist modernity, 
is always already more than a (hegemonic) sum of its parts. It is so because it already 
has a substantial symbolic embodiment: the nation-form. Nationalism, or the ideology 
of the nation, cannot simply represent one of the elements of the discursive terrain of 
immanence, as Laclau and Mouffe would have it, an element on an equal footing with 
all the others, because it represents the very condition of possibility of the structuring of 
59 Mastnak (1992), pg. 95. 
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this space, because it corresponds to the `abstract' logic of social representation itself. 60 
Even Gramsci clearly acknowledged this fact when he stressed the inseparability of the 
practice of hegemony from the terrain of the national-State - hegemony was, at its base, 
always a matter of creating a `national popular will': "One cannot make politics-history 
without this passion, without this sentimental connection between intellectuals and the 
people-nation". 61 
In the following chapter, we will explore further precisely this problem, by 
looking at the ways in which the positing of the theoretical articulation between 
nationalism and the `formalist' conception of politics at the heart of political modernity 
helps us to unravel the paradoxes of the post-socialist political rationality. 
" Mastnak seemed to have internalised this paradox in one of his engaged writings from the moment of 
Slovenian independence: "Democracy does not exist without national rights. And yet, democracy cannot 
be founded upon the national moment alone. Democracy is without origins and in democracy there are no 
rights which are more important than others. The rights of lesbians are not less important than the right to 
use one's own language; national identity is one amongst many identities and in principle it is not more 
important than the sexual identity, or any other". See Mastnak (1990) op. cit., pg. 456. The problem here 
is evident: you cannot coherently claim at the same time that nationalism is one of the preconditions and 
one of the consequences of the democratic and pluralistic order. 
6' SPN, pg. 418. For a problematisation of Gramsci's position within Marxism on this regard see Pozo, 
Luis M. (2007) "The Roots of Hegemony: The mechanism of class accommodation and the emergence of 
the nation-people", Capital and Class, Spring, No. 91, pg. 55-89. What is important to add is that Laclau 
comes to paradoxically acknowledge this fact in his recent attempt to revise and substantialise the 
political conception presented in Hegemony (See Laclau (2005) On Populist Reason). When the vision of 
politics and `radical democracy' constructed simply out of the conjunction of legalistic forms and 
identitary representations of social groups exhibits its radical lack of a political substance, of a 
determinate universal reference, one turns to the figure of populism, and by the same token, to the 
nationalist ideological spectrum. The multiplicity of particular social identities now fuse decisively into 
the identitary One of the community. But this is where the development of Laclau's theoretical and 
political endeavours comes full circle: from his initial fascination with Peronist nationalism, to the 
excursions towards the liberal dogmas, Laclau resurrects himself as a theorist of the populus. Not a 
theorist of the plebs, i. e. of the people as the undifferentiated mass of exploited and oppressed classes, of 
the 'vulgar', the 'common' and the 'underdog', but a theorist of the people correspondent to its 
institutional representation in the State, in the sense of the mass structures of the State. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
THE CASE OF `DEMOCRATISATION' IN YUGOSLAVIA 
Liberalism is like whiskey: it looks good, it tastes bitter, 
it is hazardous for the body and the spirit - and anyway, 
only the rich can afford it. 
Rastko MoUik, How Much Fascism? 
[N]ever in history, has the horizon of the thing whose 
survival is being celebrated (namely, all the old models 
of the capitalist and liberal world) been as dark, 
threatening, and threatened. 
Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx. 
5.1 Introduction: apres la fin, la deluge? 
Post-socialism bears an intimate relationship with liberal democracy. On the 
ruins of `really existing' socialist states we witness the unbridled advance of capitalism 
and the `free market', coupled with the elevation of the political reign of 
parliamentarianism and the Rule of Law. In this, post-socialism offers a ready resolve of 
the principle ideological `dilemma' of the Cold War, exploding the opposition between 
`liberal democracy' and `socialist totalitarianism' in the `evidence' of the so-called 
`transition' of socialist societies towards capitalism and parliamentarianism. But post- 
socialism does not only provide the political form of liberal democracy with a definite 
site of historical actualisation. It also provides it with one of the most potent surfaces for 
idealisation. A triumphant political consciousness transforms the political hopes of the 
Eastern Europeans into a veritable political eschatology, evoking the attainment of the 
deepest and the most universalistic aspirations of human history. With the events of 
1989 collapsing the visibility of the socio-political challenges to capitalism and to its 
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political expressions, liberal political philosophy has not only strived to depict liberal 
democracy as a system without alternative, acceptable universally, but has lauded it as 
the `most natural form of political government', even as the `endpoint in the ideological 
evolution of humanity'. Francis Fukuyama, one of the philosophical representatives of 
the new American order after the cold war, would go as far as to proclaim an `end of 
history', asserting that in liberal democracy we find the ultimate model of universal 
recognition and reconciliation, that liberal democracy is 'a political form finally 
discovered in which all the societal conflicts and antagonisms, all the contradictions 
which have incited social struggles throughout the history of political modernity, are 
finally resolved, reconciled, and brought to an end. ' With the State fashioned upon the 
rule of law and individual liberties, and based upon popular power expressed in multi- 
party parliamentary elections, we have Reason itself appearing on the scene of history, 
universal and non-contradictory, realising the full potential of humanity, pacifying all 
potential social conflicts, and satisfying all human needs. 2 
Inasmuch as this political eschatology of liberal democracy offers itself in terms 
of propositions calling upon Hegel and Kojeve, one is tempted to deploy the critical 
method that young Marx once used against Hegelian idealism - to situate `Reason' in 
the `unreason' of historical existence, to measure the ideal against the actual. And in 
this, one wants to turn the ideological assertions of the liberal democratic ideology 
against themselves: to which extent does the universalistic horizon of liberal democracy 
produce conflicts and contradictions, instead of resolving or pacifying them? To which 
Francis Fukuyama (1989) "The End of History? ", in: The National Interest, Washington: The Nixon 
Centre, (summer issue), later expanded into a book: (1992) The End of History and the Last Man, 
London: Penguin. Jacques Derrida has been a stringent and stinging critic of Fukuyama's `neo- 
evangelism'. See Jacques Derrida (1994) Spectres of Marx, London: Routledge. 
2 Quoting Fukuyama: "The state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognizes and 
protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom, and democratic insofar as it exists only 
with the consent of the governed". Or, again: "But in the universal homogenous state, all prior 
contradictions are resolved and all human needs are satisfied. There is no struggle or conflict over `large' 
issues, and consequently no need for generals or statesmen; what remains is primarily economic activity". 
(Quoted from http: //www. wesjones. com/eoh. btm - page visited 10/03/07). 
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extent is the very existence of the liberal democratic form inseparable from the political 
violence that it claims to have overcome and annulled? 
Starting from these questions, I would like to pick up from the moment which 
the analysis in the previous chapter left unanswered - the moment of the articulation of 
liberal-democracy with nationalism in the post-socialist setting. Examining in more 
detail the trajectories of the general process of `democratisation' in Yugoslavia, and 
more concretely, the case of the establishment of the institutions of the liberal 
democratic State in Croatia, I will attempt to show how nationalism, and nationalist 
violence, not only does not stand opposed to the universalistic surface of liberal 
democracy, but rather seems to represent one of its inescapable elements. 
5.2. `Democratisation' in Yugoslavia 
What do we speak about when we speak about `democratisation' in Yugoslavia? 
At one level, the facts seem to be clear. When we speak about `democratisation' in 
Yugoslavia, or the `democratic transition', we speak about a substantive transformation 
in the objectivity of the political institutions. We speak about the institutionalisation of 
the liberal framework of the State, of the Rule of Law, of the formal, that is, 
constitutional and institutional recognition of individual and collective liberties, rights 
and duties, of the implementation of `public accountability' and the creation of a 
juridical and political framework for the mediation, negotiation and compromise 
between political differences and conflicts. And in this sense, we speak about a process 
which takes tangible proportions throughout the Yugoslav political space at the end of 
the 1980s and whose most visible manifestation is the redrafting of the constitutions of 
different Yugoslav republics in 1989 and 1990. It was in Slovenia first, but soon after, 
in Croatia and Serbia and other Yugoslav republics, that the former socialist entities 
217 
{ would, through a silent but drastic symbolic shift, turn into liberal States proper, into 
states based on Law, on public representation and accountability, on individual rights 
and political pluralism. 
But this only paints the picture in half. Because when we speak about 
`democracy' in Yugoslavia, we also speak about the emergence and the formal 
constitution of a political subject. We speak about that dramatic moment at the 
beginning of 1990, when the League of Communists of Yugoslavia steps down from 
their 50-year rule in order to pave the way for the institution of multiparty parliamentary 
democracy. Again, it was first in Slovenia and Croatia, in April and May that year, and 
some months after, in other Yugoslav republics that the `first free elections' of the post- 
socialist period were to take place, announcing the end of one-party rule and the 
beginning of parliamentary democracy. This is the moment of the formal inauguration 
of the liberal-democratic subjectivity. But as elsewhere in the East of Europe, what 
precedes this formal instance in the Yugoslav context is an entire span of subjective 
energies, volitions and conceptions, a multilayered process of formation taking place 
through a number of different trajectories and shapes. If we look at these different 
trajectories in their broadest and most significant contours, we can see that the 
genealogy of the subject of liberty and democracy in Yugoslavia is fully continuous to 
all those specific subjective episodes of the `democratic revolutions' of 1989 in Eastern 
Europe: 
It is continuous, first of all, with the waves of popular protest and democratic 
dissent that characterised the end of the eighties in the socialist East, to those pressures 
`from below' through which the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, 
and other socialist states, expressed their opposition to the repressive nature of the 
regimes that were in place, to the growing alienation of the official sphere of power 
from its social base. In Yugoslavia, these processes of `democratisation from below' 
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were most manifest in the episode of the `Slovenian Spring', which we examined in the 
previous chapter, where the Alternative movements succeeded in carving out the spaces 
of human rights and civic freedoms. But the Slovenian moment was by no means the 
only one. Throughout the 1980s, in fact, the entirety of the Yugoslav social space was 
being punctured by popular and intellectual pressures, by the demands for a 
liberalisation of the political sphere, demands for freedom of expression and 
association, civic liberties and human rights. From Zagreb to Belgrade, from Kosovo to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the eighties in Yugoslavia was a decade of the ferment of 
`formal democracy'. 
At the same time, however, the drive of `democratisation' in Yugoslavia would 
not exempt the official political sphere. The second moment in which the notions of 
democracy and liberty acquire a decisive subjective form is the one which concerns the 
transformations internal to the political regimes themselves, which concerns processes 
of democratisation `from above'. We are speaking here of that general drive through 
which the Communist parties of the East of Europe start transforming their ideologies, 
whilst embracing elements of the liberal doctrine, and pacifying their political 
conceptions and strategies. In Yugoslavia, the precise equivalent to perestroika was the 
discourse of `reforms' (reforme), appearing as early as the seventies, but affirming itself 
manifestly and resolutely from the early-eighties. The the official political debates of 
the decade of the eighties seemed to have entirely revolved around problems of the 
`liberalisation' of the political and the economic system, around problems of the 
transformation of the socialist economy towards the market model and the reshaping of 
the Yugoslav political institutions along the formal coordinates of the Rechtsstaat. 3 
3 See Woodward (1995) The Balkan Tragedy, especially chapter 3.1 will be quoting extensively 
Woodward's work throughout this chapter because it is, to this day, and despite some of its shortcomings, 
the most exhaustive and the most meticulous scholarly approach to the break-up of Yugoslavia, and to the 
situation from 1990 to 1995.1 find other similar works in this field - for example, Silber, Laura and 
Little, Alan (1995) The Death of Yugoslavia, London: Penguin Books and BBC Books, or Glenny, Misha 
(1992) The Fall of Yugoslavia, London: Penguin - suffering from a too shallow, journalistic 
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The liberal democratic subjectivity, however, also appears in another space, a 
space traversing the simple opposition of `below' and `above'. It appears amongst the 
burgeoning nationalist intelligentsia, which begins to fortify itself in the cultural, 
political and academic institutions. The two most notable examples in this regard are the 
Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), drafted by a 
number of Serbian intellectuals and academics, which first appears in 1986, and the 57`h 
issue of the Slovenian cultural journal Nova Revija, published in 1987 (although written 
in the same year as the Memorandum) under the heading "Prispevki za Slovenski 
nacionalni program" ("Contributions to the Slovenian National Programme"). Besides 
the overt rhetoric of, respectively, Serbian and Slovenian nationalism, both the 
Memorandum and the theoretical tracts of the Slovene nationalist intellectuals are being 
decisively shaped on the backbone of the subject of liberty and democracy. Both of 
these texts seek to present themselves as the guardians of liberal and democratic 
traditions of their respective nations, both of them articulate their criticism of the 
socialist regime and their anti-communism through demands for an `authentic 
democratic system', for the rule of law, for the institutional recognition of human rights 
and civic freedoms. 4 As elsewhere in the East of Europe, the rebirth of democracy goes 
hand in hand with the national revival in the intellectual realm. 
All of these three spaces constitute the fundamental moments of the process of 
`democratisation' in Yugoslavia. And in this sense, the redrafting of the constitutions 
and the setting of parliamentary elections in 1990 can and must be seen as their result 
and their culmination. But if this formal moment represents the unification and 
methodology, and also from a overt political bias. Furthermore, it is important to note that currently there 
are no major historiographic attempts to address this context from within a'nativist' perspective, from the 
position of ex-Yugoslav historiography. This problem was discussed recently at a conference named `The 
Uneventment of History: the Case of Yugoslavia" held at the University of Ljubljana in October 2007. 
4 See Kuzmanik, Toni and KovaM, Gorazd (2004) "Pojmovanje driave in nacije pri novorevijagih v 
osemdesetih letih" ("The understanding of the nation and the state amongst the writers of Nova Revija in 
the 1980s"), easopis za kritiko znanosti, no. 215/216, Ljubljana: NZ. 
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overdetermination of all these different trajectories of democratic subjectivity, we 
should note that what is actually at play here is a dramatic displacement. 
Because the moment in which the League of Communists of Yugoslavia decides 
to legalise formal political association outside its confines, the moment in which it feels 
obliged to open up the challenge of the multiparty parliamentary electoral game is also 
the moment in which the political sphere in Yugoslavia is traversed by the most drastic 
divisions. The first `free and fair elections' in socialist Yugoslavia come at the time in 
which the political and intellectual elites of different Yugoslav republics are pursuing 
centripetal tendencies of politics to the utmost. They come at a time in which different 
Yugoslav republics are caught in bitter antagonisms, each against the other, and all 
against the instance which bound them together. Serbia against its provinces Kosovo 
and Vojvodina, Slovenia against the Federal Government, Macedonia and Bosnia 
Herzegovina against the Federal Government, Serbia against Slovenia, Slovenia and 
Croatia against Kosovo, Montenegro and Macedonia, and so on. 
The antagonisms between the political leaderships of different Yugoslav 
republics draw their roots from the situation after Tito's death at the beginning of the 
1980s: from a power vacuum which ensued, and which was only partially filled by a 
new political institution, a collective presidency of the federation. But also, and in a 
decisive way, they draw their roots from the drastic economic crisis which hit 
Yugoslavia in the same period -a crisis fuelled by the global debt crisis of the late 
1970s - and which forced the federal government to introduce austerity programmes 
and economic restrictions. 5 The resulting economic recession and a spiralling inflation 
in Yugoslavia in the mid 1980s let to a general political instability, as mass 
As Branka Magal pointed out: "Yugoslavia's economic problems have, no doubt, been aggravated by 
the high cost of money characteristic of the international finance market since the oil crisis in 1976 I... ý 
In 1983 alone $900 million were added to the country's $20 billion foreign debt. To service this debt, and 
in order to be able to borrow more, the government has been cutting down imports and stepping up 
exports 'at all costs'. Import reductions have in turn produced a great shortage of essential materials. The 
result has been great industrial stagnation". Magri, Branka (1993) The Destruction of Yugoslavia: 
Tracing the Break-up, 1980-92, London: Verso, pg. 95. 
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unemployment and social insecurity spread throughout the country. 6 But most 
importantly, the economic crisis inserted dramatic rifts into the official political sphere, 
as it created conflicts between the federal government and the republics, and between 
different republican leaderships themselves, conflicts over crucial issues such as the 
common budget, the economic and political sovereignty of the republican units, over 
the federal system of redistribution and aid, and even over the future shape and the 
viability of the federation as such. In a situation of economic scarcity and austerity, 
which was exacerbated by the inefficient and destructive policies of economic 
`liberalisation' of the federal government, the republican politicians started a struggle 
for political control over economic resources. "[There was[ a growing polarization", as 
Woodward noted, "between official alternatives: a federal government pushing ever 
more radical economic reforms and confronting republican governments asserting their 
sovereignty and `national' interest with equal conviction". 7 
The two richest republics, Slovenia and Croatia, demanded that the federation be 
re-organized along confederal lines, where their claims of political and economic 
sovereignty would be fully recognised, whereas Serbia, on the other hand, pushed for a 
re-centralised federation where it would claim the upper hand, and where it could also 
further its own gains of sovereignty, which primarily included the abolition of the 
autonomy of its two provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo. At the same time, these three 
republics started openly subverting the federal system and its institutions, by refusing to 
participate in federal systems of welfare, by refusing to accept the jurisdiction of federal 
courts, and, in the end, by declaring their own particular national interests above those 
of the other republics and the federation as a whole. At the same time, they started 
' According to Susan Woodward: "By 1985-86 the preconditions of a revolutionary situation were 
apparent. One million people were officially registered as unemployed. The increasing rate of 
unemployment was above 20 percent in all republics except Slovenia and Croatia. Inflation was at 50 
percent a year and climbing I... I Allocations decisions increasingly became stark questions of survival. 
Attempts to alleviate the pressures made inflation worse and undermined economic management. This 
economic polarization led to social polarization" (Woodward (1995) op. cit., pg. 73). 
Ibid. 
222 
fuelling nationalist rebukes against each other, turning issues of economic competition 
into claims of national identity: "The language of national exploitation, national 
integrity, and moral right portrayed these issues in ethical terms, replacing economic 
ideology and legalistic disquisitions on governments' economic property rights brought 
on by the severe restrictions of the stabilisation program. This shift only escalated 
conflict further because it transformed conflict within elite circles over economic 
choices [... ] into non-negotiable questions of identity". ' 
By the end of the 1980s, the conflicts between the republics evolved into open 
struggles over the legacy of the decaying Yugoslav socialist system as a whole, over its 
productive capacities, its industries and productive resources, its political institutions, its 
administrative and territorial apparatuses, its military machine, and its citizens. The 
logic of the conflicts amongst the republics, and between the republics and the federal 
government, was a logic of a vicious self-destructive spiral: "Claims for control over 
economic resources or political authority were necessarily a denial of resources, 
authority and rights to others. Protectionist economics and aggressive politics tended to 
incite defensive responses, and the interaction could escalate rapidly if not restrained. 
Popular protest excited counterprotests, and the rhetoric of national interest became 
increasingly nationalist in the sense of defining one group and its goals in opposition to 
another. The more assertive each republic became in its own political project, the more 
this impinged on politics in other republics and on the prospects for political and 
economic activities that crossed republican borders and ignored ethnic identity'? 
The turning point between the eighties and the nineties thus reveals a situation in 
which almost all the main political actors, or at least the most significant ones, are 
fervently engaged in the demolition of the Yugoslav socialist project - and specifically, 
in the demolition of the mechanisms of solidarity, redistribution and welfare that the 
8 Ibid, pg. 99. 
9 Ibid, pg. 112. 
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federal socialist system set up. In the same moment in which the Yugoslav political 
sphere was being steeped in the universalistic ideas of liberal-democracy, the entire 
political life was overflowed with excessively particularistic political demands and 
claims - ranging from those which sought to impose strict borders on republican politics 
and economies, and thus to create new nation-states out of Yugoslavia's republics, to 
those which sought an excess of cultural and `ethnic' identification in politics, fuelling 
nationalism behind the republican borders. This is why Branka Maga§ would observe 
that "Yugoslavia today resembles a vast network of trenches, behind which lie 
encamped conflicting interests spawned by developmental problems, but also by the 
heady ambitions of competing national leaders. In this war of attrition, each side is 
counting on rebellion erupting in the enemy's interior, and with some luck also among 
its front-line troops". 'o 
In the context of such an acute political crisis, it is not surprising that the 
subjective manifestations of democracy of the first multiparty parliamentary elections in 
1990 are already but a particular instance in this nationalist ferment. This is evident 
already from their form: all the elections are taking place at the republican level 
exclusively. The federal elections, scheduled for December 1990, never saw the light of 
day. And, in fact, they never had a chance to do so. Not only because all the republican 
political leaderships had already collaborated together on subverting the authority and 
the viability of the federal government, and of the federation as an instance. " But also 
because, almost without exceptions, the contents of the emergent democratic scenarios, 
the contents of the new parliamentary subjects, were nationalist per definitionern. 
10 Magas (1993) op. cit., pg. 289. 
As Woodward noted: "the prevention of federal elections was only one of the actions by the 
governments of these three republics iSlovenia, Croatia, Serbial that was aimed at destroying federal 
authority. This authority was first challenged, and effectively eliminated, by the unilateral action of the 
(then Socialist) Republic of Slovenia in September 1989, which passed amendments to its own 
constitution that claimed to render the federal constitution irrelevant to Slovenia. Following this act by 
Slovenia, the survival of the Yugoslav federation became impossible in constitutional terms". 
(Woodward, 1995, pg. 29) 
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Almost all newly appearing political parties, and this undoubtedly applies to the 
reformed republican branches of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, were set up 
as national and nationalist parties. They were not set as parties operating on the level of 
Yugoslavia as a whole, and in this sense addressing its citizens as a whole, but as parties 
confined in the first place to particular republican territories, that is, to the majority 
nations which were formally recognised as the political subjects of these territories. " 
And moreover, given that the republican borders in the Yugoslav federation did not 
strictly coincide with those of national groups, they were set as parties addressing 
national groups beyond the borders of different republics. 13 An observer recounting the 
proper names which were appearing in the burgeoning parliamentary-democracy of 
Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s would probably be bewildered by a peculiar 
excess of particular national attributes: the Croatian Social-Liberal Party, the Croatian 
Peasants' Party, the Serbian Socialist Party, the Serbian Democratic Party, the 
Slovenian Christian-Democrats, the Social-Democratic Party of Slovenia, the 
Macedonian National Front, and so on. As if all the new political differences that were 
constituted in the formal parliamentary-democratic setting needed to be, at the same 
time, immediately cancelled out and subsumed under the banner of national identity. 
In all the republics, it is the particularistic, that is, the nationalist political 
strategies which won the elections and ended up affirming themselves. Although 
coming in different guises - liberal, socialist, conservative or other; although differing 
as to their origin - in the former nomenclature, amongst political dissidents, or from 
completely new political figures, in all of the republics the platforms which caught the 
12 The two notable exceptions were the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative (known by its 
Serbo-Croatian acronym UJDI), an anti-nationalist, democratic and liberal political platform launched by 
non-party intellectuals and academics, and the federal Prime Minister Markovic's party, the Alliance of 
Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia. Both of these political platforms ended up playing a minor political role 
in the ensuing elections: UJDI failed to constitute itself as a significant subject in the parliamentary 
democratic `contest', whilst Markovid was crippled due to the decision to postpone the federal elections, 
and afterwards due to Slovenia's actual veto on holding these elections. 
13 Which proved to be a very destructive political formula, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
225 
`hearts and the minds' of the majority of the voters were those which were unable to see 
beyond their own `picket-fence', beyond the confines of their respective republic and 
national group. In this sense, the expressions of formal democratic subjectivity added 
further momentum and scale to the nationalist conflict and the political disintegration of 
the country. In fact, the parliamentary elections proved to be the critical turning point of 
the break-up. Within days after the elections, each of the newly elected democratic 
governments started openly constructing and expressing the impossibility of 
Yugoslavia. Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared their independence and started 
drawing plans for secession, whilst Serbia, who in the meantime abolished the 
autonomy of its two provinces, started making a bid for its control and domination in 
the federal political structures, and eventually for the redrawing of the borders of 
Yugoslavia with an aim of building a greater-Serbian nation-State beyond the current 
republican borders. 
Within this scenario of disintegration, the entirety of idea of democracy, in both 
its subjective and its objective dimensions, became but an instrument in the hands of 
these new governments, by which they sought to assert their sovereignty over the 
administrative apparatuses and the populations which constituted the socialist system, 
that is, by which they sought to create new nation-States out of Yugoslavia's republics. 
According to Woodward: "The introduction of multiparty elections did not open a 
democratizing process in the sense of establishing procedures for managing differences 
and conflict over policies peacefully and regularly by holding officials accountable and 
guaranteeing individual rights. The elections gave politicians the courage to escalate 
their demands and rhetoric to sabotage negotiations". " Submerged under the formula of 
state-building, the formal expressions of the will of democratic subjects became the 
14 ibid, pg. 144, 
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confirmation of the mutual exclusion of national communities. And democracy itself, at 
this juncture, was to become a mere metaphor for the sovereignty of national states. 
The catastrophic scenario which ensued from this, where nationalist wars and 
brutal armed conflicts over the creation of `ethnic States' gave a final blow to the 
historical existence of the Yugoslav socialist federation is well known, and there is no 
need to go into it in detail here. What is interesting, however, is to follow how the 
germs of the political violence enter the scene and explode precisely around the 
concrete inauguration of liberal democratic institutional and subjective forms, through 
the very process through which the Yugoslav socialist republics become liberal States. 
We will do so here by focusing on one particular case: the case of `young Croatian 
democracy', and the conflict between the Croatian state and the Croatian Serbs. 
5.3. 'Young Croatian democracy' 
Croatia was at the very forefront of the processes of `democratic transition' 
which were moving the entire country in the same rhythm with the political momentum 
of the post-socialist East. It was one of the first republics to implement the 
transformations in its political and juridical institutions, and thus also in its political and 
social consciousness, which were taking it towards the formal confines of the rule of 
law and civic liberties. In the period from February to December in 1989, the League of 
Communists of Croatia had not only allowed the formation and registration of a number 
of `alternative' political groupings - from the intellectual non-party platform of UDJI 
(the Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative), to an entire array of political 
parties proper, such as the Croatian Social-Liberal Party, the Croatian Democratic 
Union, the Croatian Democratic Party, and more than fifty others which appeared in this 
time - but had decided to legalise political pluralism and to call for multi-party 
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democratic elections. At this same moment, Croatia also witnessed a proliferation of the 
intellectual and political activities of `civil society', as numerous civic initiatives, 
human rights campaigns, campaigns for the rights of women and peace campaigns were 
stemming in the republic. 
But as substantial as the entire enthusiasm of `democracy' was in Croatia, this 
Yugoslav republic was also the place where the entire display of civic passions was to 
receive the most brutal dose of sobriety. In the same moment of the turn of the decade 
in which it would experience the fiery advance of formal political liberty and 
democracy, Croatia would become a veritable scene of the proliferation of nationalism, 
and of the violence the latter is capable of producing. 
Towards the end of the eighties it was plainly visible that the prevailing political 
sentiment in the Croatian public was openly reflecting the fractures that the Yugoslav 
political class was creating amongst itself. If nationalist opinion represented only a 
somewhat moderate partner to the `democratic changes' both within the League of 
Communists of Croatia and in other segments of Croatian political life - receiving, 
nevertheless, its most generous manifestation in the anti-federal positions of the 
Croatian political leadership and in the refusals of Croatia to contribute to the common 
federal aid of the undeveloped regions and republics, 15 at the beginning of the nineties, 
that is, during the formal setting of the multi-party parliamentary ballot, nationalist 
politics would openly surface and dominate the political scene. With the electoral 
victory of Franjo Tudman and his Croatian Democratic Union (or, as is known by its 
acronym in Croato-Serbian, HDZ) at the first post-socialist parliamentary elections in 
April 1990, a victory which fed upon a rhetoric of extreme nationalism, chauvinism and 
anti-communism, it became clear that political life in Croatia was wholly permeated 
with nationalist sentiments. And as much as the speed with which the animosity and the 
15 On the `juridical' conflict between the republics as an overture to the nationalist eruption, see 
Woodward, op. cit., chapters 3 and 4. 
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antagonism between Croats and Serbs in Croatia sprung up almost out of nowhere in the 
short period somewhere between 1989 to 1990 remains bewildering, as much as the 
imagination with which nationalist ideological and political barricades were constructed 
and fortified on both sides - especially with the help of neighbouring Serbia and the 
openly belligerent politics of Milogevie - remains an analytical enigma, what was also 
fascinating was the intransigence and cruelty of the political project of Tudman - to 
create an ethnic State for Croats, regardless of the means necessary to do so. 
What marked the peak of the liberal-democratic transmutation of Croatia was 
the deadlock between the obstinacy of the newly elected Croatian government to create 
a new state out of the vestiges of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, and do so by 
dissociating itself from Yugoslavia, and the equally militant conviction of the Croatian 
Serbs to seek political and territorial autonomy in the event that Croatia secedes. At the 
very limit, the entire drama of the `rebirth of democracy' in Croatia would reach a 
debilitating crescendo in an armed rebellion and its violent repression, and later in full- 
scale military engagements and a civil war. If we count out the `Ten-Day War' in 
Slovenia, this is the beginning proper of armed conflicts and wars which would collapse 
the Yugoslav project. Starting with the summer of 1990 and taking explosive pace by 
the spring of the subsequent year, the fervour of `democracy' in Croatia was replaced by 
the violence of the armed struggle: first between the Croatian army and police and the 
rebellion of the Croatian Serbs, and later between the Croatian armed forces and the 
Yugoslav People's Army, which had by then transformed itself into an instrument for 
the territorial ambitions of Serbian nationalism. 
But this extremity of the Croatian `road to democracy' is, nevertheless, also an 
exemplary point for the entire Yugoslav context. Because as captivating as the scenes of 
violence and brutality in the war in Croatia at the beginning of 1990s are - especially in 
the sense of representing an overture to the later tragedies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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in Kosovo and Macedonia - what is important here is the fact that the escalation of the 
political conflict between Tudman's government and the Croatian Serbs depicts in an 
almost purified way the genuine paradox in the development of the `democratic 
transition' in Yugoslavia - its simultaneity and in consubstantiality with nationalism. 
What we can trace step by step by looking at the tragedy of the development of the 
`young Croatian democracy' is the fact that nationalist politics, far from representing an 
opposition to liberal-democratic institutions and procedures, and to the universality of 
the concept which they carried, was actually practised through these institutions, 
through this prism of their universality. The crucial moments of the political antagonism 
which divided the Croatian society in two, and which left it in the wreckage of war, are 
precisely the same moments which characterised the foundation of democratic 
institutions, procedures and ideologies in Croatian political life at the end of the eighties 
and the beginning of the nineties: the moment of the inauguration of a new liberal 
constitution, the moment of the redefinition of citizenship of the Croatian Republic 
through the idiom of individual rights and duties, the moment of first formal 
expressions of democratic subjectivity, such as the multi-party parliamentary elections 
and the referenda, and finally, the moment of the definition of Croatia as a sovereign 
political community based upon the liberal-democratic order. 
The first seeds of the conflict with the Croatian Serbs could be found in the 
drafting of the new, liberal-democratic constitution for the Socialist Republic of Croatia. 
In the winter of 1989, following similar developments in Slovenia, but also in Serbia 
and in Macedonia, the Croatian parliament adopted constitutional changes which would 
redefine the republic as a state based upon individual liberty and the Rule of Law. These 
constitutional amendments marked the beginning of the process of juridico-political 
transformation which would culminate in December 1990, where Croatia would be 
unambiguously defined as "an integral and indivisible democratic social state in which 
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power is derived from the nation and belongs to the nation as a community of free and 
equal citizens". 16 At the end, the Croatian republic would not only have stripped off the 
attribute `socialist' from its official name, but would also have removed the dense and 
complex set of institutional, political and juridical elements of socialist politics, which 
inscribed social rights and the power of the working class explicitly in the constitution, 
and, moreover, which defined the State itself as the `community of socialist self- 
management'. " 
But what was also being rectified in the new liberal-democratic constitutional 
arrangement of Croatia was the definition of the political sovereign behind the 
republican order. The amendments to the preamble of the Croatian constitution 
proposed in 1989 defined the essence of the sovereignty of the Republic as residing in 
the `Croatian nation'. If this symbolic turn of phrase resolved what was perceived 
according to the new standards of liberal-democracy as legal lacunae and political 
ambivalences of the socialist order, it also implied a major demotion in the status of the 
Croatian Serbs, one of the largest minoritarian national groups in Croatia. The Serbs at 
that time made up around 12% of the population of Croatia, and were granted special 
juridical and political recognition in the previous constitutional setting. From the equal 
political and constitutional status - that of the co-constitutional nation - the Croatian 
Serbs were now to relegated to the legal and political status of a minority, albeit with 
the promise of special cultural and social rights. 18 
16 This is Article 1 in: Ustav Republike Hrvatske (The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia), Zagreb: 
Informator, 1991. 
"See Samary, Catherine (1995) Yugoslavia Dismembered, New York: Monthly Review Press. 
"' The 1974 constitution defined the Socialist Republic of Croatia as `the national state of the Croatian 
nation, the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia and the state of the nationalities who live in it', whilst at 
the same time stating that: `The Socialist Republic of Croatia is a state based upon the sovereignty of the 
people and the rule and the self-management of the working class and all working people, as well as the 
socialist self-governing democratic community of working people, citizens, equal nations and 
nationalities'. Quoted from: (1974) Ustav SFR Jugoslavije: Ustavni zakon za provodenje Ustava SFRJ; 
Ustav SR Hrvatske: Ustavni zakon za provodenje Ustava SRH, Zagreb: Narodno sveu6li9te grada 
Zagreba, Centar za aktualni politifki studij, 1974. 
231 
In the midst of the political turmoil which was destroying the ties of mutuality 
and solidarity of the multi-national federation as a whole, in the midst of the growing 
climate of political intolerance, such assurances, however, seemed far from reassuring. 
When the political leaderships of Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia brought out in the open 
the question of the dissolution of the federal order as such, such a redefinition in 
political status seemed to immediately bear upon issues of individual security and 
citizenship rights. As Woodward noted: "[The Croatian Serbs] were to be granted the 
cultural and social rights of a minority but not the equal political status and full rights to 
self-determination that belonged constitutionally to nations in Yugoslavia. Croatia was 
the state of the Croatian nation, but the implication for rights of citizenship of those who 
were not Croat but who resided in Croatia, perhaps for many generations, became very 
uncertain". 19 
When Tudman came into power in the spring of 1990, with the anti-Serb 
sentiment that he exploited for his electoral campaign, 2° and with his open plans for 
dissociation from Yugoslavia, the guarantees that the new political construction was 
offering to the Croatian Serbs seemed even more alienating. Reassurance was to 
disappear completely when the new Croatian government made one of its first official 
moves: the adoption of `new' historical symbols of statehood, the same ones which 
were last used in the 1941 Nazi instalment of the Independent State of Croatia, a regime 
distinguished for its atrocities, over Serbs, Jews, the Roma people and its political 
opponents. 2' In the context in which this symbolic abuse was coupled with the equally 
violent anti-Croatian nationalist propaganda being spread from Belgrade and Serbia, 
propaganda which played on the imagery of victimisation of Serbs, the general 
'" Woodward, op. cit., pg. 103. 
20 At a campaign rally in Zagreb in April 1990, Tudman notoriously stated: "Thank God, my wife is 
neither a Serb not a Jew". 
2J Woodward, op. cit., pg. 120. 
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sentiment amongst the Serb population in Croatia would become the sentiment of fear 
and insecurity, and also of nationalism and revolt. 22 
Tudman's government left no ambiguities in that the constitutional symbolic 
boundary between the Croats and Serbs would be turned into an instrument of real and 
violent discrimination. From the beginning, Tudman's rule was characterised by a 
massive purge of individuals of Serb origin from public institutions, most notably from 
the army and the police forces. ' The government demanded that Serbs in all sectors of 
public employment sign a loyalty oath. It also made clear that the Latin alphabet was 
obligatory in all official proceedings, thus stripping the Cyrillic script historically used 
by the Serbs off its official recognition in Croatia. At the same time, the new Croatian 
regime started redefining the entire symbolic identity of public institutions, from 
municipal authorities to health service offices, from the universities to the state media, 
from official linguistic codes all the way down to primary school textbooks, in 
accordance with an `ethnically correct' manner, as it also made sure that acquiring 
official documents and citizenship status would be encircled by impossible obstacles 
and demands. New citizenship laws that were instated in Croatia at that time were based 
upon the notion of the notion of ius sanguinis, which meant that ethnic Croats who were 
not born in Yugoslavia had a priority in obtaining citizenship documents in front of 
citizens of the republic who were not of Croat ethnicity. By the time the new Croatian 
constitution was approved, in December 1990, where the Republic was defined as a 
"national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the members of autochthonous 
national minorities", Croatia had successfully institutionalised the political conflict with 
the Croatian Serbs, just as Serbia had done in 1989, when it revoked the autonomy of 
the Province of Kosovo, thus stripping the Albanian Kosovar population of political 
== For the role of media and ideological propaganda in the fuelling of nationalism between Croatia and 
Serbia, see Skopljanac Brunner et al. (2000) Media and War, Zagreb and Belgrade: Argument. 
23 See Samary (1995) op. cit., pg. 80. See also Robert M. Hayden, (1999) Blueprints for a House Divided: 
The Constitutional Logic of Yugoslav Conflicts, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pg. 70. 
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rights and constitutional guarantees. 24 A nationalist division line was inscribed into the 
most minute pores of Croatian society, all up until it would become internalised in the 
form of what Fichte once called the `internal boundary'. 25 On the other side, Milosevic's 
government, already involved in a nationalist media campaign against Croatia, started 
openly declaring its intent to protect the interests of Serbs beyond the borders of Serbia, 
stating the possibility of intervention into the other republics. 26 
As much as we can see the antagonism between the Croatian State and the 
Croatian Serbs being inflamed through the workings of numerous ideological State 
apparatuses, both from the Croatian and the Serbian side, the actual escalation of the 
conflict followed further the inauguration of the institutions of liberal-democracy. 
The first post-socialist residing of the Croatian Parliament on 31St May 1990 
announced the rule of multiparty parliamentary democracy. One month afterwards, the 
parliament also approved constitutional amendments removing the adjective `socialist' 
from the definition of the Croatian republic and the red star from its symbols of 
statehood. 
But in this inaugural moment, as much as `young Croatian democracy' would 
become homogenised around the universality of the project of `democratisation', 27 it 
24 Robert Hayden would name this process constitutional nationalism: a system of institutional 
discrimination and of 'negative action' towards groups other than the majority nation. According to 
Hayden: "A system of constitutional nationalism I... ] institutionalizes a division between those who are 
of the sovereign nation, ethnically defined, and those who are not. The latter may hold citizenship but 
cannot aspire to equality j... I In this way constitutional nationalism institutionalizes social conflict by 
defining part of the population to be political and social aliens even if formally citizens" (Hayden, pg. 15- 
16). Hayden would also note that "[here) the effect of citizenship laws has been the reverse of 
naturalization in the United States, turning into foreigners, with very few rights of any kind, people in the 
various republics who had been fellow citizens in federal Yugoslavia and thus guaranteed equal rights in 
all republics under the federal constitution (art. 249)". (ibid, pg. 76). 
25 See the discussion of Fichte by Etienne Balibar in his essay `Fichte and the Internal Border: On 
Addresses to the German Nation' in: Balibar (1994) op. cit. 
26 In September 1989, the Serbian parliament adopted constitutional changes which committed the 
Serbian State to protect Serbs living elsewhere. It had also revoked the autonomy of its two provinces, 
Vojvodina and Kosovo, so in order to reconstitute Serbian the sovereignty of the Serbian nation. (See 
Woodward, op. cit, pg. 107 et passim). 
27 After the elections, Tudman decided to form a grand coalition of all, or in fact, all but one of the 
parliamentary political parties, in support of the process of `democratisation'. This is why the first 
government of democratic Croatia was dubbed the 'government of democratic unity'. This was confirmed 
by a declaration issued by non-party intellectuals affiliated to one of the major oppositional parties at the 
beginning of the nineties, the Coalition of National Agreement (KNS): 'We believe that political and 
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would also present itself as a political order with a particular limit. During the time of 
the seating of the new parliament, one parliamentary subject, the Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS), a party which had a massive appeal in Serb dominated areas, caused a large 
political stir. The leader of the SDS, Jovan Ra9kovie, had demanded that Serbs be 
reinstated to the former status of the equal, co-constitutional nation, indicating that the 
alternative for the Serbs is to demand cultural and political autonomy. 28 Tudman 
categorically rejected any such ideas. 29 The SDS decided to leave the parliament. By 
this symbolic gesture, the first days of the positivation of the liberal-democratic order in 
Croatia would also came to be known as the days of the beginning of its negation. In the 
same instance in which Croatia formally eliminated one-party rule and established itself 
as liberal-democratic State, it would become a state in which a large segment of its 
citizen population stands at the limits of the political order, openly contesting its 
authority. 
By the transposal of the conflict outside of the official sphere of politics, the 
political antagonism between the Croatian state and the Croatian Serbs would expand at 
remarkably violent rate. It would still do so, nevertheless, on the surface of different 
modes of democratic expression. 
On the 25`h of July 1990, the Croatian parliament decided adopted a declaration 
on the `political and economic sovereignty' of Croatia vis-ä-vis Yugoslavia, whilst also 
ideological differences, characteristic for each democratic and pluralist society, would not be an obstacle 
to the fact that all political parties, that all Croatian citizens would unite in the struggle for the defence of 
the democratic and sovereign Croatia, as well as the defence of the will of the Croatian nation, expressed 
on the last multi-party elections'; cited from: Jola Vlahovid, "Danas" 1982 - 1992, Rijeka: Novi List, 
2002, pg. 132. 
's Ra9kovi6's own political demands were, however, the inverted reflections of Tudman's government's 
policy of 'culturalisation' of the State: "The Serbs do not want a second state in Croatia, but they demand 
autonomy ... The Serbian people 
in Croatia should be allowed to speak their language, to write their 
script, to have their schools, to have their education programs, their publishing houses, their newspapers". 
Quoted from: Silber and Little (1995), pg. 102. 
2' As Tudman would explain: "The Serbs in Croatia cannot become a ruling people. We have arranged 
our affairs in democratic Croatia the way the Serbs in Serbia, the Slovenes in Slovenia, the Macedonians 
in Macedonia, and every people the world over have arranged their affairs. Here in Croatia, the Croatians 
are sovereign, and to the Serbs are accorded all the rights of a national minority and all individual rights 
[... ] But it cannot be asked that about 8% [sicl of the population, the Serbs, who found themselves here as 
a result of historical developments, should be sovereign in the country of Croatia, because nowhere in the 
world could such a thing exist". (Danas, 2nd July 1993). 
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asserting its constitutional right of secession. On the same day, the Serbs in the 
`Krajina' region, where they formed the majority, adopted a `Declaration on the 
Sovereignty and Autonomy for the Serbian People', and announced their intention to 
hold a referendum on political autonomy. Tudman's government proclaimed the 
Declaration illegal and unconstitutional. It also sent police forces in the region in order 
to prevent the referendum taking place and to take control of the local government and 
police offices which the Serbs occupied by force. The Croatian Serbs responded by 
barricading the roads. This marked the beginning of the armed conflict. 
From this point on the political conflict over constitutional recognition and over 
the definition of the political community would openly present itself as a violent 
struggle over the legacy of the state apparatuses of the Socialist Republic of Croatia. 
When the Croatian government made clear that it would yield no compromises in its 
identification of the republic and its citizenry with the majority nation, and when it tried 
to violently enforce this identification, it was not only the Croatian Serbs who were 
encouraged to take up arms. This delicate situation also provided the rationale for the 
neighbouring Serbia to further assert its own claims over national sovereignty and to 
expand its own politics of majoritarian nationalism - conducted under the slogan of `all 
Serbs in one State'. 30 
After ten months, characterised by the mutual inflaming of political animosities, 
by the intensification of armed confrontations - which were by then being mediated and 
controlled, in a thoroughly paradoxical manner, by the Yugoslav Peoples' Army - the 
struggle between the Croatian state and the Croatian Serbs would reach its paroxysmal 
peak. On May 19`h 1991, Croatia held a referendum on its independence from 
Yugoslavia. On the question "Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign 
3" As Woodward noted: "The majoritatian appeal of the Slogan `all Serbs in one state' replaced the 
impersonal, administrative slogan of "border rectification" in the campaign of Serbian leader Milosevic 
and his new socialist party, but this appeared as an open threat to leaders in neighboring republics. " 
(Woodward, op. cit, pg. 133). 
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and independent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civil rights to Serbs 
and members of other nationalities in Croatia, may enter into an alliance with other 
republics? " 93 percent of the 83.6 percent of the electorate who voted, or in total, 79 
percent of the population of Croatia, gave its support to independence. The Croatian 
Serbs massively boycotted the referendum, particularly in the so-called `Krajina' 
region, where a referendum on remaining within Yugoslavia and joining with the 
republic of Serbia was held one week earlier, which the Serbs had vastly approved. Two 
months after these contradictory expressions of direct democracy, the Yugoslav 
Peoples' Army would undertake a dramatic political transformation. Whilst abandoning 
the last remnants of its dogmatic role as the guardian of the constitutional order of 
socialist Yugoslavia, it would, under the influence of the Serbian political leadership, 
attack Croatia in the interest of Serbia's expansionist aspirations. 3' As Woodward noted: 
"The country imploded. The multiple competing nationalisms of the constitutional 
quarrels, electoral campaigns, and redefinition of political rights became wars over 
territory and borders to create separate states based on the principle of self- 
determination". 32 
If this set of events introduces us to the beginning of the end of the Yugoslav 
project in the brutality of `ethnic' wars, it also attracts our attention towards the bitter 
truth of different assertions of Ii beral -democracy in this context. At the limit - and this 
what the catastrophic escalation of the conflict between the Croatian state and the 
Croatian Serbs brings us straight in front of - we can see the paradox of the subjectivity 
generated by liberal-democracy, which here ends up becoming a simple declaration of 
the sovereignty of national collectivities in the conflict over the legacy of republican 
apparatuses of Yugoslavia. Liberal democracy finds its truth in the violent advance of 
nationalism. All of the different moments of liberal-democratic foundation, from the 
3' See Samary (1995) op. cit, pg. 76-79. 
32 Woodward, op. cit, pg. 146. 
237 
constitution to the referenda, are presented to us here as moments in the exacerbation of 
the particularistic, and particularly violent nationalist politics. This politics, despite its 
official pronouncements and its self-representation, did not simply aim at introducing 
the subjective and objective forms of formal democracy, from the multiparty 
parliamentary system to the principles of the rule of law in the socialist context. It was 
also, and primarily so, a politics of state-building, a politics which sought to create new 
nation-States, new citizens and new political communities out of the legacy of the 
Yugoslav socialist federation. 
At the level of ideological discourse, this paradox of `democratisation' can be 
clearly seen from one of the statements of the Croatian president during the escalation 
of the conflict: 
`They [the Croatian Serbs[ are attempting to bring about a scenario aimed at 
demolishing the democracy that we have established'. 33 
This inflammatory statement of Tudman, uttered in October 1990, at the 
beginning of the explosion of the conflict with the Croatian Serbs, reveals a 
symptomatic displacement in the ideological spectrum. Democracy is not posited here 
in the sense of the universality of its forms and contents. Or better, its universality is 
evoked precisely in order to support a particular political interest, a particular political 
goal - the establishment of a new State. When Tudman makes clear that democracy is 
not something which pertains to the totality of the population of the republic ('the Serbs 
represent a threat to democracy'), he unambiguously uncovers that the stake of the 
process of `democratisation' in Croatia: the endpoint of the `young Croatian democracy' 
is the foundation of a new state, a national state for the Croatian nation, a State where 
the Croatian Serbs, as Serbs, have no proper political place. 
Franjo Tudman, Vjesnik, Zagreb, 30'h October 1990. 
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The paradox here appears even greater when we realise that the continuity 
between liberal-democratic constitution and the building of `ethnic' states equally 
applies to the Kosovo situation, that we can find it in Slovenia and in Macedonia, and 
perhaps most tragically, in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. If all the Yugoslav 
republics sought to constitute themselves as liberal-democratic states, they ended up 
constituting themselves as national States for the majority nations. Concurrently to the 
universalisation of the liberal-democratic principle, there was a total dissemination of 
the particularism of the nation-State: to each nation its own State, to each republic its 
particular traits of national identity and individuality. And nothing could have been 
more contradictory in the context of the federal and socialist construction of 
Yugoslavia, which not only allowed for multiple and ambiguous identifications between 
individual and collective bodies, but which placed a particular emphasis on the 
heterogeneity of these identifications. Nothing could have been more destructive in a 
situation in which all the republican populations, without exceptions, were nationally 
heterogeneous, and where most of Yugoslavia's particular national groups crossed the 
territorial boundaries of the republican administrative apparatuses. 
5.4. liberal-democratic universalism vs. nationalist particularism? 
This scenario of `democratisation' of Yugoslavia readily subverts the picture 
painted by the ideology of 1989 and the idea of the 'end of history'. Instead of the scene 
of liberal-democratic reconciliation, we have a scene of the exacerbation of social and 
political conflicts, ultimately leading to armed confrontations and wars, taking place on 
the backbone of processes of liberal democratic constitution, and, moreover, through 
the very universalistic political institutions of liberal democracy. Instead of a strict 
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opposition between liberal-democratic universality and nationalist particularism, the 
Yugoslav context is constituted upon us a paradoxical conjunction of the two. 
But how can we explain this paradox? How does the polity based upon 
individual rights, the rule of law, on parliamentary and constitutional democracy 
citizenship become an instrument for violent nationalist politics, for a politics of 
discrimination, exclusion and repression of the non-national, or non-ethnic groups? 
How can we explain the fact that it is precisely around the `reinvention' of the 
universalistic institutions of democracy that we see political violence exploding with 
such intensity and brutality? 
Whilst looking at the domain of scholarly analyses of the break-up of 
Yugoslavia, and more generally, of the post-socialist `transition' as a whole, the 
interesting thing is that there is a clear tendency to relegate this entire paradoxical 
problem to the realm of historical accidents. The paradox of the continuity between 
liberal democratic universality and nationalist violence is not to be explained, but rather 
explained away as a historical eccentricity, as an excessive exception. Such explanatory 
tendencies take many shapes, albeit we can clearly discern at least three symptomatic 
patterns. 
The first pattern groups the analyses which attempt to safeguard and assert with 
even greater certainty the ideality of the liberal doctrine, by drawing an absolute 
distinction between liberal democracy and nationalism, that is, between universalism 
and particularism. In concrete terms, this idealisation takes the shape of a distinction 
between the doctrine of individual rights and the doctrines of collective rights or 
collectivism - which in practice implies mapping the Cold War ideological opposition 
between `democracy' and `totalitarianism' onto the opposition between the liberal 
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democratic polity and the nationalist polity. 34 Post-socialist nationalism is a historical 
accident and an absolute adversity to liberal democracy because it is a doctrine of 
collectivism and not a doctrine of individual liberty and democracy; and, moreover, 
precisely as such, as collectivist, it is seen proceeding directly, and unambiguously from 
the socialist ideology and its remains, thus pointing to the `lags' of the `transition'. 35 
The analyses that we can group in the second pattern take the form of culturalist 
arguments, attempting to wed together history and ethnography, or better, to explain 
concrete historical and political struggles through a reference to abstract models of 
`culture' and `civilisation'. If Samuel Huntington, with his geopolitical evocation of 
`civil isational' divides between the West and the East, represents the most notorious 
global example of such tendencies, in the field of post-socialist studies, the analyses of 
Stjepan G. Me9trovi6 certainly stand out as an exemplar of excessive 'cultural isation' of 
politics 36 Here, again we have liberal democracy standing in a completely contingent 
relation to the post-socialist phenomena of nationalism: the latter are seen as proceeding 
from cultural peculiarities and incompatibilities, and ultimately, from cultural and 
civilisational inequalities: from the inadequacies of the East to follow and fully embrace 
the universalistic spirit of the West. 37 
The third pattern of explanation is particularly interesting, as it is not only the 
most sophisticated one, but also because it represents a peculiar synthesis of the 
previous two. This pattern starts by acknowledging the paradox, by acknowledging the 
articulation between liberal democracy and nationalism, but it does so, however, only to 
immediately subvert this articulation, whilst reconstituting the ideal of liberal 
34 This thesis is propagated by Sabrina Ramet in her 1997 book Whose Democracy? Nationalism, 
Religion and the Doctrine of Collective Rights in Post-1989 Europe, Boston: Rowman & Littlefield. 
35 Within the ex-Yugoslav context, one of the loudest advocates of this thesis was the Croatian political 
philosopher, and former head of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Croatia, tarko Puhovski. 
See his essay `Nationalism and Democracy in Post-Communist Key' in: Skenderovid 
buk N. and 
Podunavac M. (1999) Civil Society in the Countries in Transition, Subotica: ALD. 
36 See Me9trovid, Stjepan G, Slaven Letica and Miroslav Goreta (1993) Habits of the Balkan Heart. 
College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press. 
3' For a powerful critique of such'culturalist' argumnets, see Buden (2002) op. cit. 
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democracy in its full, unblemished essence. Contingency, and the principled separation 
between liberal democracy and nationalism reappears here through a split inserted 
within the two categories, which are internally doubled. The analyses of this type thus 
effectively leave us with a distinction between two types of liberal democracy, or better, 
with a distinction between two types of nationalism: a liberal democratic, universalistic 
and tolerant nationalism, and a `nationalist' nationalism, xenophobic, excessive, violent, 
and particularistic. 38 The first model is based upon individual rights, parliamentary 
democracy and the universalism of political citizenship, whilst the second exhibits an 
excess of reference to particularisms: to belonging and to culture, to tradition and 
origins, and to the exclusion of the Other as a precondition for the constitution of the 
Same. And yet, the interesting thing with this separation is that as soon as it is 
established on the level of principles, it is at the same time immediately historicised and 
culturalised, pointing to the existence of divergent cultural origins of political 
institutions and forms. The phenomena of a `democratic' or `liberal' nationalism on the 
one hand, and a `nationalist nationalism' on the other, appear as two separated `political 
cultures', one following closely the universalist spirit of the West, and the other one 
characterising the obstinate particularisms of the cultural sphere in the East, thus 
explaining the wayward political paths of the entire European periphery or semi- 
periphery. 39 The element of contingency enters the picture again here, as the problem of 
nationalism and nationalist violence gets separated from its actual historical locus, being 
transferred onto the abstract terrain of history, and interpreted in terms of the `survival' 
" The opposition between liberal, or civic nationalism and `ethnic' nationalism is, in fact, a staple 
theoretical dualism, which was articulated already by the mid-20th century. See Hans Kohn (1944) The 
Idea of Nationalism; a Study of its Origins and Background, London: MacMillan. In the post-Yugoslav 
context, this opposition was particularly brought forward by Vesna Pusi6. See her text "Upotreba 
nacionalizma i politika priznavanja" ("The use of nationalism and the politics of recognition"), in: 
Erasmus, Zagreb, 1994: no. 8, pg. 2-20. 
39 At the centre of contemporary debates, this distinction is formulated as an opposition between the 
`French model' and the 'German model'. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker (1992) Citizenship and 
Nationhood in France and Germany, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. For an alternative view, and 
a historical relativisiation of the distinction, see Louis Dumont (1994) German Ideology: From France to 
Germany and Back, Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
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of specific historical and cultural traditions, traditions which favour the ethnos over the 
demos, and where the political community defined in terms of `tradition' and 
`belonging' takes precedence over the one based `will' and 'consciousness'. 4° Whilst 
this latter type of analysis defuses to a certain degree the ideological simplifications and 
mystifications of the previous two patterns, and whilst it broadens our understanding of 
the differences between political institutions and their forms of symbolic representation, 
it still falls dramatically short of accounting for the paradoxes of the post-socialist 
transition on their proper terms. It is insufficient to say that post-socialist nationalism is 
simply an expression of different paths in `political culture', of a cultural 
underdevelopment in relation to the core of the liberal democratic model. The problem 
is precisely to explain why nationalist particularisms and violence appear at the exact 
moment of the `reinvention' of liberal democratic political forms in the post-socialist 
setting. 
Instead of looking for answers on the slippery terrains of culture, ideality or 
contingency, we should try to posit the problem in structural terms: to understand the 
ways in which nationalism and liberal democracy are bound together and articulated 
historically and structurally. The terrain which permits us this articulation is the very 
logic of the historical and structural constitution of the modern, bourgeois and liberal 
State. Following Jürgen Habermas, we can say that everything seems to revolve around 
the problem of the constitution of the modern political community of the State out of the 
abstract political principles brought about by liberal democracy 41 If the liberal 
democratic constitution depicts the origin of the community represented in the State in 
40 The argument of the cultural presence of the `cultural nation' has been a staple pattern of explanation in 
the studies of nationalism in the post-socialist context. An interesting case here is the analysis of Robert 
Hayden, (1999) which we cited above. Hayden in fact touches upon the heart of the paradox of liberal 
democracy, as he centres his analysis precisely on the question of the new, liberal constitutional 
structures. In locating with precision the paradoxical phenomenon of 'constitutional nationalism' in the 
post-socialist context, however, Hayden, however, immediately steps away from it, as he explains it away 
in terms of the cultural presence of the cultural model of the 'ethnic nation'. See Hayden, 1999, pg. 67-87. 
41 bürgen Habermas "The European Nation-state - Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and 
Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", in. Balakrishnan, Gopal (ed. ) (1996) Mapping the Nation, 
London: Verso. 
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terms of a double bind of popular sovereignty and subjective rights, that is, if it 
assembles together the social collective through a `social contract' expressing the will of 
each individual, whose freedom and equality is guaranteed through formal and abstract 
procedures, the problem that emerges is how to make this formal existence of the 
communal bond durable and lasting, how to represent the popular sovereign as 
something which extends beyond the sheer formality and abstractness of the juridico- 
political procedure. This is where nationalism becomes a structural supplement to the 
liberal democratic State, by filling the gap between the formal constitution of the 
political community and its historical individuality and durability. As Habermas argues: 
"an idea was required that could have an appeal to the hearts and minds of the people 
stronger than those somewhat abstract ideas on human rights and popular sovereignty. 
This gap was filled by the modern idea of the nation, which first inspired the inhabitants 
of a shared territory with the sense of belonging to the same republic. Only the 
awareness of a national identity, which crystallizes around common history, language 
and culture, only the consciousness of belonging to the same nation, makes distant 
people spread over large territories feel politically responsible for each other. Citizens 
thus come to see themselves as parts of the same whole, in whatever abstract legal terms 
this whole may be constituted". 42 
According to Habermas, there exists a lack, or more exactly, a structural vacuity 
at the heart of the modern liberal democratic State, which seeks to define itself in 
abstracto, through juridical and formal procedures. Precisely in this abstractness and 
this formality, the liberal-democratic polity is structurally incapacitated: it is unable to 
reproduce itself, it is unable to translate itself into a viable and durable political body. 
How is it possible to form a community under the State which would be identical with 
itself and thus historically consistent simply on the basis of the act of free choice of 
42 Ibid, pg. 285-286. 
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equal citizens, solely on the basis of a certain juridico-political framework (taken both 
materially, as a set of practices, and ideally, as a set of values and notions)? This is 
where nationalism comes to aid in offering the substance of the communal bond, in 
representing the political community as a national community. By an investment of a 
particular substance of commonality, the ideology of the nation immediately translates 
the simple fact of voting or of civic participation into a fact of common life and shared 
history, a fact of language and culture, and, by further deduction, a fact of a common 
genealogical origin. 
The structural interrelation between the liberal polity and the national 
community thus comes at that precise moment at which the liberal-democratic State 
defined solely through formal political terms, through the artifice of laws, necessitates a 
further aura of authenticity and legitimacy, a lasting `substance' in the guise of a 
historical, cultural or biological continuity. "There is a conceptual gap in the legal 
construction of the constitutional state which invites a naturalist interpretation of the 
nation to be filled in. The scope and borders of a republic cannot be settled on 
normative grounds. In purely normative terms one cannot explain how the universe of 
those who originally join ranks in order to form an association of free and equal 
persons, and to regulate their common life by means of positive in a fair or legitimate 
way, should be composed - who should or should not belong to this circle. From a 
normative point of view, the territorial and social boundaries of a constitutional state are 
contingent". 43 
43 Ibid, pg. 287-288. It should be pointed out that Habermas here in fact resolves the dilemma of 'liberal 
nationalism' vs. 'ethnic nationalism', or of the 'French' vs. the 'German' model, by showing a continuity 
between the two, and by reformulating the problem in terms of degrees, and not absolute oppositions. As 
he argues: "Built into the self-understanding of the national state, there is this tension between the 
universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the particularism of a cultural community bound 
together by origin and fate" (ibid, pg. 287). 
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5.5. Ich, der Staat, bin das Volk: nationalism and the liberal State 
And yet Habermas leaves a vital problem unanswered here. In separating the 
historical development of the `State' and the `nation', which according to him `refer to 
convergent but different historical processes', ` Habermas misses to account for the 
determinant role of the State form in this entire historical and structural scenario. He 
obscures the question of the extent to which the entire development of the phenomenon 
of nationalism is always already anchored in the reality of the modern State. 
It is insufficient to say that nationalism is simply functional to the modern, 
bourgeois, or liberal State. This functionality is structural and constitutive: nationalism 
represents an integral element of the modern State form, and, in this sense, has to be 
seen as both its condition and its necessary product. National ideologies, or the 
ideologies of the nation, in all their culturalist or particularist manifestations, do not 
develop in externality to the State (even when they historically appear in the `minds' of 
writers, historians and romantic philosophers, rather than those of lawyers, diplomats 
and statesmen), but are structurally internal and integral to the logic and the 
development of the modern State, and, in fact, they represent one of its constitutive 
moments, if not the constitutive moment. 
Etienne Balibar should be credited here for developing what is probably the 
most elaborate conception of the structural relationship between the ideology and 
politics of the nation - what he calls the `nation form' - and the liberal State. 45 
Rearticulating the Marxian, and especially the Althusserian conception of the State (and 
its ideological apparatuses), Balibar argues that the effects that nationalism plays out in 
relation to the liberal-democratic polity cannot be seized in terms of separate ideological 
(or cultural) developments, nor, indeed, in terms of the self-realisation of the national 
44 Ibid, pg. 283. 
" See especially Balibar's essay "The Nation Form: History and Ideology" in: Balibar and Wallerstein 
(1991) op. cit. 
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idea, but as something internal to the modern, bourgeois State, as something arising out 
of structural necessity. The `nation form' - which, for Balibar, is an ideology or an 
ideological State apparatus that provides the political community of the State with a 
specific `substance' in the sense of shared history and ancestry - is a critical element for 
the existence and constitution of the modern bourgeois State. It is something which 
structurally arises at that precise moment in which the State attempts to establish (and 
reproduce) itself from historical contingency, whilst striving to assert its authority over 
a heterogeneous society and a contested territory, in constantly changing historical 
conditions. Nationalism seems particularly inescapable, as Balibar argues, when the 
modern State attempts to control the movements of people, and, above all, to pacify 
class struggles which are internal to it. 
The entirety of this `existential' problem, according to Balibar, is brought down, 
in practice, to the State's capacity to reproduce itself by continuously producing its own 
subjective substance, the `people': 
"The modern State has to `produce the people', and by this very production 
(which is material as much as symbolic) constitute its proper modernity". ' 
How does the State produce the `people', of which it is supposed to be the 
product? 
This is the precise moment where the, ideology of the national community 
presents itself as an essential component of the modern statist construction. As Balibar 
would say: "Producing the people, this means constituting, in terms of an institutional 
practice, and as representation or consciousness, the modern homo nationalis, a form of 
individual identity in which the community of reference or the `ultimate' community is 
the State, and not the family, class or religious confession". 47 This process of fabrication 
is crucial for the constitution of the State because it allows for the unification and 
46 See "Nation, cite, empire (La probleme de la forme politique bourgeoise)" in: Balibar, Etienne (1992) 
les frontieres de la dMocratie, Paris: Editions la DEcouverte, pg. 157. 
47 ibid. 
247 
hegemonisation of all different social particularities, of all the previously existing 
communal bonds, without suppressing their existence: "the community which creates a 
national `identity', rooted in the materiality of practices and institutions, subsumes and 
transforms the identities of familial groups, of classes, of religious groups, and thus 
allows the people to reproduce itself by itself, that means, to presuppose indirectly the 
State, in each instance of its quotidian existence". 48And at the same time, it is crucial 
also because it links the individual directly to the State, because it subjects the 
individual to the State, whilst also subjectivating him in a double sense of belonging - 
both to oneself and to fellow co-nationals. This is why the question of the production of 
the people, according to Balibar, "must at one and the same time be a mass phenomenon 
and a phenomenon of individuation, must effect an `interpellation of individuals as 
subjects' (Althusser) which is much more potent than the mere inculcation of political 
values or rather one that integrates this inculcation into a more elementary process [... I 
of fixation of affects of love and hate and representation of the `self'. That ideological 
form must become an a priori condition of communication between individuals (the 
`citizens') and between social groups - not by suppressing all differences, but by 
relativizing them and subordinating them to itself in such a way that it is the symbolic 
difference between `ourselves' and `foreigners' which wins out and which is lived as 
irreducible". " 
This commanding force of the national ideology is predicated upon a peculiar 
ideological mechanism, which Balibar calls fictive ethnicity. -50 The fiction of ethnicity, 
or of ethnic belonging, that is, the imaginary representation of the `individuality' of the 
community, constitutes precisely the ingredient without which no sense of political 
being-together can be properly naturalised, without which no State can appear, in its 
finality, as a national-State, the belonging to which escapes all historical contingency, 
ibid. pg. 158. 
4y Balibar `The Nation Form: History and Ideology', pg. 94. 
ý" See Balibar (1992) op. cit., pg. 157-160. 
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and which thus appears as a quasi-natural fact for each of the individuals interpellated 
as fellow nationals. In this sense, the ethnos, as a certain `supplement of particularity' to 
the liberal democratic State, plays a decisive double role: it subjects the individuals to 
the political community (and does so whilst individuating them), and, at the same time, 
it subjectivises and individuates the State, that is, it confers to the modern State, and to 
the community united under it, a fiction of individuality and personality: "Neither the 
juridical form, nor `patriotism' [... j are sufficient to constitute nationalism: the nation- 
State, in itself, possess nothing ethnic, quite the contrary. It is thus necessary to 
construct a substitute of nature common to the co-nationals, an `ethnicity', a posteriori, 
which produces the people of which it is supposed to be the product. A fiction of the 
origin, pre juridical should accord the State with a supplement of national identity, 
which is supposed to be, as such, default for it". 51 
Of course, the ethnicity in question here is not a matter of actually existing 
cultural particularities. Or better - and this is precisely what makes it fictive - it is a 
matter of existing cultural particularities inasmuch as they become an instrument of the 
State, inasmuch as they are inscribed in the practices of the ideological state 
apparatuses whose task is to ethnicise populations, that is, to nationalise society by 
`producing the people'. Because no State has an ethnic origin, each representation of the 
ethnos in the political community, as necessary as it is for the self-reproduction of the 
latter, is a matter of an aposteriori. It is a statist fact, a statist fabrication. This is why 
Balibar states: "I apply the term `fictive ethnicity' to the community instituted by the 
nation-state. This is an intentionally complex expression in which the term fiction (... 
should not be taken in the sense of a pure and simple illusion without historical effects, 
but must, on the contrary, be understood by analogy with the persona ficta of the 
juridical tradition in the sense of an institutional effect, a `fabrication'. No nation 
si Ibid, pg. 94. 
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possesses an ethnic base naturally, but as social formations are nationalized, the 
populations included within them, divided up among them or dominated by them are 
ethnicized - that is, represented in the past and future as if they formed a natural 
community, possessing of itself an identity of origins, culture and interests which 
transcends individuals and social conditions". 52 
If Habermas helps us to understand the structural, and thus necessary 
articulation between liberal democracy's formal and abstract constitution of the political 
community and the supplement of `substance' that the ideology of nationalism brings in 
to this, then Balibar's discussion of the problem of the `production of the people' adds a 
further degree of specificity to this articulation, by rooting it decisively at the very core 
of the historical constitution and the reproduction of the modern State. In this, Balibar 
also helps us overturn the idealist element of the liberal democratic doctrine, 53 by 
pointing out that in what concerns the dialectic of the subjective of the objective 
elements in the constitution of the State, the terrain is always already determined by the 
State itself, by its materiality, that is, by its presence as an objective social and political 
form: "the State, in a given moment and in terms of its historical continuity, is never 
`constituted' by the common act of citizens. Quite the contrary, it is always already 
there, as an `apparatus' or a `machine' (administrative, military, and economic), which 
means, as a material force exterior to social groups and individuals, exercising over 
4 
s'- Ibid, pg. 96. Balibar here forcefully draws our attention to the fact that within the history of the modern 
State, amongst the myriad of different practical mechanisms which provide the material infrastructure for 
the `ethnicisation' of social relations, we should find that two particular institutions are, in the last 
instance, crucial: language and family. Language which is both an immediate fact of communication and 
the statist instrument of standardisation (and nationalisation), and family as both a primary experience of 
belonging and the model upon which the racial origin of the ethnic community of `descent' can be 
structured. See the entire discussion in: Balibar (1992), pg. 97-105. 
s3 It was the merit of Friedrich Nietzsche to have confronted the idealist core of the modern, bourgeois 
constitution of the political community with a shattering dose of cynical realism: Ich, der Staat, bin das 
Volk (I, the State, am the People). See the chapter `On the new Idol' in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, New 
York: Random House, 1954. This stark reversal of the order of elocution in the centre of the modern 
pronouncement of politics and of the political community, if it should not lead us to reduce completely 
the reality of the democratic, popular subject to a simple function or appearance of the State, does warn us 
off from the idealist implications present in this concept. 
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them a specific power". ' As Balibar would point out: "This means admitting that in the 
dialectic of the State and society such as it was presented for two centuries by the entire 
philosophy of history, one needs to resolutely settle in favour of the determinant role of 
the State. The myth of the autonomous `civil society', structured independently of the 
State, goes in pair with the implicit assumption of the naturalness of the national cadre: 
what is natural (or immemorial, or inevitable) does not need to be produced. The role of 
the State is determinant not only after the fact, but also in advance, already in its 
anticipations". 55 
5.6. conclusion: how much violence? 
What are the conclusions that we can draw here in terms of the paradox of the 
relationship between liberal democracy and nationalism in the post-socialist and 
especially post-Yugoslav process of `democratisation'? 
In the first place, it should be clear that the very relationship that we encounter 
here is not a relationship of perversion at all - as it is neither one of identity - but a 
relationship of articulation, which is both historical and structural. Both the democratic 
polity and the national community, with the juridical and normative formalism of the 
former and the ethnic particularity and `fiction' of the latter, are internal to the modern, 
bourgeois State, and, in fact, constitutive for it. The bourgeois State is at once a liberal- 
democratic polity, a State of Law, and an `ethnic' State, a State fashioned upon the 
fiction of ethnicity (even if this ethnicity is not centred and exposed, but exists only in 
residues, such as in, for example, the proper names of the States). Without the former 
aspect, the bourgeois State would loose its legimitacy, it would loose its relationship to 
the political subject (even if this subject, as we 
have seen, is also produced and 
S4 Quoted from 'Propositions sur la citoyennetd', in: Balibar, Etienne (1992) op. cit., pg. 112. 
ss Cf. `Nation, cite, empire. Le probleme de la forme politique 
bourgeois', in Balibar (1992) op. cit., pg. 
157. 
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imagined), without the latter, no structural permanence of the identification of the 
political community to the State could be asserted. 
But secondly, and even more importantly, this also allows us to posit the 
problem of violence in another way. It allows us to understand that the violence that 
nationalism unleashes on the historical scene, and which we have seen employed in all 
its brutality in the Yugoslav break-up and in the post-Yugoslav wars, is not a matter of 
contingent exceptions or aberrations to the liberal-democratic State, but constitutes a 
moment inherent to this State, in the sense of a possibility which is always present in it, 
even if being constantly in excess of it. The potential for `ethnic' violence is something 
which permanently arises from the very constitution of the liberal-democratic political 
order, or, more exactly, from the tension between the universalism of the abstract legal 
community and the particularism of the community of origin and faith residing at the 
heart of the modern nation-State. Or, to put this in another way, the question of 
nationalist or `ethnic' violence cannot be settled on normative grounds with regards to 
the liberal democratic state, but has to be understood in structural terms, and in this 
sense, it has to be understood as quantitative question, a question of degree, or a 
question of how much. ' 
But how to then account for the veritable excess of forms of subjective violence 
and brutality which follows the explosion of nationalism in Yugoslavia? 
It seems to me erroneous to interpret this excess simply in subjective terms, in 
terms of `excessive' historical actors whom we can easily identify. The structural aspect 
which we brought out here, the contradiction inherent to the liberal democratic State 
' As Jack Goody pointed out in this sense, 'ethnic' violence, and 'ethnic cleansing' is a historical fact 
which almost without exceptions characterises the establishment of modern democratic States: "[Tlhere is 
virtually no modern state whose emergence has not involved similar processes of - putting it 
euphemistically - 'national consolidation', offering scant chance of reparation, let alone reversal. Who 
imagines that the fate of Australian aborigines or native Americans is going to be cancelled by 
retrospective justice? What democracy is more toasted in Western capitalism than Israel, founded on mass 
expulsion of Palestinians from their land, and long engaged in yet further expropriations of territory in the 
West Bank? ". Quoted from Goody, Jack `Bitter Icons', in New Left Review, Vol. 7, Jan-Feb 2001, pg. 7. 
Another interesting mediation on the problem of the degree can be found in Rastko MoUik's remarkable 
set of theoretical interventions in the post-socialist conjuncture: How much fascism?, (1998) op. cit. 
252 
seems all the more crucial, especially if we read the entire Yugoslav drama in the 
dimension which is truly determinant for it - the dimension of the formation and 
establishment of the State. For indeed, the essence of the processes which are realised in 
the context of the Yugoslav `democratisation' does not reside in the mere elevation or 
the `reinvention' of the liberal democratic forms over a socialist political construction, 
but precisely in the inscription of these forms in the objective process of State-building 
itself - in the process of the material transformation of the socialist republics into new 
national States. 
Taking this into account means realising that what is truly at stake in the 
paradox of `democratisation' in Yugoslavia, and what all the different violent episodes 
of the break-up of Yugoslavia depict in all its severity is not simply a scene of relentless 
and unrestrained subjective violence and destruction, a pre-modern, or a `Hobbessian' 
scenario, as one might say, but rather a scene of the objective logic of violence which 
follows the process of the constitution of the liberal State. It is necessary to read the 
excess of the subjective forms of violence in the Yugoslav situation precisely against 
the backdrop of the objective, structural violence which is inscribed in the very origin of 
the State. Althusser would portray this problem, whilst paraphrasing Marx and evoking 
Machiavelli, as the problem of `primitive political accumulation': "Bourgeois 
ideologists have long [been telling] in the language of natural law, their fairy-tale 
history of the state, the history that begins with the state of nature and continues with 
the state of war, before pacifying itself in the social contract that gives birth to the state 
and positive law. A completely mythical history, but one that makes pleasant listening, 
because in the end it explains to those who live in the state that there is nothing horrific 
in its origins, only nature and law; that the state is nothing but law, is as pure as law, 
and as this law is in human nature, what could be more 
humane than the state? ... [By 
contrast], Machiavelli is perhaps one of the few witnesses to what I shall call primitive 
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political accumulation (... I He does not speak the language of law, he speaks the 
language of the armed force indispensible to the constitution of any state, he speaks of 
the necessary cruelty of the beginnings of the state [... ) When we read him, however 
informed we may be of the violences of history, something in him grips us: a man who, 
even before all the ideologists blocked out reality with their stories, was capable not of 
living or tolerating, but of thinking the violence of the birth throes of the state". 57 
This is the critical lesson that the case of Yugoslavia brings for a political and a 
historical analysis -a lesson on the violence at the origins of the State, a lesson on the 
structural relationship between the State and violence. If this allows us to seize the 
relevance - and further develop the implications - of Althusser's attempts to 
reformulate the critical concept of the State in Marxism, and especially, to add a degree 
of specificity to the link between violence and the Law, to the essential bond between 
legal universality and the violent clash of historical forces, it also provides us with a 
forceful critical position against the consensual logic of the post-socialist political 
rationality. Fukuyama's ideologems are completely overturned at this junture: the 
dominance of the liberal-democratic State after 1989, far from representing an `end of 
history', rather points to one of the unquestionable `motors' of history: to the 
contradiction underlying the putative universality of juridico-political forms, to the logic 
of violence which surrounds the constitution and the reproduction of these forms. 
57 Louis Althusser 'Machiavelli's Solitude' in: (1999) Machiavelli and Us, London: Verso, pg. 124-125. 
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CHAPTER 6: 
BEYOND POST-SOCIALIST POLITICS: 
THE SINGULARITY OF YUGOSLAVIA 
6.1. Introduction: Yugoslavia as an unfinished State 
Amongst many texts which appeared in the late 1980s in response to the 
growing crisis - political, economic, ideological - of socialist Yugoslavia, one deserves 
particular attention: Zoran Dindic's book Yugoslavia as an Unfinished State. ' 
Yugoslavia as an Unfinished State is a remarkable little book. Remarkable in the first 
place because of its belief in the power of philosophical panaceas. This is precisely what 
Dindic sought to provide for the political and historical construction of Yugoslavia 
which was collapsing before his eyes: a single philosophical solution to a real historical 
crisis, a speculative, theoretical response to the practical, historical and political ails. All 
that Yugoslavia needed, according to Hindi&, was an `authentic interpreter': "When the 
self-evidence of the fact that we live together becomes a theme which allows for 
different possible approaches, and when everybody is calling upon common values, 
whilst deriving diametrically opposed consequences from them, in these times, as by a 
sort of an inner necessity, there is a growing need for an authentic interpreter. We need 
someone who is going to - in a way which is binding for everyone - interpret the 
subjective and objective meaning of the past decisions, who will say what were the 
motives and what were the effects of the actions on which our community resides". 2 
In which way did Zoran Dindi& see himself as an authentic philosophical 
interpreter of Yugoslavia? 
' Dindid, Zoran (1988) Jugoslavija kao nedovri<ena drIava (Yugoslavia as an Unfinished State), Novi 
Sad: Knjiievna Zajednica Novog Sada. 
2 Ibid, pg. 94. 
255 
First of all, it is important to note that Dindie's thesis - Yugoslavia as an 
unfinished State - was and remains a tremendously productive and influential thesis. 
This thesis opened the door to an entire arena of teleological judgements on the 
`defectiveness', `disfunctionality', `fragility', `irreality' and `unnaturalness' of the 
Yugoslav project - judgements which have become staple references in a great number 
of scholarly appreciations of the history of Yugoslavia. ' 
But at the same time, Dindid's thesis is also important due to its ideological 
baggage. It is important as it reveals - and it does so with exceptional clarity - one of 
the principle ideological operations which came to govern the post-socialist political 
consensus after 1989: the submission of politics to the theme of the Law. 
What is the content of the thesis `Yugoslavia as an unfinished State'? In 
investigating the symptoms of crisis, symptoms of turbulence and tension within the 
political sphere which marked the entire decade of the eighties in socialist Yugoslavia, 
Dindic saw the problem appearing in a straightforward shape: "It is not difficult to 
define the basic problem of Yugoslavia. The solution to its worst difficulties lies only in 
the constitutional-legal State form". 4 The entire crisis that Yugoslavia was experiencing 
in the eighties, with all its dramatic historical, societal and political contradictions, with 
all its tragic struggles, was reducible, according to Dindid, to a single problem: to the 
problem of the inadequacy of the political and constitutional system which the socialist 
system put in place, and, in the first place, to the problem of a defective articulation of 
sovereignty to the political community. Yugoslavia was, as Dindie argued, quite literally 
Dindid's thesis `Yugoslavia as an unfinished State' seems to have left a decisive mark in the 
historiographic apprehension of Yugoslavia. For example, one recent historical volume on socialist 
Yugoslavia (one of the few recent ones written from a `nativist' perspective) was conducted entirely 
under the aegis of Dindid's thesis: Dejan Jovi6 claims that Yugoslavia collapsed because there was never 
a proper articulation of sovereignty to the State, and this was so because the Yugoslav communists took 
communism too seriously. Instead of building the State in all its dimensions of sovereignty, they actually 
wanted it to wither away. See Jovid, Dejan (2003) Jugoslavija: Driava koja je odumrla, (Yugoslavia: A 
State Which Has Withered Away), Zagreb: Prometej. Another interesting case is that of Slavoj Lilek, who 
seems to be completely consequent to the thesis of the `unfinished State' when he claims that the `Titoist 
regime' was essentially constituted upon a `fragile equilibrium of a system of sovereign nation-states'. 
See 2iiek, Slavoj (1999) Nato as the Left Hand of God?, Bastard: Zagreb. 
' Dindi6 (1988) op. cit, pg. 38. 
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an unfinished State, a State without statehood: "The basic general characteristic of the 
current statehood of Yugoslavia is the separation of State and sovereignty. The effects 
of this are so far reaching that they extend to all forms of life, from global collective 
agency to the intimate sphere of the citizen". 5 
From this perspective Dindic went on to locate a single culprit. The source and 
the cause of Yugoslavia's `state of statelessness', the source of its vexing lack of 
statehood, and thus its structural incapacity, resided in the very idea of communist 
politics, which the Yugoslav Communist Party practiced. Communist politics, with its 
political privileging of class struggle and of the emancipation of labour, and indeed with 
its identification of politics with the question of emancipation, readily evacuated all the 
modern juridico-political concepts and forms, it evacuated even the very notion of the 
political community, which, according to Oindid, is unthinkable without a clear 
definition of its own sovereign boundaries, of its identity with itself: "The specificity of 
the communist notion of politics is precisely the abolition of the political community, 
which is only another term for an abolition of the national state. A correlate to the 
metaphysical sovereignty of the `working class' is the State defined as a `community of 
labour"'. ' Or again: "The newly proclaimed bearer of sovereignty is `class', and then, 
by mediation, its technical representative, the party. With this transformation, what is 
unequivocally abolished are all the three central determinations of modern statehood: 
sovereignty of the people, subjective rights and the parliamentary control of political 
power. What thus came into being is a new type of organisation of collective life, which 
we can call a State only in metaphorical terms". 
' 
A profound anomaly, a profound error was thus inscribed in Yugoslavia from 
the very moment of its inception. With the absence of the logic of sovereignty, with the 
absence of a clear articulation of sovereignty to the political community, the socialist 
s Ibid, pg. 12. 
6Ibid, pg. 13. 
7 Ibid, pg. 12. 
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system was devoid of any internal mechanisms of regulation and reglementation: "the 
existing social system does not possess any means of self-regulation, because these 
means were never being developed [... J Today's conflicts are disputes without a judge, 
which means that a sentimental gaze in the direction of some alleged supreme norms, 
whose historical validity would be binding, is useless". 8 And it is this, and solely this, 
which was, according to Dindie, driving the entire state construction of Yugoslavia 
towards its necessary failure and collapse. This is what inevitably led to the incapacity 
of political and juridical power in front of its structural task of guaranteeing the law of 
totality, this is what brought the system directly in front of the crisis of the 1980s, in 
front of the violent expansion of nationalism which would mark its end. 
Dindie saw only one solution for Yugoslavia, an unambiguous one: the re- 
articulation of sovereignty to the political community. In practice, however, this 
solution meant nothing other but the construction of national-States out of Yugoslavia: 
"The alternative is simple: the political identity of the political community cannot be 
divided; it belongs either to Yugoslavia or to the member republics. If it belongs to the 
republican states - as is the dominant opinion today - then it is necessary to clearly and 
openly draw the consequences of such a decision, and put on the agenda the question of 
real, and not as until now ambiguous formation of national states". 9 The key to the 
entire political and economic crisis that Yugoslavia was experiencing in the eighties, 
with all its drastic historical contradictions, its schisms and ruptures, was to be found in 
the clarity and the univocity of the application of the principle of sovereignty. This is 
why Dindic would write: "There is no reason for us to mourn the `common form' (if it 
is true that this form is only an `empty structure'). What is important is that all the 
processes - whether of unification or separation - run clearly". 10 
K Ibid, pg. 41. 
Ibid, pg. 10. 
"' Ibid. 
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There is undoubtedly an ironic dimension to these conclusions. Dindie here 
manages to place himself directly `on top' of the destructive historical processes which 
were at play in Yugoslavia in the eighties. With all the force of historical irony, 
Dindic's `authentic interpretation' did come out as truly authentic, and exactly in terms 
of its normative contents, as it provided the truth of the `solution' which would finally 
resolve Yugoslavia's crisis: in the brutality of `ethnic' violence and nationalist wars. 
With these wars having, as their primary goal, an unambiguous, clear construction of 
national-States in the Balkans, one is certainly not mistaken in claiming that the entire 
destruction of Yugoslavia in the 1990s unfolded precisely in the name of `finishing the 
Yugoslav State'. " 
But it is not only the historical irony of Dindic's analyses which should astonish 
us here. What is even more remarkable then the historical falsification of the thesis 
`Yugoslavia as an unfinished State' is something internal to Dindie's analysis: 
something touching upon its very conceptual operations. This is the falsity of its mode 
of apprehension of history and of politics, the falsity of its method. 
Where does Dindic seek to find the reality of politics in his analysis? Where is it 
that he tries to grasp the essence of the political being of the Yugoslav project? The 
answer is simple: in Law. Dindie's intellectual operation is an attempt to discover a 
fundamental juridical ground behind the political project of Yugoslavia, to run the 
historicity of the Yugoslav project against a particular set of rules and mechanisms of 
normative regulation. This is why the essential conceptual points through which he 
thinks and judges Yugoslavia are the canonical figures of juridico-political modernity: 
pouvoir constituant, sovereignty of the people, subjective rights and 
parliamentarianism. This is why the scene of politics that DindiC equates with 
" For an analysis of the peculiar continuity between 
Dindi6 and Milo. 4evid, and the paradoxes of liberal- 
democracy in Serbia, see Karamani6, Slobodan "Kosovo within the 
boundaries of liberal democracy" in: 
(2006), Agregat, No. 9/10, Ljubljana. 
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Yugoslavia is the classical modern scene of law making, of writing the constitution, of 
constituting the norm and the rules of the political bond, of the establishment of 
consensus, of legality and legitimacy. It is the scene of political compromise, of 
political agreement, of the founding of the order of the community, of the grounding of 
legitimacy of the State. The titles of Dindic's analyses speak for themselves in this 
regard: "Where is our pouvoir constituant? ", "Who is sovereign in Yugoslavia? ", "Who 
is the guardian of the constitution"? 
But can such questions fundamentally grasp what is essential in the 
revolutionary politics which has founded the Yugoslav project? Is this legalistic 
scenario able at all to approach the creative power, the historical inventiveness of the 
dramatic moment of 1943? How can a preconstituded normativity, a fact of established 
law, render thinkable a historical invention, a project of emancipation? How can it 
render thinkable that which a political singularity? 
As I will attempt to demonstrate below, what Dindic's analysis of Yugoslavia 
really offers us here is a genuine display of the contradictions inherent to the juridical 
paradigm of politics which imposes itself after 1989. When Law becomes the ultimate 
measure of all things political, politics is silently expatriated from the modality of the 
break and rupture, only to be reconfigured in the repetitive rhythms of legal procedures 
and rules. When the principle operator of intelligibility of political events is found in 
legal universality, politics is `separated from any notion of radical change, from 
emancipation as such, and is consequently reduced to a compromise with the status quo. 
By confronting Dindi«s analysis in a critical way, and by attempting to offer an 
alternative philosophical reading of the moment of Yugoslavia, a reading which takes 
cue from Althusser's stress on the singular and inventive dimensions of politics, I will 
try both to unravel the contradictions and the peculiar `obscurantism' behind the post- 
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socialist juridical conception of politics and history, and at the same time, to sketch the 
contours of a critical position in politics beyond the post-socialist political rationality. 
6.2. The event of 1943 
We should begin with the beginning itself: what is it that makes 1943, the very 
founding event of Yugoslavia intelligible? 
In historical terms, the immediate origins of the Yugoslav project reside in the 
turbulent circumstances and the experience of the Second World War. In the most direct 
sense, these were the circumstances of foreign occupation which had shattered the 
previous state apparatus, and of the popular resistance and liberation struggle, itself a 
moment in the world-wide fight against fascism. 
After the invasion by the German, Italian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian armies in 
April 1941, the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (a state which, from 1918 to 
1929, bore the name Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) signed an unconditional 
capitulation and fled into exile. The country was torn apart and divided between the 
Axis powers, with some of its parts annexed, some placed under fascist protectorates, 
and others placed under the rule of collaborator regimes. 
Already a few weeks after the occupation and the capitulation, a popular armed 
resistance movement started taking shape, seeing its first determinate forms in the cities 
and the countryside of Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia, and spreading fast to other parts of 
the country. The first sparks of the liberation movement were spontaneous, but its 
decisive organisational contours and its country-wide scope were set under the 
leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party, a political organisation existing illegally 
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in Yugoslavia since 1922.12 At the end of June 1941, the Yugoslav Communist Party 
had issued a general call to resistance, a call to liberation and emancipation, whilst 
laying the organisational coordinates of the armed struggle through the formation of the 
partisan units, the Peoples' Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia 
(NarodnooslobodilaJki Partizanski Odredi Jugoslavije). This is where the struggle that 
would give birth to Yugoslavia obtained its decisive subjective shape and its singular 
name: the Struggle for the Liberation of the Yugoslav Peoples (Narodno-oslobodilaoka 
borba, or, as it is known by its acronym in Serbo-Croatian which we will use here, 
NOB). Throughout the country, in cities and in villages, in factories, universities and 
schools, the Yugoslav communists mobilised people into rebellion and armed struggle, 
whilst building a broad partisan armed force. 13 From diversions and sabotages to mass 
uprisings, from guerrilla struggles to frontal combat, the armed resistance was gradually 
expanding both in its intensity and its scope, with the Partisan units growing into a large 
army, and with the victories in the struggle expanding the liberated territories. `a 
Together with the formation of the resistance movement and its organised armed 
force, the Communist Party also helped establish new bodies of popular-democratic rule 
which effectively took political power during the course of the liberation war. Forms of 
popular government, named the people's-liberation committees (narodnooslobodilaxki 
odbori) and the land's anti fascist councils (zemaljska antifa. istieka vijeda), modelled 
on historical forms of revolutionary-democratic organisation, were set up throughout the 
12 Although the resistance movement was primarily set up under the political, organisational and 
infrastructural leadership of the CPY, which had a thirty-year experience of clandestine activity, the 
movement was much wider in political scope. It rallied and included other political parties, organisations 
and groups, and was primarily driven by a spontaneous spirit of liberation. It was in Slovenia that the 
resistance took the most decisive pluralistic shape. The Slovenian Liberation Front (Osvobodilnafronta), 
created on 27`h April 1941, united the militants of the Communist Party together with Christian Socialists, 
the Sokol Sport Association together with many other groups and individuals who stood up against 
fascism. 
" The most advanced armed units were the `proletarian people's-liberation brigades' (proleterske 
narodnooslobodilaek-e brigade), based upon the guerrilla, mobile conception of warfare. 
14 For an authoritative account of the period of anti-fascist resistance and the emergence of the Yugoslav 
revolution, see Bilandii6, Dugan (1985) Historija Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije 
(History of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), 3rd. Edition, Zagreb: 4olska Knjiga. 
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liberated territories and even outside of them, at all different levels - from the village to 
the county, from the city to the region, the nation or the republic. 
But the liberation struggle was not only fought against the fascist armies and the 
collaborator regimes. The struggle of the Yugoslav partisans was also a struggle against 
the previous monarchical order and its consequences, against all forms of oppression 
and domination which were deeply inscribed into the socio-political fabric of the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 's In the concrete practice of war, the Partisans also fought 
against those military and political forces which the Yugoslav government in exile tried 
to control and direct in order to maintain its power against the communist-led 
insurgency. The most infamous of these were the Chetniks of Draza Mihajlovie - 
rebaptised by the emigre Yugoslav (or Serbian) government as the `Army of the 
Yugoslav Fatherland' - initially organised as a force of resistance, only to become 
fatally compromised by an open collaboration with the Nazis, when they found it 
opportune in order to crush the growing Partisan resistance, and by the atrocities that 
they committed against the non-Serb populations. 16 Catherine Samary was right to note 
in this sense that "The 1941-1945 war in Yugoslavia, [was] simultaneously a world war, 
a civil war with interethnic massacres, and a war of national and social liberation". " 
Within a year of the unfolding of the liberation war, its difficult but victorious 
development had already opened the political space for the emergence of two crucial 
events, the events in which we could see the Yugoslav project being established. 
In the winter of 1942, the Partisans, who had by then liberated and controlled a 
large part of what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina, inaugurated, on the 26"' and 27 `' 
15 The context in which the Partisan struggle emerged was a context of political, cultural and 
socioeconomic oppression and domination inherent to the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia, where the Serbian 
crown attempted to violently control and dominate the other national and political groups united in a 
common state. For an authoritative analysis of the political conflicts 
in the 'first Yugoslavia', see Banac, 
No (1984) The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press. 
16 Mihajlovi6's Chetniks, however, are most remembered in history for the 'ethnic' massacres and 
atrocities that they committed against the Croat, Muslim and 
Albanian populations during the war. See 
Samary (1995) op. cit., and Bilandiid (1985) op. cit. 
17 See Samary (1995) op. cit, pg. 49. 
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November 1942, the Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, or 
the AVNOJ, as a supreme Yugoslav civil political authority of the liberation struggle. 
The AVNOJ, which was conceived as the unifying body of all different popular 
organisations which emerged during the struggle, effectively imposed itself as a 
universal political representative force of the liberation war, whilst laying an imprint of 
permanence on the many popular-liberation councils and committees. The Partisan 
movement set up two other mass political organisations at the general Yugoslav level, 
organisations emerging out of the struggle and expanding its liberatory and 
emancipatory development: the Antifascist Front of Women of Yugoslavia, and the 
United Alliance of Antifascist Youth of Yugoslavia. 
With the defeat of Mihajlovic's Chetniks in the battle of Neretva in the summer of 
1943 and the capitulation of Italy in September 1943, the Partisan movement had gained 
the grounds in order to be able to define and declare a new political reality. At the 
Second Convention of the Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, 
which took place on 29`h November 1943 in the Bosnian town of Jajce, the AVNOJ, 
represented by almost all of the national and regional partisan liberation committees, 
was confirmed as the sole universal representative of political power in Yugoslavia. The 
AVNOJ declared the establishment of the new, republican political order, whilst 
suspending and outlawing the previous government and the Yugoslav monarch. It also 
brought a fundamental constitutional decision, the "Decision to build Yugoslavia on a 
federal principle", which was to set the foundations for the new State: a federal republic, 
proclaiming the unconditional political equality for all the nations and peoples of 
Yugoslavia, and initiating the struggle for social emancipation. 
These acts which we can see emerging in the midst of the a world war, acts 
which were both acts of the break and acts of foundation, have inscribed the 
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revolutionary subjective capacity of the NOB into the beginnings of a political form. 
This was the birth proper of Yugoslavia. 
6.3. Dindic and AVNOJ: Nothing took place but the place 
How does Dindic read this constituting scene of Yugoslavia, the event of 
AVNOJ and the birth of the Yugoslav project? 
Dindie proceeds in a classical way. The concept that he employs to grasp the 
founding of the Yugoslav project is the eminent modern figure of political constitution, 
the figure of the `sovereignty of the people'. This figure, for Oindie, is not only a 
historical norm, but it represents one of the most universal forms of political foundation. 
Sovereignty of the people, as we read, "immediately founds the concept of the 
constitution as the order of the highest values of a political community. In the figure of 
popular sovereignty this general obligation is deduced from the general active 
participation of everyone in the constitution of the communal order". ` In other words, 
Dindic wants to draw our attention to the moment of circularity and immanence which 
the bourgeois revolutions had introduced, the moment in which the legal-political order 
finds its principle of constitution in the relation that the body politics as a whole 
maintains with itself, in the capacity of the people to be able to simultaneously produce 
the laws and to subject themselves to them. This is where, in what concerns the 
establishment of the political order in its legitimacy and normativity, the binding self- 
reproductive and self-sustaining force of the notion of popular sovereignty resides. 
But Dindic evokes this notion, together with its systemic and normative power, 
only to register its absence in the Yugoslav project, only to argue that from the point of 
view of popular sovereignty, that is, from the point of view of the universality of its 
18 Dindi6, op. cit, pg. 116. 
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concept, Yugoslavia represents an irremediable anomaly. According to him, Yugoslavia 
completely lacks the formative expression of the popular will and of constituent power. 
It lacks an unambiguous decision of the political community on its form, its 
organisation and its identity, and what is more, it lacks a set of fundamental universal 
norms which would regulate its political being. The very founding gestures of 
Yugoslavia vividly display this absence: "the first constitution of the `new Yugoslavia' 
[... J was anything but an expression of the sovereign pouvoir constituant. It does not at 
all contain a clear decision about the form and the type of political unity which is 
supposed to represent what we call the Yugoslav community. The term `republican 
form' from the first article of this constitution is only an empty phrase which is to be 
filled by the real sovereign, a pouvoir from the background, the Party". 19 
What is interesting about these conclusions is the fact that Dindic is not 
interested at all in the substantial and evental dimensions of the notion of popular 
sovereignty. He is not interested in the boundless constitutive power as such, in the 
principle of subjective political foundation. The criticism that he directs against the 
founding moment of Yugoslavia is a purely formal one. Dindic calls upon the optics of 
popular sovereignty to Yugoslavia in order to note the absence of its juridico-political 
conditions of possibility, the absence of norms and procedures which would permit 
what he considers as the former's legitimate expression. Which norms and procedures? 
The classical liberal-democratic topoi of political representation and 
parliamentarianism, coupled with the figure which the continental legal-philosophical 
tradition calls subjective rights. This last figure presumes a central place for Dindic: 
"The condition of possibility of a political community are the subjective rights of 
individuals, which resist any homogenisation and which thus transform each process of 
integration into a risky and painstaking labour of creating a consent of the originary 
19 lbid, pg. 102. 
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pluralism". 20 Or again: "Subjective rights are recognised as preconstitutional rights, 
which cannot by any means of representation be completely transferred to the 
community or the State. What is preserved in these rights is the irreducible, 
metaphysical moment of popular sovereignty, without which we would not have a 
systematic foundation of the validity of the constitution ". 2' The recognition of the 
political rights of individuals, thus represents, for Dindik, the very condition of 
possibility of the political community. There can be no question of the foundation of the 
political community as such, there can be no valid moment of constitution, of an 
expression of `constitutive power', without a prior sanction of the `originary pluralism', 
a constellation of differing perspectives and opinions: "The modern, or the political 
community, is founded upon reflexivity, in the sense that the validity (or legitimacy) of 
its order is a result and not a precondition of an agreement of particular interests [... j 
The political community, and with this, the constitution, is thus possible, only if there is 
an original pluralism of perspectives". 22 
We should stop here to note the remarkable reversal of the perspective at work. 
From the intensity and explosiveness of the scene of historical constitution of politics - 
the birth of the new, the moment of a new beginning - we are displaced towards the 
motionless sight of rules and their repetitions, towards the scene of the Law. It is now 
the pouvoir constitue, conceived as a set of legal rules, norms and procedures, which is 
to explain and make possible pouvoir constituant. Whereas it was supposed to produce 
the latter, the constitutive political force of popular sovereignty is readily subordinated 
to the primacy of the legal procedure. 
It should thus not surprise us that Dindi& does not devote much discussion to the 
actual context of the AVNOJ and its historical and political significance. Instead, he 
concentrates most analytic attention on the writing of the 
first constitution of the 
20 Ibid, pg. 140. 
-'' Ibid, pg. 118-119. 
"Ibid, pg. 117. 
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People's Republic of Yugoslavia in the post-war years, whilst stressing a number of 
procedural and formal lacunae and gaps, absences and ambiguities which, in his view, 
fundamentally discredit the Yugoslav project. 
But at the same time Dindid makes his position explicit. The AVNOJ cannot be 
taken at all as a legitimate point of origin for a discussion of politics: "Here one can talk 
about the origin of the constitution only in historical terms, in terms of the theme of `the 
decisions of AVNOJ'. This peculiar onesidedness is not coincidental. The shadow 
which, by the nature of things, looms over the AVNOJ context (given that this context 
belongs to the drama of a world war) is thick enough to hide our constitutive power. 
One can talk about it only in epic and not in analytical terms. In a simple manner this 
has pushed the question of the bearer of sovereignty, and thus of the mode of legitimacy 
which the new order upholds, in the region of the narrative ". 23 
The AVNOJ context, being a context which belongs to the `drama of the great 
war' is not a political context at all. There is nothing to think in political terms in the 
moment of AVNOJ, in the event 1943, because we are not speaking of politics at all 
here but of war. The AVNOJ is not a rational political context, a context of `reflexivity', 
for this `reflexivity' has very precise coordinates, being ultimate grounded in subjective 
rights, and other formally secured political institutions. The AVNOJ, as such, is an 
irrational context, a context of an armed conflict, a context of the caesura of all Law and 
legality, where politics and political decisions do not have any binding rationality. This 
is why it can only be a matter of narration, and not of reflection. 
We probably cannot get a stronger admission of the reticence and retreat of 
political philosophy in front of the singularity of a political event. Dindie's proposition 
is a proposition of juridical formalism that refuses any discussion of the historicity of 
politics, and thus of political novelty proper, without its prior grounding in a set of 
231bid, pg. 115. 
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formal procedures and juridical norms. Popular sovereignty and its constitutive role can 
only be discussed in terms of predetermined legal norms and values - it must be 
legitimated in advance by finding its own expression in a juridico-political procedure. 
This in turn makes the entire problem of pouvoir constituant from which Dindic sets out 
a matter of a priori legal guarantees, a matter of the self-constitution and self-regulation 
of the Law itself. Between the generality and formality of legal rules, norms and 
procedures, and the political particularities that these rules and norms regulate, there is 
no space for political novelty, no space for a political singularity. Politics can only ever 
be a repetition of or a variation upon a preconstituted legalistic theme. It is severed from 
the register of the break from radical historicity as such, to be pacified under a constant 
repetition of the norm, under the atemporal fetish of the Rule of Law. 
Dindic would in fact take this revisionist moment to its utter conclusions, as he 
would not only seek to submerge the political event of AVNOJ under juridical 
universals, but to implicitly call for a defence of the coordinates of the previous legal- 
political order of (the Kingdom) Yugoslavia against the Partisan revolution: "If they had 
abandoned the metaphysical grounding of the sovereignty (by recourse to the world- 
historical mission of the `working class') the communists would cease being a party of a 
single world-view, and would become a party of the victorious conduct of the war, that 
is, a patriotic party which could then call upon popular sovereignty as a whole. The 
question of the legitimacy of rule would here become open for a rational discussion". 24 
Antonio Negri recently argued that this legalistic obscurantism is not an 
exception, for we can find it at the very core of liberal political thinking, constantly 
haunting the modern political rationality in its encounter with the disruptive force of the 
notion of pouvoir constituant, that "force that bursts apart, breaks, interrupts, unhinges 
24 ibid, pg. 123. 
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any preexisting equilibrium and any possible continuity". 25 For Negri, the entirety of 
legal-political thought of the moderns constantly fails in accounting for the `savage 
anomaly' that the notions of constituent power and popular sovereignty introduced into 
the historical field of politics. Instead of acknowledging the constituent power of the 
people in the modality of the break, juridical theory and liberal political philosophy 
incessantly attempt to `constitutionalise' the constituent principle, to render the violent 
emergence of the power which makes the laws itself submersible to the rules and norms 
of the Law: "The time of constituent power, a time characterized by a formidable 
capacity of acceleration I... ] has to be closed, treated, reduced in juridical categories, 
and restrained in the administrative routine I... ) Constituent power must itself be 
reduced to the norm of the production of law; it must be incorporated into the 
established power. Its expansiveness is only shown as an interpretative norm, as a form 
of control of the State's constitutionality, as an activity of constitutional revision. 
Eventually, a pale reproduction of constituent power can be seen at work in 
referendums, regulatory activities, and so on, operating intermittently within well- 
defined limits and procedures". 26 
The consequence of this, as Negri claims, is an annulation and restraint of the 
constituent principle: "The boundlessness of constituent expression is limited in it 
genesis because it is subjected to the rules and relative extension of suffrage; in its 
functioning because it is subjected to the rules of assembly; and in the period during 
which it is in force (which is considered delimited in its functions, assuming more the 
form of classic `dictatorship' than referring to the idea and practices of democracy). 
Finally, and on the whole, the idea of constituent power is juridically preformed, 
's Negri, Antonio (1999) Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, pg. 11. 
2' Negri, ibid, pg. 2-3. What is interesting to point out is that Negri would claim that we can find this 
tendency of obscurantism even in Carl Schmitt, who ultimately ends up subordinating his decisionism to 
the question of the self-reproduction of the State. For a discussion of Schmitt, see pg. 8. 
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whereas it was claimed that it would generate the law; it is in fact absorbed in the notion 
of political representation, whereas it was supposed to legitimize this notion". 27 
One problem remains here, however. Looking at the founding gestures of 
Yugoslavia, at the very moment of AVNOJ, can we say that Negri's criticism of the 
attempts at taming and constricting the constituent power suffices? Does the affirmation 
of the boundlessness of the pouvoir constituant provide us with an adequate analytical 
tool to seize the moment of foundation of Yugoslavia? For it seems that the whole 
problem is in fact more far reaching. The real question which the moment of 1943 
opens up is whether it is possible at all to approach the problem of the political 
foundation of Yugoslavia in terms of the logic of popular sovereignty. Is this logic able 
to register the profound historicity of the moment of 1943? 
6.4. The absent people of Yugoslavia 
Let us turn to the AVNOJ context once more. Let us try to find the marks of the 
notion of popular sovereignty in the moment of inauguration of Yugoslavia. This is not 
difficult. According to the 1943 Declaration of AVNOJ from Jajce, the AVNOJ itself is 
explicitly defined as the "supreme legislative and executive representative body of 
Yugoslavia, the supreme representative of the sovereignty of the people and of the state 
of Yugoslavia as a whole". 28 
Does this not immediately seem as a confirmation of the fact that, at least 
according to its self-definition, the founding moment of Yugoslavia is truly played out 
through the concept of le peuple souverain, through that eminent category of the 
democratic constitution of modernity? 
'' Ibid, pg. 3. 
28 Cf. Prvo i drugo zasedanje Antifaý`isticýkog vecýa narodnog oslobodenja 
Jugoslavije (26.127. novembra 
1942; 29. i 30. novembra 1943) - po stenografskim 
bele. kama i drugim izvorima, Belgrade: Prosveta 
1983. 
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But the AVNOJ pronouncement is far from an univocal pronouncement. It is 
anything but easy to decipher the precise meaning of this reference to the sovereign 
people. What is the actual content of the subject, the `people' that the AVNOJ 
Declaration calls upon in the midst of the turbulent context of the war, the liberation 
struggle and the revolution? And what exact kind of `sovereignty' is this subject 
supposed to possess? 
We can start noting the complexity of this problem of interpretation if we take a 
look at actual text of the Third Decision, the foundational decision which the 1943 
AVNOJ Convention brought, the "Decision to Build Yugoslavia on a Federal 
Principle". 
This document opens with the following statement: "On the basis of the right of 
each nation to self-determination, including the right to secession or the right to 
unification with other nations, and in accordance with the true will of all the nations of 
Yugoslavia, demonstrated during the course of the three-year long common peoples' 
liberation struggle that has forged the inseparable fraternity of the Yugoslav nations, the 
Antifascist Council of the People's Liberation of Yugoslavia brings the following 
decision". " 
Putting aside the striking evocation of the right of national self-determination, 
whose effective meaning we will try to expose in a moment (and which, it needs to be 
said in advance, has to do much more with Lenin than with Woodrow Wilson), let us 
observe the peculiarity of the pronouncement of the constitutive political category in 
this sentence, of the subject of politics which is posited as the foundation of the 
Yugoslav project. This is where we can see the enigma of the `sovereign people' of 
Yugoslavia starting to unfold. 
29 Ibid. 
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Who is the subject, whose unity and whose will the AVNOJ seeks to express and 
confirm in the founding gesture of Yugoslavia? 
The answer that we have here is minimal, but at the same time categorical: this 
subject is the liberation war itself, it is the very Struggle for the Liberation of the 
Yugoslav Peoples. As the AVNOJ document reads, Yugoslavia proceeds from the "true 
will of all the nations of Yugoslavia, demonstrated during the course of the three-year 
long common peoples' liberation struggle that has forged the inseparable fraternity of 
the Yugoslav nations". 30 The origin of Yugoslavia is not a pre-figured `people' whose 
sovereignty is at stake. It is the singular political subjectivity constituted in and through 
the liberation war: the fraternitd formed in the armed struggle for liberation and 
emancipation. 
One cannot overemphasise the profound political anomaly that is generated at 
this point. The modern subject of politics, the subjective assertion of `we the people', 
does not appear in person in this foundational sentence. There is an absence of an 
unambiguous, direct reference to the category of popular sovereignty in the constitutive 
decision of the AVNOJ. 
This, of course, is the moment where we could see flindic raising the most 
clamorous objections, and if not completely rejecting the political substance of the 
AVNOJ document, then explicitly noting its contradictory nature, and its lack of 
normativity vis-ä-vis the political order: the lack of a clear articulation and application 
of juridico-political forms. 
But this `anomalous' and ambiguous formulation immediately appears in a 
different light when we exempt it from Oindi6's juristic horizon, from the judgement of 
the established fact of law or norm, and when we consider it, on its own terms, as a 
singular political act, an act of political invention. What this `anomaly' effectively 
3d Ibid, emphasis added. 
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reveals is precisely the profound singularity of Yugoslavia, a singularity which can be 
first of all registered in the distance produced with regard to the category of popular 
sovereignty. 
Any attentive historical observer might protest at this point: is it not rather that 
the true face and the form of the modern political subject, the people, remains hidden 
under the written text of the AVNOJ? Do not the political unity and the will that the 
AVNOJ calls upon express precisely the presence of the people? And indeed, is not the 
`inseparable fraternity of the Yugoslav nations' forged in the liberation struggle 
coextensive with the subject implied in the category of popular sovereignty? 
At first sight, things do indeed look so. After all, the entire unfolding of the 
armed resistance and the liberation movement, under the leadership of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party, did take the form of a Popular Liberation Struggle, as it was also 
principally organised on the basis popular-liberation detachments and committees. 
What is more, the Communist Party did set up the popular front as an effective category 
of political representation whose function was to unify all the social and political forces 
in the struggle against fascism, both during the war and in its immediate aftermath, all 
up until the writing of the first post-war constitution of 1945. And in the end, this very 
constitution explicitly sought to shape Yugoslavia as a popular democracy and a 
popular republic. 
But at the same time, the `people' of the People's Liberation Struggle, the very 
people that we can see being inscribed into Yugoslavia, is a very peculiar political 
subject. A subject the content of which seems to immediately place in doubt and annul 
its own form. A subject whose actual political meaning seems to instantly overflow and 
subvert the representational and transcendent surface of the democratic institution of 
modernity. What we are dealing with here is not at all a category of formal political 
representation and constitution. The minimal and reductive pronunciation of the subject 
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that we find in the AVNOJ does nothing but attest to this fact: the people of the Partisan 
struggle is this struggle itself, it is the mass movement for liberation and emancipation 
of the people of Yugoslavia and the subjectivity which is dialectically caught within this 
movement. As Boris Buden pointed out: "the people and the nations of the ex- 
Yugoslavia are not united because of an ethnic closeness [... ) but precisely because on 
the basis of the common struggle against fascism. This struggle, and not some common, 
or contiguous ethnic identity is what makes the unitary, Yugoslav people". " 
The crucial thing is that this subject is not pre-given or pre-figured in any way. It 
is not a subject dependent on a priori representative surface, standing in the function of 
the representation of the State. The `people' of AVNOJ is not the people of the State - it 
is not the ideal identity of the political community existing as a transcendent symbolic 
form or a horizon. It is not the political One which, after being officially, that is, 
juridically proclaimed at the beginning of the political order, becomes a matter of a 
continuous process of re-production, a matter of an immense labour of the ideological 
apparatuses which have to inculcate on a daily basis the bond linking each individual to 
the particular community of the State. 32 The people of the People's Liberation Struggle 
is precisely the reversal and the negation of this concept. It is a political singularity in 
Aithusser's sense: a new political creation arising out of the void: out of the contingency 
and the negativity of the struggle for liberation against oppression. 
All of this comes into full light if we place the AVNOJ decision in its proper 
historical perspective. Because the absence of the category of popular sovereignty in the 
founding moments of the AVNOJ text is not simply a conceptual absence. It is a 
political and historical absence. It is an absence which signifies a radical break with the 
previous political order, with the entire substance of the State construct bearing the 
name Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The absence of the 
`people of Yugoslavia' as a unitary 
31 Buden, Boris (2003) `More about Communist Slaughters, or Why We Actually Parted', Prelom, no. 5, 
vol. 111, Belgrade: CSUb, pg. 54. 
32 See the discussion of Balibar's argument of the 'production of the people' 
in the previous chapter. 
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referent in the AVNOJ documents signifies the rejection of the concept of `national- 
popular unity' (narodno jedinstvo), a specific manifestation of the category of le peuple 
souverain on which the `first Yugoslavia' was founded. 33 This formative concept for the 
political order in the Balkans after the First World War, in which the bourgeoisies of 
several southern Slav nations - namely the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - saw the 
common prospects for the fulfilment of their political and economic gains in the 
situation opened by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman empires and 
the restructuring of the European system of states, carried a set of drastic historical 
contradictions. If the first Yugoslavia was conceived as an attempt to attain proper 
political modernity on the margins of the European order of capital and politico-military 
might, the concept of its unity, the concept of a common Yugoslav national identity, 
ended up, in its historical actualisation, being a violent practice of forced 
homogenisation, under the dictate, and after the 6`h of January 1929, under the effective 
personal dictatorship of the Serbian monarch Karadordevic. 34 The historical reality of 
the concept of the `sovereign people of Yugoslavia' was the reality of an impossible and 
alienated whole, ridden with social and political contradictions, with ineradicable and 
ever expanding political antagonisms, not simply between the particular national 
bourgeoisies trying to find a common political ground for their differing interests, and 
the monarchical and centralist State which sought to enforce this commonness violently, 
c 
" The concept of 'national-popular unity' - the unity of three 'tribes', the Croats, Serbs and Slovenes - 
grew out of the previous ideas of Yugoslavness which was entertained by the political and cultural elites 
of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, especially during the Illyrian Movement. See the discussion in Banac 
(1984) op. cit, especially the chapters of `National ideologies' and 'Unification'. 
'a On the 6`h of January 1929, the monarch of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Aleksandar 
Karadordevid disbanded the parliament and banned all political parties, effectively seizing all political 
power. The pretext for the introduction of the dictatorship was the assassination of a Croat politician 
Stjepan Radid in the national parliament, which came on the backbone of a drastic escalation of national 
tensions between the three main national groups which founded the Yugoslav state. The king then 
initiated a forced process of political and cultural unification - under the aegis of an 'integral Yugoslav 
identity', during which the State changed its name into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 
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but, most importantly, between the political apparatus as a whole and the wide popular 
masses, which were progressively being pushed on the margins of social existence. 35 
Against the failed attempt at producing the `sovereign people of Yugoslavia' - 
either by the practice of forced cultural and political homogenisation, or through the 
paradoxical display of the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy in the context of the 
monarchical dictatorship and of acute nationalist dividing lines - the Partisan struggle 
brought forward a different collective principle, a different principle of the political 
bond. It posited the `people' as an immanent expression of politics: a subject forged 
`from below', in the common struggle of the popular liberation war. In such a way, the 
struggle of the Partisans invented the possibility of a collective identity of Yugoslavia, 
in direct opposition to the opacity of the previous political construct. Moreover, it 
forged this collective identity against the grain of near impossible historical 
circumstances - the circumstances of occupation and of Nazi and fascist terror, and of 
the deep animosities between the Yugoslav national groups, fuelled on a day-to-day 
basis by the violence and the atrocities perpetrated by the collaborator regimes. 
But, at the same time, the Partisan struggle also did something more: it inscribed 
an effective break in political forms, a break with regards to the ideological 
representation of politics residing at the heart of the modern State. The historical 
significance of the `new Yugoslavia' is to be measured in this sense. Because what 
emerges in 1943, from within the liberation war, is a political project effectively 
defining itself in terms of the abolition of political transcendence, in terms of the 
abolition of the multifarious mechanisms of representation and sovereignty proper to the 
modern State. A political project which, in contrast to the metaphysical scene of the 
self-constitution of Law, derives its entire subjective substance from the real experience 
of the struggle: from the movement of the masses, from the eruption of mass 
35 See Samary (1995) op. cit. See also Bilandiid (1985) op. cit. 
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organisations, from the fraternity won in the struggle. A political project seeking its 
fundamental sources in the creative power and the innovative political capacity of the 
masses themselves. In other words, there is a completely different sense of the 
democratic subject at play here than that which we find at the core of classical liberal 
theory. 36 Democracy and democratic subjectivity are not a matter of rights and liberties 
to claim, as they are also not, in a primary sense, a matter of the representative 
structures of the State, of the circle of sovereignty and its evocation of the ideal body of 
the people. They are a matter of democratic situations, situations of effective collective 
political struggle, and of organisational forms which proceed from these situations. 37 
The AVNOJ document is a veritable historical source in this regard: precisely in 
the sense in which it locates the central political and organisational shapes of the `new 
Yugoslavia' not in the State itself, but in the democratic and revolutionary organisations 
of the liberation war - such as the popular liberation committees and the land's 
antifascist councils - in the organisations of the popular masses created from within the 
struggle for liberation and emancipation. S 
Buden is right to point out here: "[The) new Yugoslav people does not build its 
political institutions from the logic of sovereignty (inheriting the latter from the 
monarch, or from the Yugoslav nationalism of the so-called First Yugoslavia), but 
precisely through a radical negation of such a concept, namely, from the revolutionary- 
democratic idea of the councils". 39 But these forms of mass political organisation 
inscribed in the AVNOJ - forms which seek their direct origins in the workers' councils 
3fi For a critical discussion of the ideological circularity between the Law and democracy in liberal 
political theory, see Balibar (1977) op. cit, pg. 68-69 et passim. 
37 In Of an Obscure Disaster, Badiou distinguishes several different senses of what he calls the `litigious 
notion of democracy': a) the Greek idea of democracy as assembly, b) the liberal democratic 
identification of democracy with juridical liberties and rights, and c) the revolutionary emphasis on 
`democratic situations': general assemblies, mass movements, soviets, etc. See Badiou (1998) D'un 
ddsastre obscur, pg. 35. 
" The Third Article of the AVNOJ document of 1943 explicitly recognises the source of the political 
power of Yugoslavia in the political forms founded in the liberation war, such as the antifascist councils 
and the liberation committees. See the AVNOJ document cited above. 
39 Buden (2003) op. cit, pg. 54. 
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of the Paris Commune and the soviets of the October Revolution - are not only defined 
by their distance and externality vis-a-vis the State. They are also shaped in direct 
confrontation with the latter. The essential political purpose of the popular liberation 
committees and other mass democratic forms which the Partisan struggle invented was 
not only to assure effective democratic rule in the liberated territories and to provide the 
political armature of the liberation war. Their purpose was also the struggle against the 
political apparatus of the State, the struggle for the destruction of the mechanisms of 
representation and sovereignty embodied in this apparatus. Edvard Kardelj, one of the 
leading theoretical and political figures of the liberation war, made this point clear in his 
1945 speech on the `Power of the Popular Masses': "we have found, in the large part of 
the territory, the remains of the State apparatus which once served anti-popular regimes, 
and, during the war, the occupiers. This apparatus did not correspond, neither according 
to its particular individual composition, nor by its forms or contents, to the character of 
the democratic rule of the fundamental, democratic segments of the popular masses 
which emerged and developed itself in the course of the popular-liberation war. It was 
necessary to destroy this apparatus and to replace it with new forms, with forms which 
emerged in the liberated territories during the course of the war, forms which proceeded 
from the struggle, forms which withstood the bitter test of a popular uprising" 40 
6.5. The politics of AVNOJ and the dialectic of an `unfinishable State' 
There is more to be said of the consequences of this evacuation of the logic of 
popular sovereignty. For the break that presides over the event of 1943, the break that 
presides over the political consciousness of the NOB is not to be measured only in terms 
of the subjective shapes of democratic and revolutionary politics, in terms of the 
°" See Kardelj, Edvard (1949) Put nove Jugoslavije, 1941-1945 (The Path of the New Yugoslavia, 1941- 
1945), Belgrade: Kultura, pä. 119-120. 
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substance of the political bond. If the Partisan struggle had definitely effectuated a 
displacement of the question of political association from the transcendent space of the 
State and its mechanisms of representation and sovereignty, and had inscribed it in the 
immanent terrain of the political activity of the masses, in mass democratic struggle as 
such, it had also, in this process, displaced and evacuated something else. It had 
evacuated the entire conceptual and logical space which surrounds the notion of popular 
sovereignty, the field of thought and thinking proper to the idea of popular sovereignty. 
What does this mean? 
Let us return to Dindie one more time; let us recall once more the general 
construction of his argument on Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia as an unfinished State. Things 
appear quite straightforward from this perspective. The entire logic of Dindic's 
argument rests upon a set of clear-cut oppositions: A State is either finished or it is not. 
It functions or it does not function. It exists or it does not exist. It is either formed in and 
upon the Law, or it is malformed. A State either possesses an unambiguous dimension 
of sovereignty or it does not possess itself at all, it does not possess statehood as such, 
and is consequently stranded in a state of incapacity and disorder, in a `floating state', as 
Dindie would speak of Yugoslavia. 
The severity of these oppositions, as we saw, falls dramatically short of 
accounting for the historicity proper of Yugoslavia, and the scope of the politics of the 
Yugoslav Partisans. The proje6t of Yugoslavia which emerges out of 1943 immediately 
presents itself as something else. 
But what is this something else? 
We can play upon Dindie's phrasing: the `unfinished State' that we can see 
being born out the event of 1943 is quite literally an unfinishable State. This is because 
the politics that orients this event is a politics which does not seek its essence or its ends 
in the State, in the idea of the finality or the accomplishedness of Law or the legal and 
280 
political order. The political question that the AVNOJ poses is not at all the question of 
the foundation of State in Law, the constitution of the order of the political community. 
It is not the question of the subject stranded in a dialectical relationship to the juridico- 
political regime and its `conditions of possibility'. 
This can be seen, again, from the very definition of the subject present in the 
AVNOJ document, the political subject of the `new Yugoslavia'. Because indeed, what 
does it mean to posit the struggle as such as constitutive? 
Positing struggle as constitutive means, as Althusser suggests, subtracting 
politics from the official sphere of the `political', from the sphere of the State and the 
Law. But it also means positing an essential link between politics and innovation: it 
means seizing politics in the register of the break, affirming creativity, transformation 
and innovation as fundamental principles of politics. Instead of the static scene of legal- 
political establishment, what we have here is subjectivity predicated upon a dynamic of 
novelty, an openness towards the new. Instead of the fait accompli of the Law, instead 
of the indolence and the immobility of institution, we have an affirmation of movement 
and creation as principles subverting any finality of the Origin. In other words, the 
AVNOJ reveals a radical figure of political intellectuality: instead of being the 
benediction of the existing state of affairs, it is a political intellectuality which is, as 
Marx would put it, critical and revolutionary, 4' a political intellectuality which 
questions each foundation, incessantly announcing the new. 
What this means is that the politics of the AVNOJ needs to subtracted from the 
fait accompli and the finality of the legal-political institution. There is no State to be 
41 As Marx put it vis-ä-vis the question of the dialectic in the preface to the Second German edition of the 
first volume of Capital: "In its mystified form, the dialectic [... I seemed to transfigure [... [ the existing 
state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to bourgcoisdom and its doctrinaire 
professors, because it includes in its comprehension an affirmative recognition of the existing state of 
things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; 
because it regards every historically developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into 
account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; 
because it lets nothing impose upon it, 
and is in its essence critical and revolutionary". (Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit, pg. 
20). 
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finished, no juridical principle of sovereignty to be effectuated in its `clarity'. The goal 
or the essence of the politics of AVNOJ is something different: it is the development of 
collective freedom proper, the development of emancipation, at a remote from the 
freedom of legal-political universality, from that form of freedom which Hegel would 
name objective. 42 The only practical dimension proper to this goal stands beyond the 
question of the establishment and the perfection of institutional forms, beyond the 
finality of the political institution as such. This practical dimension is the emancipatory 
transformation of social relations. 
At its very origins, Yugoslavia is being constituted as a project of revolutionary 
emancipation: an unfinishable, uncompletable State. 
One might object at this point: does this not run completely against the grain of 
the actual proceedings of the moment of AVNOJ and of the political history of 
Yugoslavia after 1943? Is it not completely counterintuitive and erroneous to assert that 
the essence of politics of AVNOJ resides outside of the State-form, outside of the form 
of legal-political constitution, when the principle political act which the declaration of 
AVNOJ expresses is precisely the establishment of the federal State? 
There is, of course, no question that the political event of 1943 stands under the 
material determination of political and legal institutions and forms, as there is no 
question that the basic shape in which the politics of the Partisan struggle is realised is 
precisely the shape of different figures of legal-political constitution. And yet what is 
crucial here is not the simple fact of empirical and historical presence of these figures 
and forms of institution. What is crucial is the tendency which they carry, the tendency 
inscribed in them. Behind the institutional setting, behind the juridico-political forms 
which are set in motion, the event of AVNOJ displays something more radical: the 
explicit presence of a contradiction, the presence of an irresolvable tension between two 
42 As famously elaborated in the Philosophy of Right. 
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opposing terms. If the entire construction of the AVNOJ does indeed proceed in terms 
of different legal-political forms, if the politics of 1943 does create different political 
and juridical institutions, it seems to do so precisely in order to announce their 
overcoming, their Aufhebung. It seems to do so in order to embed a contradictory and 
innovative tendency at the heart of these forms. 
This is the exact shape of the invention set out by the event of 1943: the 
inscription of a contradictory figure of the Two, a dialectic of destruction and creation, 
into different forms of being-together, or, what amounts to the same, the production of 
forms of political life which introduce their own disappearance. 
1. We have seen this already in the way in which the displacement and the break 
with the modern category of the political subject is effectuated in 1943. We have seen it 
in the way in which the AVNOJ seeks to overcome the notion of the `sovereign people'. 
When the AVNOJ proclaims the construction of the new political order on behalf of 
`popular sovereignty', it instantly subverts this proclamation by affirming the 
unmediated political presence of the masses, it instantly disfigures the shape of the 
modern political subject by equating the `people' with the popular movement for 
liberation, and thus with mass democratic politics as such. The AVNOJ declaration 
effectively realises a contradictory figure of the subject, a contradictory figure of 
collectivity: a people which is already a non-people, a form of the One which includes 
and induces a break with the logics of representation and sovereignty on which the 
modern bourgeois construction of the political community resides. A contradictory 
figure, but a figure with a specific albeit complex positivity of its own. Because the 
`people' of AVNOJ is a figure of unity in contradiction, a form of the political subject 
tendentially announcing the abolition of the form of `popular sovereignty'. 
2. We can also see this same movement of contradiction, this same inscription of 
the negative tendency in the way in which the problem of the nation appears in the 
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politics of the popular liberation-struggle. What is exactly the `national question' 
within the political sequence of 1943? 
In the first place, we should note that it is a question with appears in a specific 
form: instead of being posed in the singular, it is a question which is being posed in the 
plural. Or better, it is a question posed in the singular plural. Because the subject 
implied in the struggle for national or popular liberation of 1943 is immediately 
multiple and heterogeneous: the liberation struggle does not concern only one nation, 
one people, but implies the emancipation of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, it implies 
liberty and the equality for each particular national group 43 This is an immense political 
break. If the monarchical order of Yugoslavia, that is, of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes, symbolically privileged three nations (and effectively, only one) whilst at 
the same time practising a repressive politics over other particular groups, the federal 
political construction of Yugoslavia is built upon an explicit recognition of the political 
equality of all nations, of all the particular peoples of Yugoslavia. 44 
But, at the same time, the revolutionary subjectivity of Yugoslavia poses the 
question of national liberation in another sense, in a sense which takes us beyond the 
formalism of juridico-political constructions. It poses the question of national liberation 
as inseparable from the wider problem of social emancipation, as inseparable from the 
question of the revolution. And in this sense, it does not only bring out something other 
43 In December 1942, at the high point of the liberation war, Tito wrote in the journal Proleter: "Our 
People's-liberation struggle would not be so persistent and so successful, if the peoples of Yugoslavia 
wouldn't see in it, apart from the victory over fascism, the victory over those who were oppressing and 
who tend towards further oppression of the peoples of Yugoslavia. The word people's-liberation struggle 
- would be a mere phrase, even a deceit, if it wouldn't carry, apart from the general Yugoslav sense, the 
national sense for each particular nation, or, if it wouldn't, apart from the liberation of Yugoslavia, 
simultaneously mean the liberation of Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, 
Muslims, and others, if the people's-liberation struggle wouldn't carry that content, that it truly brings 
freedom, equality, and brotherhood to all the peoples of Yugoslavia". See. Tito, Josip Broz (1942) 
"Nacionalno pitanje u svjetlosti Narodno-oslobodilacke borbe" ("The National Question in the Light of 
the Popular-Liberation Struggle"), Proleter, No: 16, December 1942. 
44 The political inscription of the 'rights to self-determination' into the antifascist struggle granted a 
formal recognition to some of the national political and cultural particularities of Yugoslavia for the first 
time. Montenegrins, Bosnian Muslims and Macedonians, who did not enjoy any specific means of 
political expression in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, were proclaimed as constitutive nations by the 
AVNOJ. 
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than the nation-form itself, but also opens the tendency towards the self-abolition of the 
latter. 
We can see this in the Leninist formulation of the rights of nations to self- 
determination which the Yugoslav Partisans put into practice. What does Lenin 
consider under the syntagm of national self-determination? For Lenin, although he 
equates self-determination with concrete material, and therefore, institutional 
conditions, it is out of the question to simply speak about a juridical norm. 45 The `rights 
of nations to self-determination' is not the principle according to which each national 
entity is to be reflected in its own state apparatus; it is not a norm of the State. It is, 
rather, the practical maxim of communist internationalism. The right to national self- 
determination is simply the smallest common denominator in the anti-imperialist 
struggle, it is the ground for the constitution of a collective which effectively unites 
different peoples in their struggle for the radicalisation of the egalitarian maxim, in their 
struggle for emancipation. In short, it is a right to resistance or a right to struggle, a 
figure of `right' subordinated to inventive force of mass political struggle, to the Two of 
political invention. It is in this sense that we should read the proclamation of the right to 
self-determination as one of the operative political concepts of the popular-liberation 
struggle of 1943, of Yugoslavia. It is in this sense that we can see Tito stating, at the 
height of this struggle, thirty years after Lenin, that the `right to self-determination' is 
accorded to each people "with a rifle in its hand, in this struggle for popular liberation 
today" . 
`6 
3. In the end, we can see this same movement of contradictions in the very form 
of the political order, in the form of the political State which sees its beginnings in the 
as The question of national self-determination was the object of one of the important polemics in the 
history of the workers' movement, the polemic between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. Lenin's critique of 
Luxemburg's principal dismissal of nationalism, together with his defence of the rights of nations to self- 
determination, was laid out in his 1914 pamphlet "On the Rights of Nations to Self-Determination". See 
Lenjin, V. I. (1958) 0 nacionalnom i kolonijalnom pitanju, (On the National and Colonial Question), 
Zagreb: Naprijed. 
46 See Tito, op. cit. 
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AVNOJ decisions of 1943. We can see it in the political process of construction of the 
People's Republic of Yugoslavia. What is being constructed here is, strictly speaking, 
an openly contradictory reality: a State, that is, a juridico-political order, plus something 
else than the State. This something else is the tendency of the break with the State-form, 
an explosion of politics which implodes the State-form itself. One of the participants in 
the discussions which surrounded the Third Convention of AVNOJ in 1945, and 
therefore the political intricacy of the post-war constitution of Yugoslavia, exposes this 
element in a graphic way: "We have already spoken about what the ambivalent terms of 
government and of the legacy of the popular-liberation struggle mean. I think that the 
principle error of the opposition, which has expressed itself during the course of the 
entire discussion, is that they consider the current state of affairs in Yugoslavia as a 
regime, and not as a deep social transformation which occurred". 47 
Against Dindik's oppositions, what we have here is a real presence of a third 
position, the presence of an `impossible' whole: "a State which is at the same time 
already a non-State", to quote Lenin's famous expression, a State announcing its own 
disappearance as a State. The negative aspect of this contradiction does not mean the 
plain and simple absence of the State, a fact of sheer degradation, a void. The non-State 
does not mark, as Dindid would have it, the dysfunctionality, the impotence and the 
eventual capitulation of the legal-political order in front of the forces of disorder and 
anarchy, in front of the chaos of dissolution. Quite the contrary, it marks a positive, 
solid reality: it marks the real political struggle against the State, it marks the presence 
of political invention, the presence of the dialectics of destruction and creation driving 
forms of political life towards incessant revolutionisation. 
We can also put this differently: what essentially characterises Yugoslavia as a 
political project is not the simple fact of the establishment of certain institutions 
47 Published in the Proceedings of the Third Convention ofAVNOJ, 1945, quoted in Dindid, op. cit, pg. 17. 
286 
(institutions which are considered to possess universal validity) - even though 
establishing institutions is a necessary and inescapable component. It is not even the 
simple negation and destruction of the institutional complex, the complex of political 
forms per se. The main, essential aspect of this politics is something else: it is the 
inscription of the revolutionary process at the heart of political forms, it is the assurance 
of the conditions for permanent political invention, for permanent transformation. 
This is what connects the politics of Yugoslavia to one of the foremost political 
concepts from the Marxian revolutionary tradition: the concept of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Dictatorship of the proletariat is precisely `a State which is a non-State', or 
as Badiou recently remarked, a "State which is subtracted from all classical laws of a 
`normal' State". ' As Badiou notes: "a classical State is a form of power; but the State 
named `dictatorship of proletariat' is the power of un-power, the power of the 
disappearance of the question of power' . 49 
But there is also more than a theoretical analogy at play here. One of the crucial 
questions, in my regard, of the entire history of Yugoslavia is the pertinence and 
presence of the politics of the `dictatorship of the proletariat'. To which extent did the 
Yugoslav Communist Party, and the struggle of the Partisans, invest Marx's or Lenin's 
notion in the construction of the new social and political reality which emerges after 
1943. And moreover, to which extent did the historical development of Yugoslavia 
proceed in terms of the idea of the `withering away of the State' that is implied in this 
notion. In what concerns the historicity of Yugoslavia, this seems to be one of the most 
4" Badiou, Alain (2007) `Destruction, subtraction, negation: On Pier Paolo Pasolini', Lecture at Graduate 
Seminar, Art Centre College of Design, Pasadena, quoted from Lacanian ink: 
http: //www. lacan. com/badpas. htm. The crucial thing here is precisely the contradictory relationship 
between dictatorship and democracy: `dictatorship', in the formula of the DOP, is not the opposite of 
democracy (as it is also not a dictatorship of an individual or a party), rather, it is the subversive dialectic 
between the class politics of emancipation and legal-political forms of universality. Dictatorship of the 
proletariat is a 'dictatorship' in the sense in which the working classes and working masses, those who 
were the objects of capitalist domination and exploitation, and moreover those who were previously 
excluded from the mechanisms of power and political representation, gain control of the historical process 
and seize the state power so in order to reverse and annul the effects of domination and exploitation of 
capitalism. (Cf. Lenin (1970) The State and Revolution, Peking: Foreign Languages Press). 
49 Badiou (2007), op. cit. 
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productive ways to construct the dialectic of the subjective and the objective - the 
relationship between forms of struggle and political subjectivities, on the one hand, and 
the development of institutional realities upon these forms of struggles, on the other - 
without falling onto simplified historical models. 
6.6. Conclusion: beyond the post-socialist consensus 
If the aim of the previous two analyses which make the second part of this thesis 
was essentially critical in nature, the confrontation with the post-socialist political 
rationality in this chapter also carried an inherent positive, affirmative dimension. 
Besides striving to expose the inherent contradictions of the post-socialist political 
rationality in its juridicist guise - via the example of Dindic -I have also tried to offer 
an alternative philosophical reading of Yugoslavia's history and historicity. In contrast 
to the conception which tries to find the essence of politics in Law, which tries to 
subordinate political subjectivity to pre-given rules and regulations of legal-political 
normativity - which, in the last instance, always presumes the normativity of the liberal- 
democratic State -I tried to demonstrate that the moment of the AVNOJ exhibits a 
radically different type of politics, a politics which does not exhaust itself in the 
foundation of the State or the foundation of the Law, which does not cancel itself out in 
the establishment of the pouvoir constitue, but is to be seized in terms of its singular 
rationality and its specific ruptural effects, which are at the same time both effects of 
social and political emancipation and effects of the transformation of political forms 
themselves. This is the way in which I wanted to show the pertinence of the 
Althusserian, and more generally, of the Marxian theoretical inventory for a critical 
confrontation with the post-socialist situation. But at the same time, this is also the way 
in which I wanted to sketch the elementary contours of a political subjectivity which is 
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born outside of the post-socialist political consensus. Connecting the past to the present, 
the historical case of the AVNOJ shows us the possibilities of another form of political 
subjectivity, of another practice of politics, as Balibar would call, 50 irreducible to the 
`consensual', depoliticising logic of liberal-democracy and its juridical paradigm. It 
enables us to start thinking politics differently: in terms singular events in time which 
explode the coordinates of the given, in terms of radical breaks which reconfigure the 
logic of the given situation in such a way that they put forward the possibilities which 
seemed impossible from within the logic of that situation. 
5" See the chapter on the 'Rectification of the Communist Manifesto' in Balibar, Etienne (1974), Paris: 
Francois Maspero. 
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CONCLUSION: 
Even though the formal presentation of this thesis proceeds from a split in two 
parts - carrying, on the one side, the argumentation towards an exploration of the ways 
in which the problem of politics was theorised on the fault lines between Marxism and 
post-Marxism, whilst, on the other side, going into a more direct confrontation with the 
historical context of post-socialism and with what I name the post-socialist political 
reason - its substance was organised around the idea of the deep articulation and, in 
fact, the inseparability of the two parts. This idea can be best expressed through a 
paraphrase of Kant: a critique of post-socialism remains blind without a critique of post- 
Marxism, whilst a critique of post-Marxism remains empty without critique of post- 
socialism. In other words, a critical confrontation with the present, a critique of the 
practical implications of our current situation, has to proceed at once at two levels: both 
at the level of the scrutinisation of theoretical concepts aiming to produce a position 
beyond the actual theoretical and political impasses, and at the level of a concrete 
confrontation with historical, conjunctural realities of post-socialism, which not only 
provide the pretext for the development of these concepts, but at the same time place 
them under the real test of critical effectivity. 
If post-Marxism, as I argued, maintains an organic relationship with post- 
socialism, reproducing the political impasses and the illusions of the present at the level 
of theory, then a consequent theoretical critique of post-socialism has to in the first 
place be post-post-Marxist - which practically means revisiting the prodigious critical 
potential that Marxist theory generated in the epoch of capitalism. Against the idea that 
Marxism would become outdated and theoretically defunct with post-socialism, I 
insisted upon the opposite: that a critique of the post-socialist present, of the vexing 
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contradictions of this present, remains unthinkable and impossible without a 
revitalisation of Marxism. This is the manner in which I wanted to show how theory and 
history are inseparable, whilst bearing in mind Adorno's claim that: "Whatever wants 
nothing to do with the trajectory of history belongs all the more truly to it. History 
promises no salvation and offers the possibility of hope only to the concept whose 
movement follows history's path to the very extreme". ' 
Herein lies the rationale for the entire attempt, which makes the first part of the 
thesis, to rethink the relationship between Althusser and Gramsci in Marxist theory, and 
at the limits of Marxism. My main aim in this regard was to offer a new reading of the 
development of the key theoretical concepts of politics at work in these two thinkers, 
whilst arguing how the proper resolution of the contradictory trajectory which unites 
Gramsci and Althusser around the question of the `superstructures', instead of leading 
straight to the post-Marxist celebration of the `death of Marx', rather points towards the 
real possibilities of a revalorisation and reinvigoration the Marxian critical apparatus. 
If the post-Marxist theoretical operation consisted in reading Gramsci back into 
Althusser, I argued precisely for the reverse, attempting to demonstrate how the entire 
attempt of the theoretical autonomisation and localisation of the political moment 
proper, originating from Gramsci's sketches of the space of hegemony at the distance 
both from the economic determination and from the institutional and ideological matrix 
of the State, instead of resolving the problem of Marxian politics, rather exhibits 
profound ambivalences and paradoxes. These paradoxes are exploded precisely with the 
post-Marxist propositions of Laclau and Mouffe, where the Gramscian problematic 
becomes a fully-fledged notion of the `autonomy of the political', and where politics, 
separated from its critical link with the structural inequalities of capitalism, gets 
effectively subsumed under the terrain of the liberal-democratic State. This is where 
1 Adorno, T. (1998) Critical models, New York: University of Columbia Press, pg. 17. 
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Laclau and Mouffe's `post-Marxism' presents itself as an eminently anti-Marxist 
theoretical and political move, and thus also, as a veritable symptom of the post- 
socialist political ideology, inasmuch as both tend to annul and deny the Marxian 
critical short circuit which connects the sphere of juridico-political universality to 
capitalist exploitation. 
Against these positions, I claimed that in order to find a viable solution to the 
problem of Marxist politics it is necessary to return to Althusser. And, in particular, to 
three moments from the Althusserian theoretical apparatus: a) his reformulation of the 
problem of the State, which involves a powerful dialectic between two forms of 
materiality: the materiality of ideology and the materiality of the violence of class 
struggle, b) his conception of philosophy as a practice of intervention and demarcation - 
which is an answer to Marx's injunction to `change the world' which does not collapse 
theory into ideology pure and simple; and c) his theorisation of politics outside of the 
space of the State and the Law, but also outside of the Gramscian `civil society' and 
other topographical considerations, in the register of singularity and eventuality. This 
last motif seems, in my view, to resolve the problem of the autonomy of politics without 
sacrificing the radicality of the horizon of the break, without which a revolutionary 
conception of emancipation remains unthinkable. 
In the second part of the thesis, I brought some of these discussions more closely 
towards history and the historical contradictions of post-socialism. My main aim here 
was to unravel the specific ideological operations inherent to the political rationality 
which is established after 1989, and do so in a double sense: in the first place, to 
demonstrate, beyond the `consensual' and universalistic facade of post-socialist politics, 
its inherent contradictions and its limits; secondly, to delineate the precise ways in 
which the post-socialist political reason, through violent `revisionist' moves, seeks to 
cancel out and `pacify' revolutionary thought and practice. This is the backdrop to the 
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three concrete analyses of the post-socialist situation: a) the analyses of the contiguity, 
in the concrete case of the `Slovenian Spring', between the theory of Laclau and Mouffe 
and the post-socialist political concept of `civil society', b) the analysis of the 
relationship between liberal-democracy and nationalism, in terms of the paradoxical 
conjunction of the processes of `democratisation' in Yugoslavia with nationalist 
violence, c) the analysis of the ideological effects of the post-socialist juridification' of 
politics, especially in terms of the history of the revolutionary project of Yugoslavia. 
But besides these negative, critical moments, the purpose of this confrontation 
with history was also affirmative: it consisted of the exemplification of the relevance 
and actuality of the Marxist theoretical apparatus today, especially in what concerns the 
effective possibilities of a political orientation beyond the post-socialist political reason. 
If Althusser's ideas on the complex materiality of the State, on the practicality of 
philosophy, and on the radical heterogeneity of revolutionary political practice, seem as 
compelling theoretical solutions to problems in Marxist theory, then we should also see 
them as powerful practical formulas: inasmuch as they drive us to think beyond the 
consensual logic of post-socialism, inasmuch as they practice Adorno's `categorical 
imperative' for philosophy - to be able to measure up to one's times, to produce a 
critical antithesis to historical actuality. 
By way of closing, I should point out that the relationship between theory and 
history, between Marxism, post-Marxism and post-socialism, that I sought to establish 
here certainly did not want to put final words on things, but rather to exemplify vantage 
points for a critical confrontation with the present. This means that it is necessary to 
develop the analysis further, to deepen and expand a number of moments touched upon 
here, but also to take other directions, some of which were only hinted at here. Thus, for 
example, it seems very relevant to me to follow the steps of those approaches which 
seek to think the precise points of contact between the post-socialist political forms and 
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the economic realities and structures underlying these forms, to think the actual, 
empirical and historical shapes of the relation between the liberal-democratic State and 
the forms of capitalist exploitation which are being introduced into the post-socialist 
real M. 2 This is the way to further strengthen and to expand the power of the Marxian 
short circuit which was crucial for this work. 3 
Other analytical trajectories can be sought in the expansion of the discussion of 
the Marxist theoretical concepts of politics towards the broader philosophical 
conjuncture in which the limits of Marxist theory are played out today. If my focus here 
was mainly on the post-Marxism of Laclau and Mouffe, and on different trajectories of 
Gramscianism - precisely due to the ideological baggage that these theoretical 
approaches carry vis-ä-vis the post-socialist assertion of the `death of Marx' - these 
points of contact and confrontation are by no means the only ones which are important. 
For example, it is interesting to explore the relationship between Marxism and the 
approaches of Badiou and Ranciere, especially in the light of their indebtedness to the 
philosophy of Althusser, but also, more generally, in the light of their own attempts at 
producing a critical position in theory, not after Marx, but after the `end of the truth of 
2 See, for example, MoMik's attempts to articulate the socio-economic analysis of the transformations in 
the global economic structures together with an analysis of forms of post-socialis politics, in: MoLnik, 
Rastko (2006) Svetovno gospodarstvo in revolucionarna politika (Global econamy and revolutionary 
politics), Ljubljana: Zaloiba *cf. 
3 One possible objection to the analyses presented here would seek to find a contradiction between the 
argumentation on the necessary bond between the State and class struggle, on the one hand, and the 
absence of a `concrete' class analysis - in the sense of an analysis of economic dynamics, and the 
empirical examples of the struggle between social classes - on the other hand. I can best answer to this by 
quoting Althusser: "the State and its Apparatuses only have meaning from the point of view of the class 
struggle, as an apparatus of class struggle ensuring class oppression and guaranteeing the conditions of 
exploitation and its reproduction". (ISA, pg. 171) This means that even if in my analyses I place the focus 
solely on the general, `abstract' dimensions of political forms - on their inherent contradictions -I 
consider them `abstract' without the awareness that their backdrop is precisely the relationship between a 
political logic - the post-socialist rationality - and a profound economic logic which corresponds to 
it: the 
expansion of the capitalist relations of production, and the introduction of new forms of economic 
exploitation within the post-socialist realm. Focusing solely on the political logic does not exclude the 
latter: it presupposes it. But at the same time, focusing on the political and ideological moment seems to 
me to be a necessary starting point: inasmuch as the socio-economic transformations inherent to the post- 
socialist reality feed precisely upon political and ideological forms which mask their destructive effects 
under the guise of universality. 
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the State', which has identified Marxist theory with a statist ideology. 4 At the same 
time, it seems productive to examine the relationship between Althusser and Foucault, 
another canonical figure in the theoretical anti-humanism which left a profound impact 
on the philosophical and political scene of the 1960s and 1970s, but who also bears 
direct relevance to a number of contemporary discussions of emancipatory politics. ' 
4 'The end of the truth of the State' is the subtitle to Badiou's philosophico-political essay Of an Obscure 
Disaster, cited earlier. The subtitle seems to catch the gist of the political stakes from which both 
Badiou's and Rancic're's philosophical projects proceed, especially vis-ä-vis their relationship to 
Marxism. On the relationship between Badiou and Althusser, see, for example, Bruno Bosteels (2001) 
"Alain Badiou's Theory of the Subject: Part 1. The Recommencement of Dialectical Materialism'? ", in: 
What Is Materialism? Special issue of PL/: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, no. 12: pg. 200-229; and 
Bosteels (2002) "Alain Badiou's Theory of the Subject: The Recommencement of Dialectical 
Materialism? Part 11", in: Foucault: Madness/Sexuality/Biopolitics. Special issue of PLI: The Warwick 
Journal of Philosophy, no. 13: pg. 173-208. 
3 The key moment here is certainly the currency of Foucault's notion of biopolitics. For a study of the 
relationship between Foucault and Althusser, see, for example, Montag, Warren "The Soul is the Prison 
of the Body: Althusser and Foucault 1970-1975", Yale French Studies, 1995, No. 88, pg. 53-77. See also 
Negri (1996), op. cit. 
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